Economics

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control, 109 Q.J. Econ. 957 (1994).

Lucian A. Bebchuk, & I.P.L. Png, Damage Measures for Inadvertent Breach of Contract, 19 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 319 (1999).

Lucian A. Bebchuk & Christine M. Jolls, Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 487 (1999).

Lucian A. Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorganization, 8 J.L. Econ. & Org. 253 (1992).

Lucian A. Bebchuk & Itay Goldstein, Self-fulfilling Credit Market Freezes, 24 Rev. Fin. Stud. 3519 (2011).

Oren Bar-Gill, Michal Barzuza & Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Market for Corporate Law, 162 J. Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 134 (2006).

Louis Kaplow, Competition Policy in a Simple General Equilibrium Model, 1 J. Pol. Econ. Microeconomics 80 (2023).

Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law, in 3 Handbook of Public Economics 1661 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002).

Louis Kaplow, Market Power and Income Taxation (Harv. L. Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. Discussion Paper No. 994, NBER Working Paper No. w25578, Mar. 6,…

Louis Kaplow, Market Definition, in 1 The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics 345 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2014).

Louis Kaplow, An Ex Ante Perspective on Deregulation, Viewed Ex Post, 15 Resource & Energy Econ. 153 (1993).

Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 509 (1986).

Louis Kaplow, Taxation and Risk Taking: A General Equilibrium Perspective, 47 Nat’l Tax J. 789 (1994).

Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 515 (1985).

Louis Kaplow, Incentive and Government Relief for Risk, 4 J. Risk & Uncertainty 167 (1991).

Louis Kaplow, Optimal Policy with Heterogeneous Preferences, 8 B.E. J. Econ. Analysis & Pol’y art. 40 (2008).

Enrico Perotti & Kathryn E. Spier, Capital Structure as a Bargaining Tool: The Role of Leverage in Contract Renegotiation, 83 Law & Econ. Rev. 1131…

Kathryn E. Spier & Michael D. Whinston, On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, and Renegotiation, 26 RAND…

James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn Spier, Revenue Sharing and Vertical Control in the Video Rental Industry, 49 J. Indus. Econ. 223 (2001).

James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn E. Spier, Designing a Private Industry: Government Auctions with Endogenous Market Structure, 53 J. Pub. Econ. 127 (1994).

James D. Dana & Kathryn E. Spier, Entry Deterrence in a Duopoly Market, 7 B. E. J. of Econ. Analysis & Pol’y. 1 (2007).