Faculty Bibliography

From at least the early twentieth century, legal scholars have recognized that rights and other legal relations inhere between individual legal actors, forming a vast and complex social network. Yet, no legal scholar has used the mathematical machinery of network theory to formalize these relationships. Here, we propose the first such approach by modelling a rudimentary, static set of real property relations using network theory. Then, we apply our toy model to measure the level of modularity—essentially, the community structure—among aggregations of these real property relations and associated actors. In so doing, we show that even for a very basic set of relations and actors, law may employ modular structures to manage complexity. Property, torts, contracts, intellectual property, and other areas of the law arguably reduce information costs in similar, quantifiable ways by chopping up the world of interactions between parties into manageable modules that are semi-autonomous. We also posit that our network science approach to jurisprudential issues can be adapted to quantify many other important aspects of legal systems. This article is part of the theme issue 'A complexity science approach to law and governance'.

Equity can be defined as the use of a more flexible, morally judgmental, and subjective mode of legal decision making that roughly corresponds with historical equity. This Element presents a simple contracting model that captures the role of equity as a safety valve, and shows how it can solve problems posed by opportunists–agents with unusual willingness and ability to take advantage of necessary imperfections in the law. In this model, a simple but imperfect formal legal regime is able to achieve first best in the absence of opportunists. But when opportunists are added, a more flexible regime (equity), can be preferred. However, equity is also vulnerable to being used opportunistically by the parties it intends to protect. Hence, the Element shows that it is often preferable to limit equity, reserving it for use only against those who appear sufficiently likely to be opportunists.

The tort of trespass to land has proven to be controversial as applied to airplane overflights (and more recently to drones) as well as to oil and gas production using hydraulic fracking technology. The key to applying trespass to intrusions above and below the surface of land is to distinguish between possession of land and the right to possess land. Surface owners have the right to possess the column of space above and below the surface (a kind of option value), but only to the extent that this space is subject to possible effective possession. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Briggs v. Southwestern Energy Production concluded that fracking can result in physical intrusions that can be detected using available monitoring technology. The court further concluded that such physical intrusions should be subject to trespass liability. We argue that these conclusions are correct insofar as such intrusions interfere with a surface owner’s possible effective possession – the action of the intruder necessarily means that the surface owner could also find it economically advantageous to engage in production activity in this portion of subsurface space itself. The decision confirms the utility of the law of trespass to the architecture of property, in that it establishes an indispensable baseline against which exchanges of rights and regulatory modifications of rights can occur.

Benjamin Cardozo is associated with the common law, equity, judicial decision-making, and with a characteristic kind of proto-Realism. And in his day he was the most prominent expositor of the law of New York, a jurisdiction that had led the way in the merger of law and equity. So it is with equity. Equity pervades Cardozo’s work as a theme of the law and as a problem in judicial theory, in both his theoretical writings and in his decisions. In The Nature of the Judicial Process, Cardozo invokes equity when introducing the problem of reconciling the need for both certainty and flexibility in the law. And equity plays a large role in the modes of judicial decision-making he identifies—the philosophical, the historical, the customary, and the policy-oriented. This last, or sociological, method is the “arbiter” of the others in a way suggestive of equity’s role as meta-law. Because this approach to equity could only emerge from its application, it is not surprising that cases in the area of equity would receive his special attention as a judge. Most clearly in some headline equity cases but going far beyond them, Cardozo’s vision for the integration of equity and law was functional rather than primarily jurisdictional. Equity for Cardozo both kept the law to a high moral standard and supplemented and corrected the law in limited circumstances. Sometimes Cardozo’s reformulation of equity in this functional sense reformed the law so subtly as to be easy to miss. Seen in the light of later full-blown Legal Realism, Cardozo’s equity is easily mistaken for a version of Realism in its rhetoric but disappointingly cautious in its results. Cardozo’s equity was a genuine path not taken and one that perhaps still could bring equity into the modern age.

