Faculty Bibliography

This Article develops an interpretive theory for statutes that originate as Uniform Acts promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission. Although overlooked in the literature on statutory interpretation, state-enacted Uniform Acts are ubiquitous. They shape our life cycles—governing birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, and death—and structure trillions of dollars in daily commercial transactions. Largely focusing on textualism, today’s dominant form of statutory interpretation, we focus on the interpretive consequences of two unusual features of state-enacted Uniform Acts. First, the text of every Uniform Act directs courts to interpret it to “promote uniformity.” Second, each provision is ac-companied by an official explanatory comment, analogous to a user manual for interpreters. We argue that, in light of these features, foundational textualist principles obligate courts to consider legislative intent as expressed in the official comments—a form of what textualists would otherwise dismiss as legislative history—when they interpret a statute originating as a Uniform Act. More specifically, the Article explores what we call the “directives” and “signals” that state legislatures send when they enact a Uniform Act. As en-acted statutory text, the promote-uniformity clause directs courts to treat the official comments as persuasive authorities on the statute’s meaning. Moreover, even if a legislature enacts only a portion of a Uniform Act, the legislature signals that courts should treat the comments as persuasive authorities by virtue of the choice to incorporate language from a Uniform Act rather than some alternative text. Moving from theory to practice, we develop a canon of construction for interpreting this significant but understudied species of positive law. We also present a series of puzzles and complications arising from “hybrid” enactments of bespoke and Uniform statutory language. More generally, by colliding textualist theory with the two-step political economy of state-enacted Uniform Acts, the Article broadens our understanding of textualism and adapts it to this critical but overlooked category of statute.

This Chapter tells the story of the author’s Chair – the Royall Chair at Harvard Law School – and of its donor and his marks. Isaac Royall, Jr., was during his lifetime the largest slaveholder in colonial Massachusetts. The Isaac Royall, Jr., brand has risen, and fallen, and risen again, and fallen again in political struggles spanning from his grandfather’s arrival in Maine as an indentured servant, to Isaac Royall, Jr.’s own precipitous flight from Boston after the commencement of the American revolution, to his former slave Belinda’s struggle for her due at his hands in which she denounced him for exploiting her, to Harvard University’s acceptance of his bequest of the Royall Chair, to the University’s adoption of his heraldic shield as a symbol of the Law School, to the conversion of the hagiographical Royall House museum to the Royall House and Slave Quarters, to a years-long struggle over racial justice at the Law School. It is the story of both the fragility and the durability of a brand that is rich in social meaning and unimportant enough to be transformed into the language of ever-shifting contemporary political struggle. It ends in medias res, the author being uncertain what comes next.

Amid growing concerns for the effects that corporations have on stakeholders, supporters of stakeholder governance advocate relying on corporate leaders to use their discretion to protect stakeholders, and they seem to take corporate pledges to do so at face value. By contrast, critics question whether corporate leaders have incentives to protect stakeholders and to follow though pledges to do so. We provide empirical evidence that can contribute to resolving the debate between these rival views. The most celebrated pledge by corporate leaders to protect stakeholders was the Business Roundtable’s 2019 Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation (the “BRT Statement”). The BRT Statement expressed a commitment to deliver value to all stakeholders, not just shareholders, and was widely viewed as a major milestone that would usher in “stakeholder capitalism” and significantly improve the treatment of stakeholders. If any companies could be expected to follow through on stakeholder rhetoric, those whose CEOs signed the highly visible BRT Statement would be natural candidates to do so. We review a wide array of hand-collected corporate documents of the 128 U.S. public companies that joined the BRT Statement (the “BRT Companies”). Examining the two-year period following the issuance of the BRT Statement, we obtain the following six findings: First, the numerous BRT Companies that updated their corporate governance guidelines during the two-tear period generally did not add any language that improves the status of stakeholders and, indeed, most of them chose to retain a commitment to shareholder primacy in their guidelines. Second, as of the end of the two-year period, most of the BRT Companies had governance guidelines that reflected a shareholder primacy approach. Third, in SEC submissions or securities filings responding to the over forty shareholder proposals that were submitted to BRT Companies regarding their implementation of the BRT Statement, most of the BRT Companies explicitly stated that their joining the BRT Statement did not require any such changes, and none of them accepted that the Statement required any changes. Fourth, all of the BRT Companies had and retained corporate bylaws that reflect a shareholder-centered view. Fifth, in their proxy statement following the BRT Statement, the great majority of the BRT did not even mention their joining the BRT Statement, and, among the minority of companies that did mention it, none indicated that their endorsement required or was expected to result in any changes in stakeholder treatment. Sixth, the BRT Companies all continued to pay directors compensation that strongly aligns their interests with shareholder value and avoided any use or support of stakeholder-oriented metrics. Overall, our findings support the view that the BRT Statement was mostly for show and that BRT Companies joining it did not intend or expect it to bring about any material changes in how they treat stakeholders.

