Faculty Bibliography

Democratic institutions aggregate voters’ preferences about policy options and thereby help determine which policies are implemented. Previous research has, however, suggested that such institutions can also have a direct, positive effect on cooperative and efficient behavior. In a laboratory experiment, we test this suggestion by comparing the effect of recommendations on how to play that are generated through a group vote to expert-generated recommendations, on play in a minimum effort game. We find no difference between the two: both expert recommendations and democratically generated recommendations increase the efficiency of choices. In addition, we find that merely considering potential recommendations, and knowing that others have done so as well, can help enhance efficient coordination.

The COVID-19 pandemic represents a massive global health crisis. Because the crisis requires large-scale behaviour change and places significant psychological burdens on individuals, insights from the social and behavioural sciences can be used to help align human behavior with the recommendations of epidemiologists and public health experts. Here we discuss evidence from a selection of research topics relevant to pandemics, including work on navigating threats, social and cultural influences on behaviour, science communication, moral decision-making, leadership, and stress and coping. In each section, we note the nature and quality of prior research, including uncertainty and unsettled issues. We identify several insights for effective response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and also highlight important gaps researchers should move quickly to fill in the coming weeks and months.

What is the constitutional status of falsehoods? From the standpoint of the First Amendment, does truth or falsity matter? These questions have become especially pressing with the increasing power of social media, the frequent contestation of established facts, and the current focus on “fake news,” disseminated by both foreign and domestic agents in an effort to drive U.S. politics in particular directions. In 2012, the Supreme Court ruled for the first time that intentional falsehoods are protected by the First Amendment, at least when they do not cause serious harm. But in important ways, 2012 seems like a generation ago, and the Court has yet to give an adequate explanation for its conclusion. Such an explanation must begin the risk of a “chilling effect,” by which an effort to punish or deter falsehoods might also and in the process chill truth. But that is hardly the only reason to protect falsehoods, intentional or otherwise; there are several others. Even so, these arguments suffer from abstraction and high-mindedness; they do not amount to decisive reasons to protect falsehoods. These propositions are applied to old questions involving defamation and to new questions involving fake news, deepfakes, and doctored videos. It emerges that New York Times v. Sullivan is an anachronism, and that it should be rethought in light of current technologies and new findings in behavioral science. Government should have authority to control deepfakes and doctored videos, and also certain kinds of “fake news,” when it threatens political processes. It also emerges that Facebook, Twitter, and other social media platforms should do far more than they are now doing to control falsehoods, deepfakes, and doctored videos.

The administrative state faces a pervasive problem: “benefit neglect,” understood as insufficient attention to the benefits of regulation. In 2017, for example, President Donald Trump issued Executive Order 13771, calling for a regulatory budget of $0 and directing agencies to eliminate two regulations for every regulation that they issue. The order has two laudable ambitions: to reduce the stock of existing regulations and to stem the flow of new regulations. But because it entirely ignores the benefits of regulations and focuses only on costs, it is a singularly crude instrument for achieving those goals. In both theory and practice, it threatens to impose large net costs (including significant increases in mortality and morbidity). It would be much better to abandon the idea of a regulatory budget, focused solely on costs, and instead to engage in two sustained but independent efforts: (1) a continuing “look back” at existing regulations, with the goal of simplifying or eliminating those that are unwarranted, and (2) cost-benefit discipline for new regulations. A third goal, no less important than (1) and (2), should be a very high priority, which is to produce institutional mechanisms to promote issuance of regulations that would have high net benefits (including reductions in mortality and morbidity). Congress, courts, and the executive branch should take steps to combat benefit neglect.

It is standard to think that corrective taxes, responding to externalities, are generally or always better than regulatory mandates, but in the face of behavioral market failures, that conclusion might not be right. Fuel economy and energy efficiency mandates are possible examples. Because such mandates might produce billions of dollars in annual consumer savings, they might have very high net benefits, complicating the choice between such mandates and externality-correcting taxes (such as carbon taxes). The net benefits of mandates that simultaneously reduce internalities and externalities might exceed the net benefits of taxes that reduce externalities alone, even if mandates turn out to be a highly inefficient way of reducing externalities. An important qualification is that corrective taxes might be designed to reduce both externalities and internalities, in which case they would almost certainly be preferable to a regulatory mandate.

The American administrative state has become, in important respects, a cost-benefit state. At least this is so in the sense that prevailing executive orders require agencies to proceed only if the benefits justify the costs. For defenders of the cost-benefit state, the antonym of their ideal is, alternately, regulation based on dogmas, intuitions, expressivism, or interest-group power. The focus on costs and benefits is an important effort to attend to the real-world consequences of regulations – and it casts a pragmatic, skeptical light on modern objections to the administrative state, invoking public-choice theory and the supposed self-serving decisions of unelected bureaucrats. In the future, however, there will be better ways to identify those consequences, by focusing directly on welfare, and not relying on imperfect proxies.

