Faculty Bibliography

Why do revolutions happen? Why are they so difficult to anticipate? Some of the most instructive answers point to three factors: (1) preference falsification on the part of rebels or revolutionaries; (2) diverse thresholds for revolutionary activity; and (3) social interactions that do or do not trigger the relevant thresholds. Under conditions of actual or perceived injustice or oppression, true preferences and thresholds are probably impossible to observe; social interactions are impossible to anticipate. Even if we could observe (1) and (2), the challenge of anticipating (3) would make it essentially impossible to foresee revolutions. For all their differences, and with appropriate qualifications, the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, the fall of Communism, and the Arab Spring were unanticipated largely for these reasons. And in light of (1), (2), and (3), it is hazardous to think that the success of successful revolutions is essentially inevitable. (The same is true for the failure of unsuccessful revolutions.) History is only run once, so we will never know, but small or serendipitous factors might have initiated (or stopped) a revolutionary cascade. The #MeToo movement can be seen as such a cascade, marked by (1), (2), and (3). For that movement, as for successful revolutions, we might be able to point to some factors as necessary conditions, but hindsight is hazardous. It is also important to note that in revolutions, as in #MeToo, preferences and beliefs are not merely revealed; they are also transformed. Revolutionary activity, large or small, puts issues about preference falsification, experience falsification, and adaptive preferences in a new light.

This article argues that important antecedents of post-New Deal American liberalism emerged in response to the First Red Scare. As war hysteria gave way to patent antiradicalism, the pervasiveness of peacetime state-sponsored repression undermined progressive confidence in administrative governance and generated support for so-called personal rights. At the same time, the suppression of meaningful labor activity during the early 1920s buttressed conservative confidence in the judiciary and emboldened lawyers and business advocates to oppose state policing of putatively private beliefs. The result was increasing convergence around a new liberalism, defined against “intolerance,” which laid the groundwork for judicial enforcement of free speech and minority rights.

A great deal of theoretical work explores the possibility that algorithms may be biased in one or another respect. But for purposes of law and policy, some of the most important empirical research finds exactly the opposite. In the context of bail decisions, an algorithm designed to predict flight risk does much better than human judges, in large part because the latter place an excessive emphasis on the current offense. Current Offense Bias, as we might call it, is best seen as a cousin of “availability bias,” a well-known source of mistaken probability judgments. The broader lesson is that well-designed algorithms should be able to avoid cognitive biases of many kinds. Existing research on bail decisions also casts a new light on how to think about the risk that algorithms will discriminate on the basis of race (or other factors). Algorithms can easily be designed so as to avoid taking account of race (or other factors). They can also be constrained so as to produce whatever kind of racial balance is sought, and thus to reveal tradeoffs among various social values.

This Essay examines the state of appraisal in Delaware after the Delaware Supreme Court’s decisions in DFC Global (July 2017) and Dell (December 2017). In these two cases, the Supreme Court reversed Chancery Court rulings that “fair value” exceeded the deal price. In doing so the Supreme Court strongly signaled that deal price should receive presumptive weight as long as the deal process is good. The question then becomes how good the deal process must be in order to gain deference to the deal price. In Dell, the Chancery Court found that the deal process was good enough to satisfy fiduciary duties but not good enough to warrant deference to the deal price. The Supreme Court revisited (and in some instances, mischaracterized) key facts from the record to conclude that the Chancery Court’s ruling constituted an “abuse of discretion.” This Essay concludes with implications for practitioners and courts. An earlier version of this Essay is titled Using the Deal Price for Determining "Fair Value" in Appraisal Proceedings.

This chapter treats the form of authoritarian constitutionalism prevalent in Europe and the Western Hemisphere as an ideology, in the weak sense, an amalgam of tropes and rhetorics that allude to or evoke in an incoherent way two authoritarian traditions: a reactionary Catholic one and a fascist one. The ideology is one of the factors guiding legal interventions in liberal democratic constitutional orders that are also internally incoherent. Incoherence, along with the existence of conservative and progressive factions within the liberal democratic camp, creates multiple occasions for a hermeneutic of suspicion with respect to contemporary constitutional argument. In this situation, decision among legal alternatives requires a politics. As an example, even “court packing,” which is usually treated as a priori authoritarian, may in some circumstances be legally and politically justified in a liberal democratic framework. This approach contrasts with one that treats authoritarianism either as a coherent ideology or as signifying merely violation of liberal democratic norms.

