Parent Categories
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
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Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law
January 25, 2024
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law, 5 J.L. Econ. & Org. 99 (1989).
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Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines
January 25, 2024
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines, 35 J.L. & Econ. 133 (1992).
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A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies Among Individuals
January 25, 2024
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies Among Individuals, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 618 (1991).
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A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Liability Be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?, 10 J.L. Econ.
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On Offense History and the Theory of Deterrence
January 25, 2024
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On Offense History and the Theory of Deterrence, 18 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 305 (1998).
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The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time
January 25, 2024
Steven Shavell & Laurence Weiss, The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time, 87 J. Pol. Econ. 1347 (1979).
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A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1999).
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Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks
January 25, 2024
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks, 28 J.L. Econ. & Org. 360 (2012).
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The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
January 25, 2024
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. Econ. Lit. 45 (2000).
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Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights
January 25, 2024
Steven M. Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & Econ. 525 (2001).
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Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement
January 25, 2024
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement, 81 J. Pub. Econ. 1 (2001).
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Risk Aversion and the Desirability of Attenuated Legal Change
January 25, 2024
Steven Shavell, Risk Aversion and the Desirability of Attenuated Legal Change, 16 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 366 (2014).
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The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines
January 25, 2024
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 Am. Econ. Rev. 880 (1979).
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The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment
January 25, 2024
A.Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, 24 J. Pub. Econ. 89 (1984).
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A Skeptical Attitude About Product Liability Is Justified: A Reply to Professors Goldberg and Zipursky
January 25, 2024
A. Mitchell Polinksky & Steven Shavell, A Skeptical Attitude About Product Liability Is Justified: A Reply to Professors Goldberg and Zipursky, 123 Harv. L. Rev.
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Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs
January 25, 2024
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs, 19 J. Pub. Econ. 385 (1982).
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A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Contribution and Claim Reduction Among Antitrust Defendants: An Economic Analysis, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 447 (1981).
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The Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent
January 25, 2024
Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 77 Am. Econ. Rev. 584 (1987).
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On Liability and Insurance
January 25, 2024
Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 Bell J. Econ. 120 (1982).
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Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. Legal Stud. 333 (1982).
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The Optimal Level of Corporate Liability Given the Limited Ability of Corporations to Penalize Their Employees
January 25, 2024
Steven Shavell, The Optimal Level of Corporate Liability Given the Limited Ability of Corporations to Penalize Their Employees, 17 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 203…