Faculty Bibliography

In 2018, Ukraine established a High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC). Ukrainian civil society groups, with the crucial support of the international community, pushed for this specialised court as a way to address the ineffectiveness of Ukraine’s regular courts in addressing high-level corruption. The HACC’s most distinctive institutional feature is the role of international experts in the judicial selection process, intended to safeguard against the capture of the HACC by corrupt elites.

The relationship between votes and seats in the legislature lies at the heart of democratic governance. However, there has been little previous work on the downstream effects of partisan gerrymandering on the health of political parties. In this study, we conduct a comprehensive examination of the impact of partisan advantage in the districting process on an array of downstream outcomes. We find that districting bias impedes numerous party functions at both the congressional and state house levels. Candidates are less likely to contest districts when their party is disadvantaged by a districting plan. Candidates that do choose to run are more likely to have weak resumes. Donors are less willing to contribute money. And ordinary voters are less apt to support the targeted party. These results suggest that gerrymandering has long-term effects on the health of the democratic process beyond simply costing or gaining parties seats in the legislature.

In cities across the country, artists, protestors, and businesses are using light projections to turn any building’s façade into a billboard, often without the owner’s consent. Examples are legion: “Believe Women” on a New York City Best Buy; a scantily clad male model on the side of an apartment building; a nativity scene on the Los Angeles chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union. Two courts have considered claims by owners seeking to stop these projections under theories of trespass and nuisance. In each case, the courts held that because light is intangible and the projections result in no economic harm to the property, the common law affords no relief. This Article argues that property law can and should address projection claims by private owners. It traces the history of property tort claims involving light, explaining how the law developed to emphasize economic and physical harm and identifying the forgotten strands of doctrine that nonetheless support liability for targeted projections. Projections are forms of appropriation: they disrupt the owner’s use and control, but they also cause dignity and privacy harms by exploiting the owner’s realty toward unwanted ends. Protections for these noneconomic interests have long been parasitic on trespass and nuisance, but the light projections expose a gap between the two forms of action. This Article offers a pathway to mend the gap despite hurdles in both nuisance and First Amendment law. More generally, the projection cases teach broader lessons about the development of the property torts, the relationship between privacy and property, and the nature of property itself.

Tort law is badly misunderstood. In the popular imagination, it is “Robin Hood” law. Law professors, meanwhile, mostly dismiss it as an archaic, inefficient way to compensate victims and incentivize safety precautions. In Recognizing Wrongs, John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky explain the distinctive and important role that tort law plays in our legal system: it defines injurious wrongs and provides victims with the power to respond to those wrongs civilly. Tort law rests on a basic and powerful ideal: a person who has been mistreated by another in a manner that the law forbids is entitled to an avenue of civil recourse against the wrongdoer. Through tort law, government fulfills its political obligation to provide this law of wrongs and redress. In Recognizing Wrongs, Goldberg and Zipursky systematically explain how their “civil recourse” conception makes sense of tort doctrine and captures the ways in which the law of torts contributes to the maintenance of a just polity. Recognizing Wrongs aims to unseat both the leading philosophical theory of tort law—corrective justice theory—and the approaches favored by the law-and-economics movement. It also sheds new light on central figures of American jurisprudence, including former Supreme Court Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and Benjamin Cardozo. In the process, it addresses hotly contested contemporary issues in the law of damages, defamation, malpractice, mass torts, and products liability.

A former member of the UN Human Rights Committee, Harvard’s Gerald Neuman, analyzes its draft document on peaceful assembly, in this third of a series.

