Faculty Bibliography

Several of the Supreme Court’s most controversial constitutional doctrines hinge on claims about electoral accountability. Restrictions on the President’s power to remove agency heads are disfavored because they reduce the President’s accountability for agency actions. Congress cannot delegate certain decisions to agencies because then Congress is less accountable for those choices. State governments cannot be federally commandeered because such conscription lessens their accountability. And campaign spending must be unregulated so that more information reaches voters and helps them to reward or punish incumbents for their performances. There is just one problem with these claims. They are wrong — at least for the most part. To illustrate their error, I identify four conditions that must be satisfied in order for incumbents to be held accountable. Voters must (1) know about incumbents’ records, (2) form judgments about them, (3) attribute responsibility for them, and (4) cast ballots based on these judgments and attributions. I then present extensive empirical evidence showing that these conditions typically are not met in the scenarios contemplated by the Court. The crux of the problem is that voters are less informed than the Court supposes, more likely to be biased by their partisan affiliations, and less apt to vote retrospectively than in some other way. Accountability thus does not rise in response to the Court’s interventions — at least not much. The qualifiers, though, are important. If the Court’s claims are mostly wrong, then they are partly right. If accountability does not rise much due to the Court’s efforts, then it does go up a bit. These points are established by the same studies that document the general inadequacy of the Court’s reasoning. With respect to certain voters in certain settings, accountability is influenced by presidential control over agencies, congressional delegation to agencies, federal commandeering of state governments, and regulation of campaign spending. That is why this Article discounts accountability as a constitutional value but not does reject it altogether.

Agency fees are mandatory payments that certain employees are required to make to labor unions. In recent years, the Supreme Court has moved closer to declaring these fees an unconstitutional form of compelled speech and association and may soon invalidate them entirely. The Court – and the scholarship on agency fees – proceeds from the assumption that such fees are employees’ money that employees’ pay to a union. This article argues, however, that this is the wrong way to understand agency fees and for two sets of reasons. One, the Court treats agency fees as employees’ money because fees pass through employee paychecks on the way from employers to unions. But this is simply an accounting formalism required by labor law. Because employees have no choice but to pay the fees, the fact that the fees pass through paychecks is irrelevant for purposes of First Amendment analysis. Instead, under the First Amendment, agency fees are – and must be treated as – payments made directly by employers to unions. And payments made by employers to unions raise no compelled speech or association problems for employees. Two, irrespective of the accounting regime, the article shows why agency fees ought to be treated as union property rather than as the property of individual employees. Unionization, by allowing employees to negotiate collectively, produces a premium for employees covered by union contracts. Agency fees are a small fraction of this union premium. Because it is the union that produces the premium out of which agency fees are paid, and because individual employees would never earn the premium as individuals, the premium and the fees that come out of it should be treated – under the Court’s own cases – as the property of the union that secured them. The article thus provides two sets of arguments with the same fundamental implication: agency fees are not properly understood as payments made by employees to unions, and there is accordingly no compelled speech or association problem with agency fees.

The United States has long epitomized capitalism. From its enterprising shopkeepers, wildcat banks, violent slave plantations, and raucous commodities trade to its world-spanning multinationals, its massive factories, and the centripetal power of New York in the world of finance, America has shaped political economy for two centuries and more. But an understanding of "capitalism" is as elusive as it is urgent. What does it mean to make capitalism a subject of historical inquiry? What is its potential across multiple disciplines, alongside different methodologies, and in a range of geographic and chronological settings? And how does a focus on capitalism change our understanding of American history?American Capitalism collects cutting-edge research from prominent scholars, sampling the latest work in the field. Rather than a monolithic perspective, these broad-minded and rigorous essays venture new angles on finance and debt, women's rights, slavery and political economy, labor, and regulation, among other topics. Together, the essays suggest emerging themes in the field: a fascination with capitalism as it is made by public authority, how it is experienced in the detail of daily life, how it spreads across the globe, and how it can be reconceptualized as a discrete and quantified object. A major statement for a wide-open field, this book demonstrates the breadth and scope of the work the history of capitalism can provoke.

The UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 35 summarizes the treaty body’s interpretation of the right to liberty of person, including protection against arbitrary detention, under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, one of the principal human rights treaties at the global level. This essay provides an overview of General Comment No. 35, and then focuses on three aspects that provoked controversy either within the Committee or outside it: the time limit for “prompt” presentation of pre-trial detainees to a judge; the standards governing security detention in non-international armed conflict; and the disagreement between the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities regarding whether involuntary hospitalization is ever permitted. These examples illustrate significant issues about the interaction between the Covenant and other international regimes.

A robust secondary market has emerged over the past 20 years in the debt of Chapter 11 firms. Critics worry that the trading associated with this market has undermined bankruptcy governance by forcing managers to negotiate with shifting groups of activist investors in the Chapter 11 bargaining process. This article investigates whether this is a common problem and concludes that it is not. Although trading of bond debt is pervasive, the activist groups that tend to participate in negotiations usually enter cases early and rarely change significantly. Trading in general, therefore, does not appear to have the impact on governance that many claims trading critics fear, at least insofar as the average case is concerned.

In recent years, there has been a great deal of discussion of uses of behavioral economics in policy circles, with a focus on empirical, conceptual and ethical questions. On the basis of data from many nations, our forthcoming book asks and answers a question pressing in democratic and nondemocratic nations alike: What do citizens actually think about behaviorally informed policies? (Short answer: They approve of them.) In the process, we ask and answer two other questions as well: Do citizens of different nations have identifiable principles in mind when they approve or disapprove of behaviorally informed polices? (Short answer: Yes.) Do citizens of different nations agree with each other? (Short answer: Mostly yes, but with intriguing qualifications, involving diverging levels of trust and different evaluations of liberty.) This article previews our book, providing new insights into public approval of nudges and similar policies based on behavioral insights.

Although a member of the Supreme Court at the time, Benjamin Cardozo did not participate in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. He was dying. It is a mere fortuity that Cardozo’s death coincided with the death of the general common law. Yet it has since proved to be something more—or so this symposium essay argues. It is in part because our highest court took itself out of the business of making law in contract, property, tort, and related areas that Cardozo’s beloved common law has fallen on hard times, and that even state-court judges have increasingly lost their feel for how to reason about it. Today, there is no member of a state judiciary who rivals Cardozo in stature. Mainly this is a testament to his extraordinary gifts. But it also reflects the waning of the common law in the United States, and a concomitant loss of the sense of what it means to be a great common-law judge.

The article offers information about Benjamin N. Cardozo, former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the U.S., who is known for his opinions about torts and contracts. Topics discussed include different aspect of his jurisprudence along with his opinions on the practice of law; and his opinions in which he had the opportunity to evaluate the conduct of lawyers within the practice of law; and his professional career.

In 2009, the Obama Administration entered office in the midst of a serious economic recession. Nonetheless, one of its priorities was to address the problem of climate change. It ultimately did a great deal -- producing, with the aid of market forces, significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, which ultimately helped make an international agreement possible. This essay offers a preliminary account of some of the central domestic reforms, including the “endangerment finding”; the selection of a social cost of carbon; fuel economy regulations for motor vehicles; controls on new and existing power plants; and energy efficiency regulations. At various points, potentially challenging issues of law and policy are identified, and different imaginable paths are specified. The essay can be taken as an account of the extent to which the executive branch, relying on pre-existing regulatory authorities, can accomplish a great deal in an area in which the national legislature is blocked. To that extent, the climate change initiatives offer an illuminating case study in the contemporary operation of the system of separation of powers. There is a brief discussion of whether the reforms are likely to prove enduring. Appendices offer an assortment of tables on relevant costs and benefits.

