Faculty Bibliography

The current framework governing emergency lending – including reforms to Federal Reserve lending enacted after the recent crisis – are inadequate and not credible. We propose reforms that would establish a credible framework of rules to constrain and guide emergency lending by the Federal Reserve and by fiscal authorities during a future financial crisis. Our proposed framework follows five overarching rules, informed by history, empirical evidence and theory, which would serve as the foundation on which detailed legislation should be constructed. Adequate assistance to financial institutions would be provided in systemic crises but would be limited in its form, and by the process that would govern its provision. Our framework would serve as a basis for establishing effective rules that would be credible, and that would properly balance the moral-hazard costs of emergency lending against the gains from avoiding systemic collapse of the financial system.

"After 20 years, the return of a classic! The 10th edition of Weinstein, Abrams, Brewer and Medwed, Evidence—Cases and Materials (the authors of the previous edition were Weinstein, Mansfield, Abrams and Berger)—to be published in time for classes beginning in the Fall 2017 semester. This book enables teaching of the rules of evidence, with an in-depth understanding achieved by no other casebook. The authors extensively cover rationales for the rules and how they fit into our system of resolving civil disputes as well as handling criminal justice issues in both jury and non-jury contexts. Many books focus on teaching the rules only in a trial practice mode. In this era of fewer trials, the book’s philosophic underpinning is that the best way to teach Evidence is to provide students with a full and in-depth understanding of each rule so as to prepare them to deal with any possible variation on the issues that can arise at the stages of fact-gathering and investigation, or deposition and discovery, or at the stages of trial, or on appeal. The new edition, while as comprehensive and rich in analysis and supporting materials as previous editions, also contains new explanatory material designed to further students’ understanding of the issues. This edition blends the new with the old, representing the latest installment of a casebook with a lineage that dates back to the nineteenth century. The tenth edition retains much of the historical evolution of evidence law from its common law origins through the emergence of the Federal Rules of Evidence and analogous state approaches. In addition, this comprehensive casebook covers new developments in scientific evidence, and applies new insights from fields such as logic and probability." -- Foundation Press

This Article focuses on my work in Illinois to use the Voting Rights Act (VRA) to improve minority representation at the local level, but the themes and findings are applicable across the country because many states have growing minority populations in the suburbs just outside of large city centers. These minority populations tend to be much less segregated than the minority communities in the cities, and so it is more difficult to use Section 2 of the VRA (“Section 2”) to ensure both descriptive and substantive representation. I recommend the use of fair representation systems like ranked choice and cumulative voting (with multi-member districts) to improve minority representation in these decreasingly segregated areas. I introduce three case studies from Illinois to highlight the numerous burdens facing those that seek to reform their local government redistricting systems. I finish with some thoughts on how litigation and legislative advocacy may be used to promote fair representation systems in local government.

Debates about constitutional federalism—by which I roughly mean the division of powers and responsibilities between the national and state governments—abound. Participants typically cast such debates as constitutional in character. Nearly invariably, however, policy concerns exert a dominating influence, either on the surface or just beneath it. More often than not, proponents offer federalism-based arguments on behalf of conclusions that they value for policy-based reasons. Reciprocally, champions of particular theories of constitutional federalism typically argue that their visions would yield better outcome —as measured along some dimension—than would any other understanding of the Constitution’s structure. In an effort to chart some dimensions of the relationship between federalism-based arguments and more overtly normative or policy based arguments, I pursue three lines of inquiry in this Essay.

It can be paternalistic to force people to choose. Often people do not wish to choose, but both private and public institutions ask or force them to do so, thus overriding their wishes. As a result, people’s autonomy may be badly compromised and their welfare may be greatly reduced. These points have implications for a range of issues in law and policy, suggesting that those who favor active choosing, and insist on it, may well be overriding people’s preferences and values, and thus running afoul of John Stuart Mill’s Harm Principle (for better or for worse). People have limited mental bandwidth, and forcing choices can impose a hedonic or cognitive tax. Sometimes that tax is high.

In law – and in many other social activities, including music, art, and literature – reasonable people can and do argue over the best conception of interpretation. Intended meaning is unquestionably one candidate, but there are others. To choose among plausible accounts of what interpretation entails, judges and lawyers need to think about the world and to look outward, rather than to pretend that definitions can solve the problem. They need to ask which approach would make our constitutional order better rather than worse.