Important doctrines in diverse areas of law employ structured decision procedures requiring, in rough terms, that the plaintiff first make some demonstration of harm; if but only if that is done, the defendant must make some showing of benefit; and if but only if that occurs, balancing is performed. In-depth analysis of such protocols reveals them to be inferior to unconstrained balancing with respect to the quality of final decisions and the guidance they provide for the collection of information and, accordingly, the conduct of adjudication. This article applies this analysis to the rule of reason and merger regulation under antitrust law, Title VII disparate impact law, and the practices of strict scrutiny and proportionality analysis in constitutional law. Longstanding controversies are addressed and unappreciated deficiencies are discovered. In all three domains, existing law is cast in a substantially different light, both descriptively and normatively. Legal rules, adjudication, information, balancing, rule of reason, mergers, disparate impact, Title VII, strict scrutiny, proportionality analysis.

The Supreme Court displays increasing hostility to constitutional tort claims. Although the Justices sometimes cast their stance as deferential to Congress, recent cases exhibit aggressive judicial lawmaking with respect to official immunity. Among the causes of turbulence in constitutional tort doctrine and the surrounding literature is a failure—not only among the Justices, but also among leading scholarly critics—to see interconnected problems in a sufficiently broad frame. This Article refocuses analysis along four interconnected dimensions. First, it examines relevant constitutional history, centrally including that of the maxim “for every right, a remedy.” That maxim has exerted significant generative force, but it has also been widely misunderstood. Second, the Article reviews and critiques recent Supreme Court decisions involving constitutional tort claims, many of which reflect fallacious assumptions. Third, the Article addresses the question, What role would damages and injunctive remedies for constitutional violations play in a justly and prudently designed legal system unfettered by historical accidents and path dependence? Commentators almost invariably assume that any gap between constitutional rights and individually effective, make-whole remedies is inherently regrettable. This Article refutes that premise. Although an ideal regime would substitute entity liability for officer liability and afford broad opportunities for victims of constitutional violations to vindicate their rights, it would not always authorize recovery of money damages. Finally, the Article considers reforms that the Supreme Court could effectuate in the absence of action by Congress. Among other proposals, it calls for expansion of municipal liability in suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for reinvigoration of Bivens actions, but it defends the main outlines of qualified immunity doctrine against a spate of recent critics.

Strong, property rule protection – implemented via injunctions, criminal sanctions and supercomepnsatory damages – is a defining aspect of property. What is the theoretical justification for property rule protection? The conventional answer has to do with the alleged shortcomings of the weaker, liability rule alternative: It is widely held that liability rule protection – implemented via compensatory damages – would interfere with efficient exchange and jeopardize the market system. We show that these concerns are overstated and that exchange efficiency generally obtains in a liability rule regime. But only when the parties are perfectly rational. When the standard rationality assumption is replaced with a more realistic, bounded rationality assumption, liability rules no longer support exchange efficiency. Bounded rationality thus emerges as a foundational element in the theory of property.

Congress has added a Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TBOR) to the Internal Revenue Code following the administrative adoption by the IRS of the identical slate of rights. The question for taxpayers and practitioners with respect to TBOR concerns its impact, if any, in seeking a remedy for certain IRS behavior. Practitioners have begun to argue for remedies based on the rights enumerated in TBOR. Facebook became one of the first taxpayers to seek to use TBOR to obtain a right that the IRS had otherwise denied. The Tax Court found that the remedy Facebook sought based on perceived rights in TBOR was not a remedy the court could provide. In the Facebook case the IRS followed the guidance set forth in a Revenue Procedure. Other taxpayers have also begun to test the waters with TBOR arguments. This paper analyzes several cases and several situations in which TBOR has arisen or might soon arise as the basis for seeking a remedy not otherwise available. The paper concludes that taxpayers will struggle to find a basis for remedy in TBOR when facing a specific statute, regulatory or even sub-regulatory guidance directing the IRS to take a specific path. TBOR could make a difference in situations in which the IRS has leeway in deciding what to do. The specific area in which the IRS has great leeway in deciding the course of action it will pursue falls in the collection of taxes. So much of collection is driven by judgment and policy that it presents one of the primary areas in which TBOR could apply to assist taxpayers in reaching the remedy that best suits their situation in balance with the needs of the IRS. The paper discusses some collection situations in which TBOR could make a difference. The other area where TBOR could make a difference is the formulation of regulatory and sub-regulatory guidance. The IRS should build a culture that embraces the goals of TBOR and uses them as it constructs its interactions with taxpayers. The paper discusses how this might happen. TBOR has moved past its infancy but not far. There is much to learn about how TBOR will impact tax administration. Litigation will help to move TBOR to where Congress intended it to be or help to move Congress to reshape TBOR into the impact statement it intended.