During the Second World War, fraudulent recruiters sometimes promised young Korean women factory jobs but sent them instead to war-zone brothels called "comfort stations." Western historians take it on faith that the Japanese military forced Korean women into brothels as well. Unfortunately, in doing this they do not just ignore the role that politics (Korean, Japanese, and Western academic) have played in the dispute. They also ignore the contracts that the rest of the -- not defrauded -- young women actually concluded. In the article that follows, I examine the employee-level contracts in the market for sexual services within the Japanese empire. The contracts reflect the straightforward logic of "credible commitments" so basic to elementary game theory. Realizing that the brothel owners had an incentive to exaggerate their future earnings, the women demanded a large portion of their pay upfront. Realizing that they were headed to the war zone, they demanded a relatively short maximum term. And realizing that the women had an incentive to shirk, the brothels demanded provisions that gave women incentives to work hard. Ultimately, the women and brothels concluded identure contracts that coupled a large advance with one or two year maximum terms, and an ability for the women to return early if they generated sufficient revenue. Crucial to the current dispute, the Japanese military did not force -- or even recruit -- Korean women into prostitution. Instead, the brothels surrounding the bases began and remained as privately owned and operated enterprises. They employed contracts that reflected these game-theoretic principles of promissory credility. The women were poor, they were young, and they were born into the bad circumstances. But basic principles of market economics apply to poor young people too -- and we would do well to recognize how resourcefully the women used those principles to respond to their plight.

"Described as “superb” and “inspiring” by Dean Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Enforcement dives deeply into doctrines concerning the enforcement of civil rights (rather than the content of those rights) and the aspects of those doctrines of most importance to those litigating in the field. The book is organized as a litigator might think through a case, and it provides students rich, detailed hypothetical problems to which they can apply what they are learning. Alongside these practice-focused elements, the book’s notes, questions, and topic transitions push students to grapple both with (1) strategic questions about impact litigation and the role of civil rights litigation in constitutional enforcement, and (2) theoretical questions such as tradeoffs between the values of federalism and judicial review and the relationship between rights and remedies." -- Wolters Kluwer

This is a complete but unfinished draft of an article on the history of American family law. The first part describes four stages in the legal conceptualization of the family in the U.S. over the period from the late 18th century to ca. 1960. It is part of a larger intellectual history project depicting the stages of American legal consciousness as a whole. In this part, I treat the socio-economic background and the political struggles that shape and are shaped by consciousness as context for the story of conceptual change. In the second longer part of the piece, I present the interaction of political forces with legal consciousness (as evolved in Part One), along with social, economic and cultural change, in a single narrative of the historic transformation of American family law doctrine, ca. 1950-2015. This part defines family law broadly to include rules about marriage and parenthood along with social welfare law and the law of sex and reproduction, and includes their constitutionalization. It is in the tradition of political economy, starting with conflicting groups led by elites, understood not just as collections of individuals but as loose collectives with goals and strategies that are based on shared material and ideological interests. An important theme is the influence on legal change of tacit pro-sex and neo-puritan attitudes within the law making elites.

Japanese communities with nuclear reactors have them because they applied for them, and they applied for them for the money. Among Japanese municipalities, they were some of the most dysfunctional before the reactors had even arrived. These were the villages that had long fought for targeted subsidies, but ignored infrastructural investments. Subsidies operate as a regressive tax on out-migration, of course, and the lack of private-sector infrastructure reduces the returns to high-value human capital. As a result, these were the villages from which the most talented young people had probably begun to disappear—even before the reactors arrived. After the communities built the reactors, talented young people continued to leave. Unemployment rose. Divorce rates climbed. And in time, the communities had little other than reactor-revenue on which to rely.

This paper studies the design of enforcement policies to detect and deter harmful short-term activities committed by groups of injurers. With an ordered-leniency policy, the degree of leniency granted to an injurer who self-reports depends on his or her position in the self-reporting queue. By creating a "race to the courthouse," ordered-leniency policies lead to faster detection and stronger deterrence of illegal activities. The socially-optimal level of deterrence can be obtained at zero cost when the externalities associated with the harmful activities are not too high. Without leniency for self-reporting, the enforcement cost is strictly positive and there is underdeterrence of harmful activities relative to the first-best level. Hence, ordered-leniency policies are welfare improving. Our findings for environments with groups of injurers complement Kaplow and Shavell's (1994) results for single-injurer environments. Experimental evidence provides support for our theory.

