Faculty Bibliography

Many officials have been considering whether it is possible or desirable to use choice architecture to increase use of environmentally friendly (“green”) products and activities. The right approach could produce significant environmental benefits, including large reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and better air quality. This Article presents new data from an online experiment (N=1,245) in which participants were asked questions about hypothetical green energy programs. The central finding is that active choosing had larger effects than green energy defaults (automatic enrollment in green energy), apparently because of the interaction between people’s feelings of guilt and their feelings of reactance. This finding is driven principally by the fact that when green energy costs more, there is a significant increase in opt-outs from green defaults, whereas with active choosing, green energy retains considerable appeal even when it costs more. More specifically, we report four principal findings. First, forcing participants to make an active choice between a green energy provider and a standard energy provider led to higher enrollment in the green program than did either green energy defaults or standard energy defaults. Second, active choosing caused participants to feel more guilty about not enrolling in the green energy program than did either green energy defaults or standard energy defaults; the level of guilt was positively related to the probability of enrolling. Third, respondents were less likely to approve of the green energy default than of the standard energy default, but only when green energy cost extra, which suggests reactance towards green defaults when enrollment means additional private costs. Fourth, respondents appeared to have inferred that green energy automatically would come at a higher cost and/or be of worse quality than less environmentally friendly energy. These findings raise important questions both for future research and for policymaking. If they reflect real-world behavior, they suggest the potentially large effects of active choosing — perhaps larger, in some cases, than those of green energy defaults.

Historical explanations are a form of counterfactual history. To offer an explanation of what happened, historians have to identify causes, and whenever they identify causes, they immediately conjure up a counterfactual history, a parallel world. No one doubts that there is a great deal of distance between science fiction novelists and the world’s great historians, but along an important dimension, they are playing the same game.

Findings in behavioral science, including psychology, have influenced policies and reforms in many nations. Choice architecture can affect outcomes even if material incentives are not involved. In some contexts, default rules, simplification, and social norms have had even larger effects than significant economic incentives. Psychological research is helping to inform initiatives in savings, finance, highway safety, consumer protection, energy, climate change, obesity, education, poverty, development, crime, corruption, health, and the environment. No nation has yet created a council of psychological advisers, but the role of behavioral research in policy domains is likely to grow in the coming years, especially in light of the mounting interest in promoting ease and simplification (“navigability”); in increasing effectiveness, economic growth, and competitiveness; and in providing low-cost, choice-preserving approaches.

In the early twenty-first century, public law is being challenged by a fundamental assault on the legitimacy of the administrative state, under the banner of “the separation of powers.” The challengers frequently refer to the specter of Stuart despotism, and they valorize a (putatively) heroic opponent of Stuart despotism: the common-law judge, symbolized by Edward Coke. The New Coke is a shorthand for a cluster of impulses stemming from a belief in the illegitimacy of the modern administrative state. Despite its historical guise, the New Coke is a living-constitutionalist movement, a product of thoroughly contemporary values and fears -- perhaps prompted by continuing rejection, in some quarters, of the New Deal itself, and perhaps prompted by a reaction by some of the Justices to controversial initiatives from more recent presidents. In two important decisions in 2015, however, a supermajority of the Court refused to embrace the New Coke, and properly so. Instead the Court issued the long-awaited Vermont Yankee II, insisting that courts are not authorized to add procedures to those required by the APA, and reaffirmed the validity of Auer deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations. The Court’s approach promises to honor the multiple goals of administrative and constitutional law without embracing novel, ungrounded claims that betray basic commitments of the public legal order. For now, the center holds.

The article discusses the principle of the malevolent hiding hand and the planning fallacy writ large. Particular focus is given on economist Albert O. Hirschman's ideas on social-scientific laws. Hirchman believes that social planners tend to be unrealistically optimistic, particularly in underdeveloped nations. He adds that their neglect of bad surprises is countered by a much happier surprise. He also believes that the hiding hand provides a spur and a remedy in the form of mechanism that makes the risk-averter take risks.

Review of The Witch of Lime Street: Seance, Seduction, and Houdini in the Spirit World by David Jaher (2015).