Immense amounts of information are now accessible to people, including information that bears on their past, present and future. An important research challenge is to determine how people decide to seek or avoid information. Here we propose a framework of information-seeking that aims to integrate the diverse motives that drive information-seeking and its avoidance. Our framework rests on the idea that information can alter people’s action, affect and cognition in both positive and negative ways. The suggestion is that people assess these influences and integrate them into a calculation of the value of information that leads to information-seeking or avoidance. The theory offers a framework for characterizing and quantifying individual differences in information-seeking, which we hypothesize may also be diagnostic of mental health. We consider biases that can lead to both insufficient and excessive information-seeking. We also discuss how the framework can help government agencies to assess the welfare effects of mandatory information disclosure.

Consumers, employees, students, and others are often subjected to “sludge”: excessive or unjustified frictions, such as paperwork burdens, that cost time or money; that may make life difficult to navigate; that may be frustrating, stigmatizing, or humiliating; and that might end up depriving people of access to important goods, opportunities, and services. Because of behavioral biases and cognitive scarcity, sludge can have much more harmful effects than private and public institutions anticipate. To protect consumers, investors, employees, and others, firms, universities, and government agencies should regularly conduct Sludge Audits to catalogue the costs of sludge, and to decide when and how to reduce it. Much of human life is unnecessarily sludgy. Sludge often has costs far in excess of benefits, and it can have hurt the most vulnerable members of society.

Motor vehicle fuel-economy standards have long been a cornerstone of U.S. policy to reduce fuel consumption in the light-duty vehicle fleet. In 2010 and 2012, these standards were significantly expanded in an effort to achieve steep reductions in oil demand and greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions through 2025. In 2018, following a review of the standards, the Environmental Protection Agency and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration proposed instead to freeze the standards at 2020 levels, citing high program costs (and potential safety issues). The current debate over the future of U.S. fuel economy standards provides an opportunity to consider whether the existing approach could be improved to achieve environmental and other goals at a lower cost. The current policy prescribes standards that focus on fuel economy alone, as opposed to lifetime consumption, and treats vehicle categories differentially, meaning that it imposes unnecessarily high costs and does not deliver guaranteed GHG savings. On the basis of a commitment to cost-benefit analysis, which has defined U.S. regulatory policy for more than thirty years, we propose novel reforms with three main features: (1) the direct regulation of expected fuel consumption and GHG emissions without consideration of the type or size of the vehicle; (2) use of existing data to assign lifetime fuel consumption and GHG emissions to each model; and (3) creation of a robust cap-and-trade market for automakers to reduce compliance costs. We show that these reforms would reduce fuel consumption and GHG emissions in transportation with greater certainty and do so at a far lower cost per ton of GHG emissions avoided. We also show that the the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Transportation could implement such an approach within their existing statutory authority.

Muitos incentivos são monetários e, quando instituições públicas ou privadas buscam mudar de comportamento, é natural mudar os incentivos monetários. Mas muitos outros incentivos são resultantes de significados sociais, sobre os quais as pessoas podem não deliberar, mas que podem operar como subsídios ou tributos. Em alguns momentos e lugares, por exemplo, o significado social do tabagismo tem sido positivo, aumentando o incentivo ao fumo; em outros tempos e lugares, foi negativo e, portanto, serviu para reduzir o tabagismo. No que diz respeito à segurança e à saúde, os significados sociais mudam radicalmente ao longo dos anos e podem ser drasticamente diferentes a depender do lugar. Muitas vezes, as pessoas se manifestam de acordo com os significados que lamentam ou, pelo menos, desejam que seja de outra forma. Mas é extremamente difícil para os indivíduos alterar os seus próprios conceitos. A alteração de conceitos pode advir da lei, que pode, por meio de um mandato, transformar o significado da ação em um mero: "Eu cumpro a lei", ou em algo menos brando, como: "Sou um bom cidadão". A alteração de significados sociais também pode advir de ação privada em larga escala, projetada ou promovida por "empreendedores que ressignificam", que pode transformar o significado da ação de "Eu sou um excêntrico" para "Eu cumpro meu dever cívico" ou "Eu protejo outras pessoas de danos." Às vezes, subgrupos se rebelam contra significados novos ou alterados, produzidos pela lei ou por empreendedores que ressignificam, mas geralmente esses significados permanecem e produzem mudanças substanciais.