Chevron v NRDC may well be the most important case in all of administrative law. It establishes a general principle, which is that agencies may interpret ambiguous statutory provisions, so long as their interpretations are reasonable. That principle is now under serious pressure. If the Court abandoned it, how would Chevron itself be decided? There are five possible approaches: (1) textualism; (2) purposivism; (3) resort to canons of construction; (4) use of Skidmore deference; and (5) validation of the agency’s decision, on the ground that no statutory provision prohibited it. In the context of Chevron, (1) and (2) run into serious problems, but (3), (4), and (5) are promising. The discussion suggests some general lessons for statutory interpretation and administrative law, and offers some cautionary notes for those who want to abandon the Chevron framework. Abandoning that framework would introduce high levels of confusion in the lower courts and the Supreme Court itself, and in all probability, the framework that would ultimately replace it would turn out to look a fair bit like that in Chevron itself.

The George P. Smith Lecture. Medical Tourism” is the travel of patients from a home country to a destination country for the primary purpose of receiving health care. “Circumvention Tourism” is a sub-type of such travel where the motivation is circumventing a domestic prohibition on accessing a medical service. This Article focuses on such circumvention tourism for cutting-edge medicine. I use the recently reported case of travel to Mexico for Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy as a springboard for examining the legal and ethical issues raised by the practice and to discuss restrictive regulation in place in the United States.

In recent years, legislatures and their members have increasingly asserted standing to sue other branches of government, in controversies involving state legislators or legislatures as party litigants and in controversies involving members of or parts of the U.S. Congress. These cases present challenging questions for the federal Article III courts, whose jurisdiction has been interpreted to be bounded by “justiciability” doctrines, including that the party invoking federal court jurisdiction must have standing to do so. This Essay will focus on congressional standing, discussing case law involving claims by state legislatures or legislators to the extent they are relevant.1 It will examine congressional standing—including standing of individual Members of Congress, standing of parts of Congress, and standing for the whole body—within the context of U.S. commitments to democratic constitutionalism, offering a framework for analysis that is intended more to suggest ways of thinking about congressional standing than to prescribe a set of answers.

This article examines constitutional innovation through the case study of the emergence of animal protection in Egypt's 2014 Constitution. Egypt's provision, which is a state obligation to provide al-rifq bi-l-hayawan (kindness to animals), was adopted in Article 45 as part of the country's second constitution following the 2011 revolution that ousted President Hosni Mubarak. Three aspects proved crucial to the adoption of the provision: a decision by animal protection activists to influence the constitutional process; the ability of citizens to convey their ideas to the constitutional drafters, albeit in a limited way; and, most importantly, the use of frame bridging. The activists and then the constitutional drafters presented the new cause of constitutional animal protection in terms of well-established areas of social, and constitutional, concern in the country, including Islamic law, women's rights, human rights, and the protection of the environment.

At the root of recurring bank crises are deeply-implanted incentives for banks and their executives to take systemically excessive risk. Since the 2008–2009 financial crisis, regulators have sought to strengthen the financial system by requiring more capital (which can absorb losses from risk-taking) and less risk-taking, principally via command-and-control rules. Yet bankers’ baseline incentives for system-degrading risk-taking remain intact. A key but underappreciated reason for banks’ recurring excessive risk-taking is the structure of corporate taxation. Current tax rules penalize equity and boost debt, thereby undermining the capital adequacy efforts that have been central to the post-crisis reform agenda. This tax-based distortion incentivizes financial firms to undermine regulators’ capital adequacy rules, either transactionally or by lobbying for their repeal. The resulting debt-heavy structure not only renders banks fragile but also pushes them toward further excessively risky strategies. This result is not inevitable. By repurposing tax tools used elsewhere, we show how the safety-undermining impact of the corporate tax can be reversed without affecting the overall level of tax revenue that the government raises from the financial sector. Several means to the desired end are possible, with the best trade-off between administrability and effectiveness being to lift the tax penalty on banks to the extent that they add to their loss-absorbing, safety-enhancing equity buffer above the regulatory minimum. This solution would minimize the tax impact and could have any revenue loss offset by modest tax changes affecting the riskiest forms of financial sector debt. Existing studies indicate that the magnitude of the resulting safety benefit should rival the size of the benefit from all the post-crisis capital regulation to date. Thus the main thesis we bring forward is not a small or technical claim. Standard bank regulatory style is command-and-control, and while much can be and has been accomplished with the standard style, it has its limits. In today’s political environment, current safety rules’ continuance may not be viable, as repeal of recent regulatory advances, not their refinement, has become a serious possibility. Yet rolling back the post-crisis regulatory advances without addressing the underlying risk-taking incentives would be unwise. While our policy preference would be to supplement and not replace traditional and recent regulation with the tax reform, any major rollback makes reducing the risk-taking tax distortion more urgent than ever.