Restatements interact with the common law in multiple ways. Restatements reflect the common law, but they also may do much more; for example, they may accelerate legal reform, and they may freeze the law in place. This chapter considers ways that Restatements can address a concern that Justice Cardozo emphasized: the need for a balance between certainty and flexibility. With that in mind, a central concern is the way that the common law operates as a complex system. The system of the common law is a hybrid of a spontaneous and a made order; it is also, potentially, a loosely connected system rather than the kind of deductive system that some formalists imagine. Taking these features into account, we argue that a key consideration in the drafting of Restatements should be the architecture of the common law, including its conceptual structure. Restatements can seek an “architectural fit,” and in doing so they can strike a workable balance between certainty and flexibility.

With the merger of law and equity almost complete, the idea of equity as a special part of our legal system or a mode of decision making has fallen out of view. This Article argues that much of equity is best understood as performing a vital function. Equity and related parts of the law solve complex and uncertain problems—including interdependent behavior and misuses of legal rules by opportunists—and do so in a characteristic fashion: as meta-law. From unconscionability to injunctions, equity makes reference to, supplements, and sometimes overrides the result that law would otherwise produce, while primary law operates without reference to equity. Equity operates on a domain of fraud, accident, and mistake, and employs triggers such as bad faith and disproportionate hardship to toggle into a “meta”-mode of more open-ended scrutiny. This Article provides a theoretical account of how a hybrid law, consisting of relatively simple and general primary-level law and relatively intense and directed second order equity can regulate behavior better through these specialized modes than would homogeneous law alone. The Article tests this theory on the ostensibly most unpromising aspects of equity, the traditional equitable maxims, as well as equitable fraud, defenses, and remedies. Equity as meta-law sheds light on how the fusion of law and equity spawned multifactor balancing tests, polarized interpretation, and led to the confusion of equity with standards, discretion, purely public law, and “mere” remedies. Viewing equity as meta-law also improves on the tradeoff between formalism and contextualism and ultimately promotes the rule of law.

Property has a complexity problem. Although both “property” and “complexity” are often invoked in property theory, we need more and better notions of both. Much theorizing about property law and institutions suffers from an excessive and misguided reductionism, what I call “Flatland.” The Flatland style of theorizing reduces law to a heap of rules and property to a merely additive bundle of rights. By incorporating complexity based on dense interaction into the picture, we can overcome some false dichotomies in property theory. These include the unstructured collection of “sticks,” the flattening of system, all-or-nothing formalism, misunderstandings of the role of information costs, and the assumption that purposes must be directly reflected in individual rules of property. By contrast, seeing system in property as a method of managing complexity points to the importance of exclusion versus governance; hybrid regimes of private, common, and public property; a spectrum of formalism including law versus equity; degrees of modularity and thing-ness; a combination of spontaneous and directed evolution; and a synergy of common law and legislation. Implementing these aspects of system and overcoming problematic reductionism and false dichotomies will require an encounter with practice. Applications to the law of possession, aerial trespass, nuisance, and the integration of property “bundles” demonstrate how theory can meet practice.

Avoiding the reduction of property to a bundle or rights or to the working out of a single master principle, the architectural theory of property sees property as an integrated system or structure anchored in certain unifying principles. Because our world is neither chaotic nor additively simple, property law and institutions must achieve their plural ends in a fashion that manages the inherent complexity of the interaction of valued resource attributes and human actions. In managing complexity, some of the law’s structures receive functional explanations and justifications, which can be different from the explanations and justifications that apply to the system as a whole. In working as a whole, the system exhibits a number of tightly interwoven design principles, including the centrality of things, rights to exclude and possession, hybrids of exclusion and governance, modularity, differential formalism, standardization and the numerus clausus, and “property rule” protection and equity. The architectural approach allows us to revisit some basic questions in property theory and to capture the dyanamic reality of property law and institutions.

