Faculty Bibliography

Can AI safety shed any light on old corporate governance problems? And can the law and economics of corporate governance help us frame the new problems of AI safety? The author identifies five lessons — and one dire warning — on the corporate governance of AI and other socially sensitive technologies that have been made vivid by the corporate turmoil at OpenAI.

In the current ESG debate, one leading theory argues that diversified investors have a financial incentive to reduce negative corporate externalities, such as greenhouse gas emissions, because they internalize those externalities within their investment portfolio. This Essay examines how this “portfolio primacy” theory interacts with the multiple layers of fiduciary duties of investment and corporate managers. Using a hypothetical emissions reduction in ExxonMobil as a paradigmatic case, I show that portfolio primacy creates a fiduciary deadlock: a situation in which multiple fiduciary relationships—between investment advisers and fund investors, between corporate managers and shareholders, and between controlling and minority shareholders—come into conflict with each other. I argue that, within the existing structure of fiduciary law, portfolio primacy will prove ineffective in promoting ambitious social and environmental goals. Indeed, the only way to solve the fiduciary deadlock is to abandon the central tenet of portfolio primacy.

This Article tests the claims of supporters of stakeholder capitalism (“stakeholderism”) in the context of the COVID pandemic. Supporters of stakeholderism advocate encouraging and relying on corporate leaders to use their discretion to serve stakeholders such as employees, customers, suppliers, local communities, and the environment. The pandemic followed and was accompanied by peak support for, and broad expressions of commitment to, stakeholderism from corporate leaders. Nonetheless, and even though the pandemic heightened risks to stakeholders, we document that corporate leaders negotiating deal terms failed to look after stakeholder interests. We conduct a detailed examination of all the $1B+ acquisitions of public companies that were announced from April 2020 to March 2022, totaling 122 acquisitions with an aggregate consideration exceeding $800 billion. We find that deal terms provided large gains for the shareholders of target companies, as well as substantial private benefits for corporate leaders. However, although many transactions were viewed at the time of the deal as posing significant post-deal risks for employees, corporate leaders largely did not obtain any employee protections, including payments to employees who would be laid off post-deal. Similarly, we find that corporate leaders failed to negotiate for protections for customers, suppliers, communities, the environment, and other stakeholders. After conducting various tests to examine whether this pattern could have been driven by other factors, we conclude that it is likely to have been driven by corporate leaders’ incentives not to benefit stakeholders beyond what would serve shareholder interests. While we focus on decisions in the acquisition context, we explain why our findings also have implications for ongoing-concern decisions, and we discuss and respond to potential objections to our conclusions. Overall, our findings have significant implications for long-standing debates on the corporate treatment of stakeholders. In particular, our findings are inconsistent with the implicit-promises/team-production view that corporate leaders of an acquired company should and do look after stakeholder interests; on this view, fulfilling implicit promises to protect stakeholder interests serves shareholders’ ex-ante interest in inducing the stakeholder cooperation and investment that are essential to corporate success. Our work also supports the agency critique of stakeholder capitalism which suggests that, due to their incentives, corporate leaders cannot be relied upon to look after stakeholder interests and to live up to pro-stakeholder rhetoric.

According to the “portfolio primacy” theory, large asset managers, and in particular large index funds, can and will undertake the role of “climate stewards” and will push corporations to reduce their carbon footprint. This theory is based on the view that index fund portfolios mirror the entire market and therefore have strong financial incentives to reduce market-wide threats, such as climate change. But how much can we rely on portfolio primacy to mitigate the effects of climate change? In this Article, I provide a conceptual and empirical assessment of the potential impact of portfolio primacy on climate change mitigation by examining the scope of action, economic incentives, and fiduciary conflicts of index fund managers. The analysis reveals three major limits, each reinforcing the others, that undermine the promise of portfolio primacy. First, the potential scope of index fund stewardship is narrow, as most companies around the world, including most carbon emitters, are private or controlled companies. Second, index funds internalize only a fraction of the social cost of climate change and therefore have very weak incentives to engage in ambitious climate stewardship. Third, index fund managers advise dozens of index funds with conflicting interests with respect to climate mitigation and therefore face serious fiduciary conflicts that would hamper any ambitious mitigation strategy. This analysis shows that we should have very modest expectations about the role of portfolio primacy in the fight against climate change.

