Faculty Bibliography

This update applies to the Seventh Edition (2013) of Areeda, Kaplow & Edlin, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, and Cases.

In Gundy Justice Gorsuch offered two characterizations of the facts in the Schechter case: (1) “Kosher butchers such as the Schechters had a hard time following [the rules that required ‘straight-killing’ of chickens].” (2) “Yet the government apparently singled out the Schechters as a test case; inspectors repeatedly visited them and, at times, apparently behaved abusively toward their customers.” Justice Gorsuch relied upon Amity Shlaes’s book The Forgotten Man to support these assertions. In a blog post I criticized Shlaes’s account, and used Justice Gorsuch’s reliance upon it to illustrate what I called epistemic closure in the construction of the law – by which I meant the reliance upon a closed set of sources written by authors who generally shared a specific outlook on the way the world works. Josh Blackman and Shlaes responded to my criticism. But, as I show here, their responses are largely mistaken and (or perhaps because) undertheorized because of their failure (or perhaps inability – an inability that may be intrinsic to the process) to recognize the existence of epistemic closure.

Law of Asylum in the United States is an authoritative presentation of U.S. asylum law, long considered a must-have publication for practitioners, students, researchers, and teachers. It is frequently relied upon and cited by practitioners and decision makers. Law of Asylum describes and interprets U.S. statutes, regulations, and cases, as well as numerous international sources, providing an up-to-date analysis of all aspects of asylum law. This edition has been thoroughly updated to capture recent developments in asylum law and policy, including the Trump Administration's policy changes, children's credibility, formulation of particular social groups, the material support bar to asylum eligibility, the one-year filing deadline, ongoing Safe Third Country Act litigation, and reinstatement of removal. The extensive Procedures Appendix has been expanded and thoroughly updated to provide an invaluable resource for practitioners and researchers interested in U.S. asylum processes. In addition, this edition includes numerous unpublished Board of Immigration Appeals and immigration judge decisions In addition, this edition includes numerous unpublished Board of Immigration Appeals and immigration judge decisions and asylum officer training materials in accessible perma.cc format to guide practitioners and researchers. Law of Asylum also addresses fundamental issues such as: The meaning of "well-founded fear" and "persecution" The five grounds for asylum (race, religion, nationality, social group membership, and political opinion) Withholding of removal protection and protection under the Convention Against Torture Claims based on childhood status and gender-based persecution When nonstate actors can be considered agents of persecution Extensive coverage of gang membership/opposition to gangs Elements of proof Credibility determinations Recent changes in statutory language enacted with the REAL ID Act BIA cases on social distinction and particularity

The Logocratic Method, and the Logocratic theory that underwrites it, provide a philosophical explanation of three purposes or goals that arguers have for their arguments: to make arguments that are internally strong (the premises follow from the conclusions, to a greater or lesser degree—greatest degree in valid deductive arguments), or that are dialectically strong (win in some forum of argument competition, as for example in litigation contests of plaintiffs or prosecutors on the one hand, and defendants, on the other), or that are rhetorically strong (effective at persuading a targeted audience). This article presents the basic terms and methods of Logocratic analysis and then uses a case study to illustrate the Logocratic explanation of arguments. Highlights of this explanation are: the use of a (non-moral) virtue (and vice) framework to explicate the three strengths and weaknesses of arguments that are of greatest interest to arguers in many contexts (including but not limited to the context of legal argument), the Logocratic explication of the structure of abduction generally and of legal abduction specifically, the concept of a system of arguments, and the concept of the dynamic interactive virtue (and vice) of arguments—a property of systems of arguments in which the system of arguments as a whole (for example, the set of several arguments typically offered by a plaintiff or by a defendant) is as virtuous (or vicious) as are the component arguments that comprise the system. This is especially important since, according to Logocratic theory (and as illustrated in detail in this paper), some arguments, such as abduction and analogical argument, are themselves comprised of different logical forms (for example, abduction always plays a role within analogical argument, and either deduction or defeasible modus ponens, always plays a role within legal abduction).

This supplement brings the principal text current with recent developments in the law.

In the modern era, the statements and actions of public figures are scrutinized with great care, and it often emerges that they have said or done things that many people consider objectionable, hurtful, offensive, or despicable. A persistent question is whether public figures should apologize for those statements or actions. Suppose that an apology has a purely strategic motivation: helping a politician to be elected or reelected, helping an executive to keep his job, helping a nominee to be confirmed by the U.S. Senate. Empirical work presented here suggests that an apology might well turn out to be futile or even counterproductive. One reason is Bayesian; an apology produces updating that can be unfavorable to the apologizer (by, for example, resolving doubts about whether the apologizer actually said or did the objectionable thing, and about whether what the apologizer did was actually objectionable). Another reason is behavioral; an apology triggers the public’s attention, makes the public figure’s wrongdoing more salient, and can help define him or her. But many open questions remain about the reasons why apologies by public figures fail, and about the circumstances in which they might turn out to be effective.

