Faculty Bibliography

Moral intuitions operate in much the same way as other intuitions do; what makes the moral domain so distinctive is its foundations in the emotions, beliefs, and response tendencies that define indignation. The intuitive system of cognition, System I, is typically responsible for indignation; the more reflective system, System II, may or may not provide an override. Moral dumbfounding and moral numbness are often a product of moral intuitions that people are unable to justify. An understanding of indignation helps to explain the operation of many phenomena of interest to law and politics: the outrage heuristic, the centrality of harm, the role of reference states, moral framing, and the act-omission distinction. Because of the operation of indignation, it is extremely difficult for people to achieve coherence in their moral intuitions. Legal and political institutions usually aspire to be deliberative, and to pay close attention to System II; but even in deliberative institutions, System I can make some compelling demands.

This review-essay explores the uses and limits of cost-benefit analysis in the context of environmental protection, focusing on three recent books: Priceless, by Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling; Cellular Phones, Public Fears, and A Culture of Precaution, by Adam Burgess; and Catastrophe: Risk and Response, by Richard A. Posner. The review-essay emphasizes three principal limitations on the use of cost-benefit analysis. First, it is important to distinguish between the easy cases for cost-benefit analysis, in which the beneficiaries of regulation pay all or almost all of its cost, from the harder cases, in which the beneficiaries pay little for the environmental protection that they receive. In the harder cases, net welfare gains and distributional advantages are possible even if environmental regulation fails cost-benefit analysis. Second, there are possible uses, in the environmental context, of maximin rather than cost-benefit analysis, especially when regulators are attempting to control catastrophic risks where probabilities cannot be assigned. An Anti-Catastrophe Principle makes sense for such situations. Third, human beings are citizens, not merely consumers, and this point requires abandonment of the willingness to pay criterion in some contexts.

Because risks are all on sides of social situations, it is not possible to be globally "precautionary." Hence the Precautionary Principle runs into serious conceptual difficulties; any precautions will themselves create hazards of one or another kind. When the principle gives guidance, it is often because of the availability heuristic, which can make some risks stand out as particularly salient, whatever their actual magnitude. The same heuristic helps to explain differences across groups, cultures, and even nations in the perception of risks, especially when linked with such social processes as cascades and group polarization. One difficulty here is that what is available is sometimes a result of predispositions, cultural and otherwise. There are complex links among availability, social processes for the spreading of information, and predispositions.

Over the coming decades, the increasingly popular precautionary principle is likely to have a significant impact on policies all over the world. Applying this principle could lead to dramatic changes in decision making. Possible applications include climate change, genetically modified food, nuclear power, homeland security, new drug therapies, and even war. We argue that the precautionary principle does not help individuals or nations make difficult choices in a non-arbitrary way. Taken seriously, it can be paralyzing, providing no direction at all. In contrast, balancing costs against benefits can offer the foundation of a principled approach for making difficult decisions.

Is the Internet a wonderful development for democracy? In many ways it is. As a result of the Internet, we can learn far more than we could before, and learn it much faster. If you want to get information to a wide range of people, you can do it quickly, via email and Web sites, and is another sense in which the Internet is a great boon for democracy. In particular, the rise of specialized sites and blogs increases the opportunity for people to read and write on an extraordinary array of topics. If you have an opinion and want to express it in public or want to find an opinion of almost any kind, chances are you can, at trivial cost.

In explaining how public fear might produce unjustified intrusions on civil liberties, emphasizes two potential sources of error: the availability heuristic and probability neglect. The availability heuristic, widely used by ordinary people, can lead to a grossly exaggerated sense of risk, as salient incidents make citizens think that a risk is far more serious than it actually is. When probability neglect is at work, people focus on the "worst case" and disregard the question whether it is likely that the worst case will occur - an approach that can also lead to excessive regulation. With an understanding of the availability heuristic and probability neglect, believes it possible to have a better appreciation of the sources of unsupportable intrusions on civil liberties.