Abstract Over the past three decades, the US has developed a robust body of gender asylum law, including claims of women subject to sexual violence or other serious harm for reasons of gender. This body of law both reflects and has been a catalyst for larger shifts in US jurisprudence recognising the international treaty law basis of domestic asylum law. For years such progress was stymied by a dominant Cold War ideological decision-making paradigm and a woefully inadequate and politicised administrative bureaucracy. The growth of a domestic and international women’s rights movement, and more meaningful engagement by the US judiciary, have resulted in substantial changes. Although progress remains incomplete, today there is a significant body of administrative and federal judicial case law incorporating gender into the interpretation of key categories in refugee law, including gender-defined particular social groups (PSG) and gender-based claims under the political, race and religion grounds in the definition of refugee. These more principled developments have proven vulnerable to politics, particularly under the administration of President Donald J. Trump. However, a new approach, based in part on a clearer, regulatory articulation of doctrine, holds promise for the development of a more coherent and principled body of jurisprudence. This article places US gender asylum in the context of the larger political landscape (i.e., the Cold War, and post-Cold War politics). The article also attempts to draw the links between the development of gender asylum law and larger social and legal change movements, including a domestic and international women’s rights movements focused on issues of sexual violence and violence in the home or “domestic violence.”

In The Words That Made Us: America’s Constitutional Conversation, 1760-1840, Akhil Reed Amar writes of the parlous state of democracy in the United States. He argues that our problems are due, in part, to citizens’ failure to understand their responsibilities. The quality of our “constitutional conversation,” in which we talk about the nature of our government and our aspirations for it, is extremely poor. This is, in large measure, due to scholars’—historians’ and law professors’—unwillingness to create a “usable past” that would help Americans understand their duties to the country and to one another. He sees his book as a means of starting an enriched “constitutional conversion.” Along with his diagnosis of American malaise, Amar presents his own version of the origins of the Revolution (winding the clock back to 1760, before the more traditional starting period of 1763-1765), discusses the politically volatile 1790s, and creates portraits of the most well-known figures of that period. Amar’s presentation should start a vivid conversation about the nature of American civic life, past and present.

By sharply favoring debt over equity, the U.S. corporate tax does considerable economic damage, writes professors Mark Roe and Michael Troege. Instead, they suggest we take a look at Allowance for Corporate Equity—or ACE—which fixes a tax-deductible cost to equity based on government bond rates.

Perhaps the wave of authoritarian populism has begun to recede. Rebuilding liberal constitutionalism in its aftermath now requires some attention, as Andrew Arato and András Sajó suggest. (This intervention addresses some but not all of the questions they raise.)

Algorithmic recommendations and decisions have become ubiquitous in today's society. Many of these and other data-driven policies are based on known, deterministic rules to ensure their transparency and interpretability. This is especially true when such policies are used for public policy decision-making. For example, algorithmic pre-trial risk assessments, which serve as our motivating application, provide relatively simple, deterministic classification scores and recommendations to help judges make release decisions. Unfortunately, existing methods for policy learning are not applicable because they require existing policies to be stochastic rather than deterministic. We develop a robust optimization approach that partially identifies the expected utility of a policy, and then finds an optimal policy by minimizing the worst-case regret. The resulting policy is conservative but has a statistical safety guarantee, allowing the policy-maker to limit the probability of producing a worse outcome than the existing policy. We extend this approach to common and important settings where humans make decisions with the aid of algorithmic recommendations. Lastly, we apply the proposed methodology to a unique field experiment on pre-trial risk assessments. We derive new classification and recommendation rules that retain the transparency and interpretability of the existing risk assessment instrument while potentially leading to better overall outcomes at a lower cost.

