Faculty Bibliography

Judges sometimes disagree about the best way to resolve a case. But the conventional wisdom is that they should not be too swayed by such disagreement and should do their best to decide the case by their own lights. An emerging critique questions this view, arguing instead for widespread humility. In the face of disagreement, the argument goes, judges should generally concede ambiguity and uncertainty in almost all contested cases. Both positions are wrong. Drawing on the philosophical concepts of “peer disagreement” and “epistemic peerhood,” we argue for a different approach: A judge ought to give significant weight to the views of others, but only when those others share the judge’s basic methodology or interpretive outlook—i.e., only when those others are methodological “friends.” Thus textualists should hesitate before disagreeing with other textualists, and pragmatists should hesitate before disagreeing with like-minded pragmatists. Disagreement between the two camps is, by contrast, “old news” and so provides neither camp additional reason for pause. We also suggest that judges should give weight to the views of all of their methodological friends, not just judges. And we suggest, even more tentatively, that our proposal may explain and, to some extent, justify the seemingly ideological clusters of justices on the Supreme Court. The most productive disagreements, we think, are ones that come from arguing with friends.

In 1976, the First National Bank of Boston, Gillette, and three other Massachusetts companies announced their plan to oppose a referendum authorizing a graduated income tax. State officials responded that Massachusetts law prohibited this type of corporate political expenditure. The U.S. Supreme Court intervened, declaring that Massachusetts could not prohibit speech based solely on the “corporate identity of the speaker.” The Court reasoned that shareholders through “corporate democracy” were better positioned than states to regulate companies’ political engagement. In the wake of this decision, the Boston City Council—a municipal corporation—announced its plan to spend its corporate dollars in support of a 1978 tax referendum. That same election, Massachusetts Citizens for Life—a nonprofit corporation—financed newsletters promoting anti-abortion candidates. State and federal officials again blocked these corporate political expenditures. This time, however, the Supreme Court protected only the nonprofit, observing that a “voluntary political association” did not “suddenly present the danger of corruption merely by assuming the corporate form.” These Supreme Court decisions armed business and nonprofit corporations with a powerful new weapon—the First Amendment—that future lawyers wielded against advertising bans, labor contracts, healthcare requirements, and, of course, campaign finance laws. At the same time, the decisions left the City of Boston unable to support referenda that the Bank of Boston was free to oppose. This paper will situate this “First Amendment libertarianism” in the political, legal, and social context of 1970s Boston, a city gripped by racial crisis and dependent on business corporations, especially the Bank of Boston, for financial survival. This context helps explain why courts, lawyers, and executives expected that shareholders could responsibly oversee governments better than governments could oversee shareholders—or themselves.

This chapter examines the scholarship that has dealt with the concept of hisba and the related position of muhtasib. The discussion includes a substantial section on the historical development of the concept of hisba and the position of muhtasib and a shorter section on their contemporary uses and practices. The historical section includes attention to the definitions and origins of the terms and to the position of the muhtasib, including the official’s jurisdiction, sources of law, biographies, and practice in particular historical contexts. The contemporary section focuses on the countries that have received the most scholarly attention regarding the practice of hisba and muhtasib today, notably Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Effy Vayena and colleagues argue that machine learning in medicine must offer data protection, algorithmic transparency, and accountability to earn the trust of patients and clinicians.

The prohibition against price fixing is competition law's most important and least controversial provision. Yet there is far less consensus than meets the eye on what constitutes price fixing, and prevalent understandings cannot be reconciled with principles of oligopoly theory. This article (1) presents a fundamental reconceptualization of our understanding of horizontal agreements, (2) develops a systematic analysis of price-fixing policy that focuses on its deterrence benefits and chilling costs, and (3) compares this direct approach to commentators’ favored formulations that typically involve some sort of formalistic communications-based prohibition. By targeting a subset of means rather than the illicit ends, conventional formulations tend to impose liability in cases with lower deterrence benefits and greater chilling costs than those reached under a direct approach and to incur greater administrative costs as well.

