Faculty Bibliography

Chater & Loewenstein, superb and distinguished social scientists, have misfired. Their complaint is baseless: In the real world of policymaking, behavioral science is mostly being used to reform systems, not to alter individual behavior. Nor is there empirical support for the proposition that interventions aimed at helping individuals make systemic reform less likely. Chater & Loewenstein (C&L), superb and distinguished social scientists, have misfired. In the real world of policymaking, behavioral science is mostly being used to reform systems, not to alter individual behavior. Nor is there empirical support for the proposition that interventions aimed at helping individuals make systemic reform less likely. Some conspiracy theories are true, but theirs is groundless.

This Viewpoint looks at the lawsuits brought by pharmaceutical companies to challenge the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, in particular claims under the First Amendment’s protection of free speech.

While the literature on putting a “human in the loop” in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) has grown significantly, limited attention has been paid to how human expertise ought to be combined with AI/ML judgments. This design question arises because of the ubiquity and quantity of algorithmic decisions being made today in the face of widespread public reluctance to forgo human expert judgment. To resolve this conflict, we propose that human expert judges be included via appeals processes for review of algorithmic decisions. Thus, the human intervenes only in a limited number of cases and only after an initial AI/ML judgment has been made. Based on an analogy with appellate processes in judiciary decision-making, we argue that this is, in many respects, a more efficient way to divide the labor between a human and a machine. Human reviewers can add more nuanced clinical, moral, or legal reasoning, and they can consider case-specific information that is not easily quantified and, as such, not available to the AI/ML at an initial stage. In doing so, the human can serve as a crucial error correction check on the AI/ML, while retaining much of the efficiency of AI/ML’s use in the decision-making process. In this paper, we develop these widely applicable arguments while focusing primarily on examples from the use of AI/ML in medicine, including organ allocation, fertility care, and hospital readmission.

Machine learning algorithms are increasingly able to predict what goods and services particular people will buy, and at what price. It is possible to imagine a situation in which relatively uniform, or coarsely set, prices and product characteristics are replaced by far more in the way of individualization. Companies might, for example, offer people shirts and shoes that are particularly suited to their situations, that fit with their particular tastes, and that have prices that fit their personal valuations. In many cases, the use of algorithms promises to increase efficiency and to promote social welfare; it might also promote fair distribution. But when consumers suffer from an absence of information or from behavioral biases, algorithms can cause serious harm. Companies might, for example, exploit such biases in order to lead people to purchase products that have little or no value for them or to pay too much for products that do have value for them. Algorithmic harm, understood as the exploitation of an absence of information or of behavioral biases, can disproportionately affect members of identifiable groups, including women and people of color. Since algorithms exacerbate the harm caused to imperfectly informed and imperfectly rational consumers, their increasing use provides fresh support for existing efforts to reduce information and rationality deficits, especially through optimally designed disclosure mandates. In addition, there is a more particular need for algorithm-centered policy responses. Specifically, algorithmic transparency—transparency about the nature, uses, and consequences of algorithms—is both crucial and challenging; novel methods designed to open the algorithmic “black box” and “interpret” the algorithm’s decision-making process should play a key role. In appropriate cases, regulators should also police the design and implementation of algorithms, with a particular emphasis on the exploitation of an absence of information or of behavioral biases.

Edição ampliada e definitiva de um dos maiores clássicos sobre tomada de decisão, escrito por Richard H. Thaler, ganhador do prêmio Nobel de economia, e Cass R. Sunstein, professor de Harvard. * Best-seller do New York Times * Mais de ...

Do people like algorithms? In this study, intended as a promissory note and a description of a research strategy, we offer the following highly preliminary findings. (1) In a simple choice between a human being and an algorithm, across diverse settings and without information about the human being or the algorithm, people in our tested groups are about equally divided in their preference. (2) When people are given a very brief account of the data on which an algorithm relies, there is a large shift in favor of the algorithm over the human being. (3) When people are given a very brief account of the experience of the relevant human being, without an account of the data on which the relevant algorithm relies, there is a moderate shift in favor of the human being. (4) When people are given both (a) a very brief account of the experience of the relevant human being and (b) a very brief account of the data on which the relevant algorithm relies, there is a large shift in favor of the algorithm over the human being. One lesson is that in the tested groups, at least one-third of people seem to have a clear preference for either a human being or an algorithm – a preference that is unaffected by brief information that seems to favor one or the other. Another lesson is that a brief account of the data on which an algorithm relies does have a significant effect on a large percentage of the tested groups, whether or not people are also given positive information about the human alternative. Across the various surveys, we do not find persistent demographic differences, with one exception: men appear to like algorithms more than women do. These initial findings are meant as proof of concept, or more accurately as a suggestion of concept, intended to inform a series of larger and more systematic studies of whether and when people prefer to rely on algorithms or human beings, and also of international and demographic differences.