Readings in Comparative Health Law and Bioethics examines how different countries around the world approach the same challenges in health care law and ethics: how to finance care for as many people as possible; how to ensure quality care; how to best secure patients' rights; how to regulate abortion, end of life decision-making, and assisted reproduction; and how to manage infectious diseases, tobacco use, and human subject research. The new edition considers a broader array of countries, particularly from Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East.

It is standard to think that corrective taxes, responding to externalities, are generally or always better than regulatory mandates, but in the face of behavioral market failures, that conclusion might not be right. Fuel economy and energy efficiency mandates are possible examples. Because such mandates might produce billions of dollars in annual consumer savings, they might have very high net benefits, complicating the choice between such mandates and externality-correcting taxes (such as carbon taxes). The net benefits of mandates that simultaneously reduce internalities and externalities might exceed the net benefits of taxes that reduce externalities alone, even if mandates turn out to be a highly inefficient way of reducing externalities. An important qualification is that corrective taxes might be designed to reduce both externalities and internalities, in which case they would almost certainly be preferable to a regulatory mandate.

When members of a minority group can monitor and constrain each other, they can leverage their internal social capital to financial gain. When they live within dense networks of personal contacts, they will more often have the information necessary to learn whether potential trade partners have kept their word and to punish those who have not. When members of a minority group lack that social capital, they not only lose these advantageous transactions but become vulnerable to their own self-appointed leaders as well. Lacking a network of close ties, they can neither monitor nor constrain others in the group. This vacuum creates an opening for opportunists to purport to act on their behalf (perhaps to obtain ethnic subsidies or other group preferences), but actually to divert rents to themselves--and incite hostility toward the group in the process. Arrovian statistical discrimination and selective out-migration follow. The opportunists raise the level of dysfunction within the group. Faced with an outside majority that treats minority members by the observed group mean, those minority members with the highest outside options will now leave and abandon the group to the opportunists. Any ethnic subsidies will offset the discrimination in part, of course. The higher the level of subsidies, the fewer the number of minority members who will find it advantageous to leave; the higher the level of subsidies, the slower the pace at which the dysfunctional minority will merge into the mainstream I illustrate these dynamics with examples from the burakumin outcastes in Japan, the Korean residents in Japan, and the Okinawans.

This article seeks to identify and discuss the impact of Nina Olson, in her role as National Taxpayer Advocate (NTA), on low-income taxpayer clinics (LITCs). The article discusses the background of Ms. Olson including her advocacy that led to grant funding for LITCs and the background of LITCs before she began administering the grant funds as NTA. The accomplishments of Ms. Olson with respect to LITCs are discussed in six separate topic areas: Changes to Clinic Structure; Pushing for Actions and Resources That Aided Clinics; Expanding Taxpayer Advocate Service Oversight of Low-Income Taxpayer Clinics; Changing the Culture of Low-Income Taxpayer Advocacy; Connecting LITCs to the Tax Court; and Creating Research Office That Provided Empirical Data to Support LITC Positions.

The American administrative state has become, in important respects, a cost-benefit state. At least this is so in the sense that prevailing executive orders require agencies to proceed only if the benefits justify the costs. For defenders of the cost-benefit state, the antonym of their ideal is, alternately, regulation based on dogmas, intuitions, expressivism, or interest-group power. The focus on costs and benefits is an important effort to attend to the real-world consequences of regulations – and it casts a pragmatic, skeptical light on modern objections to the administrative state, invoking public-choice theory and the supposed self-serving decisions of unelected bureaucrats. In the future, however, there will be better ways to identify those consequences, by focusing directly on welfare, and not relying on imperfect proxies.