This document is an appendix to our article, Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID, 40 YALE J. REG. (forthcoming, 2022). Although the article reports our overall findings with respect to the full sample of 112 acquisitions, the article provides full details of our analysis of particular cases only with respect to the 24 acquisitions above $10 billion in our sample. This Appendix supplements this reporting by providing full details of our analysis with respect to each of the particular cases of the 98 acquisitions in our sample with a consideration between $1 billion and $10 billion. The Article tests the claims of supporters of stakeholder capitalism (“stakeholderism”) in the context of the COVID pandemic. Supporters of stakeholderism advocate encouraging and relying on corporate leaders to use their discretion to serve stakeholders such as employees, customers, suppliers, local communities, and the environment. The pandemic followed and was accompanied by peak support for, and broad expressions of commitment to, stakeholderism from corporate leaders. Nonetheless, and even though the pandemic heightened risks to stakeholders, we document that corporate leaders negotiating deal terms failed to look after stakeholder interests. We conduct a detailed examination of all the $1B+ acquisitions of public companies that were announced from April 2020 to March 2022, totaling 122 acquisitions with an aggregate consideration exceeding $800 billion. We find that deal terms provided large gains for the shareholders of target companies, as well as substantial private benefits for corporate leaders. However, although many transactions were viewed at the time of the deal as posing significant post-deal risks for employees, corporate leaders largely did not obtain any employee protections, including payments to employees who would be laid off post-deal. Similarly, we find that corporate leaders failed to negotiate for protections for customers, suppliers, communities, the environment, and other stakeholders. After conducting various tests to examine whether this pattern could have been driven by other factors, we conclude that it is likely to have been driven by corporate leaders’ incentives not to benefit stakeholders beyond what would serve shareholder interests. While we focus on decisions in the acquisition context, we explain why our findings also have implications for ongoing-concern decisions, and we discuss and respond to potential objections to our conclusions. Overall, our findings have significant implications for long-standing debates on the corporate treatment of stakeholders. In particular, our findings are inconsistent with the implicit-promises/team-production view that corporate leaders of an acquired company should and do look after stakeholder interests; on this view, fulfilling implicit promises to protect stakeholder interests serves shareholders’ ex-ante interest in inducing the stakeholder cooperation and investment that are essential to corporate success. Our work also supports the agency critique of stakeholder capitalism which suggests that, due to their incentives, corporate leaders cannot be relied upon to look after stakeholder interests and to live up to pro-stakeholder rhetoric.

In the past few years, there has been a dramatic increase in shareholder support for proposals on political, environmental, ethical, and social issues, from climate change and employee diversity to animal welfare and corporate political spending (“social proposals”). But why do investors in a business corporation concern themselves with socially relevant issues? And how should corporate and securities law address this phenomenon? Based on the analysis of more than 2,900 social proposals submitted from 2010 to 2021, this Article argues that shareholder activism on socially relevant issues (“stockholder politics”) cannot be entirely explained by financial motives or by special interest capture, as the traditional theories hold. Rather, stockholder politics should be understood as a matchmaking enterprise in which a relatively small number of specialized actors (“stockholder politics specialists”) connect shareholders with prosocial and expressive motives on one side with corporate stakeholders, citizens, and social and policy activists on the other side. Specialists “sell” information, monitoring, and voting opportunities to shareholders interested in socially relevant issues, and they “sell” corporate voice externally to outside actors, including employees, consumers, and citizens concerned about corporate externalities. This complex phenomenon has both potential benefits and costs for corporate governance. On the one hand, it constrains managerial discretion and reduces managerial agency problems on socially relevant issues by monitoring corporate activities and eliciting shareholder preferences. On the other hand, it can engulf corporate decision-making with multidimensional decisions with no clear equilibrium, and it can exacerbate the agency problems of institutional investors.

In 2019, more than 100 CEOs of US public companies signed a Business Roundtable statement in which they pledged to deliver value to all stakeholders, not just shareholders. Have their companies lived up to this commitment? A forthcoming study based on a wide array of hand-collected corporate documents shows that, two years later, Business Roundtable companies generally have retained corporate governance principles and practices that reflect traditional shareholder primacy.

There has been growing support for replacing the traditional corporate purpose with so-called “enlightened shareholder value,” which would guide firms to consider stakeholder interests when pursuing long-term shareholder value maximization. But such a move would not benefit stakeholders and might in fact be counterproductive.