Each government agency uses a uniform figure to measure the value of a statistical life (VSL). This is a serious mistake. The very theory that underlies current practice calls for far more individuation of the relevant values. According to that theory, VSL should vary across risks. More controversially, VSL should vary across individuals -- even or especially if the result would be to produce a lower number for some people than for others. One practical implication is that a higher value should be given to programs that reduce cancer risks. Another is that government should use a higher VSL for programs that disproportionately benefit the wealthy -- and a lower VSL for programs that disproportionately benefit the poor. But there are two serious complications here. First, bounded rationality raises problems for the use of private willingness to pay, which underlies current calculations of VSL. Second, the beneficiaries of regulation sometimes pay only a fraction or even none of its cost; when this is so, the appropriate VSL for poor people might be higher, on distributional grounds, than market evidence suggests. An understanding of this point has implications for foundational issues about government regulation, including valuation of persons in poor and wealthy nations.

The most important and illuminating early writing on Brown v. Bd. of Education is a nine-page essay by Charles Black. Black memorably shows that segregation was a crucial part of a racial caste system. At the same time, he cuts through legal abstractions that made it difficult to answer the question whether the Court's decision was sufficiently "neutral." At the same time, Black's argument suffers from two serious problems: formalism and institution-blindness. Black writes as if his interpretation of the equal protection clause can be simply read off the clause, and he does not engage the complex institutional problems that were raised by the Court's decision. Nonetheless, the legal culture needs more voices like Black's.

The article presents a response to comments by Daniel Klein published in the August 2004 issue of the "Econ Journal Watch" on the article "Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron," by Cass R. Sunstein and Richard Thaler. The author rebuts Klein's suggestion that the authors are making an idiosyncratic distinction between voluntary and coercive action and states that their distinction is the pivot of the argument that opposes libertarian paternalism to nonlibertarian varieties.

Some eleven million 401(k) plan participants take a concentrated equity position in their retirement savings account, investing more than 20% of the balance in their employer's common stock. Yet investing in the stock of one's employer is a risky investment on two counts: single securities are riskier than diversified portfolios (such as mutual funds), and the employee's human capital is typically positively correlated with the performance of the company. In the worst-case scenario, illustrated by the Enron bankruptcy, workers can lose their jobs and much of their retirement wealth simultaneously. For workers who expect to work for the company for many years, a dollar of company stock can be valued at less than 50 cents to the worker after accounting for the risks. But employees still invest voluntarily in their employers' stock, and many employers insist on making matching contributions in stock, despite the fact that a dollar of investment or contribution may be worth only 50 cents on the dollar. How can competitive labor markets sustain a situation in which employers and employees make such a fundamental miscalculation? We provide evidence that employees underestimate the risk of owning company stock, while employers overestimate the benefits associated with employee stock ownership relative to its costs. This evidence provides strong reasons to consider legal reforms in this domain. We make suggestions that would increase employees' freedom of choice and improve their welfare, but without imposing significant costs on well-meaning but ill-informed employers.

In 1944, Franklin Delano Roosevelt gave a State of the Union Address that was arguably the greatest political speech of the twentieth century. In it, Roosevelt grappled with the definition of security in a democracy, concluding that "unless there is security here at home, there cannot be lasting peace in the world." To help ensure that security, he proposed a "Second Bill of Rights" -- economic rights that he saw as necessary to political freedom. Many of the great legislative achievements of the past sixty years stem from Roosevelt's vision. Using this speech as a launching point, Cass R. Sunstein shows how these rights are vital to the continuing security of our nation. This is an ambitious, sweeping book that argues for a new vision of FDR, of constitutional history, and our current political scene.

Cass Sunstein and Martha Nussbaum bring together an all-star cast of contributors to explore the legal and political issues that underlie the campaign for animal rights and the opposition to it. Addressing ethical questions about ownership, protection against unjustified suffering, and the ability of animals to make their own choices free from human control, the authors offer numerous different perspectives on animal rights and animal welfare. They show that whatever one's ultimate conclusions, the relationship between human beings and nonhuman animals is being fundamentally rethought. This book offers a state-of-the-art treatment of that rethinking.