The governance of online platforms has unfolded across three eras – the era of Rights (which stretched from the early 1990s to about 2010), the era of Public Health (from 2010 through the present), and the era of Process (of which we are now seeing the first stirrings). Rights-era conversations and initiatives amongst regulators and the public at large centered dominantly on protecting nascent spaces for online discourse against external coercion. The values and doctrine developed in the Rights era have been vigorously contested in the Public Health era, during which regulators and advocates have focused (with minimal success) on establishing accountability for concrete harms arising from online content, even where addressing those harms would mean limiting speech. In the era of Process, platforms, regulators, and users must transcend this stalemate between competing values frameworks, not necessarily by uprooting Rights-era cornerstones like CDA 230, but rather by working towards platform governance processes capable of building broad consensus around how policy decisions are made and implemented. Some promising steps in this direction could include delegating certain key policymaking decisions to entities outside of the platforms themselves; making platforms “information” or “content” fiduciaries; and systematically archiving data and metadata about disinformation detected and addressed by platforms.

The fair use doctrine requires courts “to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.” Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). The Federal Circuit’s rejection of a jury finding of fair use instead embraced a rigid approach that, as a matter of law, would bar any copying of code into a new program, even for a different platform, as non-transformative and unfair. To justify its ruling, the Federal Circuit abandoned a consensus in the lower courts about the broad scope of fair use when dealing with highly functional software elements. It made key mistakes about the fair use factors and their balancing, including inflating the relevance of commerciality, applying an erroneous “no more than necessary” standard for copying, dismissing as insignificant the highly functional nature of computer programs, and conflating the market for Java SE as a whole with the market for individual declarations. Absent these legal errors, it is clear that the jury was at least reasonable in making factual findings that supported a finding of fair use. The extent to which a new work has a new meaning, message, or purpose—transformativeness—is often and rightly prioritized in the fair use analysis. But what constitutes transformativeness is often contentious. Here, the new purpose of Google’s new code implementing the declarations was the creation of a new computing environment in which Java programmers could readily create programs on multiple platforms, which required the use of limited portions of highly functional declarations. This type of purpose has been recognized as transformative because of its role in furthering competition and innovation. A computer interface supports the creation of other creative works, and in such situations, it is important to avoid locking in third parties to specific platforms. Factors two and three of the fair use test help define the boundaries of this type of fair use. In cases such as the one at bar, the highly functional nature of the copied declarations and the limited amount of the overall Java SE work used, consistent with industry practices, are vital considerations supporting the conclusion that Google’s use was a transformative use that served copyright’s basic goal of encouraging creation of new works. By discounting to the point of irrelevance the thinness of protection for highly functional aspects of computer interfaces (factor two) and of the industry practice of treating the amount Google reimplemented as reasonable (factor three), the Federal Circuit distorted its analysis of the other fair use factors, threatening the coherence of fair use doctrine and the ultimate progress of creativity. By downplaying the relevance of the nature of the work and the amount taken, the Federal Circuit fell into the well-known trap of circularity: reasoning that, because Oracle could have charged a license fee for this type of use if fair use were unavailable, Oracle suffered cognizable market harm. Because such claims can be made for any fair use, which by definition is not paid for, this reasoning cannot distinguish fair and unfair uses. But factors two and three can help identify when crediting such claimed market harm would be inconsistent with copyright’s overall balance between past and future creators. Thus, given the limited copying of functional elements here, factors one and four also support fair use, because Google’s purpose was generative of additional creativity by third parties and because Oracle’s claimed market harm goes beyond the legitimate scope of its thin copyright in highly functional declarations. A thin copyright for software, including Java SE, provides software copyright owners with meaningful protection against copying of significant amounts of expression, but meaningful protection does not require the expansive rights that the Federal Circuit granted. Providing a broad scope to highly functional elements of software is unnecessary and dangerous to competition and innovation. Factors two and three enable fair use to implement this distinction between types of works. The Federal Circuit erred in not recognizing this interaction between the fair use factors and instead adopting a rigid rule that would preclude fair use in computer programs.

