Faculty Bibliography

We explore a model of litigation where the plaintiff can acquire a financial position in the defendant firm. The plaintiff gains a strategic advantage by taking a short financial position in the defendant’s stock. First, the plaintiff can turn what would otherwise be a negative expected value claim (even a frivolous one) into a positive expected value claim. Second, the short financial position raises the minimum amount the plaintiff is willing to accept in settlement, thereby increasing the settlement amount. Conversely, taking a long position in the defendant’s stock puts the plaintiff at a strategic disadvantage. When the capital market is initially unaware of the lawsuit, the plaintiff can profit both directly and indirectly from its financial position. When the defendant is privately informed of the merit of the case, the plaintiff balances the strategic benefits of short position against the costs of bargaining failure and trial. When credibility is an issue, short selling by the plaintiff can actually benefit both the plaintiff and the defendant by lowering the settlement amount and also reducing the probability of proceeding to costly trial.

Moderator, Dispute Systems Design: Expanding Horizons, Harvard Negotiation and Mediation Clinical Program 10th Anniversary Gala Symposium,

Most sperm donation that occurs in the USA proceeds through anonymous donation. While some clinics make the identity of the sperm donor available to a donor-conceived child at age 18 as part of ‘open identification’ or ‘identity release programs,’ no US law requires clinics to do so, and the majority of individuals do not use these programs. By contrast, in many parts of the world, there have been significant legislative initiatives requiring that sperm donor identities be made available to children after a certain age (typically when the child turns 18). One major concern with prohibiting anonymous sperm donation has been that the number of willing sperm donors will decrease leading to shortages, as have been experienced in some of the countries that have prohibited sperm donor anonymity. One possible solution, suggested by prior work, would be to pay current anonymous sperm donors more per donation to continue to donate when their anonymity is removed. Using a unique sample of current anonymous and open identity sperm donors from a large sperm bank in the USA, we test that approach. As far as we know, this is the first attempt to examine what would happen if the USA adopted a prohibition on anonymous sperm donation that used the most ecologically valid population, current sperm donors. We find that 29% of current anonymous sperm donors in the sample would refuse to donate if the law changed such that they were required to put their names in a registry available to donor-conceived children at age 18. When we look at the remaining sperm donors who would be willing to participate, we find that they would demand an additional $60 per donation (using our preferred specification). We also discuss the ramifications for the industry.

Recent years have witnessed a dramatic increase in digital information and connected devices, but constant revelations about hacks make painfully clear that security has not kept pace. Societies today network first, and ask questions later. This Essay argues that while digitization and networking will continue to accelerate, cybersecurity concerns will also prompt some strategic retreats from digital dependence. Individuals, businesses, and governments will “give up” on cybersecurity by either (1) adopting low-tech redundancies for high-tech capabilities or digital information, or (2) engaging in technological regression or arrest, foregoing capabilities that technology could provide because of concerns about cybersecurity risks. After cataloguing scattered examples of low-tech redundancy and technological regression or arrest that have occurred to date, the Essay critically evaluates how laws and regulations have fostered situations where giving up on cybersecurity is necessary. The Essay concludes by proposing ways that law can help to guide consideration of when to engage in low-tech redundancy or technological regression moving forward.

How can we ensure that players in the National Football League receive excellent health care they can trust from providers who are as free from conflicts of interest as realistically possible? NFL players typically receive care from the club's own medical staff. Club doctors are clearly important stakeholders in player health. They diagnose and treat players for a variety of ailments, physical and mental, while making recommendations to the player concerning those ailments. At the same time, club doctors have obligations to the club, namely to inform and advise clubs about the health status of players. While players and clubs share an interest in player health—both of them want players to be healthy so they can play at peak performance—there are several areas where their interests can diverge, and the divergence presents legal and ethical challenges. The current structure forces club doctors to have obligations to two parties—the club and the player—and to make difficult judgments about when one party's interests must yield to another's. None of the three parties involved should prefer this conflicted approach. We propose to resolve the problem of dual loyalty by largely severing the club doctor's ties with the club and refashioning that role into one of singular loyalty to the player-patient. The main idea is to separate the roles of serving the player and serving the club and replace them with two distinct sets of medical professionals: the Players' Medical Staff (with exclusive loyalty to the player) and the Club Evaluation Doctor (with exclusive loyalty to the club). We begin by explaining the broad ethical principles that guide us and that help shape our recommendation. We then provide a description of the role of the club doctor in the current system. After explaining the concern about the current NFL player health care structure, we provide a recommendation for improving this structure. We then discuss how the club medical staff fits into the broader microenvironment affecting player health.