People are frequently exposed to competing evidence about climate change. We examined how new information alters people’s beliefs. We find that people who doubt that man-made climate change is occurring, and who do not favor an international agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, show a form of asymmetrical updating: They change their beliefs in response to unexpected good news (suggesting that average temperature rise is likely to be less than previously thought) and fail to change their beliefs in response to unexpected bad news (suggesting that average temperature rise is likely to be greater than previously thought). By contrast, people who strongly believe that man-made climate change is occurring, and who favor an international agreement, show the opposite asymmetry: They change their beliefs far more in response to unexpected bad news (suggesting that average temperature rise is likely to be greater than previously thought) than in response to unexpected good news (suggesting that average temperature rise is likely to be smaller than previously thought). The results suggest that exposure to varied scientific evidence about climate change may increase polarization within a population due to asymmetrical updating. We explore the implications of our findings for how people will update their beliefs upon receiving new evidence about climate change, and also for other beliefs relevant to politics and law.

The completion of the project of the International Law Commission (ILC) on "the expulsion of aliens" marked an important stage in the development of international law relating to migration. The resulting Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens reflect the joint effort of the ILC's distinguished experts on public international law, from all regions of the world, to enunciate principles that regulate states' exercise of a power that is frequently abused. The product of this multi-year effort deserves the attention and engagement of other experts in the field. of international migration, regardless of the cold reception it has initially received from states. The international law regarding expulsion of aliens is influenced by centuries-old interstate rules on responsibility for injury to another state's nationals as well as modern rules of human rights law, which I will construe here as including refugee law. The Draft Articles may someday serve as the basis for a multilateral treaty regulating the expulsion of aliens, and in the meantime they offer themselves as a reference for identifying states' international responsibilities within the scope of the topic. The introductory "general commentary" and the commentary on draft article point out that the Draft Articles involve both codification of existing international law and exercises in progressive development of international law-twin aspects of the ILC's mandate The goal of this Essay is to examine the Draft Articles from the human rights perspective. One should ask, to what extent do the Draft Articles measure up to existing human rights standards, to what extent do they fall short of those standards, and to what extent do they progress beyond the status quo in human rights law? This short Essay cannot be comprehensive, but it will explore what appear to me as the most important discrepancies that are not discussed by other essays in this symposium.

This article discusses the racial injustice faced by Native Americans, with whom land titles in the United States originated with. The author argues it is vital to interpret the Supreme Court cases of the 19th century that correctly defined Indian title, and to honor the property rights of Indian title just as we do the "fee simple of the whites".

Institutional corruption is typically viewed as a subset of corruption that is legal and systemic. There has been a surge of scholarship on institutional corruption in recent years, brought on in large part by a definition put forth by Lessig (2009b; 2013). Scholars have examined institutional corruption in various domains, such as Congress, the Department of Defense, and the pharmaceutical industry (Gilga, 2014; Sah & Fugh-Berman, 2013; Thompson, 2013). The growing body of research on institutional corruption has contributed to a much greater understanding of the legal corruption that is widespread in both public and private institutions; it has also raised new questions about institutional corruption. This paper systematically reviews the existing literature on institutional corruption and examines some of these remaining open questions. Specifically, we focus on the topics of institutional purpose, the funder-institution relationship, public trust, and personal responsibility, as they pertain to institutional corruption. Finally, we explore proposed solutions to institutional corruption, namely conflict of interest disclosure, conflict of interest elimination, and blinding.

This chapter describes the principal arguments about intellectual property rights as mechanisms for promoting the public interest, as opposed to particular private interests. Public interest arguments typically feature in balancing accounts of intellectual property rights that evince concern for the distribution of benefits as well as for the production of new works or inventions. Public interest rationales also often feature in justifications both for the rights themselves and for limitations or exceptions to those rights when private control of an intellectual resource would not promote the general welfare. The chapter considers patents, copyright, trademarks, and related rights, including the right of publicity. It concludes by examining various challenges faced by public interest accounts.