Amici take no position on whether BOOKING.COM is generic, but write to encourage the Court to be cautious in resolving this case, which involves a generic term combined with a common top-level domain name identifier (.com). Trademark applications raise almost infinitely varied scenarios, including generic terms combined with other elements, and the top-level domain name identifier has some specific features that make it analogous to functional matter. Whatever rule the Court adopts should be highly attentive to the risks to competition of overassertion of registered marks that are largely or entirely comprised of generic elements. Because courts deciding infringement cases are often unfamiliar with the context of a trademark registration, they may miss limitations on the scope of the registered mark that the Trademark Office believed existed and, as a result, enforce broader rights than the registrants should actually have. Ordinary businesses receiving cease and desist letters are even more unlikely to have the expertise to understand the limits on a registration. This practical reality should guide the Court’s standards for registrations with generic components. Relatedly, the Court should reaffirm the basic principle that “de facto secondary meaning” does not give rise to protectability as a trademark. Courts have long distinguished between “de facto secondary meaning” and secondary meaning “to which courts will attach legal consequences.” De facto secondary meaning refers to an association between a generic term and a particular producer that is usually the result of an extended period of market dominance, whether achieved through advertising or through lack of competition. Because of the need to protect potential and future competition, a generic term cannot be appropriated as a trademark even if it has de facto secondary meaning The practical exclusivity afforded by domain name registration means that there may often be de facto secondary meaning in domain names, which can be difficult to distinguish from true trademark secondary meaning. This easily elided distinction affects how the Court should evaluate Booking.com’s survey, which purports to show secondary meaning. But the fact that de facto secondary meaning does not lead to trademark status does not mean it is irrelevant to the law. Even when a term is not protectable as a trademark, narrower unfair competition remedies may be available to prevent true passing off. When a term is generic or a product shape is functional, neither can be protected as a trademark and others may not be enjoined from competing using the term or shape.. Those competitors, however, may be required to distinguish themselves in the market by adding identifiers or otherwise differentiating their use, if the competitors’ use might deceive consumers. Thus, a rule that strongly protects competition by denying registration to generic terms does not leave consumers exposed to clever bad actors.

Immense amounts of information are now accessible to people, including information that bears on their past, present and future. An important research challenge is to determine how people decide to seek or avoid information. Here we propose a framework of information-seeking that aims to integrate the diverse motives that drive information-seeking and its avoidance. Our framework rests on the idea that information can alter people’s action, affect and cognition in both positive and negative ways. The suggestion is that people assess these influences and integrate them into a calculation of the value of information that leads to information-seeking or avoidance. The theory offers a framework for characterizing and quantifying individual differences in information-seeking, which we hypothesize may also be diagnostic of mental health. We consider biases that can lead to both insufficient and excessive information-seeking. We also discuss how the framework can help government agencies to assess the welfare effects of mandatory information disclosure.

This review addresses four key issues in the modern (post-1976) era of capital punishment in the United States. First, why has the United States retained the death penalty when all its peer countries (all other developed Western democracies) have abolished it? Second, how should we understand the role of race in shaping the distinctive path of capital punishment in the United States, given our country's history of race-based slavery and slavery's intractable legacy of discrimination? Third, what is the significance of the sudden and profound withering of the practice of capital punishment in the past two decades? And, finally, what would abolition of the death penalty in the United States (should it ever occur) mean for the larger criminal justice system?

Consumers, employees, students, and others are often subjected to “sludge”: excessive or unjustified frictions, such as paperwork burdens, that cost time or money; that may make life difficult to navigate; that may be frustrating, stigmatizing, or humiliating; and that might end up depriving people of access to important goods, opportunities, and services. Because of behavioral biases and cognitive scarcity, sludge can have much more harmful effects than private and public institutions anticipate. To protect consumers, investors, employees, and others, firms, universities, and government agencies should regularly conduct Sludge Audits to catalogue the costs of sludge, and to decide when and how to reduce it. Much of human life is unnecessarily sludgy. Sludge often has costs far in excess of benefits, and it can have hurt the most vulnerable members of society.