For many decades, the United States has been conducting an extraordinary natural experiment: Randomly assigned three-judge panels on courts of appeals produce extensive evidence of the effect of judicial ideology on judges' votes. If the political party of the appointing president is treated as a rough proxy for ideology, then it becomes possible to test three hypotheses: (a) a judge's votes, in ideologically contested areas, can be predicted by the party of the appointing president; (b) a judge's ideological tendency, in such areas, will be amplified if the panel has two other judges appointed by an appointing president of the same political party; and (c) a judge's ideological tendency, in such areas, will be dampened if the panel has no other judge appointed by an appointing president of the same political party. All three hypotheses are confirmed in many areas, including affirmative action, campaign finance, sex discrimination, sexual harassment, piercing the corporate veil, disability discrimination, race discrimination, and review of environmental regulations. An important implication is that panel composition has a strong effect on likely outcomes, thus creating extremely serious problems for the rule of law. Taken as a whole, the evidence suggests that judges frequently issue collegial concurrences, that is, concurrences produced by the unanimous views of the other judges on the panel, and that judges are subject to group polarization, by which groups of like-minded people go to extremes. Notably, all three hypotheses are rejected in the areas of federalism, criminal appeals, and takings of private property, because Republican and Democratic appointees vote essentially alike. In the areas of abortion and capital punishment, the first hypothesis is confirmed, but the second and third are rejected, because judges vote their convictions, and are not affected by the composition of the panel. Disaggregating the data by circuit allows courts of appeals to be ranked along an ideological spectrum; it also shows striking differences between Republican appointees and Democratic appointees on different circuits. Normative implications are briefly explored.

Each government agency uses a uniform figure to measure the value of a statistical life. This is a serious mistake. The very theory that underlies current practice calls for far more individuation of the relevant values. According to that theory, the value of statistical lives should vary across risks. More controversially, the value of a statistical life should vary across individuals - even or especially if the result would be to produce a lower number for some people than for others. One practical implication is that a higher value should be given to programs that reduce cancer risks. Should government use a higher VSL for programs that disproportionately benefit the wealthy - and lower VSL for programs that disproportionately benefit the poor? A serious complication here is that sometimes the beneficiaries of regulation pay only a fraction or even none of its cost; when this is so, the appropriate VSL for poor people might be higher, on distributional grounds, than market evidence suggests. An understanding of this point has implications for foundational issues about government regulation, including valuation of persons in poor and wealthy nations.

In protecting safety, health, and the environment, government has increasingly relied on cost-benefit analysis. In undertaking cost-benefit analysis, the government has monetized risks of death through the idea of "value of a statistical life" (VSL), currently assessed at about $6.1 million. Many analysts, however, have suggested that the government should rely instead on the "value of a statistical life year" (VSLY), in a way that would likely result in significantly lower benefits calculations for elderly people, and significantly higher benefits calculations for children. I urge that the government should indeed focus on life-years rather than lives. A program that saves young people produces more welfare than one that saves old people. The hard question involves not whether to undertake this shift, but how to monetize life-years, and here willingness to pay (WTP) is generally the place to begin. Nor does a focus on life-years run afoul of ethical limits on cost-benefit analysis. It is relevant in this connection that every old person was once young, and that if all goes well, young people will eventually be old. In fact, a focus on statistical lives is more plausibly a form of illicit discrimination than a focus on life-years, because the idea of statistical lives treats the years of older people as worth far more than the years of younger people. Discussion is also devoted to the uses and limits of the willingness to pay criterion in regulatory policy, with reference to the underlying welfare goal and to the nature of moral and distributional constraints on cost-benefit balancing.