In the US constitutional system, the president generally conducts foreign relations. But not always. In recent years, the courts and Congress have repeatedly taken steps to interact directly with foreign governments. Nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations occurs when the courts or Congress engage in or take actions that result in the opening of a direct channel of official communications between the US nonexecutive branch and a foreign executive branch. Nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations raises serious constitutional questions, but to date there is no clear rubric for analyzing the constitutionality of the judiciary’s or Congress’s actions. Moreover, nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations is likely to become more frequent due to changes in technology, foreign governments’ increasing sophistication about the US government, hyperpartisanship in the United States, and what might be called the “Trump effect.” Building on Justice Robert Jackson’s iconic tripartite framework from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer, this Article proposes a converse Youngstown framework for determining when nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations is constitutional. The converse Youngstown framework judges the constitutionality of the courts’ or Congress’s actions in light of executive authorization or condonation (Category 1), executive silence (Category 2), or executive opposition (Category 3). The converse Youngstown framework offers significant advantages over the current ad hoc approach to analyzing nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations, and it avoids some of the pitfalls that critics have identified with traditional Youngstown analysis. First, it more accurately reflects the fact that the president isn’t the only actor who exercises foreign relations initiative. Second, it avoids much of the indeterminacy that plagues traditional Youngstown analysis. Finally, it simplifies the constitutional analysis of nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations by explaining why easy cases are easy, allowing courts to engage in constitutional avoidance in some cases, and showing how Congress and the courts may sometimes trump the executive, even in Category 3.

International law has always been contested. In recent years, however, competition between States to influence the trajectory of international law has intensified. Unfortunately, most international lawyers and policy makers still employ an impoverished understanding of the way in which international law is created (i.e., through formal international negotiations or as developed through custom). In this article, I argue that this formalist perspective neglects the foundational role of domestic lawmaking and regulation in the development of international law. Indeed, this paper shows that domestic action has historically been a direct causal antecedent to international legal regimes, and concludes that States must fundamentally reconsider the underpinnings of international law if they hope to effectively advance their national interests in international politics. These findings are born out through four case studies, which analyze the development of international legal regimes for the continental shelf, bribery of foreign officials, data privacy, and artificial intelligence. In each case study, I apply an analytic model rooted in Aristotelian understandings of causation, and expanded upon through the constructivist legal literature. Throughout, the paper provides concrete suggestions as to how States can re-imagine their approach towards international law to better advance their interests in the increasingly fragmented, yet still highly interconnected, world of international politics.

In 2014, the authors of this article published the first analysis of the development and history of the relatively new academic field of Food Law & Policy (“FL&P”). As we defined the field in that article, FL&P “is the study of the basis and impact of those laws and regulations that govern the food and beverages we grow, raise, produce, transport, buy, sell, distribute, share, cook, eat, and drink.” FL&P was born out of two pre-existing fields: Food & Drug Law and Agricultural Law, but it differs from its parent fields in that it explores legal and policy issues regulation of food by various agencies, at all levels of government, and across the range of agricultural, health, labor, economic, environmental, and other issues that intersect with food. This broader analysis of the food system3 had not been part of the legal academy prior to 2004. For our 2014 article, we developed ten criteria to measure the breadth and depth of a legal-academic field. According to our analysis, FL&P met seven of the ten criteria in 2014, and was firmly entrenched in terms of course offerings, clinical projects, and scholarly writing. Now, four years later, the field meets all ten of our criteria, and its continued growth has solidified its place in legal academia. The present article endeavors to assess and discuss this growth by reviewing the same ten criteria of a legal-academic field and tracking developments in the four years since we collected our initial data. As the article details, FL&P’s newfound strength within each of our ten criteria demonstrates the field has grown strong roots.