Federal regulators have often required environmental labels, which may be designed to help consumers to save money or to reduce externalities. Under prevailing executive orders, regulators are required to project the benefits and costs of such labels, and also to show that the benefits justify the costs. These projections can be extremely challenging, partly because of the difficulty of knowing how consumers will respond to labels, partly because of the challenging of converting behavioral changes into monetary equivalents. The benefits of environmental labels should include (1) the monetary value of the reduced externalities and (2) the monetary benefit to consumers, measured by willingness to pay. It may be difficult for regulators to know (1), and even if they can figure out (2), willingness to pay may not capture the welfare benefit to consumers, at least if consumers are not adequately informed (or if they suffer from some kind of behavioral bias). In principle, agencies should include, as part of (2), the moral convictions of people who care about environmental goods, at least if those convictions are backed by willingness to pay. In the face of the evident epistemic difficulties, sometimes the best that agencies can do is to engage in breakeven analysis, by which they explore what the benefits would have to be in order to justify the costs. Technical as they might seem, these claims raise fundamental questions about valuation of environmental goods and the possible disconnect between willingness to pay and welfare.

Disclosure mandates are pervasive. Though designed to inform consumers, such mandates may lead consumers to draw false inferences – for example, that a product is harmful when it is not. When deciding to require disclosure of an ingredient in or characteristic of a product, regulators may be motivated by evidence that the ingredient or characteristic is harmful to consumers. But they may also be motivated by a belief that consumers have a right to know what they are buying or by interest-group pressure. Consumers who misperceive the regulator’s true motive, or mix of motives, will draw false inferences from the mandated disclosure. If consumers think that the disclosure is motivated by evidence of harm, when in fact it is motivated by a belief in a right-to-know or by interest-group pressure, then they will be inefficiently deterred from purchasing the product. We analyze this general concern about disclosure mandates. We also offer survey evidence demonstrating that the risk of false inferences is serious and real. Our framework has implications for the ongoing debate over the labeling of food with genetically modified organisms (GMOs); it suggests that the relevant labels might prove misleading to some or many consumers, producing a potentially serious welfare loss. Under prevailing executive orders, regulators must consider that loss and if feasible, quantify it.

Where do dogs come from? Where do human beings come from? Recent research suggests a single answer: domestication. The various characteristics of dogs, distinguishing them from wolves, appear to be byproducts of domestication and (as recently shown by Richard Wrangham) a reduction in “reactive aggression.” It has long been thought that human beings domesticated dogs, but it is more plausible to think that that dogs domesticated themselves. As dogs are to wolves, so is the less robust but more docile Homo sapiens to various other, now extinct human species, including Homo erectus, Neanderthals, and Denisovans. Homo sapiens can be seen as the dog of the various human species. Homo sapiens survived in part because a reduction in reactive aggression made it possible for us to display significant increases in social learning and cooperation.

As the information gap between experts and non-experts narrows, it is increasingly important that experts learn to give advice to non-experts in a way that is effective, and that respects their autonomy and agency. We surveyed 508 participants using a hypothetical medical scenario in which participants were counseled on the risks and benefits of taking antibiotics for a sore throat in circumstances in which antibiotics were inappropriate. We asked participants whether they preferred: (1) to make their own decision based on the information or, (2) to make their decision based on the doctor’s opinion, and then randomized participants to receive “information only”, “opinion only”, “information first, then opinion”, or “opinion first, then information.” Participants whose stated preference was to follow the doctor’s opinion had significantly lower rates of antibiotic requests when given “information first, then opinion” compared to “opinion first, then information.” Our evidence suggests that “information first, then opinion” is the most effective approach. We hypothesize that this is because it is seen by non-experts as more trustworthy and more respectful of their autonomy.

The goal of this essay is to offer a brisk progress report about behaviorally informed policy and law, while also providing some conceptual clarifications. It identifies a diverse range of initiatives, focusing largely on experience in the United States, that involve nudging and uses of behavioral science. It also explores prominent objections, coming both from those who believe that nudges are unduly aggressive, and should be avoided, and from those who believe that they are too weak and timid, and should be replaced or supplemented with mandates and bans.

One way to evaluate various interventions in people’s lives is to ask whether they make choosers better off, “as judged by themselves.” This criterion can be understood to borrow from the liberal political tradition insofar as it makes the judgments of choosers authoritative. Giving ultimate authority to choosers might be taken to respect their autonomy and also promote their welfare (insofar as people are uniquely situated to know whether choices make them better off). But for certain decisions, the “as judged by themselves” criterion is indeterminate. In such cases, what people care about shifts, depending on their choice. Some choices change people’s preferences and values, and in this sense, change their identity. In these situations, sometimes involving transformative experiences, the criterion does not offer a unique solution. It is possible that welfarist criteria will resolve the indeterminacy, despite serious questions about incommensurability. Considerations of autonomy are also relevant to choice-influencing interventions that promote transformative experiences.