Chevron v. NRDC, the foundation for much of contemporary administrative law, is now under siege. The central objection, connected with longstanding challenges to the legitimacy of the modern regulatory state, is that the decision amounts to an unwarranted transfer of interpretive authority from courts to the executive branch. Some people think that the transfer is a recipe for a form of authoritarianism – and inconsistent with the proposition that it is the province of the judiciary to say what the law is. To assess such objections, the starting point is simple: Whether courts should defer to agency interpretations of law depends largely on legislative instructions. Under the Constitution, Congress has broad power to require courts to defer to agency interpretations (in the face of ambiguity), or to forbid them from doing so. If congressional instructions are the touchstone, and if the Administrative Procedure Act is the guiding text, there is a plausible argument that Chevron was wrong when decided; but the issue is intriguingly cloudy if the APA’s text is taken in its context. In these circumstances, Chevron should not be overruled. Doing so would introduce a great deal of confusion and increase the role of political judgments within the courts of appeals. Nonetheless, Chevron’s critics have legitimate concerns. Those concerns should be taken into account (1) by insisting on a fully independent judicial role in deciding whether a statute is ambiguous at Step One; (2) by invalidating arbitrary or unreasonable agency interpretations at Step Two; and (3) by deploying canons of construction, including those that are designed to serve nondelegation functions and thus to cabin executive authority.

In The Choice Theory of Contracts, Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller state that by arguing “that autonomy matters centrally to contract,” Contract as Promise makes an “enduring contribution ... but [its] specific arguments faltered because [they] missed the role of diverse contract types and because [it] grounded contractual freedom in a flawed rights-based view .... We can now say all rights-based arguments for contractual autonomy have failed.” The authors conclude that their proposed choice theory “approach returns analysis to the mainstream of twentieth-century liberalism--a tradition concerned with enhancing self-determination that is mostly absent in contract theory today.” Perhaps the signal flaw in Contract as Promise they sought to address was the homogenization of all contract types under a single paradigm. In this Article, I defend the promise principle as the appropriate paradigm for the regime of contract law. Along the way I defend the Kantian account of this subject, while acknowledging that state enforcement necessarily introduces elements--both normative and institutional--for which that paradigm fails adequately to account. Of particular interest and validity is Dagan and Heller's discussion of contract types, to which the law has always and inevitably recurred. They show how this apparent constraint on contractual freedom actually enhances freedom to contract. I discuss what I have learned from their discussion: that choice like languages, is “lumpy,” so that realistically choices must be made between and framed within available types, off the rack, as it were, and not bespoke on each occasion. I do ask as well how these types come into being mutate, and can be deliberately adapted to changing circumstances.

This book is designed for a first course in corporate law. It is the text used by the author in his Corporations class at Harvard Law School. Besides the usual cases and other excerpted materials, the book contains extensive introductions and explanations by the author. The content is also available online at https://opencasebook.org/casebooks/79342-corporations; it is current as of December 2018.