America's judiciary is aging. The average age of federal judges is sixty-nine years old, older than it has been at any other time in the country's history. The typical reaction to this demographic shift is concern that aging judges will serve past their prime. Scholars have thus offered proposals for mandatory judicial retirement, judicial term limits, and mechanisms for judicial removal. In this Article, I critique such proposals and draw on cognitive neuroscience to argue that rather than forcing their retirement, we should empower aging judges. The central neuroscientific insight is that individual brains age differently. While at the population level, age generally leads to reductions in information processing speed, and for some, serious deficits in memory and decision-making capacity, there is much individual variation. Given individual differences in how aging effects cognitive decline, the current system--which mandates intense health scrutiny when a judge is younger, followed by no formal cognitive evaluation for the rest of the judge's career--can be improved. I argue that we can empower judges by providing them opportunities for confidential, accurate, and thorough cognitive assessments at regular intervals throughout their judicial careers. If carefully developed and implemented so as to avoid politicization and to ensure complete confidentiality of results, individualized judicial cognitive health assessments will allow judges to make more informed decisions about when and how to modify their service on the bench. More individualized assessment will allow the legal system to retain the wisdom of experienced judges, while avoiding the injustice that comes with handing over the courtroom to a judge who is no longer capable of running it.

On the eve of the financial crisis, a series of Delaware court decisions resulted in a radical change in law: creditors would no longer have the kind of common law protections from opportunism that helped protect their bargains for the better part of two centuries. In this Article, we argue that Delaware’s shift materially altered the way large firms approach financial distress, which is now characterized by a level of chaos and rent-seeking unchecked by norms that formerly restrained managerial opportunism. We refer to the new status quo as “bankruptcy hardball.” It is now routine for distressed firms to engage in tactics that harm some creditors for the benefit of other stakeholders, often in violation of contractual promises and basic principles of corporate finance. The fundamental problem is that Delaware’s change in law was predicated on the faulty assumption that creditors are fully capable of protecting their bargains during periods of distress with contracts and bankruptcy law. Through a series of case studies, we show how the creditor’s bargain is often, contrary to that undergirding assumption, an easy target for opportunistic repudiation and, in turn, dashed expectations once distress sets in. We further argue that the Delaware courts paved the way for scorched earth corporate governance. Fortunately, judges can help fix the problem with more rigorous application of existing legal doctrines.

In this paper, I explore how international legal scholarship about war, written at a time of war, ought to read. Can — and should — we demand doctrinal rigor and analytical clarity, while also expecting that scholarship makes us feel something, that it connects us to the author, that it captures the intimacy and emotion that human beings experience in relation to war? I use two eras of international legal scholarship on war — namely, the Vietnam era and the War on Terror — to illustrate key moments in the field that were typified by very different kinds of writing and the corresponding differences in thinking and feeling. I argue, in part, that — in contradistinction to passion-filled Vietnam-era scholarship — a particularly influential strand of contemporary scholarship on the United States’ War on Terror adopts a view that is aridly technical, acontextual, and ahistorical. In short, it lacks passion. (I use “passion” as a composite term in an attempt to capture diverse facets of a problem that I am attempting to diagnose.) The Introduction situates this project within broader writing on law and emotions. Part I provides a list of characteristics of what I consider passionate scholarship, using the Vietnam era as an example of that approach. Part II provides a mirrored list of the characteristics of abstract and bloodless scholarship, using the latter part of the War on Terror (2009 onward). The observations compare how scholars of each period contend with the sense of crisis and urgency of their time, the understanding that they (we) were living — and writing — through moments that would be seen as history-changing and law-shifting in the future. Part III examines possible explanations for differences where we ought to see similarities, for absences of scholarly connection where they should be plentiful, and for a seismic shift in the general tone and mood of international legal scholarship on war in less than two generations. Part IV concludes by discussing why we — international lawyers, scholars who feel strongly about war and peace — ought to care about and seek to reverse this shift.