In the modern era, the statements and actions of public figures are scrutinized with great care, and it often emerges that they have said or done things that many people consider objectionable, hurtful, offensive, or despicable. A persistent question is whether public figures should apologize for those statements or actions. Suppose that an apology has a purely strategic motivation: helping a politician to be elected or reelected, helping an executive to keep his job, helping a nominee to be confirmed by the U.S. Senate. Empirical work presented here suggests that an apology might well turn out to be futile or even counterproductive. One reason is Bayesian; an apology produces updating that can be unfavorable to the apologizer (by, for example, resolving doubts about whether the apologizer actually said or did the objectionable thing, and about whether what the apologizer did was actually objectionable). Another reason is behavioral; an apology triggers the public’s attention, makes the public figure’s wrongdoing more salient, and can help define him or her. But many open questions remain about the reasons why apologies by public figures fail, and about the circumstances in which they might turn out to be effective.

On political questions, many people are especially likely to consult and learn from those whose political views are similar to their own, thus creating a risk of echo chambers or information cocoons. Here, we test whether the tendency to prefer knowledge from the politically like-minded generalizes to domains that have nothing to do with politics, even when evidence indicates that person is less skilled in that domain than someone with dissimilar political views. Participants had multiple opportunities to learn about others’ (1) political opinions and (2) ability to categorize geometric shapes. They then decided to whom to turn for advice when solving an incentivized shape categorization task. We find that participants falsely concluded that politically like-minded others were better at categorizing shapes and thus chose to hear from them. Participants were also more influenced by politically like-minded others, even when they had good reason not to be. The results demonstrate that knowing about others’ political views interferes with the ability to learn about their competency in unrelated tasks, leading to suboptimal information-seeking decisions and errors in judgement. Our findings have implications for political polarization and social learning in the midst of political divisions.

Groups of people, outraged by some real or imagined transgression, often respond in a way that is wildly disproportionate to the occasion, thus ruining the transgressor’s day, month, year, or life. To capture that phenomenon, we might repurpose an old word: lapidation. Technically, the word is a synonym for stoning, but it sounds much less violent. It is also obscure, which makes it easier to enlist for contemporary purposes. Lapidation plays a role in affirming, and helping to constitute, tribal identity. It typically occurs when a transgressor is taken to have violated a taboo, which helps account for the different people and events that trigger left-of-center and right-of-center lapidation. One of the problems with lapidation is that it often accomplishes little; it expresses outrage, and allows people to signal their identity, but does no more. Victims of lapidation might be tempted to apologize, but apologies can prove ineffective or even make things worse, depending on the nature of the lapidators.

How do human beings make decisions when, as the evidence indicates, the assumptions of the Bayesian rationality approach in economics do not hold? Do human beings optimize, or can they? Several decades of research have shown that people possess a toolkit of heuristics to make decisions under certainty, risk, subjective uncertainty, and true uncertainty (or Knightian uncertainty). We outline recent advances in knowledge about the use of heuristics and departures from Bayesian rationality, with particular emphasis on growing formalization of those departures, which add necessary precision. We also explore the relationship between bounded rationality and libertarian paternalism, or nudges, and show that some recent objections, founded on psychological work on the usefulness of certain heuristics, are based on serious misunderstandings.

Some information is beneficial; it makes people’s lives go better. Some information is harmful; it makes people’s lives go worse. Some information has no welfare effects at all; people neither gain nor lose from it. Under prevailing executive orders, federal agencies must investigate the welfare effects of information by reference to cost-benefit analysis. Federal agencies have (1) claimed that quantification of benefits is essentially impossible; (2) engaged in “breakeven analysis”; (3) projected various endpoints, such as health benefits or purely economic savings; and (4) relied on private willingness to pay for the relevant information. All of these approaches run into serious objections. With respect to (4), people may lack the information that would permit them to make good decisions about how much to pay for (more) information; they may not know the welfare effects of information. Their tastes and values may shift over time, in part as a result of information. These points suggest the need to take the willingness-to-pay criterion with many grains of salt, and to learn more about the actual effects of information, and of the behavioral changes produced by information, on people’s experienced well-being.