Some things, people say, are “gone forever.” But what exactly does that mean? Some losses are irreparable in the sense that nothing can be done to restore the status quo ante – or if something can be done, it is not enough (or perhaps outsiders can never know if it is). The Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle takes the form of an insistence on paying a premium to freeze the status quo and to maintain flexibility for the future, while new information is acquired. In many settings, it makes sense to pay for an option to avoid a risk of irreversible losses. An implicit understanding of option value can be found in the emphasis on irreversibility in National Environmental Policy Act and other federal statutes, along with many international agreements. The idea of irreversibility offers a distinctive perspective on the legal concept of “irreparable harm,” a prerequisite for granting preliminary injunctions. In fact some irreparable harms seem to qualify as such precisely because they are irreversible. We can obtain new insights into the time-honored idea of irreparable harm through the lens of irreversibility, especially in environmental cases but also in many contexts, including freedom of speech, privacy, and discrimination on the basis of race and sex.

Do people think better in a foreign language? In some ways, yes. There is considerable evidence to this effect, at least to the extent that they are less likely to rely on intuitions that can lead to serious errors. This finding reinforces, and makes more plausible, a central claim in regulatory policy, which involves the value of cost-benefit analysis. In a sense, cost-benefit analysis is a foreign language, and it reduces the risk that people will rely on intuitions that cause serious errors. Do people think better in a foreign language? D'une certaine façon, oui. Il existe des preuves considérables à cet effet, du moins dans la mesure où ils sont moins susceptibles de s'appuyer sur des intuitions qui peuvent conduire à de graves erreurs. Questa scoperta sottolinea e rende più plausibile, una richiesta centrale nella politica di regolamentazione, il che significa che il valore delle analisi costi-benefici. In gewissem Sinne ist die Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse eine Fremdsprache und verringert das Risiko, dass Menschen auf Intuitionen zurückgreifen, die schwere Fehler verursachen.

"While the law can create conflict between religion and health, it can also facilitate religious accommodation and protection of conscience. Finding this balance is critical to addressing the most pressing questions at the intersection of law, religion, and health in the United States: should physicians be required to disclose their religious beliefs to patients? How should we think about institutional conscience in the health care setting? How should health care providers deal with families with religious objections to withdrawing treatment? In this timely book, experts from a variety of perspectives and disciplines offer insight on these and other pressing questions, describing what the public discourse gets right and wrong, how policymakers might respond, and what potential conflicts may arise in the future. It should be read by academics, policymakers, and anyone else - patient or physician, secular or devout - interested in how US law interacts with health care and religion." -- Publisher

This paper estimates the impact of local labor market conditions on criminal recidivism using rich administrative prison records on over four million offenders released from 43 states between 2000 and 2013. Exploiting each offender’s exact date of release, I find that being released to a county with higher low-skilled employment and higher average low-skilled wages significantly decreases the risk of recidivism. The impact of higher wages on recidivism is larger for both black offenders and first-time offenders, and in sectors that report being more willing to hire ex-offenders. These results are robust to individual and county-level controls, policing and corrections activity, and do not appear to be driven by changes in the composition of released offenders during good or bad economic times.

Presently, in the United States there is a fair amount of speculation regarding the future of food and agricultural laws and policies, given the recent election of a new president. Based on campaign rhetoric and comments since the election, the next four-to-eight years could signal a dramatic shift in a variety of food policy areas, including specific provisions of the Farm Bill, incentives for local food systems and organic farmers, and conservation on farms. Additionally, the new Administration has been exceedingly vocal about immigration reform, which will have significant impacts on the food and farming sectors. 

The concept of a national food strategy is not new. Other countries, facing similar food system challenges, have developed national food strategies to address these challenges in a holistic and integrated manner. These strategies represent an acknowledgement that, like the United States, many countries have an uncoordinated set of laws and policies that impact the food system. The creation of a national food strategy is both an effort to understand myriad laws and policies related to the food system, and a means by which to chart a path forward with a clear set of goals and priorities to guide future decision making. Although the United States does not have a national food strategy, it has developed national strategies in response to other issues of national concern, such as antibiotic-resistant bacteria or HIV/AIDS, where a coordinated response was needed.

While the incoming Administration's food and agricultural policies remain uncertain, the creation of a national strategy can address many existing food system regulatory challenges. Such a strategy could be created in one of two ways. First, the incoming Administration can commit to a national food strategy that may comprehensively address, prioritize, and set goals related to many of the issues important to American voters, including public health, the economy, immigration, the environment, and trade. Alternatively, stakeholders can begin the process--as they have done internationally--to develop their own strategy to present to the next Administration. This Article argues that either of these outcomes is superior to the status quo, yet concludes a national food strategy in the United States will ultimately require governmental engagement to achieve the benefits of long-term, coordinated food system law and policy making.