This paper develops a new test for identifying racial bias in the context of bail decisions – a high-stakes setting with large disparities between white and black defendants. We motivate our analysis using Becker's (1957) model of racial bias, which predicts that rates of pre-trial misconduct will be identical for marginal white and marginal black defendants if bail judges are racially unbiased. In contrast, marginal white defendants will have a higher probability of misconduct than marginal black defendants if bail judges are racially biased against blacks. To test the model, we develop a new estimator that uses the release tendencies of quasi-randomly assigned bail judges to identify the relevant race-specific misconduct rates. Estimates from Miami and Philadelphia show that bail judges are racially biased against black defendants, with substantially more racial bias among both inexperienced and part-time judges. We also find that both black and white judges are biased against black defendants. We argue that these results are consistent with bail judges making racially biased prediction errors, rather than being racially prejudiced per se.

The theory of insurance is considered here when an insured individual may be able to sue another party for the losses that the insured suffered—and thus when an insured has a potential source of compensation in addition to insurance coverage. Insurance policies reflect this possibility through so-called subrogation provisions that give insurers the right to step into the shoes of insureds and to bring suits against injurers. In a basic case, the optimal subrogation provisions involve full retention by the insurer of the proceeds from a successful suit and the pursuit of all positive expected value suits. This eliminates litigation risks for insureds and results in lower premiums—financed by the litigation income of insurers, including from suits that insureds would not otherwise have brought. Moreover, optimal subrogation provisions are characterized in the presence of moral hazard, administrative costs, and non-monetary losses, and it is demonstrated that optimal provisions entail sharing litigation proceeds with insureds in the first two cases but not when losses are non-monetary.

Dell Technologies Inc. (“Dell”) is planning a “backdoor-IPO” transaction that would bring it back to the public market with a multiclass structure. Dell’s return to the public market is expected to make it one of the ten largest multiclass companies with an aggregate capitalization substantially exceeding $50 billion. Building on our earlier work on multiclass structures, this Article identifies and analyzes three governance risks and costs that Dell’s IPO structure would create for public investors holding Dell’s low-voting stock: • Lifetime entrenchment of Michael Dell (“MD”): He would be able to retain control indefinitely even after he ceases to be a fitting leader and even if he becomes disabled or incompetent. • Small-minority controller: Although MD would initially hold a majority of the equity capital, Dell’s structure would enable him to unload most of his shares and still retain control even with a small equity stake, and his status as small-minority controller would be expected to produce substantial governance risks and costs. • Midstream changes: Dell’s governance structure would enable MD to adopt subsequent changes in governance arrangements, without any support from public investors, which would increase Dell's governance risks beyond the risks associated with a small-minority controller. Each of these governance risks can be expected to both (i) decrease the expected future value of Dell by increasing agency costs and distortions, and (ii) increase the discount to a per-share value of Dell at which low-voting shares of Dell can be expected to trade. Both types of effects would operate to reduce the value at which the low-voting shares of public investors would trade and therefore should be taken into account in assessing the risks to such investors posed by Dell’s planned structure.

This paper contends that the proper role of law in managing uses of traditional knowledge is highly contextual. In some settings, distributive justice, cultural diversity and group identity formation would be promoted by according Indigenous groups more power to control or to benefit from uses of knowledge developed and sustained by their members, while in other settings, respect for individual autonomy and the promotion of semiotic democracy counsel against providing the groups that power. The paper then outlines two alternative legal frameworks, either of which could accommodate this complex combination of competing values. The first would incorporate, in a multilateral treaty, a set of provisions that, by increasing the risk that the unauthorized use of traditional knowledge would result in forfeiture of intellectual property rights, would put pressure on private firms to accede to reasonable requests made by the governments of developing countries and by representatives of Indigenous groups. The second would augment and harness public discourse concerning the morality of particular uses of traditional knowledge by creating a disclosure obligation, disconnected from intellectual property law, analogous to the labelling requirements commonly imposed on the producers of food, clothing and drugs.

Policy-makers show an increasing interest in “nudges” – behaviorally motivated interventions that steer people in certain directions but maintain freedom of consumer choice. Despite this interest, little evidence has surfaced about which population groups support nudges and nudging. We report the results of nationally representative surveys in Denmark, Hungary, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Individual, household and geographic characteristics served as predictors of nudge approval, and the count of significant predictors as measures of controversy. Less high approval rates of nudges in Denmark and Hungary were reflected in higher controversy about “System 1” nudges, whereas the United Kingdom and Italy were marked by higher controversy about “System 2” nudges, despite high approval rates. High-controversy nudges tended to be associated with current public policy concerns, for example, meat consumption. The results point to means for effective targeting, and increase knowledge about the types of nudges likely to obtain public support.