Unlike shareholder value maximization (SV), which merely calls on corporate leaders to maximize shareholder value, enlightened shareholder value (ESV) combines this prescription with guidance to consider stakeholder interests in the pursuit of long-term shareholder value maximization. ESV is being increasingly embraced by many actors: it was adopted by the U.K. Companies Act, is being considered for inclusion in the Restatement of Corporate Governance Law, and is broadly supported by both corporate leaders and institutional investors. This article examines whether replacing SV with ESV can be expected to benefit stakeholders or society. We begin by arguing that the appeal of ESV and the enthusiasm for it among supporters is grounded in a misperception about how frequent "win-win situations" are. In reality, corporate leaders often face significant trade-offs between shareholder and stakeholder interests, and such situations are exactly those for which the specification of corporate purpose is important. Furthermore, we explain that, under certain standard assumptions, SV and ESV are always operationally equivalent and prescribe exactly the same corporate choices. We then relax these assumptions and consider arguments that using ESV is beneficial in order to (i) counter the tendency of corporate leaders to be excessively focused on short-term effects, (ii) educate corporate leaders to give appropriate weight to stakeholder effects, (iii) provide cover to corporate leaders who wish to serve stakeholders, and/or (iv) protect capitalism from a backlash and deflect pressures to adopt stakeholder-protecting regulation. We show that each of these arguments is flawed. We conclude that, at best, replacing SV with ESV would create neither value nor harm. However, to the extent that ESV would give the false impression that corporate leaders can be relied on to protect stakeholders, the switch from SV to ESV would be detrimental for stakeholders and could impede or delay reforms that could truly protect them. This paper is part of a larger research project of the Harvard Law School Corporate Governance on stakeholder capitalism and stakeholderism. Other parts of this research project include The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita, Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders? by by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita, Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita, and The Perils and Questionable Promise of ESG-Based Compensation by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita.

Companies increasingly use ESG metrics in their compensation packages for CEOs. A new empirical study suggests that this practice has questionable promise and produces significant risks.

Prior to the outbreak of Covid-19, corporate leaders pledged to look after all stakeholders, not just deliver value to shareholders. Did they live up to these promises? A new empirical study examines more than 100 major public company acquisitions that were announced during the pandemic and shows that corporate leaders failed to look after stakeholder interests.

According to a theory that is gaining support among academics and practitioners, we should expect index fund managers to undertake the role of “climate stewards” and push companies into reducing their carbon footprint. In a new paper, Roberto Tallarita shows the limits of this theory and suggests that policymakers should not rely on index fund stewardship as a substitute for traditional climate regulation.

With the rising support for stakeholder capitalism and at the urging of its advocates, companies have been increasingly using environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance metrics for CEO compensation. This Article provides a conceptual and empirical analysis of this trend and exposes its fundamental flaws and limitations. It shows that the use of ESG-based compensation has, at best, a questionable promise and poses significant perils. We identify two structural problems with the use of ESG compensation metrics and provide empirical analysis highlighting their presence in current practices of S&P 100 companies. First, ESG metrics commonly attempt to tie CEO pay to limited dimensions of the welfare of a limited subset of stakeholders. Therefore, even if these pay arrangements were to provide a meaningful incentive to improve the given dimensions, the economics of multitasking indicates that the use of these metrics could well ultimately hurt, not serve, aggregate stakeholder welfare. Second, and most importantly, the push for ESG metrics overlooks and exacerbates the agency problem of executive pay. To ensure that they are designed to provide effective incentives rather than serve the interests of executives, pay arrangements need to be subject to effective scrutiny by outsider observers. However, our empirical analysis shows that in almost all cases in which S&P 100 companies use ESG metrics, it is difficult, if not impossible, for outside observers to assess whether these metrics provide valuable incentives or merely line CEO’s pockets with performance-insensitive pay. Current practices for using ESG metrics, we conclude, likely serve the interests of executives, not of stakeholders. Expansion of such use should not be supported even by those who care deeply about stakeholder welfare.