The organizing principle of the American law of succession is freedom of disposition. This book chapter surveys freedom of disposition in American succession law--intestacy, wills, trusts, and nonprobate transfers. The chapter also considers the main limits on freedom of disposition, focusing on forced shares for spouses, the Rule Against Perpetuities, and the federal wealth transfer taxes. For the most part, however, the American law of succession facilitates rather than regulates implementation of the decedent’s intent. Most of the American law of succession is concerned with enabling posthumous enforcement of the actual intent of the decedent or, failing this, giving effect to the decedent’s probable intent. Note: The chapter is based on the author’s remarks at the Conference on Freedom of Testation and its Limits at the University of Lleida, Spain, on 20 April 2018.

The year 2015 was a significant anniversary for global health: 15 years since the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals and the creation of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, followed two years later by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria. 2015 was also the 10-year anniversary of the adoption of the International Health Regulations (May 2005) and the formal entering into force of the Framework Convention on the Tobacco Control (February 2005). The anniversary of these frameworks and institutions illustrates the growth and contribution of 'global' health diplomacy. Each initiative has also revealed on-going issues with compliance, sustainable funding and equitable attention in global health governance. In this paper, we present four thematic challenges that will continue to challenge prioritisation within global health governance into the future unless addressed: framing and prioritising within global health governance; identifying stakeholders of the global health community; understanding the relationship between health and behaviour; and the role of governance and regulation in supporting global health.

In the 1990s Brazil and other emerging economies went through a major transformation. Closed economies were opened, foreign investment encouraged, and many state-owned enterprises privatized. This “global transformation” had a major impact on the Brazilian legal system. While many parts of the legal system were affected, the corporate law profession changed the most. This sector includes all the institutions and actors that provide legal advice to corporations whether domestic and foreign, public or private. Global transformation brought about major changes in the national political economy, led to a flood of new laws governing corporate activity, and created a demand for new kinds of legal services to help companies manage the new legal environment. This led to rapid growth of the complex of institutions that provide corporate legal services and affected the way lawyering was practiced and organized. Many forces came together to give new shape to the professional identity of lawyers, the structures they work in, and the roles they play. The result was the creation of a new and powerful segment of the legal profession whose activities had profound impacts on the rest of the profession, the legal system, the operation of enterprises (both public and private), state policy and global governance. In this book, we describe the growth of the corporate legal sector in Brazil, and the impact of this development on law-making, legal education, regulation of the legal profession, public interest law, trade policy, and gender roles. The book is part of a larger study of global transformation and its impact on the legal profession carried out by GLEE, the project on Globalization, Lawyers, and Emerging Economies. Based at the Harvard Law School’s Center for the Legal Profession, GLEE is currently studying these developments in Brazil, India and China, with plans to expand the project into Africa and the states of the former Soviet Union. In Brazil, GLEE’s research has been based at the law school of the Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) in São Paulo.

Careful attention to choice architecture promises to open up new possibilities for reducing greenhouse gas emissions – possibilities that go well beyond, and that may supplement or complement, the standard tools of economic incentives, mandates, and bans. How, for example, do consumers choose between climate-friendly products or services and alternatives that are potentially damaging to the climate but less expensive? The answer may well depend on the default rule. Indeed, climate-friendly default rules may well be a more effective tool for altering outcomes than large economic incentives. The underlying reasons include the power of suggestion; inertia and procrastination; and loss aversion. If well-chosen, climate-friendly defaults are likely to have large effects in reducing the economic and environmental harms associated with various products and activities. In deciding whether to establish climate-friendly defaults, choice architects (subject to legal constraints) should consider both consumer welfare and a wide range of other costs and benefits. Sometimes that assessment will argue strongly in favor of climate-friendly defaults, particularly when both economic and environmental considerations point in their direction. Notably, surveys in the United States and Europe show that majorities in many nations are in favor of climate-friendly defaults.