The Commission on the Supreme Court’s findings may end up helping to set reform in motion, rather than stopping it in its tracks.

The self-governing republic works only if it expresses the will of the majority. But one party is now committed to minoritarian rule by any means.

Power to the People proposes that some forms of populism are inconsistent with constitutionalism, while others aren’t. By providing a series of case studies, some organized by nation, others by topic, the book identifies these populist inconsistencies with constitutionalism-and, importantly, when and how they are not. Opening a dialogue for the possibility of a deeper, populist democracy, the book examines recent challenges to the idea that democracy is a good form of government by exploring possibilities for new institutions that can determine and implement a majority’s views without always threatening constitutionalism.

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization is an open challenge to the Court’s authority, and perhaps broadly reflects a spirit of legal self-help that is running through the land.

States spend tens of billions of dollars each year to help implement humanitarian programs in conflicts across the world. Yet, in practice, counterterrorism objectives increasingly prevail over humanitarian concerns, often resulting in devastating effects for civilian populations in need of aid and protection in war. Not least, confusion and misapprehensions about the power and authority of States relative to the United Nations Security Council to set policy preferences and configure legal obligations contribute significantly to this trajectory. In a new guide for States published by the Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict (HLS PILAC), Dustin A. Lewis, Radhika Kapoor, and Naz K. Modirzadeh argue that it is possible — and, they believe, urgently called for — to arrest this trajectory and safeguard principled humanitarian action. In their view, short-term and ad-hoc solutions are less likely to uphold the humanitarian imperative. Instead, the authors present a framework for States to reconfigure the relations between these core commitments by deciding to assess the counterterrorism architecture through the lens of impartial humanitarianism. The authors also identify key questions that States may answer to help formulate and instantiate their values, policy commitments, and legal positions in order to advance the humanitarian imperative and uphold respect for principled humanitarian action in connection with carrying out the Security Council’s counterterrorism decisions.

Legal scholarship has not previously considered the role of advocacy history in Supreme Court advocacy and decision making in any of its iterations. Though well know to expert Supreme Court advocates, hiding in the shadows has been how both Supreme Court advocates and the Justices themselves rely on the advocacy underlying the Court's precedent — both the written briefs and oral argument — in discerning both the meaning of the Court's prior rulings and its precedential weight. The most recently completed Supreme Court Term is emblematic of the relevance to both Supreme Court advocates and the Justices themselves of the advocacy underlying the Court’s prior rulings. It also highlights the role that advocacy history is increasingly playing in the Court's controversial debates concerning whether a prior case should be overruled. This Article seeks to fill that void in existing legal scholarship by bringing out of the shadows the role advocacy history plays at the Court.

The invention in the late twentieth century of what I call weak-form systems of judicial review provides us with the chance to see in a new light some traditional debates within U.S. constitutional law and theory, which are predicated on the fact that the United States has strong-form judicial review. Strong- and weak-form systems operate on the level of constitutional design, in the sense that their characteristics are specified in constitutional documents or in deep-rooted constitutional traditions. After sketching the differences between strong- and weak-form systems, I turn to design features that operate at the next lower level. Here legislatures or courts specify whether their enactments or decisions will receive strong- or weak-form treatment. I examine examples of legislative allocations of issues to strong- and weak-form review and identify some practical and conceptual problems with such allocations. Then I examine judicial allocations — of the courts’ own decisions — to Strong- or weak-form categories. Here I consider Thayerian judicial review and what Professor Dan Coenen has called semisubstantive doctrines as examples of judicial choices to give their decisions weak-form effects. My conclusion is that these allocation strategies reproduce within strong- and weakform systems the issues that arise on the level of constitutional design. Weak-form systems and allocation may seem to alleviate some difficultiesassociated with strong-form systems in constitutional democracies. My analysis suggests that those difficulties may persist even when alternatives to strong-form judicial review are adopted.

This symposium explores the role of “fourth branch” institutions, and specifically the role of independent electoral commissions (IECs) in protecting and promoting constitutional democracy. It does so by focusing on the global South, and Asia in particular. It aims to go beyond the “usual suspects” in comparative constitutional law, and put the constitutional experiences of countries such as Indonesia, Kenya, Myanmar, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka at the centre of a decolonized constitutional project and understanding, supplementing them with an examination of more-often-studied systems such as Australia and India.

