Faculty Bibliography

In this interpretive note for the Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict, Radhika Kapoor, Dustin Lewis, and Naz Modirzadeh seek to support U.N. Member States’ initial efforts to understand and implement certain key aspects of the resolution, especially the humanitarian-related “carve-out” at its center.

Third World Approaches to International Law (“TWAIL”) has aspirations to transform the tools and institutions of international law—which have served for centuries to construct, enact, and extend Western exploitation and domination—into tools and institutions for Global South empowerment, agency, and freedom. Characterizing itself as an intellectual and political movement, TWAIL promises to pave a path forward through a combination of scholarship and politics to achieve radical change. In this Article, I argue that TWAIL’s promise is unfulfilled—and that, if TWAIL’s current trajectory continues, its promise is likely to be unfulfillable. I first sketch TWAIL’s origin and key successes, including bringing awareness to the colonial roots and neo-imperial present of international law. Yet I contend that TWAIL’s diverse critical insights have not led to cohesive conceptual, doctrinal, or political positions, which would serve as tools to empower Global South-based actors. I propose that this is, at least partly, due to TWAIL’s ambivalence toward the Third World state, its absence of a theory of legitimate political violence in international law, its failure to identify a methodology of representing the ‘voices’ of the Global South, and the growing influence of an academic ethos I call ‘critique-as-wellness.’ For those motivated by TWAIL’s ambitions, I suggest three possible directions to take: the construction of a grassroots-centered campaign in the service of Global South peoples; the formation of a movement focused on empowering Global South states; or a coalition originating from the Global North aimed at reshaping Western attitudes and actions toward the Global South.

In support and promotion of the recent International Review of the Red Cross edition on counterterrorism, a conversation with Naz Modirzadeh and Dustin Lewis on whether and how we can reconcile the current clash between a growing global counterterrorism architecture and impartial humanitarian activities.

States spend tens of billions of dollars each year to help implement humanitarian programs in conflicts across the world. Yet, in practice, counterterrorism objectives increasingly prevail over humanitarian concerns, often resulting in devastating effects for civilian populations in need of aid and protection in war. Not least, confusion and misapprehensions about the power and authority of States relative to the United Nations Security Council to set policy preferences and configure legal obligations contribute significantly to this trajectory. In a new guide for States published by the Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict (HLS PILAC), Dustin A. Lewis, Radhika Kapoor, and Naz K. Modirzadeh argue that it is possible — and, they believe, urgently called for — to arrest this trajectory and safeguard principled humanitarian action. In their view, short-term and ad-hoc solutions are less likely to uphold the humanitarian imperative. Instead, the authors present a framework for States to reconfigure the relations between these core commitments by deciding to assess the counterterrorism architecture through the lens of impartial humanitarianism. The authors also identify key questions that States may answer to help formulate and instantiate their values, policy commitments, and legal positions in order to advance the humanitarian imperative and uphold respect for principled humanitarian action in connection with carrying out the Security Council’s counterterrorism decisions.

In this opinion note, we explore ways to understand the contemporary encounters between a growing global counterterrorism architecture and impartial humanitarian activities while critically assessing our own role in shaping responses to those encounters. Humbled by a decade of experience in this area, we aim to explain how counterterrorism concerns have been elevated over the humanitarian imperative and to offer potential avenues to secure greater respect for impartial humanitarian activities.