The article examines U.S. President Andrew Johnson's impeachment hearings in 1868. It describes the impeachment proceedings initiated by the House of Representatives and the Senate against Johnson for violating the Tenure of Office Act and other offenses. It also discusses the actions taken by Johnson that indicated his hatred for African Americans and the political and social impact of his impeachment.

Human Rights, Democracy, and Legitimacy in a World of Disorder brings together respected scholars from diverse disciplines to examine a trio of key concepts that help to stabilize states and the international order. While used pervasively by philosophers, legal scholars, and politicians, the precise content of these concepts is disputed, and they face new challenges in the conditions of disorder brought by the twenty-first century. This volume will explore the interrelationships and possible tensions between human rights, democracy, and legitimacy, from the philosophical, legal, and political perspectives; as well as the role of these concepts in addressing particular problems such as economic inequality, catastrophic risks posed by new technologies, access to health care, regional governance, and responses to mass migration. Made up of essays arising from an interdisciplinary symposium convened at Harvard Law School in 2016, this volume will examine how these trusted concepts may bring order to the global community.

This paper examines the widespread belief that the Trump administration’s attacks on international law and institutions are significantly harming the international legal order. Part I describes the actions Trump has taken. That is the relatively easy part. It is much harder to figure out the medium- and long-term impact of Trump’s actions. For the reasons offered in Part II, we think that in most respects it is still too early to tell. But we speculate that Trump’s biggest impact is likely to come as much from his verbal attacks on international law and institutions as from the material changes he has brought to them.

Actuarial risk assessments might be unduly perceived as a neutral way to counteract implicit bias and increase the fairness of decisions made at almost every juncture of the criminal justice system, from pretrial release to sentencing, parole and probation. In recent times these assessments have come under increased scrutiny, as critics claim that the statistical techniques underlying them might reproduce existing patterns of discrimination and historical biases that are reflected in the data. Much of this debate is centered around competing notions of fairness and predictive accuracy, resting on the contested use of variables that act as "proxies" for characteristics legally protected against discrimination, such as race and gender. We argue that a core ethical debate surrounding the use of regression in risk assessments is not simply one of bias or accuracy. Rather, it's one of purpose. If machine learning is operationalized merely in the service of predicting individual future crime, then it becomes difficult to break cycles of criminalization that are driven by the iatrogenic effects of the criminal justice system itself. We posit that machine learning should not be used for prediction, but rather to surface covariates that are fed into a causal model for understanding the social, structural and psychological drivers of crime. We propose an alternative application of machine learning and causal inference away from predicting risk scores to risk mitigation.

While acknowledging that, on balance, social media can have a positive effect on democracy, the author also examines the other side of the argument, specifically the perils of polarisation. In doing so, he offers a critical view of certain aspects of the policies of social media companies that seek to offer a “personalized experience” which he argues risks keeping users in an “information cocoon”. However, he notes that there are other policies that counter this trend, which instead seek to keep users informed, and which must be pursued in order to ensure that social media is a tool that can make democracy work better.

In his book The Purse and the Sword: The Trials of Israel’s Legal Revolution, Daniel Friedmann brings under critical inspection what he names as a legal revolution in Israel. Friedmann gives us, under that name, an account of a shift of certain major and sensitive state powers from elected leaders and legislators to politically insulated officials and judges. The Supreme Court’s construction of two Basic Law enactments of the twelfth Knesset into a justiciable, substantive “formal constitution” for Israel figures in Friedmann’s book as one component of the revolution, along with other judicial developments, including purposive interpretation of constitutional and other laws, an intensified form of common-law review of administrative actions for unreasonableness, and expansionary revisions to standing and justiciability. In all these developments, Aharon Barak took a leading part as judge and as scholar. I here consider to what extent these developments may be understood as responsive to promptings from a “political-liberal” conception of a justificational burden and need for substantive constitutional law. I reflect here on the possible pull of this conception in a political-cultural setting of a persisting widespread attachment to an idea of Israel as a member of the family of liberal constitutional states, and hence on Barak’s understanding of the role and responsibility of the Supreme Court. I speculate briefly about how far that pull may extend also to Professor Friedmann in his role of critic of the judicial handiwork of Barak and the Court on which he served.

