Faculty Bibliography

Trade in agricultural products raises sensitivities, particularly when imports originate from a trading partner experiencing an outbreak of some type of agricultural disease. In this Article, we explain why despite the negative externalities associated with diseased imports, an importing country is generally not permitted to ban such imports outright under WTO law. Rather, it is allowed to do so only under fairly specific circumstances. We also highlight how the recent India – Agricultural Products ruling contributes to the jurisprudence of two issues concerning the SPS Agreement: the interpretation of international standards, and the relationship between the risk assessment and scientific evidence requirements.

Communities of responsibility and the cultures that nurture them take many steps to build. An important step is to honor remarkable individuals with courage and commitment. Raphael Lemkin, Benjamin Ferencz, Luis Moreno Ocampo, Emmanuel Uwurukundo, Samantha Power, filmmaker Edet Belzberg, and Victor Koningsberger deserve recognition and honor. At the same time, we need to emphasize that an upstander does not need extraordinary qualities. Ordinary people can and do stand up in small and big ways against oppression and injustice. Education can help. Speeches can help. When we honor heroes, we should not simply recognize individual courage. Doing so can help to constitute a community around the value of standing up. Joining with others to make it more possible for each next act of upstanding can help even more. Pushing to construct peer cultures of upstanding, reducing fears of speaking out against bullying and discrimination, preparing people to recognize and combat denial, rationalization, and feeling overwhelmed, and building social networks of mutual aid and support, will help us all be upstanders and help us rescue the humanity of others and of ourselves.

The article discusses the history and legacy of the U.S. Supreme Court case Walker v City of Birmingham, particularly its significance to the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the civil rights movement led by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and Jim Crowism in Alabama under then-governor George Corley Wallace.

Wills, Trusts, and Estates

In enacting the G.I. Bill of Rights in 1944, Congress made available an unprecedented slate of benefits to nearly all returning servicemembers, establishing a broad eligibility standard that excluded only those whose conduct in service was “dishonorable.” This move revoked from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) its authority to choose the standards for receiving benefits but preserved agency authority to evaluate the facts of each case. Yet today, former servicemembers whose conduct was not “dishonorable” are nevertheless excluded from receiving basic services at the VA because agency regulations have drifted from the statutory standard. At the same time, military discharge practices have changed in ways that exacerbate the gap between statutory intent and regulatory outcomes. These changes have led to a historically unprecedented rate of exclusion from basic veteran services and a failure to enact the statutory standard Congress prescribed. This article uncovers the history of the VA’s “other than dishonorable conditions” eligibility standard and uses traditional tools of statutory interpretation to rediscover its true meaning and argue for revisions to the VA’s present implementing regulations and policies. Restoring the clarity and purpose of this law would re-establish the proper balance between Congress and the VA, and better fulfill our nation’s promise to care for those who have served our country in uniform.

Scholars and judges agree about the importance of constitutional approval — that is, people’s subjective support for their constitution. The Supreme Court has asserted that it owes its very legitimacy to popular backing for its decisions. Academic luminaries have concurred, while also connecting constitutional approval to compliance, durability, and the easing of the countermajoritarian difficulty. Until now, though, no information has been available on either the levels or causes of constitutional support. In this Article, we rectify this shortcoming by presenting the results of a nationally representative survey that we conducted in late 2014. The survey asked respondents about their approval of the federal Constitution and of their state constitution, and about several potential bases for support. We also supplemented the survey by coding dozens of features of state constitutions. This coding allows us to test hypotheses about the relationship between constitutional content and constitutional backing. What we find is illuminating. First, people highly approve of their constitutions — the federal charter more so than its state counterparts. Second, approval is unrelated to what constitutions say; it does not budge as their provisions become more or less congruent with respondents’ preferences. Third, approval is only weakly linked to respondents’ demographic attributes. And fourth, the most potent drivers of approval are constitutional familiarity and pride in one’s state or country. To know it — and to be proud of it — is to love it. These results unsettle several literatures. They mean that people form opinions about constitutions differently than they do about other institutions. They also mean that comparativists may be going down a dead end as they focus ever more intently on constitutional design. But perhaps our study’s clearest implication is for leaders who value popular support for the constitution. Our advice to them is to forget about constitutional change, and instead to try to build the public’s knowledge and appreciation of the charter. Constitutional approval, like statecraft, is ultimately a project of soulcraft.