“Private law” embraces the traditional common law subjects (property, contracts, and torts), as well as adjacent more statutory areas such as intellectual property and commercial law. It also includes important areas that have been neglected in the United States but are beginning to make a comeback. These include unjust enrichment, restitution, equity, and remedies more generally. “Private law” can also mean private law as a whole, which invites consideration of issues such as the public-private distinction, the similarities and differences between the various areas of private law, and the institutional framework supporting private law – including courts, arbitrators, and even custom. The New Private Law is an approach to these subjects that aims to reinvigorate the study of private law by moving beyond reductively instrumentalist policy evaluation and narrow, rule-by-rule, doctrine-by-doctrine analysis, so as to consider and capture how private law’s various features fit and work together, as well as the normative underpinnings of these larger structures. This movement has begun resuscitating the notion of private law itself in the United States and has brought an interdisciplinary perspective to the more traditional, doctrinal approach prevalent in Commonwealth countries. The Handbook embraces a broad range of perspectives to private law – including philosophical, economic, historical, psychological, to name a few – yet it offers a unifying theme of seriousness about the structure and content of private law. This Introduction introduces the New Private Law and briefly summarizes the chapters in the volume.

The Oxford Handbook of the New Private Law reflects exciting developments in scholarship dedicated to reinvigorating the study of the broad field of private law. This field embraces the traditional common law subjects (property, contracts, and torts), as well as adjacent, more statutory areas, such as intellectual property and commercial law. It also includes important areas that have been neglected in the United States but are beginning to make a comeback. These include unjust enrichment, restitution, equity, and remedies more generally. "Private law" can also mean private law as a whole, which invites consideration of issues such as the public-private distinction, the similarities and differences between the various areas of private law, and the institutional framework supporting private law - including courts, arbitrators, and even custom. The New Private Law is an approach to these subjects that aims to bring a new outlook to the study of private law by moving beyond reductively instrumentalist policy evaluation and narrow, rule-by-rule, doctrine-by-doctrine analysis, so as to consider and capture how private law's various features fit and work together, as well as the normative underpinnings of these larger structures. This movement has begun resuscitating the notion of private law itself in the United States and has brought an interdisciplinary perspective to the more traditional, doctrinal approach prevalent in Commonwealth countries. The Handbook embraces a broad range of perspectives to private law - including philosophical, economic, historical, and psychological, to name a few - yet it offers a unifying theme of seriousness about the structure and content of private law. It will be an essential resource for legal scholars interested in the future of this important field.

Accounts of private law in general and property in particular have downplayed traditional notions of system in favor of a sum-of-the-parts reductionism. Recent developments in complex systems theory allows a reassessment of this picture. A system is a collection of elements and the connections between and among them; complex systems are ones in which the properties of the system as a whole are difficult to infer from the properties of the parts. Private law is a complex system. Taking the bundle of rights in property law as a starting point, the chapter shows that conventional analysis is overly reductive in that it assumes that the attributes of the whole bundle are the additive sum of the attributes of the “sticks” in the bundle taken individually. Theoretically and empirically, this aggregative approach is not as accurate as one based on “organized complexity,” points in the direction of the New Private Law: systems theory leads to a better and more unified account of the bundle of rights, standardization in property, possession, title, and equity. Systems theory also promises to mitigate some of the dichotomies in private law, such as holism versus reductionism, homogeneity versus specialization, formalism versus contextualism, and public versus private law.

The conflict between external and internal perspectives in private law is both exaggerated and underplayed. Both external and internal perspectives pay too little attention to how the ‘micro’ level of individual, even bilateral, interaction relates to the ‘macro’ level of society and the law as a whole. We will show that both perspectives overlook the resources they could employ to explain how the micro and macro are connected; in their different ways, external and internal perspectives do not draw out the connection between local simplicity and generalization. By treating law as a complex system, both perspectives could converge on a picture of private law in which locally simple structures of bilateral rights and duties scale up to produce emergent properties at the level of society. We suggest that functionalists should take seriously the moral norms immanent in private law – these norms are central to the functioning of private law as a system. Without these modular components, private law can be intractably complex. Accordingly, we propose an inclusive functionalism, one that takes these moral norms at face value. These moral norms perform a crucial function of managing the otherwise intractable complexity of the interactions between parties governed by private law. We also propose an inclusive internalism, which is more open to functional considerations involving simplicity. Private law must avoid intractable complexity if it is to function properly, and this calls for a simplicity criterion: internalists should look for moral norms that are both simple and generalizable. Resolving private law’s conceptual structure at the middle level focuses debate where it is needed. Important questions about the role of public values and the ultimate grounding of private law remain open and are sharpened by recognizing the role that complexity plays in the way that private law operates as a system.