Law of Asylum in the United States is an authoritative presentation of U.S. asylum law, long considered a must-have publication for practitioners, students, researchers, and teachers. It is frequently relied upon and cited by practitioners and decision makers. Law of Asylum describes and interprets U.S. statutes, regulations, and cases, as well as numerous international sources, providing an up-to-date analysis of all aspects of asylum law. This edition has been thoroughly updated to capture recent developments in asylum law and policy, including the Trump Administration's policy changes, children's credibility, formulation of particular social groups, the material support bar to asylum eligibility, the one-year filing deadline, ongoing Safe Third Country Act litigation, and reinstatement of removal. The extensive Procedures Appendix has been expanded and thoroughly updated to provide an invaluable resource for practitioners and researchers interested in U.S. asylum processes. In addition, this edition includes numerous unpublished Board of Immigration Appeals and immigration judge decisions In addition, this edition includes numerous unpublished Board of Immigration Appeals and immigration judge decisions and asylum officer training materials in accessible perma.cc format to guide practitioners and researchers.

"[This book presents the author's] new thesis about how the law should work in America, arguing that the courts best enable people to live together, despite their diversity, by resolving particular cases without taking sides in broader, more abstract conflicts. [The author] analyzes the way the law can mediate disputes in a diverse society, examining how the law works in practical terms, and showing that, to arrive at workable, practical solutions, judges must avoid broad, abstract reasoning. He states that judges purposely limit the scope of their decisions to avoid reopening large-scale controversies, calling such actions incompletely theorized agreements. In identifying them as the core feature of legal reasoning, he takes issue with advocates of comprehensive theories and systemization, from Robert Bork to Jeremy Bentham, and Ronald Dworkin. Equally important, [the author] goes on to argue that it is the living practice of the nation's citizens that truly makes law. Legal reasoning can seem impenetrable, mysterious, baroque. [This book] helps dissolve the mystery. Whether discussing abortion, homosexuality, or free speech, the meaning of the Constitution, or the spell cast by the Warren Court, ...[the author] moves the debate over fundamental values and principles out of the courts and back to its rightful place in a democratic state: to the legislatures elected by the people. In this second edition, the author updates the previous edition bringing the book into the current mainstream of twenty-first century legal reasoning and judicial decision-making focusing on the many relevant contemporary issues and developments that occurred since its initial 1996 publication."-- Provided by publisher.

Effective corporate governance is a crucial foundation for economic growth, and by providing accountability and legitimacy to large-scale businesses, it is a core part of America’s success story. The Committee asked for comment on the role that law plays in corporate and shareholder disclosures and governance, and how they could be improved, as well as on a number of bills introduced into Congress that address different aspects of corporate governance. I comment generally on corporate governance, and then on five of the seven bills, including bills addressing cybersecurity risk and governance, proxy advisors, and reforms to Section 13(d) blockholder disclosures.

This qualitative study examined how NFL players and their family members characterized the impact of an NFL career on the mental and emotional health of NFL players. We interviewed 25 NFL players (23 former and 2 current) and 27 family members (24 wives and 3 others) to elicit players’ experiences during and following their time in the NFL. While players experienced positive outcomes from their careers, they also described important mental health challenges including feelings of depression, loneliness, and stress. Many of their concerns during their careers were linked to anxiety about job performance and job security. Post-career concerns were linked to loss of social identify and connections. Players had difficulty finding help for their concerns. We conclude with eight recommendations, including improved resources, confidentiality, and support.