Sentencing & Punishment

Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of the General Structure of the Law (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Res. Working Paper No. w9699, Harv. L. & Econ. Discussion Paper…

Steven Shavell, Deterrence and the Punishment of Attempts, 19 J. Legal Stud. 435 (1990).

A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1999).

A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. Econ. Lit. 45 (2000).

A.Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, 24 J. Pub. Econ. 89 (1984).

Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1232 (1985).

A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, in 1 Handbook of Law and Economics 403 (A. Mitchell Polinsky &…

A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven M. Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume…

Steven Shavell, A Simple Model of Optimal Deterrence and Incapacitation, 42 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 13 (2015).

Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Trends in the Administration of Criminal Justice, in America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their Consequences, vol. II (Neil J. Smelser, William…

Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 48 (2000).

Steven Shavell & Louis Kaplow, Principles of Fairness Versus Human Welfare: On the Evaluation of Legal Policy (Harv. L. Sch. L. & Econ. Res. Paper…

Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of Fines for Acts that Definitely are Undesirable, 12 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 3 (1992).

Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of Liability, 37 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1994).

Louis Kaplow, Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed Individuals, and Acquiring Information About Whether Acts are Subject to Sanctions, 6 J.L. Econ. & Org. 93 (1990).

Louis Kaplow, A Note on the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions, 42 J. Pub. Econ. 245 (1990).

Lucian A. Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions When Individuals are Imperfectly Informed about the Probability of Apprehension, 21 J. Legal Stud. 365 (1992).

J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why is the Japanese Conviction Rate so High?, 30 J. Legal Stud. 53 (2001).

Holger Spamann et al., Judges in the Lab: No Precedent Effects, No Common/Civil Law Differences, 13 J. Legal Analysis 110 (2021).

Holger Spamann, The US Crime Puzzle: A Comparative Perspective on US Crime & Punishment, 18 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 33 (2016) (the replication code…

Victoria Angelova, Will Dobbie & Crystal S. Yang, Algorithmic Recommendations When the Stakes Are High: Evidence from Judicial Elections, 114 Am. Econ. Ass’n Papers &…