In recent years, U.S. companies have raised more equity through private offerings available only to institutional and high-net-worth investors than through initial public offerings (“IPOs”) that are available to the general public. The number of U.S. public companies has also been steadily declining, and private start-up companies are frequently reaching billion-dollar valuations without opening up to the public for investment. In this report, Expanding Opportunities for U.S. Investors and Retirees: Private Equity, we examine whether U.S. policymakers should expand access to investments in private companies through private equity funds. A private equity fund refers to an investment vehicle that invests in the securities of private companies and that is not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) as an investment company. Private equity funds include buyout funds that acquire controlling stakes in businesses and venture capital funds that invest in young private companies with high growth opportunities. We find that private equity funds have a well-established performance history that justifies expanding investor access to them. We recommend three ways to do so. First, legislative reforms to expand access to direct investments in private equity funds. Second, SEC reforms to expand access to public closed-end funds that invest in private equity funds. And finally, Department of Labor (“DOL”) reforms to facilitate the ability of 401(k) plans to invest in private equity funds.

Twentieth Anniversary Edition with a new preface and afterword From the removal of Confederate monuments in New Orleans in the spring of 2017 to the violent aftermath of the white nationalist march on the Robert E. Lee monument in Charlottesville later that summer, debates and conflicts over the memorialization of Confederate “heroes” have stormed to the forefront of popular American political and cultural discourse. In Written in Stone Sanford Levinson considers the tangled responses to controversial monuments and commemorations while examining how those with political power configure public spaces in ways that shape public memory and politics. Paying particular attention to the American South, though drawing examples as well from elsewhere in the United States and throughout the world, Levinson shows how the social and legal arguments regarding the display, construction, modification, and destruction of public monuments mark the seemingly endless confrontation over the symbolism attached to public space. This twentieth anniversary edition of Written in Stone includes a new preface and an extensive afterword that takes account of recent events in cities, schools and universities, and public spaces throughout the United States and elsewhere. Twenty years on, Levinson's work is more timely and relevant than ever.

We report here the results of an RCT evaluating the effectiveness of a pro bono initiative’s oversubscribed divorce practice in Philadelphia County from January of 2011 until, effectively, July of 2016. The legal subject area was divorce, the quintessential example of a constitutional right that can be effectuated only by resort to the courts. Our study randomized an individual seeking assistance to pursue a divorce to either an effort by the service provider to find a pro bono attorney to represent her (treated group) or a referral to existing self-help or low bono resources coupled with an offer to answer questions by telephone (control group). Our study partner was the provider of last resort for free legal services in the Philadelphia County: it accepted intakes primarily via referrals from other organizations, and it required that service seekers exhaust all other options. Treated and control groups experienced different outcomes. If one limits one’s focus to Philadelphia County, where state venue laws “required” study participants and their opposing spouses to file, and where filing should have been most convenient for our study participants (who were all Philadelphia County residents), then we observe the following. Eighteen months after randomization, 54.1% of the treated group, as opposed to 13.9% of the control group, had a divorce case on record. Three years after randomization, 45.9% of treated group, as opposed to 8.9% of the control group, had achieved a termination of a marriage. The p-values for these differences (representing the probabilities that one would observe the numbers we observed, or numbers more extreme, if there were in fact no true difference between treated and control groups) were so low as to make them almost impossible to estimate; effectively, we observed instances of p = 0. If one expands one’s focus to other Pennsylvania counties, and thus considers filings by Philadelphia County residents who risked a dismissal due to improper venue and who abandoned the system they support as taxpayers, results remain statistically and substantively significant: 60.8% of the treated group, versus 36.3% of the control group, had a divorce case on file after 18 months, p < .00002; 50.0% of the treated group, versus 25.3% of the control group, succeeded in terminating the marriage in 36 months, p < .00002. When we account for the block randomization scheme we deployed, estimated effect sizes are a few percentage points larger than the numbers above would suggest. We conduct modeling to determine the effect of having a lawyer for divorce-seekers as a way of measuring the pro se accessibility of the divorce system. We find large effects, suggesting that the system is not accessible to pro se litigants.