The enormous misdemeanor system is an increasingly important and fertile area of criminal justice reform. With over 10 million cases filed each year, vastly outnumbering felonies, the petty offense process is how most Americans experience the criminal justice system. Characterized largely by speed, informality, and a lack of regulation and transparency, the petty-offense process generates millions of criminal convictions as well as burdensome punishments that affect employment, housing, education, and immigration. This chapter explains the major policy issues raised by the misdemeanor system, including its assembly-line quality, high rates of wrongful conviction, its racial skew, and how it quietly impoverishes working people and the poor. Key targets of reform include arrest, bail, prosecutorial policies, the right to counsel, diversion, decriminalization, debtor’s prison, criminal records, and collateral consequences.

As a result of movements for labeling food with genetically modified organisms (GMOs) Congress enacted a mandatory labeling requirement in 2016. These movements, and the legislation, raise recurring questions about mandatory product labels: whether there is a market failure, neoclassical or behavioral, that justifies them, and whether the benefits of such labels justify the costs. The first goal of this essay is to identify and to evaluate the four competing approaches that agencies now use to assess the costs and benefits of mandatory labeling in general. The second goal is to apply those approaches to the context of GM food. Assessment of the benefits of mandatory labels presents especially serious challenges. Agencies have (1) claimed that quantification is essentially impossible; (2) engaged in breakeven analysis; (3) projected various endpoints, such as health benefits or purely economic savings; and (4) relied on private willingness to pay for the relevant information. All of these approaches run into serious normative and empirical challenges. In principle, (4) is best, but in practice, (2) is sometimes both the most that can be expected and the least that can be demanded. Many people favor labeling GM food on the ground that it poses serious risks to human health and the environment, but with certain qualifications, the prevailing scientific judgment is that it does no such thing. In the face of that judgment, some people respond that even in the absence of evidence of harm, people have “a right to know” about the contents of what they are eating. But there is a serious problem with this response: there is a good argument that the benefits of such labels would be lower than the costs. Consumers would obtain no health benefits from which labels. To the extent that they would be willing to pay for them, the reason (for many though not all) is likely to be erroneous beliefs, which are not a sufficient justification for mandatory labels. Moreover, GMO labels might well lead people to think that the relevant foods are harmful and thus affirmatively mislead them. Some people contend that GMOs pose risks to the environment (including biodiversity), to intelligible moral commitments, or to nonquantifiable values. Many people think that the key issue involves the need to take precautions in the face of scientific uncertainty: Because there is a non-zero risk that GM food will cause irreversible and catastrophic harm, it is appropriate to be precautionary, through labels or through more severe restrictions. The force of this response depends on the science: If there is a small or uncertain risk of serious harm, precautions may indeed be justified. If the risk is essentially zero, as many scientists have concluded, then precautions are difficult to justify. The discussion, though focused on GM foods, has implications for disclosure policies in general, which often raise difficult questions about hard-to-quantify benefits, the proper use of cost-benefit balancing, and the appropriate role of precautionary thinking.

Originalism is not about the text. Though the theory is often treated as a way to read the Constitution’s words, that conventional view is misleading. A society can be recognizably originalist without any words to interpret: without a written constitution, written statutes, or any writing at all. If texts aren’t fundamental to originalism, then originalism isn’t fundamentally about texts. Avoiding that error helps us see what originalism generally is about: namely, our present constitutional law, and its dependence on a crucial moment in the past.

From free and open source software, through Wikipedia to video journalism, peer production plays a more significant role in the information production environment than was theoretically admissible by any economic model of motivation and organization that prevailed at the turn of the millennium. Its sustained success for a quarter of a century forces us to reevaluate three core assumptions of the standard models of innovation and production. First, it places intrinsic and social motivations, rather than material incentives, at the core of innovation, and hence growth. Second, it challenges the centrality of property, as opposed to the interaction of property and commons, to growth. And third, it questions the continued centrality of firms to the innovation process.