In recent years, several judges on the nation’s most important regulatory court -- the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit -- have given birth to libertarian administrative law, in the form of a series of judge-made doctrines that are designed to protect private ordering from national regulatory intrusion. These doctrines involve nondelegation principles, protection of commercial speech, procedures governing interpretive rules, arbitrariness review, standing, and reviewability. Libertarian administrative law can be seen as a second-best option for those who believe, as some of the relevant judges openly argue, that the New Deal and the modern regulatory state suffer from basic constitutional infirmities. Taken as a whole, libertarian administrative law parallels the kind of progressive administrative law that the same court created in the 1970s, and that the Supreme Court unanimously rejected in the Vermont Yankee case. It should meet a similar fate. Two cases to be decided next Term provide an opportunity for the Court to repudiate libertarian administrative law.

Review of Phishing for Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and Deception, edited by George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller (2015).

"Since America's founding, hundreds of U.S. Supreme Court Justices have issued a vast number of decisions on a staggeringly wide variety of subjects. Yet as the eminent legal scholar, Cass R. Sunstein shows, constitutional law is dominated by a mere quartet of character types, regardless of ideology : the hero, the soldier, the minimalist, and the mute."--Jacket flap.

Many institutions, large or small, make their decisions through some process of deliberation. Nonetheless, deliberating institutions often fail, in the sense that they make judgments that are false or that fail to take advantage of the information that their members have. Micro mistakes can lead to macro blunders or even catastrophes. There are four such failures; all of them have implication for large-scale institutions as well as small ones. (1) Sometimes the predeliberation errors of an institution’s members are amplified, not merely propagated, as a result of deliberation. (2) Institutions fall victim to cascade effects, as the initial speakers or actors are followed by their successors, who do not disclose what they know. Nondisclosure, on the part of those successors, may be a product of either informational or reputational cascades. (3) As a result of group polarization, deliberating institutions sometimes end up in a more extreme position in line with their predeliberation tendencies. Sometimes group polarization leads in desirable directions, but there is no assurance to this effect. (4) In deliberating institutions, shared information often dominates or crowds out unshared information, ensuring that institutions do not learn what their members know. Informational signals and reputational pressure help to explain all four errors. The results can be harmful to numerous institutions, including large ones, and to societies as a whole. Markets are able to correct some of these problems, but cascade effects occur there as well.

Some people believe that nudges undermine human agency, but with appropriate nudges, neither agency nor consumer freedom is at risk. On the contrary, nudges can promote both goals. In some contexts, they are indispensable. There is no opposition between education on the one hand and nudges on the other. Many nudges are educative. Even when they are not, they can complement, and not displace, consumer education.

This essay has three general themes. The first involves the claim that nudging threatens human agency. My basic response is that human agency is fully retained (because nudges do not compromise freedom of choice) and that agency is always exercised in the context of some kind of choice architecture. The second theme involves the importance of having a sufficiently capacious sense of the category of nudges, and a full appreciation of the differences among them. Some nudges either enlist or combat behavioral biases but others do not, and even among those that do enlist or combat such biases, there are significant differences. The third general theme is the need to bring various concerns (including ethical ones) in close contact with particular examples. A legitimate point about default rules may not apply to warnings or reminders. An ethical objection to the use of social norms may not apply to information disclosure. Here as elsewhere, abstraction can be a trap. We continue to learn about the relevant ethical issues, about likely public reactions to nudging, and about differences across cultures and nations. Future progress will depend on a high level of concreteness, perhaps especially in dealing with the vexing problem of time-inconsistency.

But it can be done without humiliating people.

From the streets of Hong Kong to Ferguson, Missouri, civil disobedience has again become newsworthy. What explains the prevalence and extremity of acts of civil disobedience? This paper presents a model in which protest planners choose the nature of the disturbance hoping to influence voters (or other decision-makers in less democratic regimes) both through the size of the unrest and by generating a response. The model suggests that protesters will either choose a mild “epsilon” protest, such as a peaceful march, which serves mainly to signal the size of the disgruntled population, or a “sweet spot” protest, which is painful enough to generate a response but not painful enough so that an aggressive response is universally applauded. Since non-epsilon protests serve primarily to signal the leaders’ type, they will occur either when protesters have private information about the leader’s type or when the distribution of voters’ preferences are convex in a way that leads the revelation of uncertainty to increase the probability of regime change. The requirements needed for rational civil disobedience seem not to hold in many world settings, and so we explore ways in which bounded rationality by protesters, voters, and incumbent leaders can also explain civil disobedience.