In surveys, majorities of Americans disapprove of twelve hypothetical nudges (seven involving default rules, five involving education campaigns or disclosure requirements). These results provide an illuminating contrast with majority support for twenty-two nudges that were also tested, and that are much more realistic examples of the kinds of nudges that have been adopted or seriously considered in democratic nations. In general (and with some interesting exceptions), there is a strikingly broad consensus, across partisan lines, about which nudges do and do not deserve support. The best understanding of the data is that people dislike those nudges that (a) promote what people see as illicit ends, or (b) are perceived as inconsistent with either the interests or values of most choosers.

We live in an era of tribalism, polarization, and intense social division—separating people along lines of religion, political conviction, race, ethnicity, and sometimes gender. How did this happen? In Conformity, Cass R. Sunstein argues that the key to making sense of living in this fractured world lies in understanding the idea of conformity—what it is and how it works—as well as the countervailing force of dissent. An understanding of conformity sheds new light on many issues confronting us today: the role of social media, the rise of fake news, the growth of authoritarianism, the success of Donald Trump, the functions of free speech, debates over immigration and the Supreme Court, and much more. Lacking information of our own and seeking the good opinion of others, we often follow the crowd, but Sunstein shows that when individuals suppress their own instincts about what is true and what is right, it can lead to significant social harm. While dissenters tend to be seen as selfish individualists, dissent is actually an important means of correcting the natural human tendency toward conformity and has enormous social benefits in reducing extremism, encouraging critical thinking, and protecting freedom itself. Sunstein concludes that while much of the time it is in the individual’s interest to follow the crowd, it is in the social interest for individuals to say and do what they think is best. A well-functioning democracy depends on it.

Why and when does outrage grow? This essay explores two potential answers. The first points to a revision or weakening of social norms, which leads people to express outrage that they had previously suppressed. The second points to a revision or weakening of social norms, which leads people to express outrage that they had not previously felt (and may or may not now feel). The intensity of outrage is often a product of what is most salient. It is also a product of “normalization”; people compare apparently outrageous behavior to behavior falling in the same category in which it is observed, and do not compare it to other cases, which leads to predictable incoherence in judgments. These points bear on the #MeToo movement of 2017 and 2018 and the rise and fall (and rise again, and fall again) of discrimination on the basis of sex and race (and also religion and ethnicity).

In 2015, the United States government imposed 9.78 billion hours of paperwork burdens on the American people. Many of these hours are best categorized as “sludge,” reducing access to important licenses, programs, and benefits. Because of the sheer costs of sludge, rational people are effectively denied life-changing goods and services; the problem is compounded by the existence of behavioral biases, including inertia, present bias, and unrealistic optimism. In principle, a serious deregulatory effort should be undertaken to reduce sludge, through automatic enrollment, greatly simplified forms, and reminders. At the same time, sludge can promote legitimate goals. First, it can protect program integrity, which means that policymakers might have to make difficult tradeoffs between (1) granting benefits to people who are not entitled to them and (2) denying benefits to people who are entitled to them. Second, it can overcome impulsivity, recklessness, and self-control problems. Third, it can prevent intrusions on privacy. Fourth, it can serve as a rationing device, ensuring that benefits go to people who most need them. In most cases, these defenses of sludge turn out to be more attractive in principle than in practice. For sludge, a form of cost-benefit analysis is essential, and it will often argue in favor of a neglected form of deregulation: sludge reduction. For both public and private institutions,“Sludge Audits” should become routine. Various suggestions are offered for new action by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, which oversees the Paperwork Reduction Act; for courts; and for Congress.

There has been considerable recent discussion of the social effects of “liberalism,” which are said to include (among other things) a growth in out-of-wedlock childbirth, repudiation of traditions (religious and otherwise), a rise in populism, increased reliance on technocracy, inequality, environmental degradation, sexual promiscuity, deterioration of civic associations, a diminution of civic virtue, political correctness on university campuses, and a general sense of alienation. There is good reason for skepticism about these claims. Liberalism is not a person, and it is not an agent in history. Claims about the supposedly adverse social effects of liberalism are best taken not as causal claims at all, but as normative objections that should be defended on their merits. These propositions are elaborated with reference to three subordinate propositions: (1) liberalism, as such, does not lack the resources to defend traditions; (2) liberalism, as such, hardly rejects the idea of “constraint,” though the domains in which liberals accept constraints differ from those of antiliberals, and vary over time; (3) liberalism, as such, does not dishonor the idea of “honor.” There is a general point here about the difficulty of demonstrating, and the potential recklessness of claiming, that one or another “ism” is causally associated with concrete social developments.

This brief essay offers a general introduction to the idea of nudging, along with a list of ten of the most important “nudges.” It also provides a short discussion of the question whether to create a separate “behavioral insights unit” or instead to rely on existing institutions.