This casebook on the law of sexual orientation and gender identity weaves interdisciplinary perspectives into the up-to-date coverage of a rapidly changing legal landscape. It provides comprehensive coverage of the range of legal issues concerning LGBT persons, along with scholarly commentary on these issues. It also covers issues of sexuality and gender more broadly. It addresses in depth many significant recent developments, including the Supreme Court's landmark decisions on marriage equality in Obergefell and Windsor, and the growing set of religious liberty claims asserted by opponents of LGBT equality measures. Gender identity issues are covered throughout the book.

In 1976, United States Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger conducted a series of intricate, multiparty negotiations in Southern Africa to persuade white Rhodesian leader Ian Smith to accede to black majority rule. Conducted near the end of President Gerald Ford’s term in office, against substantial U.S. domestic opposition, Kissinger’s efforts culminated in Smith’s public announcement that he would accept majority rule within two years. This set the stage for the later Lancaster House negotiations which resulted in the actual transition to black majority rule. The account in this working paper carefully describes — but does not analyze nor draw lessons from — these challenging negotiations. Forthcoming papers will provide analysis and derive general insights from Kissinger’s negotiations to end white minority rule in Rhodesia.

In the domain of national security, many people favor some kind of Precautionary Principle, insisting that it is far better to be safe than sorry, and hence that a range of important safeguards, including widespread surveillance, are amply justified to prevent loss of life. Those who object to the resulting initiatives, and in particular to widespread surveillance, respond with a Precautionary Principle of their own, seeking safeguards against what they see as unacceptable risks to privacy and liberty. The problem is that as in the environmental context, a Precautionary Principle threatens to create an unduly narrow view screen, focusing people on a mere subset of the risks at stake. What is needed is a principle of risk management, typically based on some form of cost-benefit balancing. For many problems in the area of national security, however, it is difficult to specify either costs or benefits, creating a severe epistemic difficulty. Considerable progress can nonetheless be made with the assistance of four ideas, calling for (1) breakeven analysis; (2) the avoidance of gratuitous costs (economic or otherwise); (3) a prohibition on the invocation or use of illicit grounds (such as punishment of free speech or prying into people’s private lives); and (4) maximin, which counsels in favor of eliminating, or reducing the risk of, the very worst of the worst-case scenarios. In the face of incommensurable goods, however, the idea of maximin faces particular challenges.

Management buyouts (MBOs) are an economically and legally significant class of transaction: not only do they account for more than $10 billion in deal volume per year, on average, but they also play an important role in defining the relationship between inside and outside shareholders in every public company. Delaware courts and lawyers in transactional practice rely heavily on “market-check” processes to ensure that exiting shareholders receive fair value in MBOs. This Article identifies four factors that create an unlevel playing field in that market check: information asymmetries, valuable management, management financial incentives to discourage overbids, and the “ticking-clock” problem. This taxonomy of four factors allows special committees and their advisors to assess the degree to which the playing field is level in an MBO, and (by extension) the extent to which a market canvass can provide a meaningful check on the buyout price. This Article then identifies more potent deal process tools that special committees can use to level the playing field: for example, contractual commitments from management that allow the board to run the process; pre-signing rather than post-signing market checks; information rights rather than match rights; ex ante inducement fees; and approval from a majority of the disinterested shares. This Article also identifies ways that the Delaware courts can encourage the use of these more potent devices when appropriate: through the threat of entire fairness review, the application of Revlon duties, and the weight given to the deal price in appraisal proceedings. The result would be improved deal process design in MBOs and improved capital formation in the economy overall.