On June 23, 2017, the Supreme Court’s 5-3 decision in Murr v. Wisconsin provided some long-awaited guidance for courts to use in defining the relevant unit of property to perform regulatory takings analyses. The Court announced a new three-part test, tasking lower courts with two different multifactor inquiries to determine whether a federal regulatory taking has occurred. First, the court must figure out the right unit of property, and second, it must determine whether just compensation is owed using the three-pronged test articulated forty years ago in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City. Despite its resort to multiple factors to determine the relevant unit of property, Murr is most striking because of an important one it minimizes: state-specific positive law. Takings doctrine has long valued, incorporated, and awarded protection to varied unique forms of state property. This constitutional property federalism is widely perceived as desirable, encouraging beneficial competition and innovation in the forms and content of property rights in different jurisdictions. This Essay argues that the Murr decision threatens constitutional property federalism by inviting courts to define the scope of protected property interests using law and regulation across jurisdictional boundaries. As lower courts and scholars struggle to give meaning to Murr, its effects on the federalist structure of property should not be neglected.

Pennoyer v. Neff has a bad rap. As an original matter, Pennoyer is legally correct. Compared to current doctrine, it offers a more coherent and attractive way to think about personal jurisdiction and interstate relations generally. To wit: The Constitution imposes no direct limits on personal jurisdiction. Jurisdiction isn’t a matter of federal law, but of general law—that unwritten law, including much of the English common law and the customary law of nations, that formed the basis of the American legal system. Founding-era states were free to override that law and to exercise more expansive jurisdiction. But if they did, their judgments wouldn’t be recognized elsewhere, in other states or in federal courts—any more than if they’d tried to redraw their borders. As Pennoyer saw, the Fourteenth Amendment changed things by enabling direct federal review of state judgments, rather than making parties wait to challenge them at the recognition stage. It created a federal question of what had been a general one: whether a judgment was issued with jurisdiction, full stop, such that the deprivation of property or liberty it ordered would be done with due process of law. Reviving Pennoyer would make modern doctrine make more sense. As general-law principles, not constitutional decrees, jurisdictional doctrines could be adjusted by international treaty—or overridden through Congress’s enumerated powers. The Due Process Clause gives these rules teeth without determining their content, leaving space for federal rules to govern our federal system. In the meantime, courts facing jurisdictional questions should avoid pitched battles between “sovereignty” and “liberty,” looking instead to current conventions of general and international law. Pennoyer’s reasoning can be right without International Shoe’s outcome being wrong; international law and American practice might just be different now than they were in 1878 or 1945. But if not, at least we’ll be looking in the right place. General law may not be much, but it’s something: the conventional settlement of the problems of political authority at the root of any theory of personal jurisdiction. Recovering those conventions is not only useful for its own sake, but a step toward appreciating our deep dependence on shared traditions of general law.

War used to be a lucrative business. It was waged as a matter of course to expand territory, convert the religion of populations, resolve disputes, collect an unpaid debt, restore property, or punish another sovereign for a treaty violation. This was not only true as a matter of practical statecraft. It was also the accepted ethical prescription of Just War Theory. The modern jus ad bellum has transformed our view of war: From an instrument of self-interest, enforcement and punishment war has been proclaimed an evil which must be carried out only as a last resort and in self-defense. Yet, in this undoubtedly progressive move, we have also lost something – our ability to articulate the precise goals of the war, and consequently, to determine when the war must end. When self-defense is the only legitimate justification for waging war, every goal must be articulated in terms of self-defense and self-defense, in turn, becomes articulated through an endless array of goals: installing a democratic government in enemy territory, improving child literacy, empowering girls and women through education, enhancing agricultural production, building infrastructure or eliminating all terrorist threats around the globe. While the question of whether a military campaign is justified as a matter of self-defense is often debated, the question of what goals actually promote self-defense remains largely unaddressed. The problem lies not so much in lack of attention; rather, it is that even where a just cause of self-defense exists, the law is inadequate in giving us sufficient guidance on what and how much counts as a legitimate security interest. As a result, we can have no consensual vision of what victory can or should look like. Nor do we have a clear metric by which we can argue about it. In a world of perpetual threats, our existing legal framework invites perpetual war.

The longest running professional responsibility book on the market, Problems in Professional Responsibility for a Changing Profession has been thoroughly updated by its current and two new authors. It has retained its original problem-oriented focus on practical issues faced by lawyers in everyday practice, current issues faced by the profession, and its unique section examining the demographics, structure, and organization of the legal profession. The need of our profession to take account of our changing world is apparent in every chapter of the new edition.