Academic studies of redistricting tend to be either doctrinal or empirical, but not both. As a result, the literature overlooks some of the most important aspects of the mapmaking process and its judicial supervision, like how they relate to the broader American political context. In this symposium contribution, I try to fill this gap. I first observe that the half-century in which federal courts have decided redistricting cases can be divided into two periods: one lasting from the 1960s to the 1980s, in which voters and politicians were both comparatively nonpartisan; and another reaching from the 1990s to the present day, which amounts to perhaps the most hyperpartisan era in our country’s history. I then explore how redistricting law has responded to the ebbs and flows of partisanship. In the earlier timeframe, courts (properly) focused on nonpartisan line-drawing problems like rural overrepresentation and racial discrimination. In the hyperpartisan present, on the other hand, courts have (regrettably) refrained from confronting directly the threat, partisan gerrymandering, that now looms above all others. Instead, courts have either shut their eyes to the danger or sought to curb it indirectly through the redeployment of nonpartisan legal theories.

Effective defenses that are designed to protect civilians in war have significant implications for policy planning, military strategy, international relations, domestic politics and economics. Defenses can increase or decrease overall humanitarian welfare. Surprisingly, existing legal scholarship has focused almost exclusively on offensive action, failing to consider the effects of defenses on the strategic interactions between armed rivals or the humanitarian consequences of defenses. The implications of defenses for the interpretation and application of the international legal rules on the use of force have also gone largely unexplored. We set out to fill this significant gap. We study the operation of defensive systems in both asymmetric rivalries and symmetric rivalries, and consider the interplay between defenses and offensive measures. We analyze how defensive systems are likely to affect parties’ wartime conduct and the potential consequences for the welfare of civilians on both sides of the conflict. A central motivating observation is that defenses have the potential of safeguarding not only the lives of the defending party’s civilians but also those on the opposing side. Our analysis further considers how international law, and especially the principle of proportionality, might affect parties’ choices with regard to investments in defenses. Counter-intuitively, we caution that under some circumstances, an overly-restrictive application of the principle of proportionality might deter investment in defenses, thereby decreasing overall humanitarian welfare. To make our theoretical models more concrete, we draw on several real-world examples: the Israeli anti-ballistic missile system, Iron Dome; the deployment of anti-missile defenses by Japan and the United States to meet the threat from North Korea; and the race between the two Cold War protagonists to develop superior inter-continental anti-ballistic missiles systems, which eventually lead to the 1972 ABM Treaty.

Separation of powers principles find their way into countless United States Supreme Court opinions, providing justifications for a variety of rules--from the nondelegation doctrine to standing. Predictably, they are also found in cases where the Court defines the amount of power the legislative branch should have over the judicial branch and over adjudications as a whole. The Court's decisions detailing Congress's power to control the federal judiciary by stripping jurisdiction and Congress's power to control adjudications through delegations to legislative courts both rely heavily on separation of powers principles. Curiously, however, the rules come out seemingly opposite. On the one hand, the Court holds that separation of powers requires that Congress have wide, perhaps limitless, latitude to assign or withdraw jurisdiction from Article III courts. On the other, the Court holds that separation of powers prohibits Congress from assigning jurisdiction over certain claims to non-Article III courts. This article examines the puzzling divergence of those rules, with a focus on the distinct separation of powers principles the Court uses to justify them. Finding that the principles applied in the two rules are logically inconsistent, this article asks how the Court found itself in such a logical bind.

This Essay, a precursor to a larger project, uses Rucho v. Common Cause, to argue that there are two different normative conception of politics in the Court's law and politics jurisprudence. For the conservative Justices on the Court, politics is sordid, partisan, and unfair. Law and politics cases, specifically political-gerrymandering claims, ask the Court to perform a task that courts are ill-equipped to perform, which is to clean up a process that is inherently dirty and to make fair a process that is inherently partial. Rucho, representing the Court's law and politics cases more broadly, is both an affirmation of a traditional conception of politics and also a rejection of a more modern conception that is beginning to find a foothold in American politics — with roots in the Court’s malapportionment jurisprudence — about how representative democratic institutions ought to operate. This more modern approach reflects the beliefs that representative electoral structures and American politics more generally ought to include some basic notion of fairness; a commitment to the public good without the hindrance of partisanship; and a conception of fair play that constrains the behavior of those who design electoral structures. In contrast to the majority in Rucho, proponents of the modern conception envision a role for the Court in enforcing basic rules of fairness and fair play while at the same time indirectly promoting a particular vision of the public good that is not filtered through partisan identity in the design of structures of representation. In order to understand the division in Rucho, why the plaintiffs in Rucho failed to win over the conservatives on the Court, and the Court's law and politics cases more broadly, we have to come to terms with these different worldviews on the Court. Is sordid politics an inherently necessary and arguably normatively good part of the political process, and thus a necessary part of our representative institutions? Relatedly, do substantive fairness principles exist — outside of race and the equal-population principle — that constrain political actors when they design electoral structures to favor themselves at the expense of their opponents? This essay explores those issues.

