Insurance Law

Steven Shavell, Risk Aversion and the Desirability of Attenuated Legal Change, 16 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 366 (2014).

Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 Bell J. Econ. 120 (1982).

Steven Shavell, A General Rationale for a Governmental Role in the Relief of Large Risks, 49 J. Risk & Uncertainty 213 (2014).

Steven Shavell, On the Social Function and the Regulation of Liability Insurance, 25 Geneva Papers on Risk & Ins. 166 (2000).

Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q. J. Econ. 541 (1979).

Robert C. Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1416 (1980).

Robert C. Clark, The Regulation of Financial Holding Companies, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 789 (1979).

Louis Kaplow, Government Relief for Risk Associated with Government Action, 94 Scandinavian J. Econ. 525 (1992).

Louis Kaplow, Incentive and Government Relief for Risk, 4 J. Risk & Uncertainty 167 (1991).

J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. Legal Stud. 263 (1989).

Howell E. Jackson & Talia B. Gillis, Fiduciary Duties in Financial Regulation (Harv. Pub. L. Working Paper No. 18-24, Apr. 17, 2018).

David Rosenberg & Kenneth Reinker, Improve Medical Malpractice Law by Letting Health Care Insurers Take Charge, 39 J.L. Med. & Ethics 3 (2011).

David Rosenberg & Kenneth S. Reinker, Unlimited Subrogation: Improving Medical Malpractice Liability by Allowing Insurers in Charge, 36 J. Legal Stud. 261 (2007).

Ronen Avraham, Alma Cohen & Ity Shurtz, Judging Insurance Antidiscrimination Law, in Selection and Decision in Judicial Process around the World: Empirical Inquires 223 (Yun-chien…

Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets, 77 J. Risk & Ins. 39 (2010).

Alma Cohen, Asymmetric Information and Learning: Evidence from the Automobile Insurance Market, 87 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 197 (2005).

Alma Cohen, Asymmetric Learning in Repeated Contracting: An Empirical Study, 94 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 419 (2012).

Louis Kaplow, Optimal Insurance Contracts When Establishing the Amount of Losses is Costly, 19 Geneva Papers on Risk & Insurance Theory 139 (1994).