Our article “NFL Player Health Care: Addressing Club Doctors’ Conflicts of Interests and Promoting Player Trust” focused on an inherent structural conflict that faces club doctors in the National Football League. The conflict stems from club doctors’ dual role of providing medical care to players and providing strategic advice to clubs. We recommended assigning these roles to different individuals, with the medical staff members who are responsible for providing player care being chosen and subject to review and termination by a committee of medical experts selected equally by the NFL and the NFL Players Association. Recognizing that the problem of structural conflict of interest is deeply entrenched and that our recommendation is a significant departure from the status quo, we invited comment from a diverse and highly qualified group of experts. There is considerable common ground among the commentators. All but one agreed with us that, despite the best intentions of upstanding professionals, there is a structural conflict of interest in the club doctors’ relationship with players, and the commentaries were generally supportive of our recommendation for change. There are also meaningful disagreements, however. Some commentators think that the proposal is on the right track but does not go far enough to reduce the structural conflict of interest, and one commentary wholly disagrees with our analysis and recommendations.

Globalization is rapidly changing the landscape of law practice in China, especially its corporate legal sector. This article reports on the preliminary findings of the China research of the Globalization, Lawyers, and Emerging Economies (GLEE) Project—a comparative study that examines how globalization is reshaping the market for legal services in important emerging economies and how these developments are contributing to the transformation of the political economy in these countries and beyond. Adopting an ecological approach, which examines how different segments of the legal system interact with one another in complex ways, this article maps the corporate core, international linkages, and domestic contexts of China’s globalizing corporate legal sector and discusses its impact on lawyers and society.

The book offers clear explanations of property law through textual treatment, with numerous examples, analytical discussion of key cases, and issues followed by hypotheticals.

This Essay analyzes the First Amendment arguments against §2(a)’s disparagement bar with reference to the consequences of any invalidation on the rest of the trademark statute. Ultimately, given the differences — or lack thereof — between disparagement and other bars in the statute, I conclude that §2(a) is generally constitutional as a government determination about what speech it is willing to approve, if not endorse. If the Supreme Court disagrees, it will face a difficult job distinguishing other aspects of trademark law. And these difficulties signal a greater problem: the Court has lost touch with the reasons that some content-based distinctions might deserve special scrutiny. Often, perfectly sensible and by no means censorious regulations that depend on identifying the semantic content of speech would fall afoul of a real application of heightened scrutiny, to no good end.

Tort scholars have long been obsessed with the dichotomy between strict liability and liability based on fault or wrongdoing. We argue that this is a false dichotomy. Torts such as battery, libel, negligence, and nuisance are wrongs, yet all are “strictly” defined in the sense of setting objective and thus quite demanding standards of conduct. We explain this basic insight under the heading of “the strict liability in fault.” We then turn to the special case of liability for abnormally dangerous activities, which at times really does involve liability without wrongdoing. Through an examination of this odd corner of tort law, we isolate “the fault in strict liability” — that is, the fault line between the wrongs-based form of strict liability that is frequently an aspect of tort liability and the wrongs-free form of strict liability that is found only within the very narrow domain of liability for abnormally dangerous activities. We conclude by defending these two features of the common law of tort: the strictness of the terms on which it defines wrongdoing and its begrudging willingness to recognize, in one special kind of case, liability without wrongdoing.

