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Jesse M. Fried, Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 421 (2000).

Abstract: Cash distributed to public shareholders is distributed through three mechanisms: dividends, open market repurchases (OMRs), and repurchase tender offers (RTOs). The leading explanation for why a corporation would distribute cash through an RTO rathe than an OMR or a dividend is the signaling theory: that managers use RTOs to signal that the stock is underpriced. The Article has three main purposes: (1) to challenge the signaling theory, by exposing a flaw in one of its key assumptions and presenting empirical data suggesting that the theory cannot account for most RTOs; (2) to show that the same empirical data are consistent with insiders using RTOs to engage in insider trading with public shareholders; and (3) to propose that insiders be (a) required to disclose their tendering decision before the close of the RTO and (b) forbidden from selling stock outside of the RTO until six months after the announcement date. The Article explains how this disclose/delay rule would substantially reduce insiders' ability to use RTOs for insider trading, without interfering with the use of RTOs for any other purpose (including signaling).