The only question is whether American citizens today can uphold that commitment.

This Viewpoint discusses the maternal mortality crisis in the US, the need for an extension of Medicaid postpartum coverage, and the residual challenges across the US related to maternal health.

Critics of the Supreme Court think it has lost its claim to legitimacy. But proposals for reforming it must strike a balance with preserving its power and independence, which remain essential to our constitutional system.

Doing so would intrude on Georgia’s right and obligation to defend its own laws and choose its own presidential electors.

It has been suggested that the use of gendered language reinforces gendered stereotypes and influences behaviour. This column investigates whether the performance of women was affected when more gender-neutral language was introduced to Israeli standardised college entrance exams. The use of more gender-neutral language is associated with a significant improvement in performance on quantitative questions, where women are stereotypically perceived as underperforming, without negative effects on the performance of men.

The U.S. Supreme Court has eliminated the right to abortion and is revisiting all sorts of other fundamental questions today—about voting rights, affirmative action, gun laws, and much more. Once-arcane theories of constitutional interpretation are profoundly affecting the lives of all Americans. In this brief and urgent book, Harvard Law School professor Cass Sunstein provides a lively introduction to competing approaches to interpreting the Constitution—and argues that the only way to choose one is to ask whether it would change American life for the better or worse. If a method of interpretation would eliminate the right of privacy, allow racial segregation, or obliterate free speech, it would be unacceptable for that reason. But some Supreme Court justices are committed to “originalism,” arguing that the meaning of the Constitution is settled by how it was publicly understood when it was ratified. Originalists insist that their approach is dictated by the Constitution. That, Sunstein argues, is a big mistake. The Constitution doesn’t contain instructions for its own interpretation. Any approach to constitutional interpretation needs to be defended in terms of its broad effects—what it does to our rights and our institutions. It must respect those rights and institutions—and safeguard the conditions for democracy itself.

Trump has no serious first amendment defense in a court of law. Here’s why Laurence H Tribe and Dennis Aftergut Words that criminal defendants have written or spoken are used against them all the time. Perhaps you’ve heard of a confession?

Against the background of the legal reform contemplated in Israel, the Israeli Supreme Court would have to reach a decision on an array of petitions that focus on seemingly two separate subjects: (1) the implications of allegations that Prime Minster Netanyahu has breached his conflicts-of-interest arrangement in advancing the legal reform, and (2) the validity of actions adopted, both legislative and administrative, as part of the legal reform. We argue that these two subjects are interconnected, and that the decision in each of them should take the second into account. The 2020 Supreme Court decision, which enabled Netanyahu to serve as Prime Minister despite his criminal indictment, sought to advance two fundamental values: respecting the choice of the parliamentary majority regarding the choice of PM, and protecting the rule of law by requiring Netanyahu to comply with the constraints of a conflict-of-interest arrangement. The governing conflict-of-interest arrangement expressly prohibits any involvement by Netanyahu in initiatives to make changes in the legal system. This paper seeks to identify the way in which the Supreme Court should continue to protect these two values if the Court determines that Netanyahu played a substantial role in advancing the legal reform, and thereby failed to comply with his conflict-of-interest arrangement, and thereby with the obligations imposed on him by the 2020 Supreme Court decision. Such a violation of the conflicts-of-interest arrangement would confront the Supreme Court with the question of how to prevent circumvention of its 2020 decision. We examine this question. We first show that an imposition of sanctions on Netanyahu, including even removal from office, would not be an appropriate remedy to his violating the conflicts-of-interest arrangement. Our thesis is that the best judicial reaction would be to give substantial weight to this violation when considering the validity of any actions taken as part of the legal reform, whether administrative or legislative, that (i) are actions in whose adoption the conflict-of-interest arrangement prohibited any involvement by Netanyahu, and (ii) are actions to whose adoption Netanyahu contributed substantially either directly or indirectly through his support for the legal reform as a whole. In the examination of any action satisfying these criteria, the Court should invalidate the action or at least delay the point in time in which the action becomes effective until after the expiration of the conflicts-of-interest arrangement. The remedy we put forward offers an intermediate approach that would well serve the two values that the 2020 Supreme Court decision sought to protect. The proposed remedy would effectively protect the legal system, while respecting the choice of the parliamentary majority to have Netanyahu serve as PM despite his criminal trial. Because the proposed remedy would protect important interests of the different parts of the Israeli public, it also would serve the goals of strengthening the public legitimacy of, and the public trust in, the courts and the government. Finally, we show that using the proposed remedy would be consistent with existing legal doctrine and case law. Among other things, granting the proposed remedy would be consistent with the authority of courts to enforce prior judicial decisions and prevent circumventions of them, and with the prohibition on the abuse of official power. Furthermore, due to the unique circumstances on which the use of this remedy would be based, using it would not create a precedent for any significant widening of the judicial review of administration and legislative decisions.