There is not a single American awake to the world who is comfortable with the way things are.” So begins Lawrence Lessig's sweeping indictment of contemporary American institutions and the corruption that besets them. We can all see it—from the selling of Congress to special interests to the corporate capture of the academy. Something is wrong. It’s getting worse. And it’s our fault. What Lessig shows, brilliantly and persuasively, is that we can’t blame the problems of contemporary American life on bad people, as our discourse all too often tends to do. Rather, he explains, “We have allowed core institutions of America’s economic, social, and political life to become corrupted. Not by evil souls, but by good souls. Not through crime, but through compromise.” Every one of us, every day, making the modest compromises that seem necessary to keep moving along, is contributing to the rot at the core of American civic life. Through case studies of Congress, finance, the academy, the media, and the law, Lessig shows how institutions are drawn away from higher purposes and toward money, power, quick rewards—the first steps to corruption. Lessig knows that a charge so broad should not be levied lightly, and that our instinct will be to resist it. So he brings copious, damning detail gleaned from years of research, building a case that is all but incontrovertible: America is on the wrong path. If we don’t acknowledge our own part in that, and act now to change it, we will hand our children a less perfect union than we were given. It will be a long struggle. This book represents the first steps.

This book is published by the International Academy of Comparative Law to honor five great comparatists: Jean-Louis Baudouin from Canada, Xavier Blanc-Jouvan from France, Mary Ann Glendon from the United States of America, Hein Kötz from ...

A key aim of patient-centered outcomes research (PCOR) is to generate data that are important to patients by deliberately and extensively involving them in all aspects of research, from design to dissemination. However, certain elements of PCOR raise challenging and potentially novel ethical and regulatory issues for institutional review boards and oversight bodies. These challenges stem primarily from the engagement of patients in roles other than research subject, such as advisors, study personnel, and co-investigators, which gives rise to questions about appropriate levels of protection, training, and education, as well as identifying and managing conflicts of interest. This article presents and discusses recommendations from a Delphi expert panel that was convened to address these and other PCOR-related oversight challenges.

Disgust plays a role in structuring social relationships across class lines. Revulsion and fear of contamination reinforce spatial separation and the stigmatization of poverty. Moreover, terms such as ‘white trash’ indicate that class-based disgust can operate in the absence of other markers of low social status for which poverty often serves as a proxy. Although class-based disgust is rarely the principal impetus for the legal regulation of wealth and social status, it has consistently contributed to laws that denigrate and segregate the poor. Meanwhile, the theoretical capacity of law to mitigate economic inequality and, by extension, status-based distinctions has helped to render social class a putatively permeable category that is denied heightened constitutional scrutiny. Building from these premises, this chapter considers whether law might be used to dismantle the status-based stratification that exacerbates and legitimates disgust and, more equivocally, whether disgust might in some situations be redeployed to spur legal and social change.

This amicus brief, filed with the Delaware Supreme Court in Verition Partners v. Aruba Networks, addresses two topics: (i) application of the efficient market hypothesis in appraisal litigation and (ii) empirical scholarship regarding the effect of Delaware appraisal decisions and amendments to 8 Del. C. § 262 on premia in public M&A transactions.

The laws of other countries have a bearing on America’s own, writes Stephen Breyer—and the highest court in the land needs to take heed.

Today, most warfare is conducted with and through partners. As of March 2017, for example, the U.S. State Department identified 68 States and international institutions that formed the coalition against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In every partnership, each member brings its own legal interpretations, policy priorities, and military capabilities. Reconciling these disparate elements often poses significant difficulties, not least for legal advisors. While partnered warfare is by no means a recent invention, it is nonetheless vital that, in order to protect civilians, those who may be involved in or otherwise affected by such operations understand relevant risks and challenges. This one-session case study zooms in on one of the pivotal decision points in contemporary partnered conflicts: whether or not to share intelligence with a partner. With a focus on managing legal responsibility and protecting civilians, participants are primed to quickly weigh countervailing considerations, navigate interoperability challenges, and make strategic decisions in high-pressure, time-sensitive, complex operations involving several States and non-state armed groups. While fictionalized, the simulation exercise — which involves a growing threat from a designated terrorist group to a civilian population and several States — draws from experiences of recent diverse coalition operations. This case study’s general background document acquaints participants with foundations of the law and highlights ways to manage risk. The other case materials provide information about the simulation exercise’s setting as well as instructions for each of the simulation exercise’s six partners.