In response to questions that have been raised since the publication of my article.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows are at a low point as a result of not only the COVID-19 pandemic but also restrictive FDI policies adopted in recent years. Investment facilitation has gained in importance as a set of practical measures to increase the transparency and predictability of investment frameworks and promote cooperation to advance development. Investment facilitation can help to reduce the transactional and administrative costs faced by foreign investors and contribute to a resilient and sustainable economic recovery. Discussions on a distinct set of investment facilitation policies and measures have gained momentum in recent years. Negotiations are undertaken at the bilateral and regional levels, for example, in the context of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) or the Sustainable Investment Protocol of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). Another important initiative is underway among members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) which are negotiating an Investment Facilitation Framework for Development. This article develops a set of key recommendations for policy-makers on how investment facilitation frameworks can be designed to help attract sustainable FDI for sustainable development and recovery in general. These recommendations can be summarized in three guiding principles: contribute directly to sustainable development, focus on conflict prevention and management, and learn from experiences from other processes such as trade facilitation.

Economic analysis of competition regulation is most developed in the domain of horizontal mergers, and modern agency guidelines reflect a substantial consensus on the appropriate template for merger assessment. Nevertheless, official protocols are understood to rest on a problematic market definition exercise, to use HHIs and HHIs in ways that conflict with standard models, and more broadly to diverge with how economic analysis of proposed mergers should be and often is conducted. These gaps, unfortunately, are more consequential than is generally appreciated. Moreover, additional unrecognized errors and omissions are at least as important: analysis of efficiencies, which are thought to justify a permissive approach, fails to draw on the most relevant fields of economics; entry is often a misanalyzed afterthought; official information collection and decision protocols violate basic tenets of decision analysis; and single-sector, partial equilibrium analysis is employed despite the presence of substantial distortions (many due to imperfect competition) in many sectors of the economy. This article elaborates these deficiencies, offers preliminary analysis of how they can best be addressed, and identifies priorities for further research.

In evaluating behaviorally informed interventions, policymakers should consider both their welfare effects (including, for example, their potentially negative effects on subjective well-being) and their effects on distributive justice (including, for example, their potentially negative effects on those at the bottom of the economic ladder). Four specific questions are relevant: (1) What are the aggregate effects on social welfare? For purposes of evaluation, it is tempting to focus on increases in participation rates or on cost-effectiveness. The welfare question is much more important, though it raises serious normative, conceptual, and empirical challenges. (2) Who is likely to be helped and who is likely to be hurt? This is a plea for a distributional analysis of the effects of behaviorally informed interventions. (3) What are the expected effects on the least well-off? It is important to ask whether the relevant interventions help or hurt those who have the least, defined in terms of welfare, a point that is connected with “prioritarianism.” (4) Do the benefits to those who are helped exceed the costs to those who are hurt? If the gainers gain more than the losers lose, we have a strong point in favor of the intervention. But the point might not be decisive if, for example, the gainers are well-off to begin with, and the losers are not. The four questions are meant as an objection to efforts to evaluate behaviorally informed interventions in terms of (for example) effects on participation rates; as a plea for analysis of the distributive effects of such interventions; and as a plea for specification and investigation of their welfare effects.

In her Jorde Lecture, Pam Karlan paints a grim picture of American democracy under siege. Together, the malapportioned Senate, the obsolete Electoral College, rampant voter suppression and gerrymandering, and a Supreme Court happy to greenlight these practices, threaten the very notion of majority rule. I share Karlan’s bleak assessment. I’m also skeptical that conventional tools—judicial decisions and congressional statutes—will solve our current problems. So in this response, I explore a pair of less familiar but possibly more potent alternatives: the authority of each chamber of Congress to judge its members’ elections, and presidential enforcement of the Guarantee Clause. These powers are explicitly delineated by the Constitution. They can’t be stymied by either the Senate’s filibuster or the Court’s hostility. And they hold enormous democratic potential, especially if channeled through the procedures I outline.