This chapter argues for viewing equity as a second-order system—law about law, or meta law—whose loss through fusion has created a variety of jurisprudential quandaries. On this view, equity serves as a second-order safety valve particularly suited to problems of great variability and uncertainty—including opportunism, conflicting rights, and multipolar conflicts—and although such problems were not the exclusive preserve or the only focus of equity courts, the former jurisdictional divide did much to highlight the second-order equitable function. The flattening out of this second-order equitable function through fusion of law and equity has intensified numerous jurisprudential controversies—including the debate between formalism and contextualism and the distinction between rules and standards—in contrast to the older, less polarized path of hybrid law-equity. Effacing distinctive second-order equity also leads to extreme views about the supposed death of contract and all-consuming tort. Even the relationship of law and morality tends to be more fraught when equity as meta law is taken off the table.

The law of Equity, a latecomer to the field of private law theory, raises fundamental questions about the relationships between law and morality, the nature of rights, and the extent to which we are willing to compromise on the rule of law ideal to achieve social goals. In this volume, leading scholars come together to address these and other questions about underlying principles of Equity and its relationship to the common law: What relationships, if any, are there between the legal, philosophical, and moral senses of 'equity'? Does Equity form a second-order constraint on law? If so, is its operation at odds with the rule of law? Do the various theories of Equity require some kind of separation of law and equity-and, if they do, what kind of separation? The volume further sheds light on some of the most topical questions of jurisprudence that are embedded in the debate around 'fusion'.

Wesley Hohfeld’s scheme of jural relations possesses two fundamental strengths. First, the legal relations tend to correspond closely to potential legal results availing between individual persons – who can sue whom for what. Second, the system of “fundamental” relations possesses a symmetry and generality that made it attractive to the Realists as a springboard to their approach to law. In this paper we argue that Hohfeld’s scheme is incomplete: without more, the legal relations identified by Hohfeld do not scale up properly. Instead of being mere aggregates of more basic relations, complex relations and legal doctrines are structured and interact as a system. Activities that belong at the mid-level between the individual and large populations are most difficult to capture. What is required is a formulation of the legal relations that connects the micro of parties and the macro of the legal system at the level of society. The adoption by the Legal Realists of Hohfeld’s incomplete scheme built a gap between the micro and the macro into most subsequent American theorizing about private law. By contrast, other pre- and non-Realist versions of the broadly “Hohfeldian” program, and in particular that of Albert Kocourek, pay more attention to realistic, “economical” methods of delineating legal relations. These analytical but less reductionist formulations “scale up” better than the conventional picture, and can inspire new theories that explain more of the emergent properties of the legal system.

The fusion of law and equity in common law systems was a crucial moment in the development of the modern law. Common law and equity were historically the two principal sources of rules and remedies in the judge-made law of England, and this bifurcated system travelled to other countries whose legal systems were derived from the English legal system. The division of law and equity – their fission – was a pivotal legal development and is a feature of most common law systems. The fusion of the common law and equity has brought about major structural, institutional and juridical changes within the common law tradition. In this volume, leading scholars undertake historical, comparative, doctrinal and theoretical analysis that aims to shed light on the ways in which law and equity have fused, and the ways in which they have remained distinct even in a 'post-fusion' world. Brings together comparative, doctrinal, historical and theoretical analyses of equity in a single volume, providing multiple perspectives on the issue. Analyses the fusion of law and equity in various jurisdictions, including Australia, Canada, England, Scotland, and the U.S. allowing readers to gain insights into their domestic legal systems by contrasting developments in others. Provides insights into the experiences of fusion, merger and fission of law and equity in different jurisdictions and discusses the misunderstandings about the modern relation of law to equity.