When national security conflicts with individual liberty, reviewing courts might adopt one of three general orientations: National Security Maximalism, Liberty Maximalism, and minimalism. National Security Maximalism calls for a great deal of deference to the President, above all because of his authority as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Liberty Maximalism asks courts to assume the same liberty-protecting posture in times of war as in times of peace. Minimalism asks courts to follow three precepts: the President needs clear congressional authorization for intruding on interests having a strong claim to constitutional protection; fair hearings should generally be provided to those who have been deprived of their freedom; and courts should discipline their own authority through narrow, incompletely theorized rulings. Of the three positions, Liberty Maximalism is the easiest to dismiss; courts will not and should not adopt it. National Security Maximalism is far more plausible, but it is in grave tension with the constitutional structure, and it is built on excessive optimism about the incentives of the President. The most appealing approach is minimalism, which does remarkably well in capturing prominent decisions of the Supreme Court in World War I, World War II, the Cold War, and the war on terrorism.

Between 1905 and 1937, the legal culture experienced a genuine revolution. In the Supreme Court's view, the police power was sharply limited, and whatever it included, it did not include the power to require minimum wages or maximum hours. Ideas of this sort played an important role in cases striking down not only minimum wage and maximum hour laws, but a number of other measures attempting to protect workers. To say the least, Lochner's Legacy was not a work of legal history, and David Bernstein's article, "Lochner's Legacy's Legacy," is an extremely valuable addition. But his picture seems incomplete, above all because it does not adequately specify the Court's understanding of the police power. There is a close connection between that understanding and the Court's use of common law baselines to question legislation.

In this timely book, Cass R. Sunstein shows that organizations and nations are far more likely to prosper if they welcome dissent and promote openness. Attacking “political correctness” in all forms, Sunstein demonstrates that corporations, legislatures, even presidents are likely to blunder if they do not cultivate a culture of candor and disclosure. He shows that unjustified extremism, including violence and terrorism, often results from failure to tolerate dissenting views. The tragedy is that blunders and cruelties could be avoided if people spoke out. Sunstein casts new light on freedom of speech, showing that a free society not only forbids censorship but also provides public spaces for dissenters to expose widely held myths and pervasive injustices. He provides evidence about the effects of conformity and dissent on the federal courts. The evidence shows not only that Republican appointees vote differently from Democratic appointees but also that both Republican and Democratic judges are likely to go to extremes if unchecked by opposing views. Understanding the need for dissent illuminates countless social debates, including those over affirmative action in higher education, because diversity is indispensable to learning. Dissenters are often portrayed as selfish and disloyal, but Sunstein shows that those who reject pressures imposed by others perform valuable social functions, often at their own expense. This is true for dissenters in boardrooms, churches, unions, and academia. It is true for dissenters in the White House, Congress, and the Supreme Court. And it is true during times of war and peace.

The idea of libertarian paternalism might seem to be an oxymoron, but it is both possible and legitimate for private and public institutions to affect behavior while also respecting freedom of choice. Often people's preferences are ill-formed, and their choices will inevitably be influenced by default rules, framing effects, and starting points. In these circumstances, a form of paternalism cannot be avoided. Equipped with an understanding of behavioral findings of bounded rationality and bounded self-control, libertarian paternalists should attempt to steer people's choices in welfare-promoting directions without eliminating freedom of choice. It is also possible to show how a libertarian paternalist might select among the possible options and to assess how much choice to offer. Examples are given from many areas, including savings behavior, labor law, and consumer protection.

We determined the frequency of antenatal corticosteroid use for mothers with threatened premature deliver in 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000. We next compared published data to the surveyed recollections of 302 obstetricians who were practicing during these years. Two points emerged. First, published reports reveal that the use of antenatal corticosteroids increased steadily, from 8% in 1985 to 20% in 1990, 52% in 1995, and 75% in 2000 (P < .001). Second, "expert" opinions derived from the recollections of practicing obstetricians consistently overestimated the actual use of antenatal corticosteroids during the year in question - 31% versus 8% for 1985, 56% versus 20% for 1990, 78% versus 52% for 1995, and 92% versus 75% for 2000 (all Ps < .001). The use of antenatal corticosteroids by obstetricians in the past 15 years reveals a phenomenon that is widely recognized elsewhere - retrospective memories are often wrong, and when they are wrong they are not randomly wrong. Rather, recollections are systematically skewed toward an outcome that, in hindsight, is considered desirable (the "Monday morning quarterback" phenomenon). We offer a simple proposal. In determining the "standard of medical care," the legal system should rely on statistical data about doctors' performance rather than the recollections of experts about doctors' performance. The fallible memories of isolated experts are a crude second-best, far inferior to the data that they approximate. Widespread adoption of the view by professional physician organizations would dramatically increase the rationality of expert testimony in medical malpractice tort law.

