Kathryn E. Spier

Albert H. Choi & Kathryn E. Spier, Class Actions and Private Antitrust Litigation, 14 Am. Econ. J.: Microeconomics 131 (2022).

Albert H. Choi & Kathryn E. Spier, Liability for Non-Disclosure in Equity Financing (U. Mich. L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 22-007, 2022).

Xinyu Hua & Kathryn E. Spier, Holding Platforms Liable (HKUST Bus. Sch. Research Paper No. 2021-048, 2021).

Albert H. Choi & Kathryn E. Spier, The Economics of Class Action Waivers, 38 Yale J. on Reg. 543 (2021).

Kathryn E. Spier & J.J. Prescott, Contracting on Litigation, 50 RAND J. Econ. 391 (2019).

Albert H. Choi & Kathryn E. Spier, Taking a Financial Position in Your Opponent in Litigation, 108 Am. Econ. Rev. 3626 (2018).

Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, Ordered Leniency: An Experimental Study of Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting (NBER Working Paper No. w25094, Sept. 13, 2018).

Xinyu Hua & Kathryn E. Spier, Product Safety, Contracts, and Liability, 51 RAND J. Econ. 233 (2020).

Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency, 63 J.L. & Econ. 71 (2020).

James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn E. Spier, Bundling and Quality Assurance, 49 Rand J. Econ. 128 (2018).

Kathryn E. Spier, The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation, in The Economics of Evidence, Procedure, and Litigation v. 1 (Chris W. Sanchirico ed., 2007).

Kathryn E. Spier, Defense Procurement: Politics, Management, and Incentives: Discussion, in Incentives in Procurement Contracting 22 (James Leitzel & Jean Tirole eds., 1993).

Kathryn E. Spier & David E. Weinstein, Retaliatory Mechanisms for Eliminating Trade Barriers: Aggressive Unilateralism vs. GATT Cooperation, in Imperfect Competition in International Trade 231…

Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards, in The Economics of Evidence, Procedure, and Litigation v. 2 (Chris W. Sanchirico ed.,…

Kathryn E. Spier, Economics of Litigation, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).

Kathryn E. Spier, Product Safety, Buybacks and the Post-Sale Duty to Warn, in Economic Models of Law (Thomas J. Miceli & Mathew J. Baker eds.,…

J.J. Prescott, Kathryn E. Spier & Albert Yoon, 审判与和解：高低协议研究 [Trial and Settlement: A Study of High-Low Agreements], 80 比较: Comp. Stud. 154 (2015) (Yajie Xin,…

Kathryn Spier, Litigation, in The Handbook of Law and Economics 249 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven M. Shavell eds., 2007).

Kathryn E. Spier & Claudia Landeo, Shotguns and Deadlocks, 31 Yale J. on Reg. (2014).

Albert H. Choi & Kathryn E. Spier, Taking a Financial Position in Your Opponent in Litigation (Va. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 3, Nov.

Kathryn E. Spier & J.J. Prescott, Contracting on Litigation (Univ. Mich. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 16-009, Apr. 8, 2016).

James D. Dana & Kathryn E. Spier, Bundling and Quality Assurance (Northeastern Univ. D’Amore-McKim Sch. of Bus. Research Paper, Aug. 27, 2015).

Kathryn E. Spier & James D. Dana, Bundling and Firm Reputation (Harv. L. Sch. L. & Econ. Discussion Paper No. 649, Sept. 14, 2009).

Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, Stipulated Damages as a Rent-Extraction Mechanism: Experimental Evidence, 172 J. Inst. & Theoretical Econ. 235 (2016).

Enrico Perotti & Kathryn E. Spier, Capital Structure as a Bargaining Tool: The Role of Leverage in Contract Renegotiation, 83 Law & Econ. Rev. 1131…

Kathryn E. Spier, A Note on Joint and Several Liability: Insolvency, Settlement, and Incentives, 23 J. Legal Stud. 559 (1994).

Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, Irreconcilable Differences: Judicial Resolution of Business Deadlock, 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 203 (2014).

Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, Exclusive Dealing and Market Foreclosure: Further Experimental Results, 168 J. Inst. & Theoretical Econ. 150 (2012).

Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement with Multiple Plaintiffs: The Role of Insolvency, 18 J.L. Econ. & Org. 293 (2002).

Kathryn E. Spier, ‘Tied to the Mast’: Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Contracts, 32 J. Legal Stud. 91 (2003).

Kathryn E. Spier, Product Safety, Buybacks, and the Post-Sale Duty to Warn, 27 J.L. Econ. & Org. 515 (2011).

Kathryn E. Spier, The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation, 59 Rev. Econ. Stud. 93 (1992).

James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn E. Spier, Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation, 9 J.L. Econ. & Org.

Kathryn E. Spier & Michael D. Whinston, On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, and Renegotiation, 26 RAND…

J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier, A Comprehensive Theory of Civil Settlement, 91 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 59 (2016).

J.J. Prescott, Kathryn E. Spier & Albert Yoon, Trial and Settlement: A Study of High-Low Agreements, 57 J. L. & Econ. 699 (2014).

Kathryn E. Spier, A Note on the Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Settle Under a Negligence Rule, 26 J. Legal Stud.

David Dranove, Kathryn E. Spier & Laurence Baker, ‘Competition’ Among Employers Offering Health Insurance, 19 J. Health Econ. 121 (2000).

Kathryn E. Spier & Alan O. Sykes, Capital Structure, Priority Rules, and the Settlement of Civil Claims, 18 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 187 (1998).

James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn E. Spier, Do Tying, Bundling, and Other Purchase Restraints Increase Product Quality?, 43 Int’l J. Indus. Org. 142 (2015).

Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier, Strategic Judgment Proofing 39 Rand J. Econ. 926 (2008).

Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier, Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer, 164 J. Inst. & Theoretical Econ. 4 (2008).

Kathryn E. Spier, The Use of ‘Most-Favored-Nation’ Clauses in Settlement of Litigation, 34 RAND J. Econ. 78 (2003).

Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signaling, 23 RAND J. Econ. 432 (1992).

Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, Shotgun Mechanisms for Common-Value Partnerships: The Unassigned-Offeror Problem, 121 Econ. Letters 390 (2013).

Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards, 10 J.L. Econ. & Org. 84 (1994).

James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn Spier, Revenue Sharing and Vertical Control in the Video Rental Industry, 49 J. Indus. Econ. 223 (2001).