This article argues that Calabresi and Melamed’s “Cathedral” framework of property rules, liability rules, and inalienability rules needs to be extended using the tools of complex systems theory in order to capture important institutional features of the law. As an applied field, law and economics looks to law in choosing the appropriate analytical tools from economics—something that Calabresi has identified (in strong form) as law and economics as opposed to economic analysis of law. Recognizing law as a complex system requires a rethinking of some Realist-inspired assumptions that underpin economically inspired analysis of law. These assumptions include a preference for narrow, concrete concepts and a skepticism about traditional doctrines and baselines—and ultimately Legal Realism’s extreme nominalism and the strong bundle of rights picture of property. The article shows how the Calabresi and Melamed (C&M) framework exhibits gaps that can be addressed by systems theory; these include narrow entitlements to engage in specific activities, liability rules that allow an affected party to buy out an activity (Rule 4), opportunistic behavior by parties that destabilizes liability rules, and the role of equity as an institutional response. Extending the C&M framework to treat it as a system helps prevent the C&M framework from flattening the law out. If we supplement the C&M framework to take account of law as a system, we can bring it closer to Calabresian law and economics.

Ingestible electronic sensors are a promising technology for improving health outcomes that may, for example, be useful in monitoring and promoting the taking of medication. However, these sensors also raise ethical and legal challenges that need to be considered by all stakeholders—notably, the creators of such products—at the earliest stages of the development process. Here, we examine selected ethical and legal issues related to ingestible electronic sensors. We first briefly describe sensors that are already available on the US and European markets as well as potential future sensor combinations. We then focus on ethical aspects, discussing patient, provider, and social issues. Finally, we provide a comparative analysis of legal regulation of ingestible electronic sensors in the US and Europe.

The Football Players Health Study at Harvard University (FPHS) is a unique transdisciplinary, strategic initiative addressing the challenges of former players’ health after having participated in American style football (ASF). The whole player focused FPHS is designed to deepen understanding of the benefits and risks of participation in ASF, identify risks that are potentially reversible or preventable, and develop interventions or approaches to improve the health and wellbeing of former players. We are recruiting and following a cohort of former professional ASF players who played since 1960 (current n = 3785). At baseline, participants complete a self‐administered standardized questionnaire, including initial reporting of exposure history and physician‐diagnosed health conditions. Additional arms of the initiative are addressing targeted studies, including promising primary, secondary, and tertiary interventions; extensive in‐person clinical phenotyping, and legal and ethical concerns of the play. This paper describes the components of the FPHS studies undertaken and completed thus far, as well as those studies currently underway or planned for the near future. We present our initiatives herein as a potential paradigm of one way to proceed (acknowledging that it is not the only way). We share what we have learned so that it may be useful to others, particularly in regard to trying to make professional sports meet the needs of multiple stakeholders ranging from players to owners, to fans, and possibly even to parents making decisions for their children.

As financial institutions move their operations, including core functions, to the cloud, financial regulators have begun to issue regulations and informal guidance addressing the use of cloud services in the financial sector. These are typically based on the regulator’s existing framework for outsourcing by a financial institution to third-party technology providers, under which the risks associated with outsourcing and the supervision of third-party providers are primarily the responsibility of the financial institution. This report provides background on the use of cloud computing in the financial sector, reviews existing regulatory and supervisory frameworks for cloud use by financial institutions, and recommends improvements to those frameworks that could reduce obstacles to more widespread cloud adoption by financial institutions.

In this paper, we examine the actual and potential roles of silence as an element of jus ad bellum treaty law and customary international law. By silence, we mean a lack of a publicly discernible response either to conduct reflective of a legal position or to the explicit communication of a legal position. We focus here on the silence of States and the United Nations Security Council as the primary actors who are positioned to shape, interpret, and apply jus ad bellum. We evaluate how silence has been employed by various scholars in making legal arguments in this field, and how silence may have the potential to affect the formation, identification, modification, and termination of various doctrines. We submit that there is no quantum of silence that has clear doctrinal force. We argue that, at least in relation to jus ad bellum, only certain forms of qualified silence — whether of States or of the Security Council — may be capable of contributing to legal effects. We further contend that, due in part to the nature and status of the norms underlying this field, those forms of qualified silence ought not to be lightly presumed. Arguably, there is a strong, if rebuttable, presumption that silence alone does not constitute acceptance of a jus ad bellum claim. Still, States and other international actors should be aware of the possible role that their silence could play in the identification and development of this field. We complement our analysis with an Annex that offers the most comprehensive catalogue to date of communications made by U.N. Member States to the Security Council of measures taken in purported exercise of the right of self-defense. The catalogue records over 400 communications made since the founding of the United Nations in late October 1945 through 2018. These communications reflect the views of the submitting State(s) on the scope of the right to employ force on the purported basis of self-defense.