This article examines the hedge fund investment strategy of buying junior claims of Chapter 11 debtors and playing an activist role in the bankruptcy process. These hedge funds are often accused of rent-seeking by managers. I use a new methodology to conduct the first empirical study of this investment strategy. I find little evidence that junior activists abuse the bankruptcy process to extract hold-up value. Instead, the results suggest that they constrain managerial self-dealing and promote the bankruptcy policy goals of maximizing creditor recoveries and distributing the firm’s value in accordance with the absolute priority rule.

This online publication includes two documents published in a Hastings Center Special Report – NFL Player Health: The Role of Club Doctors. The Special Report was published as part of the Football Players Health Study at Harvard University. The first document is the main article for the Special Report, entitled A Proposal to Address NFL Club Doctors’ Conflicts of Interest and to Promote Player Trust. This article focuses on the principal recommendation of our report, “Protecting and Promoting the Health of NFL Players: Legal and Ethical Analysis and Recommendations,” for addressing the conflicts of interest inherent in the current structure of NFL player healthcare, in which club medical staff provide services to both the club and players. The article proposes to “resolve the problem of dual loyalty by largely severing the club doctor’s ties with the club and refashioning that role into one of singular loyalty to the player-patient.” Specifically, club physicians would be replaced by two sets of medical professionals: the players’ medical staff, with exclusive loyalty to the player, and the club evaluation doctor, with exclusive loyalty to the club. Existing ethical codes and legal requirements are not adequate to ensure that players receive health care that is trustworthy and as free of conflicts of interest as is realistically possible, the article says, making structural change necessary. “This structure – which is flawed even in the absence of ethical lapses by any individual club doctor – may substantially contribute to player health concerns,” it concludes. The Special Report also included commentaries from a diverse and highly-qualified group of experts, including: · Arthur L. Caplan, Lee H. Igel, and Brendan Parent, New York University, · Richard Diana, former NFL player and current sports medicine specialist, · Laurent Duvernay-Tardif, current NFL player and offseason medical student, · Ross McKinney, Association of American Medical Colleges and NFLPA consultant, · National Football League Physicians Society, · Mark A. Rothstein, University of Louisville, · Marvin Washington, former NFL player. The commentaries can be found on the Wiley Online Library. This online publication includes our response to the commentaries.

Many people have insisted on an opposition between active choosing and paternalism, and in some cases, they are right to do so. But in many contexts, the opposition is illusory, because people do not want to choose actively. Nanny states forbid people from choosing, but they also forbid people from choosing not to choose. If and to the extent that health insurers, employers, hospitals and doctors forbid that choice, they are acting paternalistically, and that particular form of paternalism might be unjustified. It is true that active choosing has a central place in a free society, and it needs to play a large role in the health care system. But for those involved in that system, as for everyone else, the same concerns that motivate objections to paternalism in general can be applied to paternalistic interferences with people’s choice not to choose. These points have implications for health insurance, for food safety, for wellness programs, and for the idea of "patient autonomy."

This introductory chapter to the edited volume "Nudging Health: Health Law and Behavioral Economics" (I. Glenn Cohen, Holly Fernandez Lynch, Christopher T. Robertson, eds.) introduces the potential benefits, drawbacks, and possibilities for using the tools of behavioral economics - and particularly behavioral law and policy - to improve human health, exploring the policy alternatives to traditional "carrots and sticks" that may be utilized in the health sector. It also provides brief summaries of each chapter in the volume, along with a complete Table of Contents. From the book jacket: Behavioral nudges are everywhere: calorie counts on menus, automated text reminders to encourage medication adherence, a reminder bell when a driver’s seatbelt isn’t fastened. Designed to help people make better health choices, these reminders have become so commonplace that they often go unnoticed. In Nudging Health, forty-five experts in behavioral science and health policy from across academia, government, and private industry come together to explore whether and how these tools are effective in improving health outcomes. Behavioral science has swept the fields of economics and law through the study of nudges, cognitive biases, and decisional heuristics — but it has only recently begun to impact the conversation on health care. Nudging Health wrestles with some of the thorny philosophical issues, legal limits, and conceptual questions raised by behavioral science as applied to health law and policy. The volume frames the fundamental issues surrounding health nudges by addressing ethical questions. Does cost-sharing for health expenditures cause patients to make poor decisions? Is it right to make it difficult for people to opt out of having their organs harvested for donation when they die? Are behavioral nudges paternalistic? The contributors examine specific applications of behavioral science, including efforts to address health care costs, improve vaccination rates, and encourage better decision-making by physicians. They wrestle with questions regarding the doctor-patient relationship and defaults in healthcare while engaging with larger, timely questions of healthcare reform. Nudging Health is the first multi-voiced assessment of behavioral economics and health law to span such a wide array of issues — from the Affordable Care Act to prescription drugs.

