Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information: The Article 9 Full Priority Debates, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 1373 (1997).
Abstract: A logical construction for the Symposium on the Priority of Secured Debt would have been an introduction to highlight the issues, followed by a panel of commentators supporting full priority, a panel opposing full priority, and a panel discussing the optimal implementation for any constraints on priority. ... Professor Schwartz revived an old debate in the newly discovered language of law and economics by asking whether secured debt is efficient. ... The first Committee brought order out of chaos, turning assets in which no security interest could reliably be enforced at state law into valuable collateral. ... Nor is it possible to hypothesize an unsecured creditor who lost a fortune while the secured creditor walked away with all the assets of a business saying much more than no. ... The full priority system gives full priority against only the unfavored groups who failed to persuade a legislature to pass a friendly statutory lien. ... A full priority system of secured credit permits some creditors to make a partial opt out from the bankruptcy system. ... Notwithstanding the features of bankruptcy that curtail the power of the secured creditor, the ability of the secured creditor to demand adequate protection and to insist on a priority repayment of assets effectively gives the secured creditor the power to block a reorganization.