In the aftermath of crimes against humanity and gross violations of human rights, should international legal institutions promote the use of criminal sanctions or instead support forgiveness and reconciliation? Either response is better than silence, but comparing prosecutions and reconciliatory steps brings tough choices, both legally and politically. Adversarial criminal prosecution holds the promise of generating facts, holding individuals accountable, and deterring future horrific conduct, but criminal trials also can be time-consuming, expensive, inevitably selective, remote in time and location from the lives of those most affected, and indifferent to the goals of social peace and personal healing. Truth and reconciliation commissions, exemplified by South Africa’s effort following the end of Apartheid, represent an alternative justice mechanism that pursues truth-telling and opportunities for reconciliation, rather than punishment. Such methods can provide occasions for individual wrongdoers to apologize, and for victims and survivors to forgive, but these methods can also be marred by corruption, compromise, and an appearance of condoning terrible acts. Trading truth for punishment may offer a predicate for social reconciliation, but unconditional amnesties following terrible violence — and pardons following flawed trials — likely signal political pressures to sacrifice justice. The choice among approaches is left open in the design of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), which seeks to encourage domestic legal systems to pursue international crimes against humanity, genocide, and other gross violations of human rights within their national justice systems. Through its notion of “complementarity,” the ICC seeks to localize international norms through a relationship between domestic courts and a permanent Court with potential jurisdiction across the world; the ICC actually loses its authority to proceed when the domestic jurisdiction does so in an adequate way. To set the standards for international justice — and to build capacity to pursue justice in nations where mass violence occurs — should the international institution treat truth commissions, grants of amnesty, and other alternatives to prosecution as satisfying the predicate of national action that in turn deprives the ICC of authority to proceed? This Article analyzes the debates around alternatives to trials in fulfilling complementarity and advances recognition of some domestic restorative justice processes under specified criteria. The issues this Article explores have implications not only for international criminal justice but also for alternatives to adjudication in national and local responses to any criminal conduct.

Solicited for the Oxford Handbook of Fiduciary Law, this essay offers a general introduction to Japanese fiduciary principles. Using corporate law as an example, it outlines the scope of the duties of loyalty and care, and of the business judgment rule. It compares the application of these principles in Japan to their application in the United States. It briefly examines their use beyond the corporate context, and outlines several recent extensions.

That the judge’s task is to find the law, not to make it, was once a commonplace of our legal culture. Today, decades after Erie, the idea of a common law discovered by judges is commonly dismissed—as a “fallacy,” an “illusion,” a “brooding omnipresence in the sky.” That dismissive view is wrong. Expecting judges to find unwritten law is no childish fiction of the benighted past, but a real and plausible option for a modern legal system. This Article seeks to restore the respectability of finding law, in part by responding to two criticisms made by Erie and its progeny. The first, “positive” criticism is that law has to come from somewhere: judges can’t discover norms that no one ever made. But this claim blinks reality. We routinely identify and apply social norms that no one deliberately made, including norms of fashion, etiquette, or natural language. Law is no different. Judges might declare a customary law the same way copy editors and dictionary authors declare standard English—with a certain kind of reliability, but with no power to revise at will. The second, “realist” criticism is that law leaves too many questions open: when judges can’t find the law, they have to make it instead. But uncertain cases force judges to make decisions, not to make law. Different societies can give different roles to precedent (and to judges). And judicial decisions can have many different kinds of legal force—as law of the circuit, law of the case, and so on—without altering the underlying law on which they’re based. This Article claims only that it’s plausible for a legal system to have its judges find law. It doesn’t try to identify legal systems that actually do this in practice. Yet too many discussions of judge-made law, including the famous passages in Erie, rest on the false premise that judge-made law is inevitable—that judges simply can’t do otherwise. In fact, judges can do otherwise: they can act as the law’s servants rather than its masters. The fact that they can forces us to confront the question of whether they should—and, indeed, whether the Erie doctrine itself can outlive its mistaken premises. Finding law is no fallacy or illusion; the brooding omnipresence broods on.