In recent years, there has been a great deal of discussion of the welfare effects of digital goods, including social media. A national survey, designed to monetize the benefits of a variety of social media platforms (including Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram), found a massive disparity between willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA). The sheer magnitude of this disparity reflects a “superendowment effect.” Social media may be Wasting Time Goods (WTG) – goods on which people spend time, but for which they are not, on reflection, willing to pay much (if anything). It is also possible that in the context of the WTP question, people may be giving protest answers, signaling their intense opposition to being asked to pay for something that they had formerly enjoyed for free. Their answers may be expressive, rather than reflective of actual welfare effects. At the same time, the WTA measure may also be expressive, a different form of protest, telling us little about the actual effects of social media on people’s lives and experiences. It may greatly overstate those effects. In this context, there may well be a sharp disparity between conventional economic measures and actual effects on experienced well-being.

The law forbids discrimination. But the ambiguity of human decision-making often makes it extraordinarily hard for the legal system to know whether anyone has actually discriminated. To understand how algorithms affect discrimination, we must therefore also understand how they affect the problem of detecting discrimination. By one measure, algorithms are fundamentally opaque, not just cognitively but even mathematically. Yet for the task of proving discrimination, processes involving algorithms can provide crucial forms of transparency that are otherwise unavailable. These benefits do not happen automatically. But with appropriate requirements in place, the use of algorithms will make it possible to more easily examine and interrogate the entire decision process, thereby making it far easier to know whether discrimination has occurred. By forcing a new level of specificity, the use of algorithms also highlights, and makes transparent, central tradeoffs among competing values. Algorithms are not only a threat to be regulated; with the right safeguards in place, they have the potential to be a positive force for equity.

In this pathbreaking book, New York Times bestselling author Cass Sunstein asks us to rethink freedom. He shows that freedom of choice isn’t nearly enough. To be free, we must also be able to navigate life. People often need something like a GPS device to help them get where they want to go—whether the issue involves health, money, jobs, children, or relationships. In both rich and poor countries, citizens often have no idea how to get to their desired destination. That is why they are unfree. People also face serious problems of self-control, as many of them make decisions today that can make their lives worse tomorrow. And in some cases, we would be just as happy with other choices, whether a different partner, career, or place to live—which raises the difficult question of which outcome best promotes our well-being. Accessible and lively, and drawing on perspectives from the humanities, religion, and the arts, as well as social science and the law, On Freedom explores a crucial dimension of the human condition that philosophers and economists have long missed—and shows what it would take to make freedom real.

The common consequence effect and preference reversals are two of the foundational violations of the standard model of rational choice (i.e. von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility theory) and, as such, played an important role in the development of empirical behavioural economics. One can hypothesise, however, that due to varying degrees of risk aversion when faced with outcomes of different magnitude, the rate of both of these violations may vary with outcome size. Using various types of outcome, this article reports tests of these violations using different outcome magnitudes in within-respondent designs. The results observed are broadly consistent across outcome type: the common consequence effect, while rarely being substantially observed in any of the tests undertaken, was often found to be somewhat susceptible to outcome size while preference reversals, which were everywhere substantially observed, were not. In and of itself, the observation of systematic preference reversals implies that preferences are often constructed according to the way in which questions are asked, and is sufficient to question the usefulness of stated preference techniques for informing public policy.

How does social change happen? When do social movements take off? Sexual harassment was once something that women had to endure; now a movement has risen up against it. White nationalist sentiments, on the other hand, were largely kept out of mainstream discourse; now there is no shortage of media outlets for them. In this book, with the help of behavioral economics, psychology, and other fields, Cass Sunstein casts a bright new light on how change happens. Sunstein focuses on the crucial role of social norms—and on their frequent collapse. When norms lead people to silence themselves, even an unpopular status quo can persist. Then one day, someone challenges the norm—a child who exclaims that the emperor has no clothes; a woman who says “me too.” Sometimes suppressed outrage is unleashed, and long-standing practices fall. Sometimes change is more gradual, as “nudges” help produce new and different decisions—apps that count calories; texted reminders of deadlines; automatic enrollment in green energy or pension plans. Sunstein explores what kinds of nudges are effective and shows why nudges sometimes give way to bans and mandates. Finally, he considers social divisions, social cascades, and “partyism,” when identification with a political party creates a strong bias against all members of an opposing party—which can both fuel and block social change.

