Parent Categories
Banking & Finance
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Why (Ever) Define Markets?
January 25, 2024
Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 437 (2010).
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Government Relief for Risk Associated with Government Action
January 25, 2024
Louis Kaplow, Government Relief for Risk Associated with Government Action, 94 Scandinavian J. Econ. 525 (1992).
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Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage
January 25, 2024
Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 515 (1985).
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Market Definition, Market Power
January 25, 2024
Louis Kaplow, Market Definition, Market Power, 43 Int’l J. Indus. Org. 148 (2015).
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Incentive and Government Relief for Risk
January 25, 2024
Louis Kaplow, Incentive and Government Relief for Risk, 4 J. Risk & Uncertainty 167 (1991).
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Optimal Policy with Heterogeneous Preferences
January 25, 2024
Louis Kaplow, Optimal Policy with Heterogeneous Preferences, 8 B.E. J. Econ. Analysis & Pol’y art. 40 (2008).
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Louis Kaplow, Optimal Insurance Contracts When Establishing the Amount of Losses is Costly, 19 Geneva Papers on Risk & Insurance Theory 139 (1994).
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Kathryn E. Spier, Defense Procurement: Politics, Management, and Incentives: Discussion, in Incentives in Procurement Contracting 22 (James Leitzel & Jean Tirole eds., 1993).
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Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, Stipulated Damages as a Rent-Extraction Mechanism: Experimental Evidence, 172 J. Inst. & Theoretical Econ. 235 (2016).
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Capital Structure as a Bargaining Tool: The Role of Leverage in Contract Renegotiation
January 25, 2024
Enrico Perotti & Kathryn E. Spier, Capital Structure as a Bargaining Tool: The Role of Leverage in Contract Renegotiation, 83 Law & Econ. Rev. 1131…
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Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, Exclusive Dealing and Market Foreclosure: Further Experimental Results, 168 J. Inst. & Theoretical Econ. 150 (2012).
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On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, and Renegotiation
January 25, 2024
Kathryn E. Spier & Michael D. Whinston, On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, and Renegotiation, 26 RAND…
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Strategic Judgment Proofing
January 25, 2024
Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier, Strategic Judgment Proofing 39 Rand J. Econ. 926 (2008).
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Incomplete Contracts and Signaling
January 25, 2024
Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signaling, 23 RAND J. Econ. 432 (1992).
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Revenue Sharing and Vertical Control in the Video Rental Industry
January 25, 2024
James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn Spier, Revenue Sharing and Vertical Control in the Video Rental Industry, 49 J. Indus. Econ. 223 (2001).
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Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities, 99 Am. Econ. Rev. 1850 (2009).
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James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn E. Spier, Designing a Private Industry: Government Auctions with Endogenous Market Structure, 53 J. Pub. Econ. 127 (1994).
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Entry Deterrence in a Duopoly Market
January 25, 2024
James D. Dana & Kathryn E. Spier, Entry Deterrence in a Duopoly Market, 7 B. E. J. of Econ. Analysis & Pol’y. 1 (2007).
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Joseph W. Singer, Property Law and the Mortgage Crisis: Libertarian Fantasies and Subprime Realities, 1 Prop. L. Rev. 7 (2011).
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Corporate Responsibility in a Free and Democratic Society
January 25, 2024
Joseph W. Singer, Corporate Responsibility in a Free and Democratic Society, 58 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1031 (2008).
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Foreclosure and the Failures of Formality, or Subprime Mortgage Conundrums and How to Fix Them
January 25, 2024
Joseph W. Singer, Foreclosure and the Failures of Formality, or Subprime Mortgage Conundrums and How to Fix Them, 46 Conn. L. Rev. 497 (2013).