As used in this paper, “proportionality” names a protocol for use in deciding questions of the constitutionality of laws. The protocol is typically understood to consist of a four- or five-step order of decisional march, of which there are multiple close-kindred versions in circulation. Debates about the virtues, vices, and variations of the protocol and its deployment routinely construct the theater of action as a court of law engaged in judicial constitutional review. Adjudicative use of the protocol is what we think of as the central case. An aim of this paper is to achieve some first steps towards figuring out what relevance, if any, the protocol of proportionality might have for “extended” cases (as we may call them) of constitutional discourses outside the courts. I try here to think about the protocol’s pertinence, if any, to political-practice idealizations in which other political actors displace independent judiciaries as sole or final arbiters of constitutional compliance.

At the federal level in the United States, development of regulations is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the statute by which Congress authorized various federal agencies to develop rules with the force of law, under a process called “notice and comment rulemaking.” In 2011, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) published in the Federal Register an “Advanced Notice of Proposed Rule Making” (ANPRM) to begin the first public discussion in decades about amending the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, also known as the “Common Rule.” Over 1,100 public comments were submitted. In 2015, HHS along with several other federal agencies issued a “Notice of Proposed Rule Making” (NPRM), the second step in the process toward revising the Common Rule. This time, the agencies received nearly 2,200 public comments. Courts have interpreted the APA to require that agencies consider public comments with an “open mind” susceptible to persuasion, although this does not require an agency to actually change what has been proposed. Given the relatively lax legal standard for engaging with public comments, it seems clear that despite widespread opposition to several key changes that have been proposed to the Common Rule, the agencies are free to finalize the rule essentially as set forth in the NPRM. In our view, this would be an extremely worrisome outcome, but one offering little to no legal recourse—and given the pace of change to the Common Rule over the past several decades, not one likely to be corrected any time soon.

Trademark scholars widely agree that our current system for evaluating what rights a trademark owner should have over others’ uses of their (or similar) marks is broken. Courts too readily find too many acts to be infringing even when they’re harmless or actually useful to consumers. Trademark practitioners, meanwhile, while often quite approving of broad interpretations of trademark law, widely recognize that our trademark registration system has significant practical problems. What we haven’t done is try to unite concerns over the expansion of trademark rights with concerns over the registration system and explain their relationship to each other. Registration offers some of the most challenging puzzles in trademark law. Consider: If the mark REDSKINS for a football team is disparaging and its trademark registration therefore invalid, can trademark law nonetheless protect the team against unauthorized uses of the term? This question became more than theoretical when a district court recently upheld the invalidation of the REDSKINS registrations, a ruling now on appeal and likely headed to the Supreme Court. Or suppose the PTO determines that, in the abstract, an applied-for trademark is likely to cause confusion with another previously registered mark. If the applicant decides to use the mark anyway, without a registration, should the PTO’s determination bind a federal court asked to determine whether the new mark, as actually used, causes confusion with that previously registered mark? The Supreme Court just decided this issue in a way that generated large-scale uncertainty about the new relationship between registration and infringement liability. These questions, and a number of others, highlight the need for renewed attention to trademark registration as such. Registration provides opportunities to limit trademark’s current structurelessness. Specifically, registration works best in a system that doesn’t aim to search out and extirpate every possible instance of confusion, instead recognizing multiple reasons that we might avoid fact-intensive confusion inquiries and either ban or allow certain market behaviors. Moreover, maintaining the registration system requires the investment of substantial government and private resources, which is currently almost irrelevant at the enforcement stage. Applicants and the PTO spend much time and effort crafting the equivalent of an exquisitely detailed origami crane; rather than considering the details, courts then ask the equivalent of “is this paper folded?” and move on. Not only is this a waste of resources, but it also leads courts to misunderstand the proper scope of a registration. There are a number of changes, ranging from small tweaks to sweeping statutory reforms and the rejection of the Supreme Court’s ahistorical conclusion that registration is a matter of factual accident rather than an important distinction between types of marks, that could improve the law to the benefit of trademark owners and nonowners alike.

Many people insist on drawing a line between active choosing and paternalism, but that line is often illusory. Whenever private or public institutions override people’s desire not to choose, and insist on active choosing, they are likely to be behaving paternalistically, through a kind of choice-requiring paternalism. Active choosing can be seen as a form of libertarian paternalism if people are permitted to opt out of choosing in favor of a default (and in that sense not to choose). This is a distinctive approach – “simplified active choosing” – and in many contexts, it has considerable appeal. By contrast, active choosing is a form of nonlibertarian paternalism insofar as people are required to choose. These points have implications for a range of issues in law and policy, suggesting that those who favor active choosing, or insist on it, may well be overriding people’s preferences (for better or for worse).