Many "nudges" aim to make life simpler, safer, or easier for people to navigate, but what do members of the public really think about these policies? Drawing on surveys from numerous nations around the world, Sunstein and Reisch explore whether citizens approve of nudge policies. Their most important finding is simple and striking. In diverse countries, both democratic and nondemocratic, strong majorities approve of nudges designed to promote health, safety, and environmental protection—and their approval cuts across political divisions. In recent years, many governments have implemented behaviorally informed policies, focusing on nudges—understood as interventions that preserve freedom of choice, but that also steer people in certain directions. In some circles, nudges have become controversial, with questions raised about whether they amount to forms of manipulation. This fascinating book carefully considers these criticisms and answers important questions. What do citizens actually think about behaviorally informed policies? Do citizens have identifiable principles in mind when they approve or disapprove of the policies? Do citizens of different nations agree with each other? From the answers to these questions, the authors identify six principles of legitimacy—a "bill of rights" for nudging that build on strong public support for nudging policies around the world, while also recognizing what citizens disapprove of. Their bill of rights is designed to capture citizens’ central concerns, reflecting widespread commitments to freedom and welfare that transcend national boundaries.

Why do revolutions happen? Why are they so difficult to anticipate? Some of the most instructive answers point to three factors: (1) preference falsification on the part of rebels or revolutionaries; (2) diverse thresholds for revolutionary activity; and (3) social interactions that do or do not trigger the relevant thresholds. Under conditions of actual or perceived injustice or oppression, true preferences and thresholds are probably impossible to observe; social interactions are impossible to anticipate. Even if we could observe (1) and (2), the challenge of anticipating (3) would make it essentially impossible to foresee revolutions. For all their differences, and with appropriate qualifications, the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, the fall of Communism, and the Arab Spring were unanticipated largely for these reasons. And in light of (1), (2), and (3), it is hazardous to think that the success of successful revolutions is essentially inevitable. (The same is true for the failure of unsuccessful revolutions.) History is only run once, so we will never know, but small or serendipitous factors might have initiated (or stopped) a revolutionary cascade. The #MeToo movement can be seen as such a cascade, marked by (1), (2), and (3). For that movement, as for successful revolutions, we might be able to point to some factors as necessary conditions, but hindsight is hazardous. It is also important to note that in revolutions, as in #MeToo, preferences and beliefs are not merely revealed; they are also transformed. Revolutionary activity, large or small, puts issues about preference falsification, experience falsification, and adaptive preferences in a new light.

A great deal of theoretical work explores the possibility that algorithms may be biased in one or another respect. But for purposes of law and policy, some of the most important empirical research finds exactly the opposite. In the context of bail decisions, an algorithm designed to predict flight risk does much better than human judges, in large part because the latter place an excessive emphasis on the current offense. Current Offense Bias, as we might call it, is best seen as a cousin of “availability bias,” a well-known source of mistaken probability judgments. The broader lesson is that well-designed algorithms should be able to avoid cognitive biases of many kinds. Existing research on bail decisions also casts a new light on how to think about the risk that algorithms will discriminate on the basis of race (or other factors). Algorithms can easily be designed so as to avoid taking account of race (or other factors). They can also be constrained so as to produce whatever kind of racial balance is sought, and thus to reveal tradeoffs among various social values.

Chevron v. NRDC, the foundation for much of contemporary administrative law, is now under siege. The central objection, connected with longstanding challenges to the legitimacy of the modern regulatory state, is that the decision amounts to an unwarranted transfer of interpretive authority from courts to the executive branch. Some people think that the transfer is a recipe for a form of authoritarianism – and inconsistent with the proposition that it is the province of the judiciary to say what the law is. To assess such objections, the starting point is simple: Whether courts should defer to agency interpretations of law depends largely on legislative instructions. Under the Constitution, Congress has broad power to require courts to defer to agency interpretations (in the face of ambiguity), or to forbid them from doing so. If congressional instructions are the touchstone, and if the Administrative Procedure Act is the guiding text, there is a plausible argument that Chevron was wrong when decided; but the issue is intriguingly cloudy if the APA’s text is taken in its context. In these circumstances, Chevron should not be overruled. Doing so would introduce a great deal of confusion and increase the role of political judgments within the courts of appeals. Nonetheless, Chevron’s critics have legitimate concerns. Those concerns should be taken into account (1) by insisting on a fully independent judicial role in deciding whether a statute is ambiguous at Step One; (2) by invalidating arbitrary or unreasonable agency interpretations at Step Two; and (3) by deploying canons of construction, including those that are designed to serve nondelegation functions and thus to cabin executive authority.