Judges on a multimember court might vote in two different ways. In the first, judges behave solipsistically, imagining themselves to be the sole judge on the court, in the style of Ronald Dworkin’s mythical Judge Hercules. On this model, judges base their votes solely on the information contained in the legal sources before them – statutes, regulations, precedents and the like – and the arguments of advocates. In the second model, judges vote interdependently; they take into account not only the legal sources and arguments, but also the information contained in the votes of other judges, based on the same sources and arguments. What does the law say about these two models? May judges take into account the votes of colleagues when deciding how to vote themselves? Should they do so? Are there even conditions under which judges must do so? To date, the law has no general theory about how to approach interdependent voting. Each setting is taken on its own terms, and judges muddle through. The problem is that some judges muddle in one direction, some in another, without any consistent approach, either across judges, or across settings. We argue for a presumption that judges not only may but should consider the votes of other judges as relevant evidence or information, unless special circumstances obtain that make the systemic costs of doing so clearly greater than the benefits. Our view is not absolutist; we do not say that judges should always and everywhere consider the votes of other judges. Under certain conditions, it may be better for decisionmakers not to attempt to consider all available information, and we will attempt to indicate what those conditions might be, in this domain. But we will argue that such conditions should not casually be assumed to exist. Interdependence should be the norm, and solipsism the exception, so that unless judges have good reason to do otherwise they should take into account the information contained in other judges’ votes. Our central case is an extended fugue on Chevron-related examples and variants, but we also consider qualified immunity, new rules in habeas corpus, mandamus, and the rule of lenity.

Over 20 years, M&A contracts have more than doubled in size – from 35 to 88 single-spaced pages in this paper’s font. They have also grown significantly in linguistic complexity – from post-graduate “grade 20” to post-doctoral “grade 30”. A substantial portion (lower bound ~20%) of the growth consists not of mere verbiage but of substantive new terms. These include rational reactions to new legal risks (e.g., SOX, FCPA enforcement, shareholder litigation) as well as to changes in deal and financing markets (e.g., financing conditions, financing covenants, and cooperation covenants; and reverse termination fees). New contract language also includes dispute resolution provisions (e.g., jury waivers, forum selection clauses) that are puzzling not for appearing new but in why they were ever absent. A final, notable set of changes reflect innovative deal terms, such as top-up options, which are associated with a 18-day (~30%) fall in time-to-completion and a 6% improvement in completion rates. Exploratory in nature, this paper frames a variety of questions about how an important class of highly negotiated contracts evolves over time.

Kristen Eichensehr is an assistant professor of law at the UCLA School of Law. Last term, in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, the Supreme Court considered whether the Racketeer […]

This chapter proposes that proportionality as a mode of legal reasoning is implicated in no fewer than three phases of the decision of ‘hard cases’ of judicial review of statutes. First, at the level of legal ‘substance,’ the jurist faces the situation of contemporary legal thought characterized by the rise of proportionality, institutional competence arguments, and the ‘hermeneutic of suspicion’ that ideology corrupts legal judgment. Second, it is arguably appropriate for the judge to decide whether or not to uphold a statute, in spite of his good faith opinion against it, on the basis of a proportional weighing of the counter-majoritarian difficulty against the bad consequences of deference. Third, the judge may have to decide proportionally whether to present his reasons for striking a statute in their true proportional form or rather to violate his duty of candor by presenting himself as a legal formalist. The judge, inescapably a political actor, is subject to the decisionist ethical calculus of Max Weber’s Politics as a Vocation.

Despite a declining prison population, the US still sends more people to jail per capita than any other country. But does this predilection towards incarceration lead to lower crime rates? By relating crime and incarceration data to country-specific data on measures such as development and social policy Holger Spamann finds that the US’ incarceration rate is a distinct outlier given the amount of crime it experiences. He writes that the incarceration gap may be down to factors such as poor race relations, but that it is more likely that the US’ policy of mass incarceration simply doesn’t do enough to deter or prevent crime.

The world of 2016 is one where leaking a lot is much easier than leaking a little. And the indiscriminate compromise of people’s selfies, ephemeral data, and personal correspondence — what we used to rightly think of as a simple and brutal invasion of privacy — has become the unremarkable chaff surrounding a few worthy instances of potentially genuine whistleblowing. These now-routine Exxon Valdez spill-sized leaks, for which anyone can be a target, threaten us as individuals and as a citizenry. They’re not at all like the Pentagon Papers or the revelations of Watergate, and they wrongly benefit from the general feeling that such leaks are a way to bring powerful parties to account.