Advances in medicine often depend on the effective collection, storage, research use, and sharing of human biological specimens and associated data. But what about the sources of such specimens? When a blood specimen is drawn from a vein in your arm, is that specimen still you? Is it your property, intellectual or otherwise? Should you be allowed not only to consent to its use in research but also to specify under what circumstances it may be used? These and other questions are at the center of a vigorous debate over the use of human biospecimens in research. In this book, experts offer legal, regulatory, and ethical perspectives on balancing social benefit and human autonomy in biospecimen research. After discussing the background to current debates as well as several influential cases, including that of Henrietta Lacks, the contributors consider the rights, obligations, risks, and privacy of the specimen source; different types of informed consent under consideration (broad, blanket, and specific); implications for special patient and researcher communities; and the governance of biospecimen repositories and the responsibilities of investigators.

The attached paper is a draft of the concluding chapter in a book about religion in relation to other social systems (governments, economic markets, and secular social groups and entities). Prior chapters reviewed multiple theories and many empirical studies, as well as social-science scholarship, bearing on the relative advantages and costs of the four types of systems as they attempt to provide multiple kinds of benefits for human individuals and groups. The attached table of contents may give a more concrete sense of those inquires. A general theme that emerged was that the four systems not only have relative advantages and disadvantages that vary by type of benefit or cost, but also by specific context and over time, as there are changes in external factors like social scale and technological developments. Some general trends are identified in the prior chapters. The final chapter is deliberately cast as a reflective essay. It speculates about the future of religion over the next several centuries (e.g., to the year 2500), and identifies three categories of predictions: virtually complete decline; fluctuating endurance; and morphological evolution. It then considers high-level arguments for and against them. For example: (1) The virtually complete secularization model seems supported by trends in some advanced economies, e.g., in western Europe and more recently in the US, by reflection on efficiency improvements in the other social systems, and by arguments about the impact of science and reason on religious beliefs. But the better and more comprehensive global demographic evidence indicates a very different pattern of trends. The essay reflects on likely explanations of the conflict between prediction and evidence, ranging from the differential fertility rates of secular and religious groups to theological moves in all dominant world religions that aim to blunt the apparent conflict between reason and religion. (2) The fluctuating endurance model is supported by some painstaking historical accounts of the development of religions over the centuries. But it is also called into question by historical studies of the evolution of religions over the millennia, and by recent multidisciplinary work on cultural evolution. (3) The same historical and multidisciplinary work also supports the plausibility of expecting another fairly fundamental evolution in the features of those world religions, or spinoffs from them, that will be successful in the future. To explore this possibility more systematically, the paper first offers ideal-type general descriptions of three prior stages – religion for good personal fortune; religion for public goods; and religion for pro-social norms – and offers thoughts on how the later stages each involved changes along multiple but related dimensions of religion and how those changes were related to changes in the typical external human environment. Finally, the paper then speculates about a plausibly emerging fourth stage – religion for expanding circles – in which there is more emphatic, widespread, and effective emphasis on norms relating to moral concern for out-groups and future generations, and ties such shifts to mega-changes (like greater globalization and environmental sustainability challenges) in the modern human environment. It then imagines, as a thought experiment, how the seven typical mechanisms of the dominant world religions might be modified in the fourth stage.

Pepper & Nettle use an evolutionary framework to argue that “temporal discounting” is an appropriate response to low socioeconomic status (SES), or deprivation. We suggest some conceptual refinements to their “appropriate-response” perspective, with the hope that it usefully informs future research on and public policy responses to the relationship between deprivation and temporal discounting.

When should a court interpreting some statutory provision consider information besides the text—legislative history, surrounding provisions, practical consequences, the statute’s title, etc.? This might be one of the most asked questions of statutory interpretation. One recurring answer in the Court’s cases is the “plain meaning rule,” which is something of a compromise. If the statute’s meaning is “plain,” the other information can’t be considered. If it isn’t plain, the information comes in. The rule seems to make obvious sense as an intermediate position between strict textualism and some form of pragmatism. And yet, once we think a little more deeply about the plain meaning rule, we ought to see that its basic structure is puzzling. Information that is relevant shouldn’t normally become irrelevant just because the text is clear. And vice versa: irrelevant information shouldn’t become useful just because the text is less than clear. We can sketch some conditions under which this puzzling structure could be justified, but we highly doubt that they could justify the plain meaning rule in its current form.