Faculty Bibliography
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Three ongoing mega-trends are reshaping corporate governance: indexing, private equity, and globalization. These trends threaten to permanently entangle business with the state and create organizations controlled by a small number of individuals with unsurpassed power. The essay focuses on indexation. After providing background, the essay describes the rise of and reasons for indexation, noting that “passive” indexed investing takes a variety of forms. Data on indexation are presented — with the bottom line that indexation has progressed farther than most realize, because foreign ownership, institutional indexation, and “closet” indexation are often neglected by observers. Index providers’ incentives, resources, and methods are reviewed, with an emphasis on the how such providers have greater practical importance than simpler analytical approaches might suggest. The essay ends with an outline of policy options, and preliminary analyses of which seem likely to address the “Problem of Twelve” — the likelihood that in the near future roughly twelve individuals will have practical power over the majority of U.S. public companies.
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This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the ability of an enforcement agency to detect and deter harmful short-term activities committed by groups of injurers. With ordered-leniency policies, early cooperators receive reduced sanctions. We replicate the strategic environment described by Landeo and Spier (2018). In theory, the optimal ordered-leniency policy depends on the refinement criterion applied in case of multiplicity of equilibria. Our findings are as follows. First, we provide empirical evidence of a "race-to-the-courthouse" effect of ordered leniency: Mild and Strong Leniency induce the injurers to self-report promptly. These findings suggest that the injurers' behaviors are aligned with the risk-dominance refinement. Second, Mild and Strong Leniency significantly increase the likelihood of detection of harmful activities. This fundamental finding is explained by the high self-reporting rates under ordered-leniency policies. Third, as a result of the increase in the detection rates, the averages fines are significantly higher under Mild and Strong Leniency. As expected when the risk-dominance refinement is applied, Mild Leniency exhibits the highest average fine.
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The use of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors in investing is increasingly common and widely encouraged by investment professionals and non-government organizations. However, trustees and other fiduciary investors in the United States, who manage trillions of dollars, have raised concerns that using ESG factors violates the fiduciary duty of loyalty. Under the “sole interest rule” of trust fiduciary law, a trustee or other investment fiduciary must consider only the interests of the beneficiary. Accordingly, a fiduciary’s use of ESG factors, if motivated by the fiduciary’s own sense of ethics or to obtain collateral benefits for third parties, violates the duty of loyalty. On the other hand, some academics and investment professionals have argued that ESG investing can provide superior risk-adjusted returns. On this basis, some have even argued that ESG investing is required by the fiduciary duty of care. Against this backdrop of uncertainty, this paper examines the law and economics of ESG investing by a fiduciary. We differentiate “collateral benefits” ESG from “risk-return” ESG, and we provide a balanced assessment of the theory and evidence from financial economics about the possibility of persistent, enhanced returns from risk-return ESG. We show that ESG investing is permissible under trust fiduciary law only if two conditions are satisfied: (1) the fiduciary believes in good faith that ESG investing will benefit the beneficiary directly by improving risk-adjusted return, and (2) the fiduciary’s exclusive motive for ESG investing is to obtain this direct benefit. We reject the claim that the law imposes any specific investment strategy on fiduciary investors, ESG or otherwise. We also consider how the law should assess ESG investing by a fiduciary if authorized by the terms of a trust or a beneficiary or if it would be consistent with a charity’s purpose, clarifying such cases by asking whether a distribution would have been permissible under similar circumstances.
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When agents with a significant risk of termination in the short term have discretion over project selection, they may have incentives to underinvest in projects whose results would be realized only in the long term, and owners may take this agency problem into account when deciding whether to grant those agents discretion in decision-making. Because NBA rookies who participate in games gain NBA experience that likely improves their long-term performance, decisions of NBA teams about whether to let rookies play provide a useful context for investigating this potential agency problem. We develop a model that identifies when owners will choose to leave coaches with discretion over rookie participation decisions and shows that, in the presence of such discretion, coaches facing a higher termination risk can be expected to use rookies less often. Testing our model using NBA data, we find evidence that is consistent with the predictions of our model (JEL D20, J44, K00, L83).