This Viewpoint discusses why the legality of calling patients located in another state has suddenly been called into question.

No case in our system of justice could more directly and fundamentally address the stakes of American democracy and the rule of law.

The public has a right to see justice done, and the legitimacy of the proceedings hinges on transparency.

This Viewpoint discusses recent judicial developments and the newly-enunciated FDA position that levonorgestrel is a nonabortifacient.

Economic arrangements, Ramseyer writes, are structured and implemented with the intent and hope that they will be carried out with 'care, intelligence, discretion, and effort.' Yet entrepreneurs work with partial information about the products, and people, they are dealing with. Contracting in Japan illustrates this by examining five sets of negotiations and unusual contractual arrangements among non-specialist businessmen, and women, in Japan. In it, Ramseyer explores how sake brewers were able to obtain and market the necessary, but difficult-to-grow, sake rice that captured the local terroir; how Buddhist temples tried to compensate for rapidly falling donations by negotiating unusual funerary contracts; and how pre-war local elites used leasing instead of loans to fund local agriculture. Ramseyer examines these entrepreneurs, discovering how they structured contracts, made credible commitments, obtained valuable information, and protected themselves from adverse consequences to create, maintain, strengthen, and leverage the social networks in which they operated.

Bankruptcy filings are thought to be traumatic events that demoralize workers and spark employee flight. Using social media data, I present evidence suggesting that this belief is both accurate and, to a large extent, overstated. Online employee reviews show that employees of distressed firms are much more likely to complain about corporate culture and the firm’s financial struggles after their employer files for Chapter 11. This may translate into real action, as I also observe a sharp increase in employee departures immediately following the bankruptcy filing. However, viewed in fuller context, these departures are best described as a continuation of a steady rise in employee attrition that began, on average, a year prior to bankruptcy, suggesting that workforce response to Chapter 11 filings is more a story of continued flight from a distressed employer than an abrupt shift following a federal bankruptcy filing.

Patients, physicians, and hospital administrators in the USA are often unaware of how legislation governs medical data—but agree that rights over such data should be expanded for patients and curtailed for health systems.

Observational studies provide crucial information early during epidemics and pandemics, but they often suffer from methodological shortcomings, which can be resolved. Scientific research is a necessary part of epidemic preparedness and response. Observational studies, in which the intervention and outcome(s) of interest are not under the researcher’s control, are used in epidemics to describe basic properties of a pathogen and its transmission; clinical symptoms; associations between interventions and patient outcomes; and the effectiveness of public health measures to curb disease spread.

The modern world is legalized: legal language, institutions, and professionals are everywhere. But what is law’s power in global life? What does all this legality have to do with hegemony, with hierarchy and inequality, and with the diversity of human experience? What is its history and how does that history matter in world affairs? Above all, what does it mean to think “critically” about law and global affairs? In this poignant and iconoclastic book, two leading scholars take us to the heart of the matter, examining law’s relationship with history, power, and political economy. David Kennedy and Martti Koskenniemi have often inspired each other and are both considered “critical” voices in international law, but they have never explored their similarities and differences as deeply as they do here. Of Law and the World takes the form of a conversation, as the authors reflect on the study of international law, the motivations underlying their research, and the payoffs and limitations of their investigations into law’s role in global affairs. They revisit and renew debates about the past and future of the many legalities that shape our world. Erudite, open-minded, and informed by decades of experience and observation, Of Law and the World is an unflinchingly honest confrontation with humanity’s struggle to live together.