In surveys, majorities of Americans disapprove of twelve hypothetical nudges (seven involving default rules, five involving education campaigns or disclosure requirements). These results provide an illuminating contrast with the majority support for twenty-two nudges that were also tested, and that are more realistic examples of the kinds of nudges that have been adopted or seriously considered in democratic nations. In general (and with some interesting exceptions), there is a strikingly broad consensus, across partisan lines, about which nudges do and do not deserve support. The best understanding of the data is that people dislike those nudges that (a) promote what people see as illicit ends or (b) are perceived as inconsistent with either the interests or values of most choosers. A ranking of the thirty-four nudges, in terms of their popularity, is provided, along with reports of differences (when they exist) among Democrats, Republicans, and Independents.

This paper offers a framework for regulating internalities. Using a simple economic model, we provide four principles for designing and evaluating behaviorally-motivated policy. We then outline rules for determining which contexts reliably reflect true preferences and discuss empirical strategies for measuring internalities. As a case study, we focus on energy efficiency policy, including Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards and appliance and lighting energy efficiency standards.

Human beings often see coherence and planned design when neither exists. This is so in movies, literature, history, economics, and psychoanalysis – and constitutional law. Contrary to the repeated claims of George Lucas, its principal author, the Star Wars series was hardly planned in advance; it involved a great deal of improvisation and surprise, even to Lucas himself. Serendipity and happenstance, sometimes in the forms of eruptions of new thinking, play a pervasive and overlooked role in the creative imagination, certainly in single-authored works, and even more in multi-authored ones extending over time. Serendipity imposes serious demands on the search for coherence in art, literature, history, and law. That search leads many people (including Lucas) to misdescribe the nature of their own creativity and authorship. The misdescription appears to respond to a serious human need for sense-making and pattern-finding, but it is a significant obstacle to understanding and critical reflection. Whether Jedi or Sith, many authors of constitutional law are a lot like the author of Star Wars, disguising the essential nature of their own creative processes.

This essay is a review of Edna Ullmann-Margalit’s pathbreaking 1978 book, The Emergence of Norms. It urges that Ullmann-Margalit’s treatment of PD norms and coordination norms remains convincing, but that a great deal of work remains to be done on the topic of norms of partiality, where adaptive preferences and preference falsification play significant roles. It also emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between causal and functional accounts of norms.

In diverse areas—from retirement savings, to fuel economy, to prescription drugs, to consumer credit, to food and beverage consumption—government makes personal decisions for us or helps us make what it sees as better decisions. In other words, government serves as our agent. Understood in light of Principal-Agent Theory and Behavioral Principal-Agent Theory, a great deal of modern regulation can be helpfully evaluated as a hypothetical delegation. Shifting from personal decisions to public goods problems, we introduce the idea of reverse delegation, with the government as principal and the individuals as agents.

Many regulators have concluded that cost-benefit analysis is the best available method for capturing the welfare effects of regulations. It is therefore understandable that in recent years, some people have been interested in requiring financial regulators to engage in careful cost-benefit analysis of their regulations, and to proceed only if the benefits justify the costs. Ideas of this sort have played a significant role in judicial review of agency action, especially in cases involving the Securities and Exchange Commission. But it is important to distinguish the question whether courts should require cost-benefit analyses, and review them for arbitrariness, from the separate question whether financial regulators should produce such analyses. It is also important to understand that in some cases, cost-benefit analysis presents serious challenges for financial regulators. When agencies lack relevant information, and cannot project benefits (or costs), they can invoke established techniques to discipline the question whether and how to proceed. In particular, breakeven analysis plays a valuable role. Of course it remains possible that in rare cases, agencies have so little information that they cannot even use breakeven analysis. In such cases, it is not helpful to refer to the precautionary principle or to “expert judgment.” In such rare cases, the best that agencies may be able to do is to rely on some version of maximin, while also seeking to fill informational gaps over time.