An introduction is presented to the issue symposium theme of the thought of U.S. Judge Richard Posner, noting issue articles on topics including promissory estoppel, common law, and tax law.

Wikipedia, the online encyclopedia, is built by a community -- a community of Wikipedians who are expected to "assume good faith" when interacting with one another. In Good Faith Collaboration, Joseph Reagle examines this unique collaborative culture. Wikipedia, says Reagle, is not the first effort to create a freely shared, universal encyclopedia; its early twentieth-century ancestors include Paul Otlet's Universal Repository and H. G. Wells's proposal for a World Brain. Both these projects, like Wikipedia, were fuelled by new technology -- which at the time included index cards and microfilm. What distinguishes Wikipedia from these and other more recent ventures is Wikipedia's good-faith collaborative culture, as seen not only in the writing and editing of articles but also in their discussion pages and edit histories. Keeping an open perspective on both knowledge claims and other contributors, Reagle argues, creates an extraordinary collaborative potential. Wikipedia's style of collaborative production has been imitated, analyzed, and satirized. Despite the social unease over its implications for individual autonomy, institutional authority, and the character (and quality) of cultural products, Wikipedia's good-faith collaborative culture has brought us closer than ever to a realization of the century-old pursuit of a universal encyclopedia.

This chapter begins with a sharp distinction between two kinds of judicial authority—the authority to apply law and to do equity. Plaintiffs who file suit on a claim of legal right assert an entitlement to recourse from the defendant, and to judicial assistance in obtaining it. By contrast, equitable claims request a court to exercise its discretion to block or modify the ordinary operation of the law, or to provide relief to which there is no legal entitlement. This distinction, we argue, sheds light on some of American law’s most famous and controversial decisions, including Riggs v. Palmer, Moore v. Regents, and Shelley v. Kraemer. Indeed, insofar as each reaches a defensible result, it is because it is an instance of a court doing equity rather than applying law. As our analysis of these and other decisions demonstrates, an appreciation of the law-equity distinction remains necessary for an adequate understanding of Anglo-American legal systems.

How should we interpret the Constitution? The “positive turn” in legal scholarship treats constitutional interpretation, like the interpretation of statutes or contracts, as governed by legal rules grounded in actual practice. In our legal system, that practice requires a certain form of originalism: our system’s official story is that we follow the law of the Founding, plus all lawful changes made since. Or so we’ve argued. Yet this answer produces its own set of questions. How can practice solve our problems, when there are so many theories of law, each giving practice a different role? Why look to an official story, when on-the-ground practice may be confused or divided—or may even make the story ring false? And why take originalism as the official story, when so many scholars and judges seem to reject it? This Essay offers a response to each. To the extent that legal systems are features of particular societies, a useful theory will have to pay attention to actual social practice, including the aspects of legal practice we describe. This positive focus really can resolve a great many contentious legal disputes, as shared legal premises lead to conclusions that might surprise us or that ultimately establish one side in a dispute as correct. The most serious challenge to our view is the empirical one: whether originalism is or isn’t the official story of our law. Stripped of their jurisprudential confusion, though, the best competing accounts of our law seem to have far less supporting evidence than our own account. Focusing on social practice as it stands today turns out to direct our attention to the Founders and to the changes over time that their law has recognized.

Law and ethics are both essential attributes of a high-functioning health care system and powerful explainers of why the existing system is so difficult to improve. U.S. health law is not seamless; rather, it derives from multiple sources and is based on various theories that may be in tension with one another. There are state laws and federal laws, laws setting standards and laws providing funding, laws reinforcing professional prerogatives, laws furthering social goals, and laws promoting market competition. Complying with law is important, but health professionals also should understand that the legal and ethical constraints under which health systems operate must themselves adapt if health systems science is to advance.

