Corporate Governance

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel & Roberto Tallarita, Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID, 40 Yale J. Regul. (forthcoming 2023).

Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Perils of Dell’s Low-Voting Stock (Nov. 1, 2018).

Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers, 107 Geo L.J. 1453 (2019).

Mark Roe, Holger Spamann, Jesse M. Fried & Charles C.Y. Wang, The Sustainable Corporate Governance Initiative in Europe, 38 Yale J. on Reg. Bull. 133…

Mark J. Roe, Holger Spamann, Jesse M. Fried & Charles C.Y. Wang, The European Commission’s Sustainable Corporate Governance Report: A Critique (Oct. 14, 2020).

Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Tackling the Managerial Power Problem, Pathways Mag., Summer 2010, at 9.

Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, in The Economic Nature of the Firm 327 (Louis Putterman & Randall S. Kroszner…

Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 2029 (2019).

Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation (Harvard Univ. Press 2004).

Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. Econ. Persp. 71 (2003).

Lucian Bebchuk et al., “Director Liability”, 31 Del. J. Corp. L. 1011 (2006).

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel & Roberto Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain, 94 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1467 (2021).

Duarte Brito, Einer Elhauge, Ricardo M. Ribeiro & Helder Vasconcelos, Modeling the Objective Function of Managers in the Presence of Overlapping Shareholding (2022).

Holger Spamann & Jacob Fisher, Corporate Purpose: Theoretical and Empirical Foundations/Confusions (Harvard Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper…

Considering the Index Fund Voting Process: Hearing Before the S. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 117th Cong. (2022) (testimony of John C. Coates…

Lucian A. Bebchuk (with Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Thomas Keusch), Dancing with Activists, 137 J. Fin. Econ. 1 (2020).

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1085 (2015).

Caley Petrucci & Guhan Subramanian, Pills in a World of Activism and ESG, 1 U. Chi. Bus. L. Rev. 417 (2022).

Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Big Three Power, and Why it Matters, 102 Boston U. L. Rev. 1547 (2022).

Carlos Portugal Gouvêa & Caio Henrique Yoshikawa, O Perfil do Advogado Empresarial Contemporâneo: Entre o Arquiteto Institucional e o Empreendedor Jurídico [The Profile of the…

Carlos Portugal Gouvêa, The Managerial Constitution: The Convergence of Constitutional and Corporate Governance Models (July 2, 2013).

Jared A. Ellias, The Law and Economics of Investing in Bankruptcy in the United States (2020).

Jared A. Ellias & Robert J. Stark, Bankruptcy Hardball, 108 Cal. L. Rev. 745 (2020).

Kenneth Ayotte & Jared A. Ellias, Bankruptcy Process for Sale, 39 Yale J. Reg. 1 (2022).

Alex Dimitrief, Employee Reporting is Best Line of Defense Against Corporate Misconduct, Bloomberg Law Insight (Aug. 8, 2019, 4:01 AM).

Nikolas Bowie, Corporate Personhood v. Corporate Statehood, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 2009 (2019) (reviewing Adam Winkler, We the Corporations: How American Businesses Won Their Civil…

Sharon Block, Op-Ed, We Can’t Stop Sexual Harassment Until We Restructure Corporate Boards, Quartz (Nov. 7, 2017).

Enron and Other Corporate Fiascos: The Corporate Scandal Reader (Nancy Rapoport, Jeffrey Van Niel & Bala Dharan, eds., Foundation Press 2009).

A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Employees be Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given Existence of Corporate Liability?, 13 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ.

Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Capital Market Efficiency, 28 J. Corp. L. 565 (2003).

Robert H. Sitkoff & Jonathan Klick, Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and Corporate Control: Evidence from Hershey’s Kiss-Off, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 749 (2008).

William J. Carney, Jack B. Jacobs, Richard Painter, Robert Pritzker & Robert H. Sitkoff, Roundtable Discussion: Corporate Governance, 77 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 235 (2001)(Symposium: Theory…

Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Incomplete Organizations: Legal Entities and Asset Partitioning in Roman Commerce, in Roman Law and Economics: Institutions and Organizations,…

Karl Hofstetter, Eugene F. Soltes & Reinier H. Kraakman, Compliance, Compensation and Corporate Wrongdoing(Program for the Comp. Study of L. & Corp. Governance, May 1,…

William T. Allen, Reinier Kraakman & Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization (Wolters Kluwer 6th ed. 2021).

John Armour, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Basic Governance Structure: The Interests of Shareholders as a Class, in Reinier Kraakman, John Armour,…

Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Reflections on the End of History for Corporate Law, in Convergence of Corporate Governance: Promise and Prospects 32 (Abdul Rasheed…

Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Takeovers in the Boardroom: Burke Versus Schumpeter, 60 Bus. Law. 1419 (2005).

Assaf Hamdani & Reinier Kraakman, Rewarding Outside Directors, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1677 (2007).

Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 Geo. L.J. 439 (2001).

Henry Hansmann & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Uneasy Case for Limiting Shareholder Liability in Tort, 100 Yale L.J. 1879 (1991).

Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863 (1991).

Reinier H. Kraakman & Henry Hansmann, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 Yale L.J. 387 (2000).

Reinier Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd ed. Mar. 2017).

Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 Yale L.J. 857 (1984).

Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549 (1984).

Reinier H. Kraakman & Bernard Black, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1911 (1996).