All over the world, governments are using nudges as regulatory tools. Is this ethical? Much of the answer depends on whether nudges promote or instead undermine welfare, autonomy, and dignity. Many nudges, and those that deserve support, promote some or all of those ideals, and undermine none of them. If welfare is our guide, much nudging is actually required on ethical grounds, even if it comes from government. If autonomy is our guide, much nudging is also required on ethical grounds, in part because some nudges actually promote autonomy, in part because some nudges enable people to devote their limited time and attention to their most important concerns. Finally, nudges should not, and need not, compromise individual dignity, which many nudges actually promote. There is, however, a genuine risk that some nudges might count as manipulation; an emphasis on welfare, autonomy, and dignity helps to show how to avoid that risk.

Behavioral economists have shown that consumers may disregard the long-term, display unrealistic optimism, ignore shrouded attributes, procrastinate, make mistaken judgments about probability, and suffer from “internalities,” which occur when people make decisions that hurt their future selves. Moreover, choice architecture, understood as the social background, is always present, and it can have major consequences for both consumption decisions and environmental outcomes. Small changes in the underlying architecture may have a large impact on consumer behavior, potentially even larger than that of significant economic incentives. Such changes may involve disclosure, warnings, default rules, increased salience, and use of social norms. In the domain of environmental protection, non-price interventions, preserving freedom of choice, have considerable potential.

"Our ability to make choices is fundamental to our sense of ourselves as human beings, and essential to the political values of freedom-protecting nations. Whom we love; where we work; how we spend our time; what we buy; such choices define us in the eyes of ourselves and others, and much blood and ink has been spilt to establish and protect our rights to make them freely. Choice can also be a burden. Our cognitive capacity to research and make the best decisions is limited, so every active choice comes at a cost. In modern life the requirement to make active choices can often be overwhelming. So, across broad areas of our lives, from health plans to energy suppliers, many of us choose not to choose. By following our default options, we save ourselves the costs of making active choices. By setting those options, governments and corporations dictate the outcomes for when we decide by default. This is among the most significant ways in which they effect social change, yet we are just beginning to understand the power and impact of default rules. Many central questions remain unanswered: When should governments set such defaults, and when should they insist on active choices? How should such defaults be made? What makes some defaults successful while others fail? Cass R. Sunstein has long been at the forefront of developing public policy and regulation to use government power to encourage people to make better decisions. In this major new book, Choosing Not to Choose, he presents his most complete argument yet for how we should understand the value of choice, and when and how we should enable people to choose not to choose. The onset of big data gives corporations and governments the power to make ever more sophisticated decisions on our behalf, defaulting us to buy the goods we predictably want, or vote for the parties and policies we predictably support. As consumers we are starting to embrace the benefits this can bring. But should we? What will be the long-term effects of limiting our active choices on our agency? And can such personalized defaults be imported from the marketplace to politics and the law? Confronting the challenging future of data-driven decision-making, Sunstein presents a manifesto for how personalized defaults should be used to enhance, rather than restrict, our freedom and well-being"-- Provided by publisher.

In the modern regulatory state, there is a serious tension between two indispensable ideas. The first is that it is important to measure, both in advance and on a continuing basis, the effects of regulation on social welfare, usually through cost-benefit analysis. The second idea, attributable above all to Friedrich Hayek, is that knowledge is widely dispersed in society. As Hayek and his followers emphasize, governments planners cannot possibly know what individuals know, simply because they lack that dispersed knowledge. When important information is missing, cost-benefit analysis can be exceptionally difficult to conduct. There are three ways to respond to that problem. The first involves notice-and-comment rulemaking, which has particular promise in the modern era, where regulators are in a far better position to collect the dispersed information of the public. The second involves retrospective analysis, accompanied by a process for obtaining public comment. In many cases, retrospective analysis has found that the ex ante estimates were wrong, thus pointing the way toward potential improvements both in rules and in future estimates. The third, and potentially the most valuable, involves experiments, above all randomized controlled trials, which can give a clear understanding of the likely effects of regulations.

