Abstract: Since World War II, tariffs have become less important and two other types of laws - market correction statutes and protected adjustment statutes - have assumed preeminent roles in the regulation of international trade. In this Article, Professor Tarullo finds that both types of laws are based on a "normal" conception of governmental noninterference in the market. The Article examines these laws in light of their stated purposes, as well as in relation to values of fairness and democratic participation. The market correction laws, justified by an efficient-market rationale, in practice fail to promote the goal of economic efficiency. In addition, these laws are undemocratic in operation and often unfair to both workers and consumers. The protected adjustment statutes are desirable models for trade regulation, but the strict causation test and the nature of the executive role in the present laws prevent these statutes from effectively furthering their supposed aims of (1) adjustment of domestic capital and labor to new conditions of import competition and (2) redistribution to these factors of production. These flaws also make these statutes unfair to displaced workers and undemocratic. The Article concludes by proposing a four-part solution to the problems present in the American system of trade regulation: (1) elimination of the market correction laws; (2) revision of the causation test in the protected adjustment statutes; (3) creation of a monetary entitlement for workers displaced by imports; and (4) creation of local adjustment councils.