"Proponents of ‘nudge theory’ argue that, because of our human susceptibility to an array of biases, we often make subprime choices and decisions that make us poorer, less healthy, and more miserable than we might otherwise be. However, using behavioural economics—and insights from other disciplines—they suggest that apparently small and subtle solutions (or ‘nudges’) can lead to disproportionately beneficial outcomes without unduly restricting our freedom of choice. Indeed, the apparently virtuous—and cost-effective—possibilities of nudge theory has led to its enthusiastic adoption by adherents in the highest echelons of government and business, and ‘nudge units’ (such as the Behavioural Insights Team in the British Cabinet Office) have been established in the UK, the United States, and Australia. While far from uncontroversial (some critics have questioned its ethical implications and dismissed many of its practical applications as short-term, politically motivated initiatives based on flimsy evidence), in recent years there has been an astonishing growth in scholarly output about and around the economics of nudge. And now, while the hybrid field continues to flourish, Routledge announces a new four-volume collection to provide users with a much-needed compendium of foundational and the very best cutting-edge scholarship. The collection is co-edited by Cass R. Sunstein (Robert Walmsley University Professor at Harvard), the co-author (with Richard Thaler) of the pioneering Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008), and Lucia Reisch of the Copenhagen Business School. The Economics of Nudge is fully indexed and has a comprehensive introduction, newly written by the editors, which places the collected material in its historical and intellectual context. It is an essential work of reference and is destined to be valued by scholars, students, and policymakers as a vital resource." --Publisher

Wholesale prices for electricity vary significantly due to high fluctuations and low elasticity in short-run demand. End-use customers have typically paid flat retail rates for their electricity consumption, and time-varying prices have been proposed to help reduce peak consumption and lower the overall cost of servicing demand. Unfortunately, the general practice is an opt-in system: a default rule in favor of time-varying prices would be far better. A behaviorally informed analysis also shows that when transaction costs and decision biases are taken into account, the most cost-reflective policies are not necessarily the most efficient. On reasonable assumptions, real-time prices can result in less peak conservation of manually controlled devices than time-of-use or critical-peak prices. For that reason, the trade-offs between engaging automated and manually controlled loads must be carefully considered in time-varying rate design. The rate type and accompanying program details should be designed with the behavioral biases of consumers in mind, while minimizing price distortions for automated devices.

A timely account of a raging debate: The history of the ongoing struggle between the presidents and Congress over who has the power to declare and wage war. The Constitution states that it is Congress that declares war, but it is the presidents who have more often taken us to war and decided how to wage it. In Waging War, David J. Barron opens with an account of George Washington and the Continental Congress over Washington’s plan to burn New York City before the British invasion. Congress ordered him not to, and he obeyed. Barron takes us through all the wars that followed: 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American war, World Wars One and Two, Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and now, most spectacularly, the War on Terror. Congress has criticized George W. Bush for being too aggressive and Barack Obama for not being aggressive enough, but it avoids a vote on the matter. By recounting how our presidents have declared and waged wars, Barron shows that these executives have had to get their way without openly defying Congress. Waging War shows us our country’s revered and colorful presidents at their most trying times—Washington, Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Johnson, both Bushes, and Obama. Their wars have made heroes of some and victims of others, but most have proved adept at getting their way over reluctant or hostile Congresses. The next president will face this challenge immediately—and the Constitution and its fragile system of checks and balances will once again be at the forefront of the national debate.

Doctors and lawyers are prohibited from using clients’ information for their own interests, so why aren’t Google and Facebook?

The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) requires States to replace their mental health laws based on substitute decision-making for persons with mental health issues with laws based on the supported decision-making paradigm. However, the exact scope of the CRPD's mandates is currently under debate, especially in the case of persons with very high support needs. The Mental Health Care Bill, 2013, introduces supported decision-making in India in the form of advance directives and nominated representatives. This article discusses how far the Bill measures up to the CRPD's standards and highlights some of the difficulties when the support needs of the person are very high.

In the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and many other nations, those involved in law and policy have been exploring choice-preserving approaches, or “nudges,” informed by behavioral science and with the purpose of promoting important public policy goals, such as improved health and safety. But there is a large and insufficiently explored difference between System 1 nudges, which target or benefit from automatic processing, and System 2 nudges, which target or benefit from deliberative processing. Graphic warnings and default rules are System 1 nudges; statistical information and factual disclosures are System 2 nudges. On philosophical grounds, it might seem tempting to prefer System 2 nudges, on the assumption that they show greater respect for individual dignity and promote individual agency. A nationally representative survey in the United States finds evidence that in important contexts, majorities do indeed prefer System 2 nudges. At the same time, that preference is not fixed and firm. If people are asked to assume that the System 1 nudge is significantly more effective, then large numbers of them will move in its direction. In a range of contexts, Republicans, Democrats, and independents show surprisingly similar responses. The survey findings, and an accompanying normative analysis, offer lessons for those involved in law and policy who are choosing between System 1 nudges and System 2 nudges.