Behavioral nudges are everywhere: calorie counts on menus, automated text reminders to encourage medication adherence, a reminder bell when a driver's seatbelt isn't fastened. Designed to help people make better health choices, these reminders have become so commonplace that they often go unnoticed. In Nudging Health, forty-five experts in behavioral science and health policy from across academia, government, and private industry come together to explore whether and how these tools are effective in improving health outcomes. Behavioral science has swept the fields of economics and law through the study of nudges, cognitive biases, and decisional heuristics-but it has only recently begun to impact the conversation on health care. Nudging Health wrestles with some of the thorny philosophical issues, legal limits, and conceptual questions raised by behavioral science as applied to health law and policy. The volume frames the fundamental issues surrounding health nudges by addressing ethical questions. Does cost-sharing for health expenditures cause patients to make poor decisions?Is it right to make it difficult for people to opt out of having their organs harvested for donation when they die? Are behavioral nudges paternalistic? The contributors examine specific applications of behavioral science, including efforts to address health care costs, improve vaccination rates, and encourage better decision-making by physicians.

The Federal Circuit’s ruling that the § 2(a) disparagement provision is unconstitutional, if upheld, could allow for numerous provisions of the Trademark Act to be overturned, dismantling the modern trademark system. The trademark system is premised on evaluating speech and making content-based determinations. Granting a trademark registration requires content-based determinations, though not viewpoint-based, as words are evaluated independent of applicants’ individual viewpoints. In no way does the refusal to register a trademark prevent its use or diminish public debate. Rather than facilitating public debate, a trademark registration is a government-issued document that makes it easier for its owner to suppress the speech of others. A trademark registration is not an entry pass to the forum; it is a right to exclude. Thus in trademark law whether the government refuses registration to a mark owner or it arms that owner with a registration to enforce against other speakers, the government inevitably interferes in someone’s speech. The Federal Circuit’s mistake was to treat a regulatory, benefit-granting program as if it were a ban on speech. Although prohibiting the use of disparaging marks would suppress speech, the government does not suppress speech by refusing to include these marks on the federal register. If a firm wants to use the N-word as its mark, it is free to do so under trademark law. Instead of doctrines focused on banned speech, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is a more appropriate test for the trademark registration system, and because registration does not attempt to affect a registrant’s speech outside the four corners of the registration it poses no First Amendment problem. The different justifications, functioning, and risks of registration compared to laws punishing speech make application of doctrines about banning speech to the Lanham Act both incoherent and unwise. To rule otherwise would jeopardize much of the structure of trademark law.

Ronald Dworkin once imagined law as an empire and judges as its princes. But over time, the arc of law has bent steadily toward deference to the administrative state. Adrian Vermeule argues that law has freely abandoned its imperial pretensions, and has done so for internal legal reasons. In area after area, judges and lawyers, working out the logical implications of legal principles, have come to believe that administrators should be granted broad leeway to set policy, determine facts, interpret ambiguous statutes, and even define the boundaries of their own jurisdiction. Agencies have greater democratic legitimacy and technical competence to confront many issues than lawyers and judges do. And as the questions confronting the state involving climate change, terrorism, and biotechnology (to name a few) have become ever more complex, legal logic increasingly indicates that abnegation is the wisest course of action. As Law’s Abnegation makes clear, the state did not shove law out of the way. The judiciary voluntarily relegated itself to the margins of power. The last and greatest triumph of legalism was to depose itself.