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How well can anyone know a historical figure? How well can one person know another? What really matters? This essay explores those questions with reference to A.S. Byatt's masterpiece, Possession. A novel or a romance will not give crisp answers to such questions, but Byatt's answers, at once life-affirming and heartbreaking, are the right ones.
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My role in this symposium, and my paper, are less academic than others’. I clerked for Justice Abe Fortas during the 1968–69 Term and worked with him on Brandenburg v. Ohio. I will describe the process by which Brandenburg was created, its per curiam status, and its meaning as seen from the perspective of its author. I also will address the theme of this conference, especially the claim that Brandenburg incorporated Learned Hand’s view of the First Amendment.
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This essay reflects on the relationship between the diffuse legal struggle to dismantle vagrancy laws during the 1960s and the larger history of twentieth-century social movement advocacy. In Vagrant Nation, Risa Goluboff persuasively links the demise of vagrancy laws to the cultural and constitutional turmoil of the 1960s. It is possible, however, to interpret that decade's upheaval, which rendered explicit social stratification increasingly vulnerable, as an impediment to a budding anti-vagrancy law consensus instead of a prerequisite for legal change. On this alternative reading, the uncoordinated legal efforts to overturn vagrancy laws in a decade dominated by more contentious litigation campaigns may have contributed to a tepid decision by the Supreme Court, which ultimately invalidated vagrancy laws on narrow legalistic grounds. Indeed, the relatively protracted dismantlement of the vagrancy law regime raises the question whether bottom-up constitutionalism lacks potency in the absence of an intermediary organization with a well-defined litigation strategy.
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The debate between rational models of behavior and their systematic deviations, often referred to as “irrational behavior”, has attracted an enormous amount of research. Here, we reconcile the debate by proposing an evolutionary explanation for irrational behavior. In the context of a simple binary choice model, we show that irrational behaviors are necessary for evolution in stochastic environments. Furthermore, there is an optimal degree of irrationality in the population depending on the degree of environmental randomness. In this process, mutation provides the important link between rational and irrational behaviors, and hence the variety in evolution. Our results yield widespread implications for financial markets, corporate behavior, and disciplines beyond finance.
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Regardless of whether it’s renamed for McCain, Russell’s name should not be on it.
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Mark J. Roe & Robert C. Pozen, Six Months Isn’t ‘Long Term’, Wall St. J., Aug. 21, 2018, at A13.
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How do judgments about law and morality shift? Why do we come to see conduct as egregiously wrong, when we had formerly seen it as merely inappropriate or even unobjectionable? Why do shifts occur in the opposite direction? A clue comes from the fact that some of our judgments are unstable, in the sense that they are an artifact of, or endogenous to, what else we see. This is true of sensory perception: Whether an object counts as blue or purple depends on what other objects surround it. It is also true for ethical judgments: Whether conduct counts as unethical depends on what other conduct is on people’s viewscreens. It follows that conduct that was formerly seen as ethical may come to seem unethical, as terrible behavior becomes less common, and also that conduct that was formerly seen as unethical may come to seem ethical, as terrible behavior becomes more common. In these circumstances, law (and enforcement practices) can have an important signaling effect, giving people a sense of what is normal and what is not. There is an important supplemental point, intensifying these effects: Once conduct comes to be seen as part of an unacceptable category – abusiveness, racism, lack of patriotism, microaggression, sexual harassment – real or apparent exemplars that are not so egregious, or perhaps not objectionable at all, might be taken as egregious, because they take on the stigma now associated with the category. Stigmatization by categorization can intensify the process by which formerly unobjectionable behavior becomes regarded as abhorrent. There is a relationship between stigmatization by categorization and “concept creep,” an idea applied in psychology to shifting understandings of such concepts as abuse, bullying, mental illness, and prejudice.
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Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Fate of the Death Penalty, Time, Aug. 20, 2018, at 23.
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The article looks at how Pope Francis' declaration that the Catholic Church deemed the death penalty inadmissible could influence the use of such punishment in authoritarian countries and the U.S.
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William A. Klein, J. Mark Ramseyer & Stephen M. Bainbridge, Agency, Partnerships, and Limited Liability Entities: Unincorporated Business Associations (Foundation Press 4th ed., 2018).