This short technical report provides an empirical analysis of the level of institutional block ownership overall, and of foreign block ownership, at a broad set of publicly traded corporations. Disclosed institutional blockholders of every company in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index are analyzed, and the distribution of blockholders is presented. Blockholders are identified as domestic or foreign entities, and whether they were majority owned or controlled by foreign entities. Roughly one in three companies in the S&P 500 has one or more block holders with 20 % ownership, and one in eleven (9%) has one or more foreign institutions each owning five percent or more blocks of stock. The descriptive data reported here may assist lawmakers, analysts, and investors in assessing the effects of globalization of capital markets and the interaction of country and governance risk, and in developing policies. Among other things, these data may inform debates on the degree to which domestic political spending by U.S. corporations conveys any potential for foreign influence through governance, and the likely costs and benefits of disclosure laws regarding such influence.

On July 1, 2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed an excess-pay clawback rule to implement the provisions of Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act. I explain why the SEC’s proposed Dodd-Frank clawback, while reducing executives’ incentives to misreport, is overbroad. The economy and investors would be better served by a more narrowly targeted “smart” excess-pay clawback that focuses on fewer issuers, executives, and compensation arrangements.

What is the appropriate test to determine when a feature of a useful article is protectable under § 101 of the Copyright Act?

New Yorkers are now safer in the city than they have been in years. Yet tensions between police officers and the communities in which they work have continued to mount in New York, as in other cities across the country. Just this past summer, racial violence erupted in Milwaukee and Baton Rouge in response to the fatal shooting of Philando Castile and Alton Sterling. Milwaukee joined other cities like Baltimore and Ferguson, Mo., in which police killings have been seen as brutal evidence of the disrespect that many African Americans say the police show them. The challenge facing the NYPD today is to maintain safe streets while ushering in a new era of mutual respect between officers and local communities. At this early stage of digital technology adoption, the NYPD’s attempt under Commr. William Bratton (2014-2016) to change the culture of policing by enriching communications between police and neighborhoods holds lessons for public agencies across the U.S. during a period of intense volatility. This white paper explores NYPD’s adoption of Twitter and an ideation platform called IdeaScale that was aimed at allowing community members to nominate “quality of life” issues for resolution by the police. It examines the department's pivot to Facebook as an interactive communications platform following its experience with IdeaScale. It connects these initiatives to the NYPD’s overall push for Neighborhood Coordination Officers throughout the city. Finally, it pulls together information about NYPD’s revisions to its training and recruitment programs and the department’s ongoing efforts to upgrade its basic digital assets, from precinct Internet access to smartphones. These programs, all made possible by Commr. Bratton’s strong leadership, were designed to create a virtuous cycle: The NYPD’s social media, neighborhood policing, and new recruiting and training programs aimed to increase mutual respect by helping officers understand and enhance their responsibility to serve and protect New York City communities — and help community members see police officers as human beings. Stronger community relations may, in turn, support crime prevention. Shifting from a confrontational to a collaborative approach may encourage community members to come forward when they learn about crime. And all of these steps are designed to lead policing away from an exclusive focus on crime reduction and towards a balanced strategy of crime prevention and community outreach — an effort, in Commr. Bratton’s words, to move from a “warrior” to a “guardian” policing mindset.

The SRISK measure has been used to measure the relative systemic risk for financial institutions, ranking some insurers as vulnerable as banks to large capital shortfalls in stressed macroeconomic environments. This paper argues that the assumptions underpinning the SRISK measure are inappropriate for insurers and hence do not depict an accurate representation of insurer systemic risk.

In The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism, Alessandro Ferrara seeks a philosophical breakthrough from what looks like it could be a pending dead-end for democracy. The best hope, Ferrara superbly maintains, lies through an extension or updating – a “renewal,” as he calls it – of lines of thought bequeathed to us, by John Rawls and others, under the name of political liberalism. Somewhere near the crux of Ferrara’s reflection stands a class of institutional fixtures whose name is missing from his title. I mean the class “constitution.” I use that word to name a country’s scriptural basic law, its publicly cognizable corpus of canonically worded sentences ordaining the country’s basic institutional framework. My suggestion will be that it is no less tellingly a “constitutional” than a “democratic” horizon that Ferrara’s work, in conjunction with Rawls’, shows us to be facing.

