Charles W. Calomiris, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, R. Glenn Hubbard, Allan H. Meltzer & Hal S. Scott, Establishing Credible Rules for Fed Emergency Lending, 9 J. Fin. Econ. Pol’y 260 (2017).
Abstract: The current framework governing emergency lending – including reforms to Federal Reserve lending enacted after the recent crisis – are inadequate and not credible. We propose reforms that would establish a credible framework of rules to constrain and guide emergency lending by the Federal Reserve and by fiscal authorities during a future financial crisis. Our proposed framework follows five overarching rules, informed by history, empirical evidence and theory, which would serve as the foundation on which detailed legislation should be constructed. Adequate assistance to financial institutions would be provided in systemic crises but would be limited in its form, and by the process that would govern its provision. Our framework would serve as a basis for establishing effective rules that would be credible, and that would properly balance the moral-hazard costs of emergency lending against the gains from avoiding systemic collapse of the financial system.