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This book is a collection of edited cases, original text, questions, and problems designed for use in a law school level course on agency, partnerships, and limited liability entities. A key feature of this casebook is the extensive coverage of limited liability entities, especially unincorporated limited liability companies (LLCs). The authors include cases on such LLC topics as formation, interpretation of the operating agreement, piercing the LLC "veil," fiduciary obligation, expulsion of an LLC member, and dissolution. Also included is a section on the question of whether membership interests in LLCs and limited partnerships are a security. This edition has been meticulously updated with important cases and rules.
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Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit Revolution (MIT Press 2018).
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Opinions on government policies vary widely. Some people feel passionately about the child obesity epidemic and support government regulation of sugary drinks. Others argue that people should be able to eat and drink whatever they like. Some people are alarmed about climate change and favor aggressive government intervention. Others don't feel the need for any sort of climate regulation. In The Cost-Benefit Revolution, Cass Sunstein argues our major disagreements really involve facts, not values. It follows that government policy should not be based on public opinion, intuitions, or pressure from interest groups, but on numbers―meaning careful consideration of costs and benefits. Will a policy save one life, or one thousand lives? Will it impose costs on consumers, and if so, will the costs be high or negligible? Will it hurt workers and small businesses, and, if so, precisely how much? As the Obama administration's "regulatory czar," Sunstein knows his subject in both theory and practice. Drawing on behavioral economics and his well-known emphasis on "nudging," he celebrates the cost-benefit revolution in policy making, tracing its defining moments in the Reagan, Clinton, and Obama administrations (and pondering its uncertain future in the Trump administration). He acknowledges that public officials often lack information about costs and benefits, and outlines state-of-the-art techniques for acquiring that information. Policies should make people's lives better. Quantitative cost-benefit analysis, Sunstein argues, is the best available method for making this happen―even if, in the future, new measures of human well-being, also explored in this book, may be better still.
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Throughout the book, the authors note the cross-border implications of U.S. rules, and compare, where appropriate, the U.S. financial regulatory framework and policy choices to those in other places around the globe, especially the European ...
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We are living in an age of political turbulence, social division, and resistance. The resistance that formed in reaction to the election of Donald Trump styles itself a force to defend constitutional rights, democratic norms, and the rule of law in the United States. Perhaps the New Republic best explained its advent: the Resistance had been born of partisan—that is, Democratic—fury after “liberalism had been dealt its most stunning and consequential defeat in American history.” “For the first time in decades, liberalism has been infused with a sense of energy and purpose,” with millions of people devoted to a singular cause: resisting Trump.
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In important contexts, people prefer option A to option B when they evaluate the two separately, but prefer option B to option A when they evaluate the two jointly. In consumer behavior, politics, and law, such preference reversals are often a product of the pervasive problem of "evaluability." Some important characteristics of options are difficult or impossible to assess in separate evaluation, and hence choosers disregard or downplay them; those characteristics are much easier to assess in joint evaluation, where they might be decisive. But the empirical findings do not resolve central questions: Is either mode of evaluation reliable? Which mode of evaluation is better? Some people insist that joint evaluation is more reliable than separate evaluation, because it offers more information. But that conclusion is far too simple. In joint evaluation, certain characteristics of options may receive excessive weight, because they do not much affect people's actual experience or because the particular contrast between joint options distorts people’s judgments. In joint as well as separate evaluation, people are subject to manipulation, though for different reasons. It follows that neither mode of evaluation is reliable. The appropriate approach will vary depending on the goal of the task – increasing consumer welfare, preventing discrimination, achieving optimal deterrence, or something else. Under appropriate circumstances, global evaluation would be much better, but it is often not feasible. These conclusions bear on preference reversals in law and policy, where joint evaluation is often better, but where separate evaluation might ensure that certain characteristics or features of situations do not receive excessive weight.
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Holger Spamann, Simplified DGCL: including a guide to the federal proxy rules (2018).
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with Resources for Study, 2018-2019 (Stephen N. Subrin, Martha L. Minow, Mark S. Brodin, Thomas O. Main & Alexandra Lahav eds., Wolters Kluwer supplement ed. 2018).