New work on heuristics and biases has explored the role of emotions and affect; the idea of "dual processing"; the place of heuristics and biases outside of the laboratory; and the implications of heuristics and biases for policy and law. This review-essay focuses on certain aspects of "Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment", edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman. An understanding of heuristics and biases casts light on many issues in law, involving jury awards, risk regulation, and political economy in general. Some attention is given to the possibility of "moral heuristics" - rules of thumb, for purposes of morality, that generally work well but that also systematically misfire.

When strong emotions are involved, people tend to focus on the badness of the outcome, rather than on the probability that the outcome will occur. The resulting “probability neglect” helps to explain excessive reactions to low-probability risks of catastrophe. Terrorists show a working knowledge of probability neglect, producing public fear that might greatly exceed the discounted harm. As a result of probability neglect, people often are far more concerned about the risks of terrorism than about statistically larger risks that they confront in ordinary life. In the context of terrorism and analogous risks, the legal system frequently responds to probability neglect, resulting in regulation that might be unjustified or even counterproductive. But public fear is itself a cost, and it is associated with many other costs, in the form of “ripple effects” produced by fear. As a normative matter, government should reduce even unjustified fear, if the benefits of the response can be shown to outweigh the costs.

Sunstein argues that real understanding of how the findings of behavioral economics relate to law demands and investigates the connection between relevant findings and social influences. He describes the available heuristic and the probability neglect bias and the way it helps to explain individual thinking about risks. Cascades, group polarization, politics, interest groups, and the media, may exert influence in mediating the types of processes dealt with in psychology and behavioral economics.

To evaluate theories of interpretation, it is necessary to focus on institutional considerations - to ask how actual judges would use any proposed approach, and to investigate the possibility that an otherwise appealing approach will have unfortunate dynamic effects on private and public institutions. Notwithstanding this point, blindness to institutional considerations is pervasive. It can be found in the work of early commentators on interpretation, including that of Jeremy Bentham; in the influential work of H.L.A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, and Henry Hart and Albert Sacks; and in much contemporary writing. This blindness to institutional considerations creates serious problems for the underlying theories. The problems are illustrated with discussions of many disputed issues, including the virtues and vices of formalism; the current debate over whether administrative agencies should have greater interpretive freedom than courts; and the roles of text, philosophy, translation, and tradition in constitutional law. In many cases, an understanding of institutional capacities and dynamic effects should enable diverse people, with different views about ideal legal interpretation, to agree on what actual legal interpretation should entail.

The precautionary principle has been highly influential in legal systems all over the world. In its strongest and most distinctive forms, the principle imposes a burden of proof on those who create potential risks, and it requires regulation of activities even if it cannot be shown that those activities are likely to produce significant harms. Taken in this strong form, the precautionary principle should be rejected, not because it leads in bad directions, but because it leads in no directions at all. The principle is literally paralyzing - forbidding inaction, stringent regulation, and everything in between. The reason is that in the relevant cases, every step, including inaction, creates a risk to health, the environment, or both. This point raises a further puzzle. Why is the precautionary principle widely seen to offer real guidance? The answer lies in identifiable cognitive mechanisms emphasized by behavioral economists. In many cases, loss aversion plays a large role, accompanied by a false belief that nature is benign. Sometimes the availability heuristic is at work. Probability neglect plays a role as well. Most often, those who use the precautionary principle fall victim to what might be called "system neglect," which involves a failure to attend to the systemic effects of regulation. Examples are given from numerous areas, involving arsenic regulation, global warming and the Kyoto Protocol, nuclear power, pharmaceutical regulation, cloning, pesticide regulation, and genetic modification of food. The salutary moral and political goals of the precautionary principle should be promoted through other, more effective methods.