With vivid and compelling writing, Tamir Moustafa in Constituting Religion takes us into the Malaysian state’s creation and management of law that is purportedly Islamic. Following in the line of...

An ideal accompaniment to any civil procedure casebook, including the authors' own Civil Procedure: Doctrine, Practice, and Context, Fifth Edition, the 2019-2020 statutory supplement presents the current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). Useful cross-references to Advisory Committee Notes, Restatement sections, and Transnational Rules have been integrated into the FRCP to help students explore the larger context of each Rule.

On political questions, many people are especially likely to consult and learn from those whose political views are similar to their own, thus creating a risk of echo chambers or information cocoons. Here, we test whether the tendency to prefer knowledge from the politically like-minded generalizes to domains that have nothing to do with politics, even when evidence indicates that person is less skilled in that domain than someone with dissimilar political views. Participants had multiple opportunities to learn about others’ (1) political opinions and (2) ability to categorize geometric shapes. They then decided to whom to turn for advice when solving an incentivized shape categorization task. We find that participants falsely concluded that politically like-minded others were better at categorizing shapes and thus chose to hear from them. Participants were also more influenced by politically like-minded others, even when they had good reason not to be. The results demonstrate that knowing about others’ political views interferes with the ability to learn about their competency in unrelated tasks, leading to suboptimal information-seeking decisions and errors in judgement. Our findings have implications for political polarization and social learning in the midst of political divisions.

Like other contributors to this special issue and beyond, I believe we are at a critical inflection point in human rights and need to re-energize our work broadly to address growing economic inequality as well as inequalities based on different axes of identity. In relation to the constellation of fields involved in ‘health and human rights’ specifically—which link distinct communities with dissonant values, methods and orthodoxies—I argue that we also need to challenge ideas that are taken for granted in the fields that we are trying to transform. After setting out a personal and subjective account of why human rights-based approaches (HRBAs) are unlikely to be meaningful tools for social change as they are now generally being deployed, I suggest we collectively—scholars, practitioners and advocates—need to grapple with how to think about: (1) biomedicine in relation to the social as well as biological nature of health and well-being; and (2) conventional public health in relation to the social construction of health within and across borders and health systems. In each case, I suggest that challenging accepted truths in different disciplines, and in turn in the political economy of global health, have dramatic implications for not just theory but informing different strategies for advancing health (and social) justice through rights in practice.

This Article contributes to the long-standing and heated debate over dual-class companies by placing a spotlight on a significant set of dual-class companies whose structures raise especially severe governance concerns: those with controllers holding a small minority of the company’s equity capital. Such small-minority controllers dominate some of the country’s largest companies, and we show that their numbers can be expected to grow. We begin by analyzing the perils of small-minority controllers, explaining how they generate considerable governance costs and risks and showing how these costs can be expected to escalate as the controller’s stake decreases. We then identify the mechanisms that enable such controllers to retain their power despite holding a small or even a tiny minority of the company’s equity capital. Based on a hand-collected analysis of governance documents of these companies, we present novel empirical evidence on the current incidence and potential growth of small-minority and tiny-minority controllers. Among other things, we show that governance arrangements at a substantial majority of dual-class companies enable the controller to reduce his equity stake to below 10% and still retain a lock on control, and a sizable fraction of such companies enable retaining control with less than a 5% stake. Finally, we examine the considerable policy implications that arise from recognizing the perils of small-minority controllers. We first discuss disclosures necessary to make transparent to investors the extent to which arrangements enable controllers to reduce their stake without forgoing control. We then identify and examine measures that public officials or institutional investors could take to ensure that controllers maintain a minimum fraction of equity capital; to provide public investors with extra protections in the presence of small-minority controllers; or to screen midstream changes that can introduce or increase the costs of small-minority controllers.