“Partyism” is a form of hostility and prejudice that operates across political lines. For example, some Republicans have an immediate aversive reaction to Democrats, and some Democrats have the same aversive reaction to Republicans, so much so that they would discriminate against them in hiring or promotion decisions, or in imposing punishment. If elected officials suffer from partyism – perhaps because their constituents do – they will devalue proposals from the opposing party and refuse to enter into agreements with its members, even if their independent assessment, freed from partyism, would be favorably disposed toward those proposals or agreements. In the United States, partyism has been rapidly growing, and it is quite pronounced – in some ways, more so than racism. It also has a series of adverse effects on governance itself, above all by making it difficult to enact desirable legislation and thus disrupting the system of separation of powers. Under circumstances of severe partyism, relatively broad delegations of authority to the executive branch, and a suitably receptive approach to the Chevron principle, have considerable appeal as ways of allowing significant social problems to be addressed. This conclusion bears on both domestic issues and foreign affairs.

This essay defends the following propositions. (1) It is pointless to object to choice architecture or nudging as such. Choice architecture cannot be avoided. Nature itself nudges; so does the weather; so do spontaneous orders and invisible hands. The private sector inevitably nudges, as does the government. It is reasonable to object to particular nudges, but not to nudging in general. (2) In this context, ethical abstractions (for example, about autonomy, dignity, and manipulation) can create serious confusion. To make progress, those abstractions must be brought into contact with concrete practices. Nudging and choice architecture take diverse forms, and the force of an ethical objection depends on the specific form. (3) If welfare is our guide, much nudging is actually required on ethical grounds. (4) If autonomy is our guide, much nudging is also required on ethical grounds. (5) Choice architecture should not, and need not, compromise either dignity or self-government, though imaginable forms could do both. (6) Some nudges are objectionable because the choice architect has illicit ends. When the ends are legitimate, and when nudges are fully transparent and subject to public scrutiny, a convincing ethical objection is less likely to be available. (7) There is, however, room for ethical objections in the case of well-motivated but manipulative interventions, certainly if people have not consented to them; such nudges can undermine autonomy and dignity. It follows that both the concept and the practice of manipulation deserve careful attention. The concept of manipulation has a core and a periphery; some interventions fit within the core, others within the periphery, and others outside of both.

Some people believe that the very idea of interpretation requires judges to adopt a particular method for interpreting the Constitution. The problem with this view is that in constitutional law, the general idea of interpretation is compatible with a range of different approaches, and among them, none is mandatory, in the sense of having some unique or privileged connection with the general idea. Any particular approach must be defended on the ground that it would make our constitutional order better rather than worse. No one should doubt that there are legitimate questions about the institutional capacities of judges, and about the virtues and vices of a deferential role on their part; the answers to those questions can motivate a view about constitutional interpretation. But they do not depend on an understanding of what interpretation necessarily requires.

In 2013, the Supreme Court showed an unusually high rate of unanimous decisions – the highest, in fact, since 1940. This increase in unanimity, long favored by Chief Justice John Roberts, places a spotlight on an insufficiently appreciated fact: In 1941, the Supreme Court experienced a radical transformation. Almost immediately, it changed from a court that had operated by consensus, with very few separate opinions, into something closer to nine separate law offices, with a large number of dissenting opinions and concurrences, and with a significant rate of 5-4 divisions. Remarkably, the patterns established in the early 1800s continued until 1941, and the patterns established in the early 1940s have persisted to the present day. The transformation of 1941 appears to be attributable, in significant part, to the leadership style of Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, who had no aversion to separate opinions and split decisions, and who was a frequent dissenter himself. The transformation offers general lessons not only about consensus and dissent within courts, but also about broader relationships among leaders, personnel, path dependence, prevailing norms, and the Court’s future. With respect to group behavior, it suggests the possibility of multiple equilibria: With small differences in leadership style and prevailing norms, the level of publicly expressed dissent can either grow or wither. With respect to the normative issues, the standard arguments in favor of a higher level of consensus within the Court – pointing to the values of legitimacy, stability, and minimalism – rest on fragile empirical foundations. It is true that a badly fractured Supreme Court can create uncertainty, and that internal divisions have costs as well as benefits, but there is no sufficient reason to hope for a return to the pre-1941 patterns.

