Child Categories
Torts
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Law and Economics
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, Law and Economics, in 12 International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences 8446 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001).
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Law: Economics of its Public Enforcement
December 4, 2024
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Law: Economics of its Public Enforcement, in 12 International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences 8510 (Neil J.
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The Mistaken Restriction of Strict Liability to Uncommon Activities
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, The Mistaken Restriction of Strict Liability to Uncommon Activities, J. Legal Analysis (Feb. 8, 2019).
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Subrogation and the Theory of Insurance When Suits Can Be Brought for Losses Suffered
December 4, 2024
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Subrogation and the Theory of Insurance When Suits Can Be Brought for Losses Suffered (Stanford Law & Econ. Olin…
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Corrective Taxation versus Liability as a Solution to the Problem of Harmful Externalities
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, Corrective Taxation versus Liability as a Solution to the Problem of Harmful Externalities, 54 J.L. & Econ. S249 (2011).
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Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis
December 4, 2024
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869 (1998).
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Economic Analysis of the General Structure of the Law
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of the General Structure of the Law (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Res. Working Paper No. w9699, Harv. L. & Econ. Discussion Paper…
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Minimum Asset Requirements
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, Minimum Asset Requirements (Harv. L. Sch. L. & Econ. Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 389, Nov. 2002).
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Liability and the Incentive to Obtain Information about Risk
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, Liability and the Incentive to Obtain Information about Risk, 21 J. Legal Stud. 259 (1992).
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A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Liability Be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?, 10 J.L. Econ.
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Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law
December 4, 2024
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law, 5 J.L. Econ. & Org. 99 (1989).
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Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks
December 4, 2024
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks, 28 J.L. Econ. & Org. 360 (2012).
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On Liability and Insurance
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 Bell J. Econ. 120 (1982).
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The Optimal Level of Corporate Liability Given the Limited Ability of Corporations to Penalize Their Employees
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, The Optimal Level of Corporate Liability Given the Limited Ability of Corporations to Penalize Their Employees, 17 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 203…
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The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. Legal Stud. 575 (1997).
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Uncertainty Over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability
December 4, 2024
Stevem Shavell, Uncertainty Over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability, 28 J.L. & Econ. 587 (1985).
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Legal Advice About Contemplated Acts: The Decision to Obtain Advice, Its Social Desirability, and Protection of Confidentiality
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Contemplated Acts: The Decision to Obtain Advice, Its Social Desirability, and Protection of Confidentiality, 17 J. Legal Stud. 123 (1988).
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Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 357 (1984).
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Public Enforcement of Law
December 4, 2024
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven M. Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume…
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On the Social Function and the Regulation of Liability Insurance
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, On the Social Function and the Regulation of Liability Insurance, 25 Geneva Papers on Risk & Ins. 166 (2000).
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Do Excessive Legal Standards Discourage Desirable Activity?
December 4, 2024
Steven M. Shavell, Do Excessive Legal Standards Discourage Desirable Activity?, 95 Econ. Letters 394 (2007).