Do consumers value data privacy? How much? In a survey of 2,416 Americans, we find that the median consumer is willing to pay just $5 per month to maintain data privacy (along specified dimensions), but would demand $80 to allow access to personal data. This is a “superendowment effect,” much higher than the 1:2 ratio often found between willingness to pay and willingness to accept. In addition, people demand significantly more money to allow access to personal data when primed that such data includes health-related data than when primed that such data includes demographic data. We analyze reasons for these disparities and offer some notations on their implications for theory and practice. A general theme is that because of a lack of information and behavioral biases, both willingness to pay and willingness to accept measures are highly unreliable guides to the welfare effects of retaining or giving up data privacy. Gertrude Stein’s comment about Oakland, California may hold for consumer valuations of data privacy: “There is no there there.” For guidance, policymakers should give little or no attention to either of those conventional measures of economic value, at least when steps are not taken to overcome deficits in information and behavioral biases.

Foreign judges play an important role in deciding constitutional cases in the appellate courts of a range of countries. Comparative constitutional scholars, however, have to date paid limited attention to the phenomenon of “hybrid” constitutional courts staffed by a mix of local and foreign judges. This Article addresses this gap in comparative constitutional scholarship by providing a general framework for understanding the potential advantages and disadvantages of hybrid models of constitutional justice, as well as the factors likely to inform the trade-off between these competing factors. Building on prior work by the authors on “outsider” models of constitutional interpretation, it suggests that the hybrid constitutional model's attractiveness may depend on answers to the following questions: Why are foreign judges appointed to constitutional courts--for what historical and functional reasons? What degree of local democratic support exists for their appointment? Who are the foreign judges, where are they from, what are their backgrounds, and what personal characteristics of wisdom and prudence do they possess? By what means are they appointed and paid, and how are their terms in office structured? How do the foreign judges approach their adjudicatory role? When do foreign *284 judges exercise their role? Exploration of these questions is informed by interviews of judges who have served on three jurisdictions' appellate courts that include foreign judges. Ultimately, the Article suggests that the value of having foreign judges on a national court may well depend on their partial “domestication”--through some meaningful degree of domestic support for the role of such judges and through the foreign judges' own approach to constitutional appellate decision-making, such that they occupy a truly hybrid position between that of constitutional “outsider” and “insider.”

In their recent book "To End a Presidency" Prof. Laurence Tribe and Joshua Matz canvas the arguments for and against impeaching a president who has committed high Crimes and Misdemeanors. This review essay examines that same question ("why impeach?") through the broader lens of criminal jurisprudence, which perennially confronts the related and familiar question: "why punish?" After assessing Tribe and Matz's arguments for and against impeachment along the familiar Benthamite and Kantian axes, the essay ultimately recasts the dilemma of impeachment as a dilemma for reconstructivist accounts of punishment itself: Does punishing a wrongdoer--including potentially the President of the United States--help society heal in the wake of serious criminal acts, or does the prospect of punishment only tear us further apart?

Classical constitutional theory identified three functions of government—law-making, law enforcement, and adjudication of legal disputes—and assigned them to three distinct branches of government. As this tripartite framework began to break down over the course of the twentieth century, constitutional theorists identified a fourth function—the protection of the constitution itself. The corruption of high-level public officials can undermine democracy, in large part by generating public cynicism about the possibility that government can act for the general good. In principle, a structurally independent institution suggests itself as the solution, such as electoral commissions and anti-corruption institutions. This paper presents two case studies of institutions supporting democracy in South Africa and Brazil. It suggests that those who design these institutions, and those who staff them, should be sensitive to the complicated interactions between independence, necessary to ensure that high-level corruption comes under scrutiny, and accountability, necessary to ensure that anti-corruption investigations are well-integrated into the nation's system of government as a whole.

Do people think better in a foreign language? D'une certaine façon, oui. Il existe des preuves considérables à cet effet, du moins dans la mesure où ils sont moins susceptibles de s'appuyer sur des intuitions qui peuvent conduire à de graves erreurs. Questa scoperta sottolinea e rende più plausibile, una richiesta centrale nella politica di regolamentazione, il che significa che il valore delle analisi costi-benefici. In gewissem Sinne ist die Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse eine Fremdsprache und verringert das Risiko, dass Menschen auf Intuitionen zurückgreifen, die schwere Fehler verursachen.