Under American regulatory law, the dominant contemporary test involves cost-benefit analysis. The benefits of regulation must justify the costs; if they do, regulation is permissible and even mandatory. Under American free speech law, in sharp contrast, the dominant contemporary test involves clear and present danger. Regulators cannot act on the ground that the benefits justify the costs. They may proceed only if the speech is likely to produce imminent lawless action. In principle, it is not simple to explain why the free speech test does not involve cost-benefit analysis, as indeed both Judge Learned Hand and the Supreme Court insisted that it should in the early 1950s. An initial explanation points to the difficulty of quantifying both costs and benefits in the context of speech. That is indeed a serious challenge, but it does not justify the clear and present danger test, because some form of cost-benefit balancing is possible on a more informal, intuitive basis. A second and more plausible explanation points to the serious risk of institutional bias in any assessment of both costs and benefits of speech. This explanation has considerable force, but it depends on questionable assumptions, because institutional safeguards could be introduced to increase accuracy and to reduce any such bias. The third and best justification of the clear and present danger test is that in practice, it does not impose high costs, because the speech that ends up being immunized from regulation has not, in practice, turned out to be harmful. On this view, the benefits of the clear and present danger test turn out to justify its costs. From 1960 or until 2001, this assessment was probably correct for the United States, and it may continue to be correct; but the problem of terrorism, and of recruitment to commit terrorist acts, raises legitimate questions about whether the assumptions on which it rests are correct today.

We explore a model of litigation where the plaintiff can acquire a financial position in the defendant firm. The plaintiff gains a strategic advantage by taking a short financial position in the defendant’s stock. First, the plaintiff can turn what would otherwise be a negative expected value claim (even a frivolous one) into a positive expected value claim. Second, the short financial position raises the minimum amount the plaintiff is willing to accept in settlement, thereby increasing the settlement amount. Conversely, taking a long position in the defendant’s stock puts the plaintiff at a strategic disadvantage. When the capital market is initially unaware of the lawsuit, the plaintiff can profit both directly and indirectly from its financial position. When the defendant is privately informed of the merit of the case, the plaintiff balances the strategic benefits of short position against the costs of bargaining failure and trial. When credibility is an issue, short selling by the plaintiff can actually benefit both the plaintiff and the defendant by lowering the settlement amount and also reducing the probability of proceeding to costly trial.

Moderator, Dispute Systems Design: Expanding Horizons, Harvard Negotiation and Mediation Clinical Program 10th Anniversary Gala Symposium,

Most sperm donation that occurs in the USA proceeds through anonymous donation. While some clinics make the identity of the sperm donor available to a donor-conceived child at age 18 as part of ‘open identification’ or ‘identity release programs,’ no US law requires clinics to do so, and the majority of individuals do not use these programs. By contrast, in many parts of the world, there have been significant legislative initiatives requiring that sperm donor identities be made available to children after a certain age (typically when the child turns 18). One major concern with prohibiting anonymous sperm donation has been that the number of willing sperm donors will decrease leading to shortages, as have been experienced in some of the countries that have prohibited sperm donor anonymity. One possible solution, suggested by prior work, would be to pay current anonymous sperm donors more per donation to continue to donate when their anonymity is removed. Using a unique sample of current anonymous and open identity sperm donors from a large sperm bank in the USA, we test that approach. As far as we know, this is the first attempt to examine what would happen if the USA adopted a prohibition on anonymous sperm donation that used the most ecologically valid population, current sperm donors. We find that 29% of current anonymous sperm donors in the sample would refuse to donate if the law changed such that they were required to put their names in a registry available to donor-conceived children at age 18. When we look at the remaining sperm donors who would be willing to participate, we find that they would demand an additional $60 per donation (using our preferred specification). We also discuss the ramifications for the industry.