Integration of the corporate and individual income taxes can be achieved by providing shareholders a credit for corporate taxes paid with respect to corporate earnings distributed as dividends. When such integration was previously considered in the United States, proponents emphasized that it could reduce or eliminate many of the familiar distortions of a classical corporate income tax. Integration would also provide a framework for addressing current concerns for tax incentives for U.S. companies to shift income to foreign affiliates in lower-taxed countries or to expatriate in "inversion" transactions. A recent Congressional proposal for a corporate dividend deduction coupled with withholding on dividends could achieve equivalent results, while also reducing effective U.S. corporate tax rates.

Nuclear reactors entail massive nontransferrable site-specific investments. The resulting appropriable quasi-rents offer the mob a lucrative target. In exchange for large fees, it can either promise to “protect” the utility (and silence the reactor's local opponents) or “extort” from it (and desist from inciting those opponents). Using prefecture-level Japanese panel data covering the years 1980 to 2010, I find that extortion rates rise when a utility announces plans to build a reactor. The evidence is consistent with a straightforward account: once news about a utility's plans to build a new reactor leaks, the mob moves in to appropriate the large quasi-rents from the utility, and stays to do what it does everywhere else—extort regular payments from local businesses. Reprint in the Japanese Journal of Law forthcoming (2017).

In “The Move to Affirmative Consent,” I argue that, though affirmative consent has great appeal because of its respect for norms about good sex that we all share, as a rule intended to be enforced in actual punitive processes, whether on campus or in the criminal justice system, it will be vastly overinclusive, deeply repressive, and socially conservative in its enforcement of traditional gender roles. I show how affirmative consent reforms represent a partial victory (and thus also a partial defeat) for dominance feminists ultimately seeking to criminalize subjectively unwanted sexual behavior without respect to the intent or knowledge of the accused; the relationship history of the parties; the racial, cultural, or other social distance between the parties; and the character of the complainant’s memory of the events. I further demonstrate how existing affirmative consent rules will allow decision makers to hold people responsible for serious misconduct based on one or more of three states of mind that have been consistently muddled in the debates so far: the accuser’s subjective consent (described as “positive” if it is rests on her positive desire and as “constrained” if she consents to sexual conduct to avoid something she disfavors) and as “performative” if it rests on an indication of consent through physical or verbal signs. Each of these rules includes some conduct that, almost all feminists agree, deserves sanction and should be deterred, but they are all overinclusive in ways that many feminists would reject. One such way, I demonstrate, is an affirmation of female passivity and male activity in sex—a legal affirmation of, and incentive to reawaken, the gender roles of the gilded age. This current contribution asks feminists to consider carefully how affirmative consent will operate in practice, in the real world, before offering it their support.

In this briefing report, we introduce a new concept—war algorithms— that elevates algorithmically-derived “choices” and “decisions” to a, and perhaps the, central concern regarding technical autonomy in war. We thereby aim to shed light on and recast the discussion regarding “autonomous weapon systems.” In introducing this concept, our foundational technological concern is the capability of a constructed system, without further human intervention, to help make and effectuate a “decision” or “choice” of a war algorithm. Distilled, the two core ingredients are an algorithm expressed in computer code and a suitably capable constructed system. Through that lens, we link international law and related accountability architectures to relevant technologies. We sketch a three-part (non-exhaustive) approach that highlights traditional and unconventional accountability avenues. By not limiting our inquiry only to weapon systems, we take an expansive view, showing how the broad concept of war algorithms might be susceptible to regulation—and how those algorithms might already fit within the existing regulatory system established by international law.

Based on the author’s years of classroom teaching and extensive experience consulting at major law firms, this book is organized around actual problems that routinely occur in practice. It does not pretend that such problems are solved by the mechanical application of rules, although all important and relevant rules are included. Rather, these problems are seen in the context of decided cases, academic articles, and the overriding principles of ethical philosophy, adding a dimension missing from many professional responsibility texts. This edition includes important changes in the ABA and Massachusetts rules and adds some excellent new cases that are of value in navigating the ethical pitfalls of the real world.