This article argues that Calabresi and Melamed’s “Cathedral” framework of property rules, liability rules, and inalienability rules needs to be extended using the tools of complex systems theory in order to capture important institutional features of the law. As an applied field, law and economics looks to law in choosing the appropriate analytical tools from economics—something that Calabresi has identified (in strong form) as law and economics as opposed to economic analysis of law. Recognizing law as a complex system requires a rethinking of some Realist-inspired assumptions that underpin economically inspired analysis of law. These assumptions include a preference for narrow, concrete concepts and a skepticism about traditional doctrines and baselines—and ultimately Legal Realism’s extreme nominalism and the strong bundle of rights picture of property. The article shows how the Calabresi and Melamed (C&M) framework exhibits gaps that can be addressed by systems theory; these include narrow entitlements to engage in specific activities, liability rules that allow an affected party to buy out an activity (Rule 4), opportunistic behavior by parties that destabilizes liability rules, and the role of equity as an institutional response. Extending the C&M framework to treat it as a system helps prevent the C&M framework from flattening the law out. If we supplement the C&M framework to take account of law as a system, we can bring it closer to Calabresian law and economics.

This article utilizes a unique data set of property laws in 119 jurisdictions in the world to test convergence/divergence theories in comparative property law. Our theory predicts that first, the structure of property law among all jurisdictions in the world will converge, or is similar since some time in the distant past, as they all face the same, positive transaction costs in delineating property rights. Second, our theory posits that the style of property law will tend to converge when the doctrines in question are isolated, but diverge when they are interconnected. Our data and descriptive analysis support the theory. Doctrines regarding possession, sales, condominium, tenancy in common, and limited property rights serve as prominent examples.

Equity and Tort appear to be strangers. Beyond historically making equitable relief available in some cases, equity did not intervene in tort law to the extent it did in contract and some aspects of property. And yet substantive equity focuses on wrongful conduct and affords persons the opportunity to seek remedies for such conduct through the courts. Are there ‘equitable wrongs’, and, if so, how if at all do they differ from torts? We focus on a particular function loosely associated with historic equity jurisdiction: equity supplements the law where it fails to address problems that are difficult to handle on the same ‘level’ on which they arise. In situations of conflicting rights, party opportunism, and interacting behavior, it is difficult to formulate solutions that do not make reference to the ordinary (primary level) set of rights and rules. Thus, it is often more effective to frame ‘abuse of rights’ in terms of what one can do with rights rather than formulate the right to make it resistant to abuse. We distinguish three scenarios at the intersection of equity and tort: (i) tort law itself contains a second-order element to deal with problems such as coming to the nuisance; (ii) equity solves an inadequacy of tort law, such as by reformulating privity, which is then incorporated into tort law going forward; and (iii) equity maintains a limited but open-ended capacity to counteract inadequacies of tort law, especially involving hard-to-foresee manipulation of rules and conflicts of rights. With the increasing fusion of law and equity, it has been difficult to maintain this second-order equitable function, but nowhere more so than at the equity-tort interface. Many of the interventions of equity, especially into areas of wrongful interference, invite redescription as torts, and have in fact induced courts to recognize new torts, for better and worse. On our account, this reformulation into tort is appropriate only where a problem is amenable to delineation in terms of general rights and fails where a degree of open-endedness is necessary to deal with party opportunism and new types of conflict. We also consider the diffusion of ‘flattened’ equitable notions into primary-level tort law, often in the form of balancing tests, which have in many ways rendered tort less coherent, stable, and law-like than is desirable.

Legal directives – whether laws, regulations, or contractual provisions – can be written along a spectrum of specificity, about which behavioral and legal scholarship present conflicting views. We hypothesized that the combination of specificity and monitoring promotes compliance but harms performance and trust, whereas the combination of specificity and good faith enhances both the informative goal-setting aspects of specificity and people's sense of commitment. To test these hypotheses, we used a 2x2x2 experimental design in which participants were instructed to edit a document with either general or detailed instructions, with a reference to good faith or without it, and with a review of the work or without it. Participants could engage in various levels and kinds of editing, allowing us to distinctly measure both compliance and performance. When participants require information and guidance, as in the case of editing, we found that specificity increases performance relative to the vague standard condition. We discuss the characteristics of the regulatory frameworks in which our findings are especially relevant.