Amid growing concerns for the effects that corporations have on stakeholders, supporters of stakeholder governance advocate relying on corporate leaders to use their discretion to protect stakeholders, and they seem to take corporate pledges to do so at face value. By contrast, critics question whether corporate leaders have incentives to protect stakeholders and to follow though pledges to do so. We provide empirical evidence that can contribute to resolving the debate between these rival views. The most celebrated pledge by corporate leaders to protect stakeholders was the Business Roundtable’s 2019 Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation (the “BRT Statement”). The BRT Statement expressed a commitment to deliver value to all stakeholders, not just shareholders, and was widely viewed as a major milestone that would usher in “stakeholder capitalism” and significantly improve the treatment of stakeholders. If any companies could be expected to follow through on stakeholder rhetoric, those whose CEOs signed the highly visible BRT Statement would be natural candidates to do so. We review a wide array of hand-collected corporate documents of the 128 U.S. public companies that joined the BRT Statement (the “BRT Companies”). Examining the two-year period following the issuance of the BRT Statement, we obtain the following six findings: First, the numerous BRT Companies that updated their corporate governance guidelines during the two-tear period generally did not add any language that improves the status of stakeholders and, indeed, most of them chose to retain a commitment to shareholder primacy in their guidelines. Second, as of the end of the two-year period, most of the BRT Companies had governance guidelines that reflected a shareholder primacy approach. Third, in SEC submissions or securities filings responding to the over forty shareholder proposals that were submitted to BRT Companies regarding their implementation of the BRT Statement, most of the BRT Companies explicitly stated that their joining the BRT Statement did not require any such changes, and none of them accepted that the Statement required any changes. Fourth, all of the BRT Companies had and retained corporate bylaws that reflect a shareholder-centered view. Fifth, in their proxy statement following the BRT Statement, the great majority of the BRT did not even mention their joining the BRT Statement, and, among the minority of companies that did mention it, none indicated that their endorsement required or was expected to result in any changes in stakeholder treatment. Sixth, the BRT Companies all continued to pay directors compensation that strongly aligns their interests with shareholder value and avoided any use or support of stakeholder-oriented metrics. Overall, our findings support the view that the BRT Statement was mostly for show and that BRT Companies joining it did not intend or expect it to bring about any material changes in how they treat stakeholders.

Traditional theories portray stockholders as fully focused on profits. But that’s not as true as it once was.

At the center of a fundamental and heated debate about the purpose that corporations should serve, an increasingly influential “stakeholderism” view advocates giving corporate leaders the discretionary power to serve all stakeholders and not just shareholders. Supporters of stakeholderism argue that its application would address growing concerns about the impact of corporations on society and the environment. By contrast, critics of stakeholderism object that corporate leaders should not be expected to use expanded discretion to benefit stakeholders. This Article presents novel empirical evidence that can contribute to resolving this key debate. During the hostile takeover era of the 1980s, stakeholderist arguments contributed to the adoption of constituency statutes by more than thirty states. These statutes authorize corporate leaders to give weight to stakeholder interests when considering a sale of their company. We study how corporate leaders in fact used the power awarded to them by these statutes in the past two decades. In particular, using hand-collected data, we analyze in detail more than a hundred cases governed by constituency statutes in which corporate leaders negotiated a sale of their company to a private equity buyer. We find that corporate leaders have used their bargaining power to obtain gains for shareholders, executives, and directors. However, despite the risks that private equity acquisitions posed for stakeholders, corporate leaders made very little use of their power to negotiate for stakeholder protections. Furthermore, in cases in which some protections were included, they were practically inconsequential or cosmetic. We conclude that constituency statutes failed to deliver the benefits to stakeholders that they were supposed to produce. Beyond their implications for the long-standing debate on constituency statutes, our findings also provide important lessons for the ongoing debate on stakeholderism. At a minimum, stakeholderists should identify the causes for the failure of constituency statutes and examine whether the adoption of their proposals would not suffer a similar fate. After examining several possible explanations for the failure of constituency statutes, we conclude that the most plausible explanation is that corporate leaders have incentives not to protect stakeholders beyond what would serve shareholder value. The evidence we present indicates that stakeholderism should be expected to fail to deliver, as have constituency statutes. Stakeholderism therefore should not be supported, even by those who deeply care about stakeholders. This paper is part of a larger research project of the Harvard Law School Corporate Governance on stakeholder capitalism and stakeholderism. Another part of this research project is The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita.

Corporate purpose is now the focus of a fundamental and heated debate, with rapidly growing support for the proposition that corporations should move from shareholder value maximization to “stakeholder governance” and “stakeholder capitalism.” This Article critically examines the increasingly influential “stakeholderism” view, according to which corporate leaders should give weight not only to the interests of shareholders but also to those of all other corporate constituencies (including employees, customers, suppliers, and the environment). We conduct a conceptual, economic, and empirical analysis of stakeholderism and its expected consequences. We conclude that this view should be rejected, including by those who care deeply about the welfare of stakeholders. Stakeholderism, we demonstrate, would not benefit stakeholders as its supporters claim. To examine the expected consequences of stakeholderism, we analyze the incentives of corporate leaders, empirically investigate whether they have in the past used their discretion to protect stakeholders, and examine whether recent commitments to adopt stakeholderism can be expected to bring about a meaningful change. Our analysis concludes that acceptance of stakeholderism should not be expected to make stakeholders better off. Furthermore, we show that embracing stakeholderism could well impose substantial costs on shareholders, stakeholders, and society at large. Stakeholderism would increase the insulation of corporate leaders from shareholders, reduce their accountability, and hurt economic performance. In addition, by raising illusory hopes that corporate leaders would on their own provide substantial protection to stakeholders, stakeholderism would impede or delay reforms that could bring meaningful protection to stakeholders. Stakeholderism would therefore be contrary to the interests of the stakeholders it purports to serve and should be opposed by those who take stakeholder interests seriously.