In criminal courts, prosecutors have considerable discretion over defendant’s sentencing, suggesting skilled prosecutors may be able to reduce both incarceration and future crime. Leveraging the quasi-random assignment of low-level felonies in North Carolina Superior Court, we find that prosecutors vary in their effects on both incarceration and re-offense. Since differences across prosecutors in their re-offense effects cannot be fully explained by their incarceration effects, prosecutors vary in their “skill” — the degree to which they selectively incarcerate those defendants most likely to re-offend. Indeed, prosecutors who are one standard deviation above the mean achieve a 2pp (8%) lower rate of re-offense than one would expect given their incarceration effect.

Startup founders, who generally must cede control to obtain VC financing, are widely believed to regain control in the event of IPO, à la Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg. Indeed, the premise that founders expect to reacquire control if there is an IPO underlies the leading finance theory for why venture capital cannot thrive without a robust stock market: the existence of an IPO market enables VCs to give founders a “call option on control” exercisable if the firm is successful. But little is known about how frequently founders regain control via IPO. Using a sample of over 18,000 VC-backed firms that received their initial round of VC financing during 1990-2012, we show that founders generally do not reacquire control if there is an IPO. In almost 60% of firms that do go public, the founder is no longer CEO at IPO. In firms with a founder-CEO right after IPO, founders generally lack substantial voting power; 50% are no longer CEO of the firm within three years. Zuckerberg is not the norm. We also show that the ex ante likelihood of any given founder reacquiring control via IPO is extremely low, suggesting that the expected value of any call option on control is trivial. As of initial VC financing, the likelihood that a founder takes her firm public and retains the CEO position and voting control for three years is about 0.4%. Our results shed light on how control evolves in U.S. startups, and cast doubt on the plausibility of the “call option on control” theory linking stock and VC markets.

Abuse of power and obstruction of Congress have long been considered criminal and merit impeachment.

What should be the role of law in response to the spread of artificial intelligence in war? Fuelled by both public and private investment, military technology is accelerating towards increasingly autonomous weapons, as well as the merging of humans and machines. Contrary to much of the contemporary debate, this is not a paradigm change; it is the intensification of a central feature in the relationship between technology and war: double elevation, above one’s enemy and above oneself. Elevation above one’s enemy aspires to spatial, moral, and civilizational distance. Elevation above oneself reflects a belief in rational improvement that sees humanity as the cause of inhumanity and de-humanization as our best chance for humanization. The distance of double elevation is served by the mechanization of judgement. To the extent that judgement is seen as reducible to algorithm, law becomes the handmaiden of mechanization. In response, neither a focus on questions of compatibility nor a call for a ‘ban on killer robots’ help in articulating a meaningful role for law. Instead, I argue that we should turn to a long-standing philosophical critique of artificial intelligence, which highlights not the threat of omniscience, but that of impoverished intelligence. Therefore, if there is to be a meaningful role for law in resisting double elevation, it should be law encompassing subjectivity, emotion and imagination, law irreducible to algorithm, a law of war that appreciates situated judgement in the wielding of violence for the collective.