About two decades ago Stephen Gardbaum and I noticed something seemingly new in constitutional design: the emergence of a “New Commonwealth Model” of constitutional review or “weak-form” judicial review.1 Our starting point was constitutional review under the Canadian Charter of Rights and, in particular, its theorization by Peter Hogg and Alison Bushell Thornton as creating opportunities for dialogue between legislatures and constitutional courts.

On April 2019, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) on the definition of "fiduciary capacity" regarding "directed trusts." The ANPR references in particular the Uniform Directed Trust Act (UDTA) (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017). We served as the Reporter (Morley) and Chair (Sitkoff) of the drafting committee for the UDTA. Following the UDTA, we use the term “directed trust” to refer to a trust in which the terms of the trust grant a person other than a trustee a power over some aspect of the trust’s administration. As the prefatory note to the UDTA explains, “[t]here is no consistent vocabulary to describe the person other than a trustee that holds a power in a directed trust. Several terms are common in practice, including ‘trust protector,’ ‘trust adviser,’ and ‘trust director.’” The same is true for the trustee in a directed trust, who may be “sometimes called an ‘administrative trustee’ or ‘directed trustee.’” Following the UDTA, we will refer to a trustee in a directed trust as a “directed trustee,” a person who is not a trustee with a power over the administration of the trust as a “trust director,” and the power that a trust director holds over the administration of the trust as a “power of direction.” The hard question of law and policy raised by the proliferation of directed trusts is how to address the many complications created by giving a power of direction to a trust director, including in particular how to allocate fiduciary responsibility among a trust director and a directed trustee. The patchwork of modern state directed trust statutes, which to varying degrees has displaced the older but more consistent common law regime, has given rise to uncertainty that, in the words of the ANPR, may “make it difficult for institutions to assess and manage litigation risk and to understand OCC expectations for managing these accounts in a safe and sound manner.” We are in agreement that additional OCC guidance on directed trusts could be helpful. However, we have six concerns about the way the ANPR frames the issue, which we elaborate in this comment letter.

Given the well-documented risks associated with anonymous companies, there’s no longer any serious question that governments should collect accurate information on companies’ “ultimate beneficial owners” (UBOs), and should make this information available to law enforcement and entities conducting due diligence.

This essay explores Marc Blitzstein’s 1937 labor opera, The Cradle Will Rock, as an assault on legal legitimacy. Since its famous first production—a pared-down performance in which actors delivered their parts from the house, improvised when the WPA canceled the scheduled opening of the controversial project—critics have emphasized Cradle’s indebtedness to the German playwright Bertolt Brecht, to whom Blitzstein dedicated the work. Consistent with Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt, Blitzstein distances the audience from Cradle’s characters, substituting rational understanding for unreflective empathy. Like Brecht, he employs this theatrical device to expose the cultural and economic underpinnings of familiar social practices, including capitalism. Imported to the US context, the Brechtian reimagining of theatrical conventions resonated with a corresponding attack on formal legal justice. At the height of the New Deal’s crisis of legal legitimacy, Cradle depicts a judicial system baldly beholden to wealth and property. The anti-union steel magnate at the show’s center bribes and manipulates journalists, professionals, and public officials to promote his concept of “liberty,” namely, freedom from organized labor. By amplifying the effects of economic interests on legal outcomes while undermining empathy with the characters who facilitate and legitimate repression, Cradle invites the audience to consider its own complicity in law’s injustice.

Groups of people, outraged by some real or imagined transgression, often respond in a way that is wildly disproportionate to the occasion, thus ruining the transgressor’s day, month, year, or life. To capture that phenomenon, we might repurpose an old word: lapidation. Technically, the word is a synonym for stoning, but it sounds much less violent. It is also obscure, which makes it easier to enlist for contemporary purposes. Lapidation plays a role in affirming, and helping to constitute, tribal identity. It typically occurs when a transgressor is taken to have violated a taboo, which helps account for the different people and events that trigger left-of-center and right-of-center lapidation. One of the problems with lapidation is that it often accomplishes little; it expresses outrage, and allows people to signal their identity, but does no more. Victims of lapidation might be tempted to apologize, but apologies can prove ineffective or even make things worse, depending on the nature of the lapidators.

Crawford v. Washington, 542 U.S. 36 (2004), is the latest in a series of misconceived confrontation holdings. Its 'testimonial' hearsay standard has created endless confusion and done nothing to protect the rights of defendants nor the needs of fair jury trials. Constitutional confrontation requires legal sufficiency of proof. A crime may not be proved by hearsay alone. This is not a rule about the admissibility of hearsay evidence. It is a rule responsive to the injustice done to Sir Walter Raleigh mandating proof of criminal guilt by live-witness, personal-knowledge testimony sufficient to warrant conviction. Overruling Crawford and replacing it with a proper judicial understanding of the Sixth Amendment will rationalize confrontation law and restore the centrality of jury process to American criminal justice.