takeholderism—granting corporate leaders discretion to give weight to the interest of all stakeholders—should not be expected to deliver its purported benefits to stakeholders. Furthermore, it could well impose substantial costs on shareholders, stakeholders themselves, and society at large, and therefore should be rejected, even by those who are deeply concerned about stakeholders.

The debate about stakeholder capitalism should seek to learn from our experience with constituency statutes, which authorized corporate leaders to take into account stakeholder interests in considering a sale of the company. We document how, over the past two decades, these statutes utterly failed to produce the hoped-for stakeholder benefits: Corporate leaders used their bargaining power to secure benefits for shareholders, executives, and directors, but made little use of it to obtain protections for stakeholders.

In the fight against COVID-19, weighing costs and benefits is indispensable for moral clarity. At the same time, we must not forget its limits.

The presentation slides in this document provide an overview of our study, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, which will be published by the Cornell Law Review in December 2020. The document is based on presentations slides we prepared for March 2020 presentations at Columbia Law School and Harvard Law School. Corporate purpose is now the focus of a fundamental and heated debate, with rapidly growing support for the proposition that corporations should move from shareholder value maximization to “stakeholder governance” and “stakeholder capitalism.” Our study critically examines the increasingly influential “stakeholderism” view, according to which corporate leaders should give weight not only to the interests of shareholders but also to those of all other corporate constituencies (including employees, customers, suppliers, and the environment). We conduct a conceptual, economic, and empirical analysis of stakeholderism and its expected consequences. We conclude that this view should be rejected, including by those who care deeply about the welfare of stakeholders. Stakeholderism, we demonstrate, would not benefit stakeholders as its supporters claim. To examine the expected consequences of stakeholderism, we analyze the incentives of corporate leaders, empirically investigate whether they have in the past used their discretion to protect stakeholders, and examine whether recent commitments to adopt stakeholderism can be expected to bring about a meaningful change. Our analysis concludes that acceptance of stakeholderism should not be expected to make stakeholders better off. Furthermore, we show that embracing stakeholderism could well impose substantial costs on shareholders, stakeholders, and society at large. Stakeholderism would increase the insulation of corporate leaders from shareholders, reduce their accountability, and hurt economic performance. In addition, by raising illusory hopes that corporate leaders would on their own provide substantial protection to stakeholders, stakeholderism would impede or delay reforms that could bring meaningful protection to stakeholders. Stakeholderism would therefore be contrary to the interests of the stakeholders it purports to serve and should be opposed by those who take stakeholder interests seriously.

This Article seeks to contribute to the heated debate on the disclosure of political spending by public companies. A rulemaking petition urging SEC rules requiring such disclosure has attracted over 1.2 million comments since its submission seven years ago, but the SEC has not yet made a decision on the petition. The petition has sparked a debate among academics, members of the investor and issuer communities, current and former SEC commissioners, and members of Congress. In the course of this debate, opponents of mandatory disclosure have put forward a wide range of objections to such SEC mandates. This Article provides a comprehensive and detailed analysis of these objections, and it shows that they fail to support an opposition to transparency in this area. Among other things, we examine claims that disclosure of political spending would be counterproductive or at least unnecessary; that any beneficial provision of information would best be provided through voluntary disclosures of companies; and that the adoption of a disclosure rule by the SEC would violate the First Amendment or at least be institutionally inappropriate. We demonstrate that all of these objections do not provide, either individually or collectively, a good basis for opposing a disclosure rule. The case for keeping political spending under the radar of investors, we conclude, is untenable.

This article studies the political preferences of chief executive officers (CEOs) of public companies. We use Federal Election Commission records to compile a comprehensive database of the political contributions made by more than 3800 individuals who served as CEOs of Standard & Poor’s 1500 companies between 2000 and 2017. We find a substantial preference for Republican candidates. We identify how this pattern is related to the company’s industry, region, and CEO gender. In addition, we show that companies led by Republican CEOs tend to be less transparent to investors with respect to their political spending. Finally, we discuss the policy implications of our analysis.