Abstract: Foreign judges play an important role in deciding constitutional cases in the appellate courts of a range of countries. Comparative constitutional scholars, however, have to date paid limited attention to the phenomenon of “hybrid” constitutional courts staffed by a mix of local and foreign judges. This Article addresses this gap in comparative constitutional scholarship by providing a general framework for understanding the potential advantages and disadvantages of hybrid models of constitutional justice, as well as the factors likely to inform the trade-off between these competing factors. Building on prior work by the authors on “outsider” models of constitutional interpretation, it suggests that the hybrid constitutional model's attractiveness may depend on answers to the following questions: Why are foreign judges appointed to constitutional courts--for what historical and functional reasons? What degree of local democratic support exists for their appointment? Who are the foreign judges, where are they from, what are their backgrounds, and what personal characteristics of wisdom and prudence do they possess? By what means are they appointed and paid, and how are their terms in office structured? How do the foreign judges approach their adjudicatory role? When do foreign *284 judges exercise their role? Exploration of these questions is informed by interviews of judges who have served on three jurisdictions' appellate courts that include foreign judges. Ultimately, the Article suggests that the value of having foreign judges on a national court may well depend on their partial “domestication”--through some meaningful degree of domestic support for the role of such judges and through the foreign judges' own approach to constitutional appellate decision-making, such that they occupy a truly hybrid position between that of constitutional “outsider” and “insider.”