Equitable defences are the front line of controversy over fusion. Because law and equity offer a range of defences that partially overlap and the rationale for matching equitable defences to equitable remedies is at least as obscure as the rationale for separate equitable remedies, conventional wisdom holds that the more one can fuse the equitable defences into the law the better. In this chapter I argue that equity roughly reflects a distinct function - a safety valve that operates at a higher (meta) level over the rest of the law and that responds to problems of high uncertainty and variability. These characteristic problems include opportunism and multipolar conflicts. From a functional point of view, some of the special treatment of equitable defences makes sense, and puzzling patterns in this area receive an explanation and some justification. Even the adaptation of some equitable defences into the law dovetails with a dynamic picture of the equitable function.

In his important article, Benito Arruñada draws out the significance of sequential exchange for property rights and traces inadequacies in the economics of property rights to its overly contractual focus, to the exclusion of multiple transactions on the same asset. In this comment, I argue that although Arruñada's problem is a genuine one, it is part of a larger inadequacy in the economic analysis of property rights: property institutions have to manage complexity stemming from many kinds of interactions, making it problematic to focus solely on local interactions. Modular structures in property, including legal ‘things’ themselves, serve to manage this complexity. The larger problem of complexity allows us to set sequential exchange in its proper context.

In this book chapter, we argue that the distinction between "structure" and "style" is important in understanding the similarities and dissimilarities in common and civil law property. Structure is the functional form the law employs to protect people’s use interests, whereas style is a manner of delineating entitlements that is characteristic of a particular legal culture. The same structure of property can be implemented in a number of styles. For transaction costs reasons, property systems under the two traditions (common and civil laws) are similar and have to be similar. Their styles today, as is well known, are quite different, due to their different histories and path dependence. To underpin our point that it is critical to look beyond property styles to understand the economic nature of property, we closely examine mortgage (called hypothec in civil law countries). The styles of mortgage/hypothec cannot be more different. Several countries consider mortgage a property right; several others delineate it as a contract; while some others view it as neither property nor contract. We demonstrate that mortgage/hypothec, like other, uncontroversial property interests, contains the three essential elements of property. Thus, in terms of structure, mortgage/hypothec is a property right in all jurisdictions, despite the wide variety of styles in the civil and common law systems.

Despite the fusion of law and equity and the apparent demise of equity as a distinct system, this Article argues that equity is a distinct decision making mode within a legal system. Private law relies on formal structures of rights and rules that can be exploited and abused by opportunists. The possibility of strategic manipulation of the information available to other parties and to courts furnishes a rationale for a second-order safety valve on the formal law. In the Anglo-American tradition this anti-opportunism safety valve corresponds roughly to a major strand of equity jurisprudence. The Article shows that an equitable safety valve is to be found in both traditional equity theory and as a theme in equity, from the maxims to defenses to remedies to procedure. The Article explains and partially justifies the equitable safety valve as an ex post higher-order intervention aimed at a problem of measurement and uncertainty: law needs protection against opportunistic distortion and misuse of probabilistic information used by parties and courts. The importance of equity suggests a rethinking of “actuarialist” assumptions in conventional law and economics about stable and unbiased probabilistic information being available to parties and courts. Opportunists can be regarded as entrepreneurs in doing bad who exploit uncertainty. Once the function of equity as an anti-opportunism device is understood, many jurisprudential debates, especially those revolving around formalism and contextualism, can be seen to be lacking an appreciation of hybrid decision making that equity makes possible. Equity as an anti-opportunism safety valve provides an attractive way out of some thorny dilemmas.

Property law and equity appear to be enemies. The generality and stability of property law stands in some tension with ex post invocations of fairness and morality. This chapter argues that the conflict is overblown, and that equity protects both property and the rule of law against opportunistic evasion. In the face of potential opportunism, equity helps maintain the general, stable structures within property called for by the rule of law. Likewise, the rule-of-law criteria themselves are formal and can be evaded opportunistically. Prevention of substantive evasion of the rule of law requires reference to norms outside the formal law, in a form of macro equity, thus pointing to some limits of formalism. Just as moral and information cost theories tend to converge at the level of legal doctrine, so too formal law and natural justice can be seen to point in similar directions at the level of the law as a whole.

