Parent Categories
Civil Practice & Procedure
-
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Contribution and Claim Reduction Among Antitrust Defendants: An Economic Analysis, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 447 (1981).
-
The Optimal Level of Corporate Liability Given the Limited Ability of Corporations to Penalize Their Employees
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, The Optimal Level of Corporate Liability Given the Limited Ability of Corporations to Penalize Their Employees, 17 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 203…
-
Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. Legal Stud. 333 (1982).
-
The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. Legal Stud. 575 (1997).
-
Uncertainty Over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability
December 4, 2024
Stevem Shavell, Uncertainty Over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability, 28 J.L. & Econ. 587 (1985).
-
The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. Legal Stud. 379 (1995).
-
Suit versus Settlement When Parties Seek Nonmonetary Judgments
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, Suit versus Settlement When Parties Seek Nonmonetary Judgments, 22 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1993).
-
A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 15 Rand J. Econ. 271 (1984).
-
Legal Advice About Contemplated Acts: The Decision to Obtain Advice, Its Social Desirability, and Protection of Confidentiality
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Contemplated Acts: The Decision to Obtain Advice, Its Social Desirability, and Protection of Confidentiality, 17 J. Legal Stud. 123 (1988).
-
Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. Legal Stud. 55 (1982).
-
The Appeals Process and Adjudicator Incentives
December 4, 2024
Steven M. Shavell, The Appeals Process and Adjudicator Incentives, 35 J. Legal Stud. 1 (2006).
-
Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1995).
-
Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 357 (1984).
-
Optimal Discretion in the Application of Rules
December 4, 2024
Steven M. Shavell, Optimal Discretion in the Application of Rules, 9 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 175 (2007).
-
The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
December 4, 2024
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, in 1 Handbook of Law and Economics 403 (A. Mitchell Polinsky &…
-
Public Enforcement of Law
December 4, 2024
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven M. Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume…
-
Costly Litigation and Optimal Damages
December 4, 2024
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Costly Litigation and Optimal Damages, 37 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 86 (2014).
-
On the Social Function and the Regulation of Liability Insurance
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, On the Social Function and the Regulation of Liability Insurance, 25 Geneva Papers on Risk & Ins. 166 (2000).
-
Steven Shavell, A Fundamental Enforcement Cost Advantage of the Negligence Rule over Regulation, 42 J. Legal Stud. 275 (2013).
-
Do Excessive Legal Standards Discourage Desirable Activity?
December 4, 2024
Steven M. Shavell, Do Excessive Legal Standards Discourage Desirable Activity?, 95 Econ. Letters 394 (2007).
-
The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement, 36 J.L. Econ. 255 (1993).