Following several years of study, the Oxford International Tax Group recently proposed a fundamental reform: the traditional corporate income tax would be replaced by taxation of a corporation’s domestic cash flows. One, perhaps surprising, argument for this proposal is that its incidence would fall primarily on a country’s residents who own shares in domestic and foreign companies. For example, equilibrating changes in floating exchange rates would transform a U.S. tax on U.S. sales by U.S. and foreign corporations into a tax on U.S. shareholders of U.S. and foreign corporations, wherever their sales occurred. The Oxford Group indicates that resulting tax burden is very likely to be progressive. If, however, a progressive tax borne by individual owners of corporate stock is desirable, why not tax shareholders directly? The purpose of this comment is to illustrate the equivalence of the two taxes with a simple numerical example and to stimulate their comparison.

The stock market generates less wealth than it appears. We show that total shareholder return (TSR), the standard measure of stock investor performance, substantially exaggerates returns earned by these investors in aggregate, and thus by most investors. The main reason: from investors’ collective perspective, dividends cannot be reinvested in public equity, as TSR assumes, but only in other lower-yielding assets. In addition, TSR is inflated by well-timed repurchases and equity issuances that merely transfer value among investors. We put forward another measure–"all-shareholder return" (ASR)–which better captures the wealth generated by the stock market for investors. We estimate that the ASR equity premium is 17 to 73% lower than the TSR-implied equity premium, depending on the investment alternative. We also estimate that the wedge between ASR and TSR is primarily driven by the reinvestment effect. However, over time, the reinvestment effect declines while the timing effect of cash flows increases, consistent with rising stock issuances and buybacks.

In this Essay in remembrance, Professors Larisa G Bowman, Esme Caramello, and Nicole Summers grieve the loss of Chief Justice Ralph D. Gants: a past, present, and future champion for housing justice. Housing as an area of unmet civil legal need occupied his final thoughts; he called it "the greatest access to justice challenge of our lifetime." This Essay charts Chief Justice Gants's evolution in becoming a champion for housing justice. Part I discusses his early housing-related judicial opinions as well as the exposure to housing issues he gained as Co-Chair of the Massachusetts Access to Justice Commission. Part II covers his time as the Chief Justice, reviewing some of his seminal opinions related to housing issues and his advocacy for broad changes across the entire Massachusetts court system, such as expansion of the Housing Court, that would increase access to justice for low-income litigants. Finally, in Part III, this Essay ends with Chief Justice Gants's leadership during the COVID-19 crisis. He paid close attention and threw his full weight behind the cause because he believed that the legal system, with reform and ingenuity, could deliver justice in housing.

This Article demonstrates that constitutional provisions rarely if ever have uniquely correct “original public meanings” that are sufficiently determinate to resolve disputed constitutional cases. As public meaning originalism (“PMO”) ascends toward a position of dominance within the Supreme Court, both practitioners and critics should recognize the limited capacity of historical and linguistic facts to settle modern issues. To understand successful constitutional communication, this Article argues, requires a distinction between “minimal” original public meanings, which either are entailed by language and logic or are otherwise noncontroversial, and the richer and more determinate meanings that originalists often purport to discover. When the Constitution says that each state shall have “two Senators,” “two” means two. By contrast, when members of the Founding generation disagreed about the meaning of a constitutional provision—as they frequently did—the idea of a uniquely correct and determinate more-than-minimal meaning that existed as a matter of linguistic and historical fact is chimerical. Judges can of course reach determinate conclusions, but seldom can those dispute-resolving conclusions be ones of simple historical fact. Insofar as practitioners of PMO—including Justices of the Supreme Court—purport to discover more-than-minimal original public meanings that provide determinate resolutions to contested cases, skepticism is in order. The problem with claims about more-than-minimal original public meanings is conceptual, not epistemological. Although public meaning originalists speak of “evidence” establishing the historical validity of disputed claims about original public meanings, they have no adequate account of what, exactly, the evidence is supposed to be evidence of. Beyond historical facts about who said and believed different things at particular times, there is no further, diversity-transcending fact of an original public meaning that extends beyond minimal and noncontroversial meanings. After identifying the conceptual limitations of public meaning originalism, this Article examines the resulting challenges for both theorists of PMO and for originalist and nonoriginalist Justices alike. It also draws lessons concerning the nature of and necessary conditions for successful constitutional communication across generations.