Do consumers value data privacy? How much? In a survey of 2,416 Americans, we find that the median consumer is willing to pay just $5 per month to maintain data privacy (along specified dimensions), but would demand $80 to allow access to personal data. This is a “superendowment effect,” much higher than the 1:2 ratio often found between willingness to pay and willingness to accept. In addition, people demand significantly more money to allow access to personal data when primed that such data includes health-related data than when primed that such data includes demographic data. We analyze reasons for these disparities and offer some notations on their implications for theory and practice. A general theme is that because of a lack of information and behavioral biases, both willingness to pay and willingness to accept measures are highly unreliable guides to the welfare effects of retaining or giving up data privacy. Gertrude Stein’s comment about Oakland, California may hold for consumer valuations of data privacy: “There is no there there.” For guidance, policymakers should give little or no attention to either of those conventional measures of economic value, at least when steps are not taken to overcome deficits in information and behavioral biases.

Do people think better in a foreign language? D'une certaine façon, oui. Il existe des preuves considérables à cet effet, du moins dans la mesure où ils sont moins susceptibles de s'appuyer sur des intuitions qui peuvent conduire à de graves erreurs. Questa scoperta sottolinea e rende più plausibile, una richiesta centrale nella politica di regolamentazione, il che significa che il valore delle analisi costi-benefici. In gewissem Sinne ist die Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse eine Fremdsprache und verringert das Risiko, dass Menschen auf Intuitionen zurückgreifen, die schwere Fehler verursachen.

In 2014, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration finalized its rear visibility regulation, which requires cameras in all new vehicles, with the goal of allowing drivers to see what is behind them and thus reducing backover accidents. In 2018, the Trump administration embraced the regulation. The rear visibility initiative raises numerous puzzles. First: Congress’ grant of authority was essentially standardless – perhaps the most open-ended in all of federal regulatory law. Second: It is not easy to identify a market failure to justify the regulation. Third: The monetized costs of the regulation greatly exceeded the monetized benefits, and yet on welfare grounds, the regulation can plausibly be counted as a significant success. Rearview cameras produce a set of benefits that are hard to quantify, including increased ease of driving, and those benefits might have been made a part of “breakeven analysis,” accompanying standard cost-benefit analysis. In addition, rearview cameras significantly improve the experience of driving, and it is plausible to think that in deciding whether to demand them, many vehicle purchasers did not sufficiently anticipate that improvement. This is a problem of limited foresight; rearview cameras are “experience goods.” A survey conducted in 2019 strongly supports this proposition, finding that about 56 percent of consumers would demand at least $300 to buy a car without a rearview camera, and that fewer than 6 percent would demand $50 or less. Almost all of that 6 percent consists of people who do not own a car with a rearview camera. (The per-person cost is usually under $50.) These conclusions may have general implications for other domains in which regulation has the potential to improve people’s lives, even if it fails standard cost-benefit analysis; the defining category involves situations in which people lack experience with a good whose provision might have significant welfare effects.

As the information gap between experts and non-experts narrows, it is increasingly important for experts to give advice to non-experts in a way that is both effective and respectful of their autonomy. We surveyed 508 participants using a hypothetical medical scenario in which participants were counselled on the risks and benefits of taking antibiotics for a sore throat in circumstances in which antibiotics were inappropriate. We asked participants whether they preferred (1) to make their own decision based on the information or (2) to make their decision based on the doctor’s opinion, and then randomized participants to receive “information only”, “opinion only”, “information first, then opinion”, or “opinion first, then information.” Participants whose stated preference was to follow the doctor’s opinion had significantly lower rates of antibiotic requests when given “information first, then opinion” compared to “opinion first, then information.” Our evidence suggests that in some important contexts, “information first, then opinion” is the most effective approach. We hypothesize that this is because it is seen by non-experts as more trustworthy and more respectful of their autonomy. Our finding might have general implications for expert communications.

Policy-makers show an increasing interest in “nudges” – behaviorally motivated interventions that steer people in certain directions but maintain freedom of consumer choice. Despite this interest, little evidence has surfaced about which population groups support nudges and nudging. We report the results of nationally representative surveys in Denmark, Hungary, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Individual, household and geographic characteristics served as predictors of nudge approval, and the count of significant predictors as measures of controversy. Less high approval rates of nudges in Denmark and Hungary were reflected in higher controversy about “System 1” nudges, whereas the United Kingdom and Italy were marked by higher controversy about “System 2” nudges, despite high approval rates. High-controversy nudges tended to be associated with current public policy concerns, for example, meat consumption. The results point to means for effective targeting, and increase knowledge about the types of nudges likely to obtain public support.

How well can anyone know a historical figure? How well can one person know another? What really matters? This essay explores those questions with reference to A.S. Byatt's masterpiece, Possession. A novel or a romance will not give crisp answers to such questions, but Byatt's answers, at once life-affirming and heartbreaking, are the right ones.