It is not fruitful to puzzle over the question whether economists and others ‘favor’ or ‘lean’ toward the regulatory or welfare state; that is an unhelpful and confusing question, one that orients people in the wrong way. It is better to begin by emphasizing that the first should be designed to handle market failures, and that the second should be designed to respond to economic deprivation and unjustified inequality.

"Why are group decisions so hard? Since the beginning of human history, people have made decisions in groups--first in families and villages, and now as part of companies, governments, school boards, religious organizations, or any one of countless other groups. And having more than one person to help decide is good because the group benefits from the collective knowledge of all of its members, and this results in better decisions. Right? Back to reality. We've all been involved in group decisions--and they're hard. And they often turn out badly. Why? Many blame bad decisions on "groupthink" without a clear idea of what that term really means. Now, "Nudge" coauthor Cass Sunstein and leading decision-making scholar Reid Hastie shed light on the specifics of why and how group decisions go wrong--and offer tactics and lessons to help leaders avoid the pitfalls and reach better outcomes. In the first part of the book, they explain in clear and fascinating detail the distinct problems groups run into: They often amplify, rather than correct, individual errors in judgment; They fall victim to cascade effects, as members follow what others say or do; They become polarized, adopting more extreme positions than the ones they began with; They emphasize what everybody knows instead of focusing on critical information that only a few people know. In the second part of the book, the authors turn to straightforward methods and advice for making groups smarter. These approaches include silencing the leader so that the views of other group members can surface, rethinking rewards and incentives to encourage people to reveal their own knowledge, thoughtfully assigning roles that are aligned with people's unique strengths, and more. With examples from a range of organizations--from Google to the CIA--and written in an engaging and witty style, "Wiser" will not only enlighten you; it will help your team and your organization make better decisions--decisions that lead to greater success." --Publisher

Together, they matter more than intelligence.

The article reviews the books "Happiness by Design: Change What You Do, Not How You Think" by Paul Dolan, with a foreword by Daniel Kahneman and "Subjective Well-Being: Measuring Happiness, Suffering, and Other Dimensions of Experience" edited by Arthur A. Stone and Christopher Mackie.

This brief essay offers a general introduction to the idea of nudging, along with a list of 10 of the most important “nudges.” It also provides a short discussion of the question whether to create some kind of separate “behavioral insights unit,” capable of conducting its own research, or instead to rely on existing institutions.

The problem of nonquantifiability is a recurrent one in both public policy and ordinary life. Much of the time, we cannot quantify the benefits of potential courses of action, or the costs, or both, and we must nonetheless decided whether and how to proceed. Under existing Executive Orders, agencies are generally required to quantify both benefits and costs, and (to the extent permitted by law) to show that the former justify the latter. But agencies are also permitted to consider apparently nonquantifiable factors, such as human dignity and fairness, and also to consider factors that are not quantifiable because of the limits of existing knowledge. When quantification is impossible, agencies should engage in “breakeven analysis,” by which they explore how high the nonquantifiable benefits would have to be in order for the benefits to justify the costs. Breakeven analysis can be used and potentially disciplined in three different ways. (1) Sometimes agencies are able to identity lower or upper bounds, either through point estimates or through an assessment of expected value. (2) Agencies can often make progress by exploring comparison cases in which relevant values have already been assigned (such as for a statistical life). (3) When agencies cannot identify lower or upper bounds, and when helpful comparisons are unavailable, breakeven analysis requires agencies to identify what information is missing and to specify the conditions under which benefits would justify costs (“conditional justification”). In admittedly rare cases, regulators, no less than individuals, might have to “pick” or instead to “opt.”