Do animals have rights? Almost everyone believes in animal rights, at least in some minimal sense; the real question is what that phrase actually means. By exploring that question, it is possible to give a clear sense of the lay of the land - to show the range of possible positions, and to explore what issues, of theory or fact, separate reasonable people. On reflection, the spotlight should be placed squarely on the issue of suffering and well-being. This position requires rejection of some of the most radical claims by animal rights advocates, especially those that stress the "autonomy" of animals, or that object to any human control and use of animals. But this position has radical implications of its own. It strongly suggests, for example, that there should be extensive regulation of the use of animals in entertainment, in scientific experiments, and in agriculture. It also suggests that there is a strong argument, in principle, for bans on many current uses of animals.

The Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas is best seen as a cousin to Griswold v. Connecticut, invalidating a ban on the use of contraception within marriage, and Reed v. Reed, invalidating a preference for men over women in the administration of estates. In both cases, the Court struck down an anachronistic law palpably out of step with existing public convictions. Lawrence should be understood in the same terms, as rooted in a distinctly American-style doctrine of desuetude. The central principle is that at least if certain interests are involved, criminal statutes may not be invoked against citizens when the underlying moral judgments have become anachronistic, as demonstrated by a pattern of nonenforcement. A key problem here is procedural; it involves an absence of fair notice and arbitrary exercise of discretion. This understanding of the decision has implications for the many imaginable constitutional challenges to other laws involving sex and sexual orientation. After Lawrence, states are certainly prohibited from banning fornication; they are almost certainly forbidden to ban use of sexual devices. Bans on prostitution, incest, and adultery stand on firmer grounds, though even here responsible challenges can be imagined. After Lawrence, the Constitution almost certainly forbids public discrimination against those who have engaged in homosexual conduct, at least outside of certain specialized contexts (most notably the military). The hardest cases involve the failure to recognize same-sex marriages. The ban on same-sex marriages cannot be said to be an anachronism, even though it is not easy, in principle, to reject the law struck down in Lawrence while permitting states to deny gays and lesbians the right to marry. One general lesson, underlined by Lawrence, is that political and social change is usually a precondition for changed interpretation of the Constitution.

Much of the time, human beings do what others do. This is perfectly sensible, because the actions and statements of other people convey valuable information about what should be done. In addition, most people want the good opinion of others, and this desire promotes conformity. But conformity can lead both groups and institutions in unfortunate and even catastrophic directions. The most serious problem is that by following others, people fail to disclose what they know and believe, thus depriving society of important information. Those who dissent, and who reject the pressures imposed by others, perform valuable social functions, often at their own expense, material or nonmaterial. These points are illustrated by reference to theoretical and empirical work on conformity, cascades, and group polarization. An understanding of the role of conformity and dissent casts new light on a variety of legal issues, including the expressive function of law; the institutions of the American constitution; the functions of free speech in wartime; the debate over the composition of the federal judiciary; and affirmative action in higher education.

New work on heuristics and biases has explored the role of emotions and affect; the idea of "dual processing"; the place of heuristics and biases outside of the laboratory; and the implications of heuristics and biases for policy and law. This review-essay focuses on certain aspects of "Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment", edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman. An understanding of heuristics and biases casts light on many issues in law, involving jury awards, risk regulation, and political economy in general. Some attention is given to the possibility of "moral heuristics" - rules of thumb, for purposes of morality, that generally work well but that also systematically misfire.

When strong emotions are triggered by a risk, people show a remarkable tendency to neglect a small probability that the risk will actually come to fruition. Experimental evidence, involving electric shocks and arsenic, supports this claim, as does real-world evidence, involving responses to abandoned hazardous waste dumps, the pesticide Alar, and anthrax. The resulting "probability neglect" has many implications for law and policy. It suggests the need for institutional constraints on policies based on ungrounded fears; it also shows how government might effectively draw attention to risks that warrant special concern. Probability neglect helps to explain the enactment of certain legislation, in which government, no less than ordinary people, suffers from that form of neglect. When people are neglecting the fact that the probability of harm is small, government should generally attempt to inform people, rather than cater to their excessive fear. But when information will not help, government should respond, at least if analysis suggest that the benefits outweigh the costs. The reason is that fear, even if it is excessive, is itself a significant problem, and can create additional significant problems.