Class action law is built on a model that assumes a large group of individuals have similar legal claims of such small value that no one of them has the incentive or ability to litigate alone. Rule 23 resolves that collective action problem by enabling one class member to represent the group, with a common fund fee award sharing the costs across the class. The Constitution guarantees class members the options of opting out (exit) or objecting (voice), but given the small stakes, most do nothing (loyalty). While elegant, this model does not capture the reality of all class suits. In many cases, some class members have significant enough legal claims that they are capable of litigating alone. The group dynamics accordingly change, with everything turning on the decisions of the large claimants: in some securities cases, they step forward to perform a monitoring function (voice) and often they simply remain passive (loyalty), but the central question is whether they will opt out and litigate separately in the hopes of maximizing their recovery (exit). The risk that they might deters defendants from settling the class’s small claims, lest they then have to litigate the large claimants’ valuable claims. But the risk simultaneously creates an opportunity: if the class could present a united front, a defendant would likely pay a premium to settle the whole package of claims. Heterogeneous classes can therefore suffer a problem akin to a prisoner’s dilemma: every class member might be best off if they could work together, but lacking a mechanism to do so, coordination costs render the option elusive. The tragedy of this commons is that, built on a different template, class action law offers class members only the three options of exit, voice, or loyalty. In this Article, we offer heterogeneous class members a fourth option: cooperation. Our proposed mechanism for harnessing claimants’ cooperative instincts is a new form of class certification that we call “negotiation class certification.” Under this approach, class members would work together to generate a metric for distributing a lump sum settlement across the class. They would then ask the court to certify a “negotiation class” and to direct notice to the class members informing them that counsel will negotiate a lump sum settlement and that, if achieved, the lump sum amount would be put to a vote, with a supermajority vote binding the class; the notice would also explain the distributional metric. Any class member that did not want to bind itself to either the distributional metric or the supermajority voting process could opt out. By establishing the contours of the class prior to settlement discussions, negotiation class certification would provide the defendant with a precise sense of the scope of finality a settlement would produce, hence encouraging a fulsome offer. The proposal is a novel use of Rule 23, but it is, in many ways, a less ambitious one than certification of a settlement class, although the latter approach, controversial at its inception, has been a “stock device” in class action practice for nearly a quarter century. And while novel, negotiation class certification is consistent with the requirements of both Rule 23 and the Constitution. Indeed, engaging large class members in the settlement negotiation process ex ante improves on a system that delegates that authority to agents and involves the class only ex post.

Harvard Law Professor Mark Wu discusses the inevitable structural changes taking place in U.S.-China trade relations and how President Donald Trump has impacted these shifts.

Women’s rights lawyer Kathryn Kolbert argued the pro-choice case last time a serious attempt was made to overturn Roe v Wade. She explains her concerns that the Supreme Court might soon side with those keen to restrict access to abortion.

Merger and acquisition deals are governed by merger clauses which are negotiated between the bidder and target in order to communicate deal terms, specify risk sharing between the parties, and describe dispute management provisions in case of litigation. In a large sample of manually collected U.S. deal contracts involving publicly traded bidders and targets, we construct merger clauses indices based on legal scholars’ ex-ante prediction and examine the relationship between announcement returns and different types of merger clauses. We find that bidder protective clauses correlate with higher bidder returns while target protective clauses and pro-competition clauses correlate with higher target returns. We also find that bidder and target protective indices have larger impacts on announcement abnormal returns for “bad” deals than for “good” deals. Finally, we find that the inclusion of more bidder protective clauses leads to lower deal completion rates while the inclusion of more target protective clauses and pro-competition clauses has no impact on deal completion rates. These results are consistent with the expert lawyer/efficient contracting view of Cain, Macias, and Davidoff Solomon (2014), and Coates (2016), and against merger contracts as boilerplate agreements.

Two risk‐averse litigants with different subjective beliefs negotiate in the shadow of a pending trial. Through contingent contracts, the litigants can mitigate risk and/or speculate on the trial outcome. Contingent contracting decreases the settlement rate and increases the volume and costs of litigation. These contingent contracts mimic the services provided by third‐party investors, including litigation funders and insurance companies. The litigants (weakly) prefer to contract with risk‐neutral third parties when the capital market is transaction‐cost free. However, contracting with third parties further decreases the settlement rate, increases the costs of litigation, and may increase the aggregate cost of risk bearing.