This Essay (the “Essay”) estimates the U.S. bankruptcy system’s ability to absorb an anticipated surge of financial distress among American consumers, businesses, and municipalities as a result of COVID-19. An increase in the unemployment rate has historically been a leading indicator of the volume of bankruptcy filings that occur months later. If prior trends repeat this time, the May 2020 unemployment rate of 13.3 percent will lead to a substantial increase in all types of bankruptcy filings. Mitigation, governmental assistance, the unique features of the COVID-19 pandemic, and judicial triage should reduce the potential volume of bankruptcies to some extent, or make it less difficult to handle, and it is plausible that the predictive power of the recent unemployment spike will be smaller than history would otherwise predict. We hope this will be so. Yet, even assuming that the worst-case scenario could be averted, our analysis suggests substantial, temporary investments in the bankruptcy system may be needed. Our model assumes that Congress would like to have enough bankruptcy judges to maintain the average bankruptcy judge’s caseload at no more than it was during the last bankruptcy peak in 2010, when the bankruptcy system was pressured and the public caseload figures indicate that judges worked 50 hour weeks on average. To keep the judiciary’s workload at 2010 levels, we project that, in the worst-case scenario, the bankruptcy system could need as many as 246 temporary judges—a very large number. But even in our most optimistic model, the bankruptcy system will still need 50 additional temporary bankruptcy judgeships, as well as the continuation of all current temporary judgeships. The optimistic model begins with the observation that an unusually large number of the unemployed believe that they are only temporarily furloughed and will be back at work soon. Accordingly, we (optimistically) removed the excess-from-baseline number of unemployed who believe they will be back at work shortly—as if they will be back at work shortly with no adverse impact on the economy’s channel to bankruptcies. That reduction yielded a projected need of between 50 and 69 fewer judges to maintain a judicial workload no greater than the one bankruptcy courts faced in the 2009 financial crisis. In other circumstances, the enormous uncertainty of what the bankruptcy caseload will be would warrant waiting to see what develops. And strong action probably will not occur until we see a major across-the-board rise in filings. (Large business filings are rising sharply now, but consumer filings are not rising.) The downside of a wait-and-see strategy is that full-scale bankruptcy court appointments need about a year to complete. The dilemma in what action to take now is that if bankruptcies do in fact rise by several-fold---a plausible but uncertain prospect, then waiting for the rise will lead to a large gap that will put the system one year behind where it ought to be if the filings had been anticipated as certain and acted upon. Hence, we recommend that the relevant players act on the optimistic estimation and re-assess bankruptcy needs as the economy evolves and more information develops. Judicial appointments need not be for the full term of a bankruptcy judge. Capacity can be added via temporary judges (of which there already are some in the bankruptcy court system) and by recalling recent retirees who are willing to serve.

This is Chapter 14 from the 2020 edition of Advertising & Marketing Law: Cases and Materials, a casebook by Rebecca Tushnet and Eric Goldman. This chapter examines the legal issues arising from featuring people in advertisements, including publicity rights and endorsement/testimonial guidelines.

Motor vehicle fuel-economy standards have long been a cornerstone of U.S. policy to reduce fuel consumption in the light-duty vehicle fleet. In 2010 and 2012, these standards were significantly expanded in an effort to achieve steep reductions in oil demand and greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions through 2025. In 2018, following a review of the standards, the Environmental Protection Agency and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration proposed instead to freeze the standards at 2020 levels, citing high program costs (and potential safety issues). The current debate over the future of U.S. fuel economy standards provides an opportunity to consider whether the existing approach could be improved to achieve environmental and other goals at a lower cost. The current policy prescribes standards that focus on fuel economy alone, as opposed to lifetime consumption, and treats vehicle categories differentially, meaning that it imposes unnecessarily high costs and does not deliver guaranteed GHG savings. On the basis of a commitment to cost-benefit analysis, which has defined U.S. regulatory policy for more than thirty years, we propose novel reforms with three main features: (1) the direct regulation of expected fuel consumption and GHG emissions without consideration of the type or size of the vehicle; (2) use of existing data to assign lifetime fuel consumption and GHG emissions to each model; and (3) creation of a robust cap-and-trade market for automakers to reduce compliance costs. We show that these reforms would reduce fuel consumption and GHG emissions in transportation with greater certainty and do so at a far lower cost per ton of GHG emissions avoided. We also show that the the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Transportation could implement such an approach within their existing statutory authority.