This Chapter offers a bottom-up account of possession that builds on salience-based accounts of conventions and on the economics of property rights. Possession is a first cut at a legal ontology in an overall modular architecture of property. The legal ontology divides the world up into persons and things, and establishes associations between persons and things. These associations will be in the interest of use, and so possession will usually require stylized duties of abstention on the part of other potential users. Depending on the nature of the group, the resources, and the universe of possible uses, duties of abstention can be implemented though norms of exclusion or governance of particular uses. What counts as a “thing” emerges from a combination of possession and accession, and so these aspects of property form a basic module, which serves as a basic default regime that can be displaced by more refined rules of title and governance. Possessory customs tend to be formalized into law, and yet for reasons of information cost, basic notions of possession retain their importance in many, especially informal, contexts. From the basic modular architecture many of the puzzling features of possession receive an explanation.

Fiduciary law is both celebrated as unbound by rules and deplored as unprincipled. Moralists see in fiduciary law a fixed and mandatory system, even as legal economists and contractarians have cast fiduciary law as the ultimate set of defaults to fill in incomplete contracts. Like general equity, out of which it grew, modern fiduciary law suffers from the hard times the theory of equity has fallen into, and for the same reasons. This chapter argues that a functional theory of equity – of equity as a safety valve aimed at countering opportunism – captures the character of fiduciary law. Fiduciary relationships, in which someone undertakes to act on another’s behalf by using discretion, carry more than the usual potential for opportunism. In the equitable solutions to opportunism based on proxies and presumptions, fiduciary law gets its main features. Like equity but in a more sweeping and often more categorical way, fiduciary law sets the presumption against the fiduciary when certain proxies are triggered. Thus, in situations of undisclosed conflict of interest the presumption of opportunism arises even without regard to the substance of the deal. For self-dealing likewise the presumption arises in an almost indefeasible way. Like equity generally, fiduciary law features a constrained residuum of open-endedness to deal with new and creative ways of being opportunistic. The theory of equity as targeting potential opportunism unifies the best aspects of traditional and modern theories of fiduciary law, and helps explain why fiduciary law has become so disparate and contested after the fusion of law and equity. Cut off from the special rationales of equity, fiduciary law itself threatens to become too expansive or too narrow and hidebound – like equity generally. Finally, the functional theory of equity as anti-opportunism helps explain the similarity of fiduciary law to another much misunderstood area of private law – unjust enrichment – and the relation between the two. The chapter concludes with some remarks about fiduciary law within the overall architecture of private law.

In this contribution to a volume on the work property scholarship of Thomas Merrill, I will show how an account of property as the law of things completes the picture of property, putting the right to exclude in proper perspective. Contra Merrill, the right to exclude is not the sine qua non of property, and the main features of property cannot be derived from the right to exclude. Nonetheless, I will argue that Merrill is right to search for a unifying theme in property and that the relevant thread is the mediation of legal relations through things. From the role of the thing in depersonalizing and formalizing property relations, we can see when the right to exclude and closely related notions of possession are – and are not – important. Private law deals with the complex interactions of members of society, and a first cut at managing potential conflict is to carve the world into modular things, in tangibles or intangibles, and associate them with people through the norms and the law of property. More complex aspects of property from governance strategies to entity property build off of the legal thing. At the heart of property is the thing.

This chapter considers a type of reductionism in property theory, that of a certain kind of anti-conceptualism under which property is not to be conceived of in terms of general concepts like the fee simple or the right to immediate, exclusive possession, but is rather to be understood and applied as a series of rules or norms to be applied on a case-by-case basis. It argues that identifying the important role that concepts play as intensions — modes of presenting particulars in the world — explains some dilemmas in property theory and paves the way for a better type of theory that combines the best of conceptualism and realism, formalism and contextualism, functionalism and moralism, and even reductionism and holism. It analyzes the perennial problem in property theory of the nature of in rem rights.