Administrative agencies frequently say “not now.” They defer decisions about rulemaking or adjudication, or decide not to decide, potentially jeopardiz- ing public health, national security, or other important goals. Such decisions are often made as a result of general Administration policy, may be highly controversial, and are at least potentially subject to legal challenge. When is it lawful for agencies to defer decisions? A substantial degree of agency autonomy is guaranteed by a recognition of resource constraints, which require agencies to set priorities, often with reference to their independent assessments of the relative importance of national policies. Agencies frequently defer decisions because they do not believe that certain policies warrant prompt attention. Unless a fair reading of congressional instructions suggests otherwise, agencies may defer decisions because of their own judgments about appropriate timing. At the same time, agencies may not defer decisions—or decide not to decide—if (1) Congress has imposed a statutory deadline, (2) their failure to act amounts to a circumvention of express or implied statutory requirements, or (3) that failure counts as an abdication of the agency’s basic responsibility to promote and enforce policies established by Congress. Difficult questions are raised by moratoria, formal or informal, on regulatory activity, especially if they are motivated by political considerations. Difficult questions also arise when agencies cannot feasibly meet statutory deadlines while fulfilling their obligation to engage in reasoned decisionmaking.

Choice can be an extraordinary benefit or an immense burden. In some contexts, people choose not to choose, or would do so if they were asked. For example, many people prefer not to make choices about their health or retirement plans; they want to delegate those choices to a private or public institution that they trust (and may well be willing to pay a considerable amount for such delegations). This point suggests that however well-accepted, the line between active choosing and paternalism is often illusory. When private or public institutions override people’s desire not to choose, and insist on active choosing, they may well be behaving paternalistically, through a form of choice-requiring paternalism. Active choosing can be seen as a form of libertarian paternalism, and a frequently attractive one, if people are permitted to opt out of choosing in favor of a default (and in that sense not to choose); it is a form of nonlibertarian paternalism insofar as people are required to choose. For both ordinary people and private or public institutions, the ultimate judgment in favor of active choosing, or in favor of choosing not to choose, depends largely on the costs of decisions and the costs of errors. But the value of learning, and of developing one’s own preferences and values, is also important, and may argue on behalf of active choosing, and against the choice not to choose. For law and policy, these points raise intriguing puzzles about the idea of “predictive shopping,” which is increasingly feasible with the rise of large data sets containing information about people’s previous choices. Some empirical results are presented about people’s reactions to predictive shopping; the central message is that most (but not all) people reject predictive shopping in favor of active choosing.

This essay is an introduction to a forthcoming special issue of the Journal of Consumer Policy, on Behavioural Economics, Environmental Policy and the Consumer. It emphasizes that consumer behavior can be greatly affected by the context, which may make it easy or difficult for people to make choices that benefit or harm the environment, and which may make environmentally relevant features of products more or less salient. Open questions, both ethical and empirical, are identified. The essays in the symposium, summarized here, offer both positive and more critical accounts of behaviourally informed regulation and its tools, as well as a wide range of hands-on applications of behavioural findings to environmentally relevant consumer behaviour.

"The White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is the United States's regulatory overseer. In Valuing Life, Cass R. Sunstein draws on his firsthand experience as the Administrator of OIRA from 2009 to 2012 to argue that we can humanize regulation--and save lives in the process. As OIRA Administrator, Sunstein helped oversee regulation in a broad variety of areas, including highway safety, health care, homeland security, immigration, energy, environmental protection, and education. This background allows him to describe OIRA and how it works--and how it can work better--from an on-the-ground perspective. Using real-world examples, many of them drawn from today's headlines, Sunstein makes a compelling case for improving cost-benefit analysis, a longtime cornerstone of regulatory decision-making, and for taking account of variables that are hard to quantify, such as dignity and personal privacy. He also shows how regulatory decisions about health, safety, and life itself can benefit from taking into account behavioral and psychological research, including new findings about what scares us, and what does not. By better accounting for people's fallibility, Sunstein argues, we can create regulation that is simultaneously more human and more likely to achieve its goals. In this highly readable synthesis of insights from law, policy, economics, and psychology, Sunstein breaks down the intricacies of the regulatory system and offers a new way of thinking about regulation that incorporates human dignity--and an insistent focus on the consequences of our choices." --Publisher