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Including excerpts from the Restaements (Second) of Judgments, U.S. Constitution, U.S. Code, Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure, State Long -Arm and Venue Statutes, and Recent Supreme Court Case Law.
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As progress in the biosciences soldiers forth, new breakthroughs can often be swept up in a common narrative, that is, the narrative of science as a disruptive threat. Responding to perceived threats, policymakers the world over have frequently overreacted to these developments by enacting shortsighted legislation. These knee-jerk reactions often entail a ban or pause on the science to be explored, thereby foregoing a dialog or term-limited oversight. In this paper, we explore the history and transparency of such moratoria.
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Across Europe and the Americas, the Enlightenment brought intellectual and institutional tumult over that most basic attribute of the political economy – its medium. By the time the age was over, money operated according to a new design. It enabled a set of financial practices that were unprecedented: modern money worked synergistically with circulating public debt, capital markets, and commercial banking. Together, that quartet of innovations transformed the political economies of the West. The essay considers the themes of that change, including the depth of conceptual innovation on money and finance, the range of institutional experimentation, and the contentious nature of the debate. The essay takes a short tour of the Enlightenment quartet to suggest how interdependent was (and is) the development of those institutions.
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Though redistricting has always been a problem in American politics, the outsized role of partisanship in the redistricting process has received unprecedented attention across the nation since 2010. This guide is intended to arm legislators, good government advocates, and activists with the knowledge needed to design an independent redistricting commission for state legislative or congressional districts.
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In this chapter, we analyze three instances that illustrate the political economy of corporate governance. First, we examine how the politics of organizing financial institutions affects, and often determines, the flow of capital into the large firm, thereby affecting, and often determining, the power and authority of shareholder-owners. Second, we show how continental European nations have been slow in developing diffusely owned public firms in the years after World War II. The third political economy example deals with management in diffusely owned firms. The chapter also looks at the historical organization of capital ownership in the United States, noting how the country’s fragmented financial system limited the institutional blockholders and increased managerial autonomy over the years. Finally, it discusses the power of labor in postwar Europe, political explanations for the continuing power of the American executive and the board in recent decades, other political economy channels for corporate governance, and the limits of a political economy analysis.
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This chapter examines how mergers, acquisitions, and restructuring are regulated, both within the formal body of corporate law and as that law interacts with other bodies of law such as securities (including listing standards), antitrust, industry-specific regulation, and regulations of cross-border transactions. It begins with an overview of relevant terminology and scope of M&A and restructuring and how they differ from other corporate transactions or activities. It then considers major types of M&A transactions, the core goals of corporate law or governance, and other bodies of law (antitrust, industry-based regulation, regulation of foreign ownership of business, and tax) that give special treatment to M&A and restructuring, and sometimes interact with corporate law and governance. It also looks at laws that constrain M&A transactions and those that facilitate them. It concludes by summarizing empirical research and discussing what variations in types and modes of regulation governing M&A and restructuring transactions imply.
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This chapter examines the impact of private and public enforcement of securities regulation on the development of capital markets. After a review of the literature, it considers empirical findings related to private and public enforcement as measured by formal indices and resources, with particular emphasis on the link between enforcement intensity and technical measures of financial market performance. It then analyses the impact of cross-border flows of capital, valuation effects, and cross-listing decisions by corporate issuers before turning to a discussion of whether countries that dedicate more resources to regulatory reform behave differently in some areas of market activities. It also explores the enforcement of banking regulation and its relationship to financial stability and concludes by focusing on direct and indirect, resource-based evidence on the efficacy of the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s enforcement actions.
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This chapter reviews the benefits and costs of using indices, in particular the G- and E-indices, in empirical corporate governance research. As with corporate governance itself, the widespread use of corporate governance indices have both costs and benefits. The literature has identified a number of concerns with the use of these indices including concerns over measurement error, endogeneity, reverse causation, omitted variables and proper identification of the actual mechanisms by which corporate governance might matter. On the other hand, these indices enjoy several important benefits that explain their continued and widespread use. It concludes that event study methodology and the utilization of legal shocks/regulatory discontinuities for identification will likely play an ever greater role in future research.
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