This Viewpoint explains the history of the Comstock Act, its use by those seeking to restrict abortion, and why it threatens abortion access in the US.

¿Cuál es el papel adecuado de los tribunales en un Estado de Derecho? ¿Pueden reemplazar o corregir las decisiones de las legislaturas, integradas por personas elegidas por el voto de las mayorías? ¿Deberían compartir con el Congreso la potestad de interpretar las leyes? Dicho de otro modo, ¿quién debería tener la última palabra en la traducción de la Constitución y las leyes a la vida cotidiana? En este libro de extraordinaria influencia, que renovó de raíz el pensamiento jurídico contemporáneo, Mark Tushnet despliega los efectos positivos de un papel más débil por parte del Poder Judicial, un sistema en el que los legisladores y los funcionarios del Poder Ejecutivo participen abiertamente en la interpretación constitucional. Postula, además, una concepción más fuerte de los derechos sociales y económicos, que deberían quedar bajo la custodia activa de todas las ramas de gobierno (en primer lugar, las ramas políticas). Fundador de la corriente de los estudios críticos del derecho en los años setenta, rara avis en el derecho norteamericano como jurista de izquierda que ocupa un lugar central en la discusión constitucional contemporánea, Tushnet pone a prueba su propuesta comparando el derecho de los Estados Unidos con los de Australia, Canadá o el Reino Unido, y demuestra que un control de constitucionalidad débil, como el que aplican esos países, puede ser compatible con el autogobierno democrático y la garantía del cumplimiento efectivo de los derechos para todas las personas. Mientras en la región se multiplican los conflictos entre poderes ejecutivos y judiciales y su solvencia y legitimidad para tomar decisiones, Siglo XXI acerca a los lectores de lengua castellana una obra clave para enriquecer y matizar esas discusiones, que en el fondo hablan de la fortaleza o debilidad de nuestras democracias.

Silicon Valley founders are known for selling a vision to investors and prospective customers, and then laboring to turn it into a reality. Black entrepreneurs are rarely afforded the same benefit of the doubt. Instead, their efforts are deemed unethical and even criminal.

This Viewpoint discusses how regulators across the world should approach the legal and ethical challenges, including privacy, device regulation, competition, intellectual property rights, cybersecurity, and liability, raised by the medical use of large language models.

In the last several months, several major disciplines have started their initial reckoning with what ChatGPT and other Large Language Models (LLMs) mean for them – law, medicine, business among other professions. With a heavy dose of humility, given how fast the technology is moving and how uncertain its social implications are, this article attempts to give some early tentative thoughts on what ChatGPT might mean for bioethics. I will first argue that many bioethics issues raised by ChatGPT are similar to those raised by current medical AI – built into devices, decision support tools, data analytics, etc. These include issues of data ownership, consent for data use, data representativeness and bias, and privacy. I describe how these familiar issues appear somewhat differently in the ChatGPT context, but much of the existing bioethical thinking on these issues provides a strong starting point. There are, however, a few “new-ish” issues I highlight – by new-ish I mean issues that while perhaps not truly new seem much more important for it than other forms of medical AI. These include issues about informed consent and the right to know we are dealing with an AI, the problem of medical deepfakes, the risk of oligopoly and inequitable access related to foundational models, environmental effects, and on the positive side opportunities for the democratization of knowledge and empowering patients. I also discuss how races towards dominance (between large companies and between the U.S. and geopolitical rivals like China) risk sidelining ethics.

U.S. banking regulators have considerable discretion in developing and enforcing prudential rules. Regulators have also enjoyed wide discretion in exercising supervisory authority over banks, in order to guard against potential safety and soundness risks that are not covered by the rules. However, recent developments in U.S. administrative law may create some conflict with that broad discretion. Whether or not this conflict comes to pass, a form of judicial review that focuses less on individual supervisory actions, and more on the overall framework within which the supervisory function is carried out, is a more promising way to achieve the administrative law aims of fairness and consistency.

In “Ultra-Processed People,” Chris van Tulleken takes a close look at the franken-snacks that barely resemble what they’re imitating.