Fifty years ago the Tax Court adopted a small tax case procedure in 1968. A year later Congress formalized the procedure passing Code Sec. 7463.1 For most types of cases the Tax Court offers a choice between having your case heard via the "regular" procedure or the small tax case procedure. The regular procedure generally follows normal court formalities and allows the parties to appeal an adverse outcome to the appropriate US Court of Appeal. The small tax case procedure offers less formality and finality of outcome. In comparing the procedures, the discussion will presume that the default is to the regular procedure. This article will first discuss 15 things to think about in deciding whether to choose the small tax case instead of the regular procedure. By evaluating the factors differentiating the two types of Tax Court cases, a qualifying taxpayer with a ticket to Tax Court can choose the appropriate "forum" for their case within the Tax Court.

The dominant formulation for modeling the objective function of managers of competing firm with horizontal shareholding has been critiqued for producing the result that, if non-horizontal shareholders are highly dispersed, managers would mimic the interests of horizontal shareholders even if they own a share of the firm that does not induce full control. We show that this issue can be avoided (while maintaining the remaining features of the dominant approach) with an alternative formulation that is derived from a probabilistic voting model that assumes shareholders with higher financial stakes will take greater interest in the managerial actions, which yields the result that managers maximize a control-weighted sum of the shareholders’ relative returns.

The article explores the topic of judicial independence and impartiality in the U.S. The author reflects on the connection between an impartial judiciary system and security for financial investment and prosperity. The article also presents U.S. Supreme Court cases such as Worcester v. Georgia, Cooper v. Aaron, and Bush v. Gore. Other topics include the rule of law, racial segregation, and telephone justice.

Justice Anthony Kennedy’s retirement in July has the potential to significantly affect the field of environmental law for years to come. The Supreme Court’s 2019 docket includes cases that cover a litany of environmental issues, and his replacement will play a key role. For the past three decades, Justice Kennedy was a crucial swing vote on a variety of issues, including the 5-4 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA and 4-1-4 decision in Rapanos v. United States. These examples illustrate the changes that could lie ahead. On July 18, 2018, ELI held an expert panel exploring Justice Kennedy’s influence on environmental law, what his departure could mean for the future, and the nomination of Judge Brett Kavanaugh to the Court. This article presents a transcript of the discussion, which has been edited for style, clarity, and space considerations.

The conduct of adjudication is often influenced by motions--requests made by litigants to modify the course of adjudication. The question studied in this article is why adjudication is designed so as to permit the use of motions. The answer developed is that litigants will naturally know a great deal about their specific matter, whereas a court will ordinarily know little except to the degree that the court has already invested effort to appreciate it. By giving litigants the right to bring motions, the judicial system leads litigants to efficiently provide information to courts that is relevant to the adjudicative process.

The Advanced Introduction to Freedom of Expression provides an overview of major issues in the doctrinal structure of a law of freedom of expression, relevant to discussions of freedom of expression under many national constitutions. Assuming familiarity with basic theories of free expression, this book addresses the implications of reasonable disagreement between legislatures and courts about whether a specific measure violates freedom of expression, the implications of the fundamental proposition that speech can cause harm, the distinction between the coverage of freedom of expression and the protections it affords, and the appropriate doctrinal forms when speech is said to conflict with other rights such as equality, or merely other social interests. The book will be of interest to anyone, including students, teachers, researchers and policymakers wanting to learn more about the freedom of expression and the law.

Improper confinement of children in migration contexts – unnecessary, prolonged, or in harmful conditions – is a severe and troubling phenomenon. In that regard, the UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 35 (2014) summarizes the treaty body’s interpretation of the right to liberty of person, including protection against arbitrary detention, under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, one of the principal human rights treaties at the global level. This essay describes the Human Rights Committee’s approach to detention of migrants, including child migrants. It explains why General Comment No. 35 employs a broad definition of “detention,” and the resulting need for a nuanced and non-absolutist approach to the “detention” of children in migration contexts. Such “detention” is not invariably arbitrary, but rather should be used only as a measure of last resort, and for the shortest appropriate period of time.