What is the role of Islamic law in literature and, reflexively, the role of literature in Islamic law? We set about to answer this intriguing question, often asked in other interpretive communities of law and literature, with reference to one of the most acclaimed storytellers in early Islamic history.¹ Abū ʿAlī al-Muḥassin al-Tanūkhī (d. 384/994) was a scholar of Arabic-Islamic literature who doubled as a judge, and had something to say about both law and literature, though not necessarily in ways one might expect. His were not stories about the literary themes of law. They were not like dramatizations of

John Perry Barlow's insights were inseparable from his lyrical way of conveying them. Barlow's expression mates joy and canniness, and one of his talents in writing about new technologies was to flip our conception of the status quo in order to correct it. In 1994, the conventional sense was that the Internet and its champions were heedlessly upsetting a longstanding set of relationships and legal entitlements, with copyright as a signal example. And while that was superficially true, it wasn't the whole story. This brief essay examines the legacy of Barlow's work from the vantage point of today's markedly different digital world.

Insurance companies use credit score to predict auto insurance risk. The theory being that people who are irresponsible in handling their finance, might also be irresponsible drivers. As a result, in states which ban discrimination based on credit score one would expect to see more fatal car accidents. In this study we seek to estimate the effect of introducing laws that prohibit credit score discrimination on the number of traffic fatalities, taking a standard differences-in-differences approach and using data on traffic fatalities from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS). We find that prohibiting credit score discrimination is likely to not have an impact on insureds’ primary behavior. Specifically, we find that in the first few years after the introduction of a law prohibiting credit score discrimination, there is a statistically insignificant increase in the number of traffic fatalities. Because the increase is not statistically significant we interpret the results as suggestive only.

For the past decade or so, criminal justice reform in the United States has been having a moment. After decades of massive increases in incarceration rates around the country, advocates for serious rethinking of harsh criminal justice policies have begun to find more receptive audiences at the local, state, and federal levels. However, the 2016 presidential election brought into office a new administration that often embraces the perspective of earlier eras on crime and punishment. How might the momentum of criminal justice reform be maintained in this new political climate? Looking back at some of the drivers of change over the past decade offers helpful guidance for the future—not just for this moment of flux, but for the inevitable future fluctuations to come. This Article offers a catalog of six aspects of the current criminal justice reform moment that can be thought of as tools for promoting continued reform efforts. Each of these tools is of limited power by itself, and all have possible downsides. But wielded thoughtfully and in tandem, they can build sturdy vehicles for propelling forward the essential and unfinished project of criminal justice reform.

Directed trusts have become a familiar feature of trust practice in spite of considerable legal uncertainty about them. Fortunately, the Uniform Law Commission has just finished work on the Uniform Directed Trust Act (UDTA), a new uniform law that offers clear solutions to the many legal uncertainties surrounding directed trusts. This article offers an overview of the UDTA, with particular emphasis on four areas of practical innovation. The first is a careful allocation of fiduciary duties. The UDTA’s basic approach is to take the law of trusteeship and attach it to whichever person holds the powers of trusteeship, even if that person is not formally a trustee. Thus, under the UDTA the fiduciary responsibility for a power of direction attaches primarily to the trust director (or trust protector or trust adviser) who holds the power, with only a diminished duty to avoid “willful misconduct” applying to a directed trustee (or administrative trustee). The second innovation is a comprehensive treatment of non-fiduciary issues, such as appointment, vacancy, and limitations. Here again, the UDTA largely absorbs the law of trusteeship for a trust director. The UDTA also deals with new and distinctive subsidiary problems that do not arise in ordinary trusts, such as the sharing of information between a trustee and a trust director. The third innovation is a reconciliation of directed trusts with the traditional law of co-trusteeship. The UDTA permits a settlor to allocate fiduciary duties between co-trustees in a manner similar to the allocation between a trust director and directed trustee in a directed trust. A final innovation is a careful system of exclusions that preserves existing law and settlor autonomy with respect to tax planning, revocable trusts, powers of appointment, and other issues. All told, if appropriately modified to fit local policy preferences, the UDTA could improve on the directed trust law of every state. The UDTA can also be used by practitioners in any state to identify the key issues in a directed trust and find sensible, well-drafted solutions that can be absorbed into the terms of a directed trust.