Courts have recently developed a new principle of interpretation: Administrative agencies are not bound by the literal language of regulatory statutes, if they are attempting to ensure against absurd or patently unreasonable outcomes. This principle is an effort to allow agencies to overcome the occasionally pathological rigidity of regulatory statutes, at least when those statutes must be applied in circumstances that Congress could not possibly anticipate. The new principle deserves widespread approval. After all, courts have long refused to interpret statutes literally in cases of absurdity. While it is possible to question the extent to which courts should feel free to inquire into the absurdity of an application of a statutory text, agencies have strong advantages over courts, because they are in a better position to know whether literalism, or departures from literalism, will improve the regulatory system. These points are connected with a more general one: Theories of interpretation should focus less on abstractions about democracy and legitimacy, and more on institutional capacities and concrete consequences. An appreciation of this suggestion fits well with courts' emerging enthusiasm for allowing agencies to interpret statutes more flexibly than courts do.

Recent scientific innovations, and proposed legislation, have raised questions about the nature of the constitutional right to reproductive freedom, and in particular about whether there is a constitutional "right to clone." This essay urges that as a matter of substantive due process, rationality review is probably appropriate, and that restrictions on both reproductive and therapeutic cloning would and should survive constitutional scrutiny. At the same time, many of the arguments for banning both forms of cloning are based on ignorance, myths, and speculation. It is extremely important to distinguish between reproductive and nonreproductive cloning, and it is equally important to distinguish among the various rationales for banning each. Some of those rationales have some, but others, including some of the most influential, are exceedingly weak.

What does cost-benefit mean, or do, in actual practice? When agencies are engaging in cost-benefit balancing, what are the interactions among law, science, and economics? This Article attempts to answer that question by exploring, in some detail, the controversy over EPA’s proposed regulation of arsenic in drinking water. The largest finding is that science often can produce only “benefit ranges,” and wide ones at that. With reasonable assumptions based on the existing science data, the proposed arsenic regulation can be projected to save as few as 0 lives and as many as 112. With reasonable assumptions, the monetized benefits of the regulation can range from $0 to $560 million. In these circumstances, there is no obviously right decision for government agencies to make. These points have numerous implications for lawyers and courts, suggesting the ease of bringing legal challenges, on grounds specified here, and the importance of judicial deference in the face of scientific uncertainty. There are also policy implications. Agencies should be given the authority to issue more targeted, cost-effective regulations. They should also be required to accompany the cost-benefit analysis with an effort to identify the winners and losers, so as to see if poor people are mostly hurt or mostly helped.

When people make moral or legal judgments in isolation, they produce a pattern of outcomes that they would themselves reject, if only they could see that pattern as a whole. A major reason is that human thinking is category-bound. When people see a case in isolation, they spontaneously compare it to other cases that are mainly drawn from the same category of harms. When people are required to compare cases that involve different kinds of harms, judgments that appear sensible when the problems are considered separately often appear incoherent and arbitrary in the broader context. Another major source of incoherence is what we call the translation problem: The translation of moral judgments into the relevant metrics of dollars and years is not grounded in either principle or intuition, and produces large differences among people. The incoherence produced by category-bound thinking is illustrated by an experimental study of punitive damages and contingent valuation. We also show how category-bound thinking and the translation problem combine to produce anomalies in administrative penalties. The underlying phenomena have large implications for many topics in law, including jury behavior, the valuation of public goods, punitive damages, criminal sentencing, and civil fines. We consider institutional reforms that might overcome the problem of predictably incoherent judgments. Connections are also drawn to several issues in legal theory, including valuation of life, incommensurability, and the aspiration to global coherence in adjudication.