Patterns of population health are keen reflections of structural inequities in societies, yet they are rarely subject to the requirements of democratic justification that other systemic inequalities provoke. Nor are health systems generally subject to societal scrutiny regarding fidelity to normative commitments of dignity and equality. Increased recognition of social determinants of health has challenged the narrow biomedical view of health as a stochastic phenomenon. More recently the sweeping devastation of the COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare structural injustices across many democracies, which contributed to widely disparate rates of infection and mortality.

The large American corporation faces ever-rising pressure to pursue a purpose that’s more than just for shareholder profit. This rising pressure interacts with sharp changes in industrial organization in a way that has not been comprehensively analyzed and is generally ignored. Firms’ capacity to accommodate pressure for a wider purpose is rising as well. Three changes are most relevant: the possibility of declining competition, the counter-possibility that what seems to be a competitive decline is really increasing winner-take-all competition, and the possibility that the ownership of the big firms has concentrated (even if the firms themselves have not) and thereby diluted competitive zeal. Consider competitive decline: In robustly competitive economies, firms cannot deviate much from profit maximization for expensive corporate purpose programs unless expanded purpose bolsters profitability (by branding the firm positively for consumers or by better motivating employees, for example). In economies with slack competition, in contrast, monopolistic and oligopolistic firms can accommodate purpose pressure, sometimes even expensive purpose pressure, from the profits they garner above what a competitive firm requires. In simplistic form, purpose can pressure such firms to redirect their excess profit from shareholders to stakeholders—to customers, employees, or the public good—in ways that firms in strongly competitive industries cannot. By most accounts, competition has been declining in the United States. By some accounts, it has declined precipitously. That decline suggests three possibilities: One—the central thesis of this Article— purpose pressure has greater potential to succeed if competition has declined or rents have otherwise grown; in competitive markets, the profit-oriented purpose-pressured firm has no choice but to refuse the purpose pressure (or to give it only lip service), while in monopolistically-organized industries, the purpose-pressured firm has more room to maneuver. Two, the normative bases undergirding shareholder primacy, although still strong, are less powerful in monopolistic markets. Three, declining corporate competition and rising corporate profits create a lush field for social conflict inside the firm and the polity for shareholders and stakeholders to seek a share of those profits. The result can infuse basic corporate governance with social conflict. This new, or expanded, field for conflict can contribute to and exacerbate our rising political and social instability. Expanding purpose pressure is one manifestation of this conflict.

O texto é a parte de um conteúdo conferência Conferência ministrada em 7 de dezembro de 2016 no IV Fórum Nacional de Direito e Infraestrutura, realizado pelo Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos Jurídicos da Infraestrutura (IBEJI), em parceria com o Conselho Regional de Engenharia e Agronomia do Estado de São Paulo (CREA-SP). Examinam-se as estratégias de desenvolvimento ocorridas na história do nosso país para mostrar que precisamos organizar uma nova estratégia, condição vital para resolver a questão da infraestrutura. Assim, delineia-se um método para esta nova estratégia, juntamente com a descrição das condições sociais, políticas e intelectuais para a sua criação. São propostas várias ideias, como a criação de uma “produtividade inclusiva” e a qualificação e democratização da economia em relação à produção e à oferta, aliada a uma revolução na natureza da educação. Além disso, explicam-se as qualidades necessárias a uma política de infraestrutura: agnosticismo em relação aos setores da economia, capilaridade social e fortalecimento da federação. Por fim, mas não menos importante, delineiam-se os componentes necessários para o encaminhamento de uma estratégia nacional de desenvolvimento: forte investimento público, cooperação e coordenação entre os estados e o setor privado, e o papel fundamental dos juízes para fazer o detalhamento jurídico dos modelos necessários à organização. esta nova política de infraestrutura (imaginação institucional).

Book review of Until I Am Free: Fannie Lou Hamer’s Enduring Message to America by Keisha N. Blain.

This article proposes that the U.S. Senate adopt a “popular-majoritarian cloture rule,” under which a motion to close debate and proceed to a final vote would carry if but only if supported by a majority of Senators who collectively represent a larger share of the population than those Senators in opposition. This rule, which would be a constitutional exercise of the Senate’s power to set the rules of its proceedings, would make the body more democratic and more functional, and would be preferable both to the current filibuster rule and to simple majority rule.

Would the outcome in Dobbs put originalism in doubt?

To compare post-operative vocal outcomes of a voice rest regimen versus no voice restrictions following micro-laryngeal surgery for benign glottic lesions.