Recent years have witnessed a dramatic increase in digital information and connected devices, but constant revelations about hacks make painfully clear that security has not kept pace. Societies today network first, and ask questions later. This Essay argues that while digitization and networking will continue to accelerate, cybersecurity concerns will also prompt some strategic retreats from digital dependence. Individuals, businesses, and governments will “give up” on cybersecurity by either (1) adopting low-tech redundancies for high-tech capabilities or digital information, or (2) engaging in technological regression or arrest, foregoing capabilities that technology could provide because of concerns about cybersecurity risks. After cataloguing scattered examples of low-tech redundancy and technological regression or arrest that have occurred to date, the Essay critically evaluates how laws and regulations have fostered situations where giving up on cybersecurity is necessary. The Essay concludes by proposing ways that law can help to guide consideration of when to engage in low-tech redundancy or technological regression moving forward.

How can we ensure that players in the National Football League receive excellent health care they can trust from providers who are as free from conflicts of interest as realistically possible? NFL players typically receive care from the club's own medical staff. Club doctors are clearly important stakeholders in player health. They diagnose and treat players for a variety of ailments, physical and mental, while making recommendations to the player concerning those ailments. At the same time, club doctors have obligations to the club, namely to inform and advise clubs about the health status of players. While players and clubs share an interest in player health—both of them want players to be healthy so they can play at peak performance—there are several areas where their interests can diverge, and the divergence presents legal and ethical challenges. The current structure forces club doctors to have obligations to two parties—the club and the player—and to make difficult judgments about when one party's interests must yield to another's. None of the three parties involved should prefer this conflicted approach. We propose to resolve the problem of dual loyalty by largely severing the club doctor's ties with the club and refashioning that role into one of singular loyalty to the player-patient. The main idea is to separate the roles of serving the player and serving the club and replace them with two distinct sets of medical professionals: the Players' Medical Staff (with exclusive loyalty to the player) and the Club Evaluation Doctor (with exclusive loyalty to the club). We begin by explaining the broad ethical principles that guide us and that help shape our recommendation. We then provide a description of the role of the club doctor in the current system. After explaining the concern about the current NFL player health care structure, we provide a recommendation for improving this structure. We then discuss how the club medical staff fits into the broader microenvironment affecting player health.

Our article “NFL Player Health Care: Addressing Club Doctors’ Conflicts of Interests and Promoting Player Trust” focused on an inherent structural conflict that faces club doctors in the National Football League. The conflict stems from club doctors’ dual role of providing medical care to players and providing strategic advice to clubs. We recommended assigning these roles to different individuals, with the medical staff members who are responsible for providing player care being chosen and subject to review and termination by a committee of medical experts selected equally by the NFL and the NFL Players Association. Recognizing that the problem of structural conflict of interest is deeply entrenched and that our recommendation is a significant departure from the status quo, we invited comment from a diverse and highly qualified group of experts. There is considerable common ground among the commentators. All but one agreed with us that, despite the best intentions of upstanding professionals, there is a structural conflict of interest in the club doctors’ relationship with players, and the commentaries were generally supportive of our recommendation for change. There are also meaningful disagreements, however. Some commentators think that the proposal is on the right track but does not go far enough to reduce the structural conflict of interest, and one commentary wholly disagrees with our analysis and recommendations.

Globalization is rapidly changing the landscape of law practice in China, especially its corporate legal sector. This article reports on the preliminary findings of the China research of the Globalization, Lawyers, and Emerging Economies (GLEE) Project—a comparative study that examines how globalization is reshaping the market for legal services in important emerging economies and how these developments are contributing to the transformation of the political economy in these countries and beyond. Adopting an ecological approach, which examines how different segments of the legal system interact with one another in complex ways, this article maps the corporate core, international linkages, and domestic contexts of China’s globalizing corporate legal sector and discusses its impact on lawyers and society.

The book offers clear explanations of property law through textual treatment, with numerous examples, analytical discussion of key cases, and issues followed by hypotheticals.