For at least a decade, States, humanitarian bodies, and civil-society actors have raised concerns about how certain counterterrorism measures can prevent or impede humanitarian and medical activities in armed conflicts. In 2019, the issue drew the attention of the world’s preeminent body charged with maintaining or restoring international peace and security: the United Nations Security Council. In two resolutions — Resolution 2462 (2019) and Resolution 2482 (2019) — adopted that year, the Security Council urged States to take into account the potential effects of certain counterterrorism measures on exclusively humanitarian activities, including medical activities, that are carried out by impartial humanitarian actors in a manner consistent with international humanitarian law (IHL). By implicitly recognizing that measures adopted to achieve one policy objective (countering terrorism) can impair or prevent another policy objective (safeguarding humanitarian and medical activities), the Security Council elevated taking into account the potential effects of certain counterterrorism measures on exclusively humanitarian activities to an issue implicating international peace and security. In this legal briefing, we aim to support the development of an analytical framework through which a State may seek to devise and administer a system to take into account the potential effects of counterterrorism measures on humanitarian and medical activities. Our primary intended audience includes the people involved in creating or administering a “take into account” system and in developing relevant laws and policies. Our analysis zooms in on Resolution 2462 (2019) and Resolution 2482 (2019) and focuses on grounding the framework in respect for international law, notably the U.N. Charter and IHL. In section 1, we introduce the impetus, objectives, and structure of the briefing. In our view, a thorough legal analysis of the relevant resolutions in their wider context is a crucial element to laying the conditions conducive to the development and administration of an effective “take into account” system. Further, the stakes and timeliness of the issue, the Security Council’s implicit recognition of a potential tension between measures adopted to achieve different policy objectives, and the relatively scant salient direct practice and scholarship on elements pertinent to “take into account” systems also compelled us to engage in original legal analysis, with a focus on public international law and IHL. In section 2, as a primer for readers unfamiliar with the core issues, we briefly outline humanitarian and medical activities and counterterrorism measures. Then we highlight a range of possible effects of the latter on the former. Concerning armed conflict, humanitarian activities aim primarily to provide relief to and protection for people affected by the conflict whose needs are unmet, whereas medical activities aim primarily to provide care for wounded and sick persons, including the enemy. Meanwhile, for at least several decades, States have sought to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and punish those who commit, attempt to commit, or otherwise support acts of terrorism. Under the rubric of countering terrorism, States have taken an increasingly broad and diverse array of actions at the global, regional, and national levels. A growing body of qualitative and quantitative evidence documents how certain measures designed and applied to counter terrorism can impede or prevent humanitarian and medical activities in armed conflicts. In a nutshell, counterterrorism measures may lead to diminished or complete lack of access by humanitarian and medical actors to the persons affected by an armed conflict that is also characterized as a counterterrorism context, or those measures may adversely affect the scope, amount, or quality of humanitarian and medical services provided to such persons. The diverse array of detrimental effects of certain counterterrorism measures on humanitarian and medical activities may be grouped into several cross-cutting categories, including operational, financial, security, legal, and reputational effects. In section 3, we explain some of the key legal aspects of humanitarian and medical activities and counterterrorism measures. States have developed IHL as the primary body of international law applicable to acts and omissions connected with an armed conflict. IHL lays down several rights and obligations relating to a broad spectrum of humanitarian and medical activities pertaining to armed conflicts. A violation of an applicable IHL provision related to humanitarian or medical activities may engage the international legal responsibility of a State or an individual. Meanwhile, at the international level, there is no single, comprehensive body of counterterrorism laws. However, States have developed a collection of treaties to pursue specific anti-terrorism objectives. Further, for its part, the Security Council has assumed an increasingly prominent role in countering terrorism, including by adopting decisions that U.N. Member States must accept and carry out under the U.N. Charter. Some counterterrorism measures are designed and applied in a manner that implicitly or expressly “carves out” particular safeguards — typically in the form of limited exceptions or exemptions — for certain humanitarian or medical activities or actors. Yet most counterterrorism measures do not include such safeguards. In section 4, which constitutes the bulk of our original legal analysis, we closely evaluate the two resolutions in which the Security Council urged States to take into account the effects of (certain) counterterrorism measures on humanitarian and medical activities. We set the stage by summarizing some aspects of the legal relations between Security Council acts and IHL provisions pertaining to humanitarian and medical activities. We then analyze the status, consequences, and content of several substantive elements of the resolutions and what they may entail for States seeking to counter terrorism and safeguard humanitarian and medical activities. Among the elements that we evaluate are: the Security Council’s new notion of a prohibited financial “benefit” for terrorists as it may relate to humanitarian and medical activities; the Council’s demand that States comply with IHL obligations while countering terrorism; and the constituent parts of the Council’s notion of a “take into account” system. In section 5, we set out some potential elements of an analytical framework through which a State may seek to develop and administer its “take into account” system in line with Resolution 2462 (2019) and Resolution 2482 (2019). In terms of its object and purpose, a “take into account” system may aim to secure respect for international law, notably the U.N. Charter and IHL pertaining to humanitarian and medical activities. In addition, the system may seek to safeguard humanitarian and medical activities in armed conflicts that also qualify as counterterrorism contexts. We also identify two sets of preconditions arguably necessary for a State to anticipate and address relevant potential effects through the development and execution of its “take into account” system. Finally, we suggest three sets of attributes that a “take into account” system may need to embody to achieve its aims: utilizing a State-wide approach, focusing on potential effects, and including default principles and rules to help guide implementation. In section 6, we briefly conclude. In our view, jointly pursuing the policy objectives of countering terrorism and safeguarding humanitarian and medical activities presents several opportunities, challenges, and complexities. International law does not necessarily provide ready-made answers to all of the difficult questions in this area. Yet devising and executing a “take into account” system provides a State significant opportunities to safeguard humanitarian and medical activities and counter terrorism while securing greater respect for international law.

A conversation between Pablo Arrocha Olabuenaga and Naz Khatoon Modirzadeh on the origins, objectives, and context of the 24 February 2021 'Arria-formula' meeting convened by Mexico.

In developing international humanitarian law (IHL), States have aimed in part to lay down the primary normative and operational framework pertaining to principled humanitarian action in situations of armed conflict. The possibility that certain counterterrorism measures may be instituted in a manner that intentionally or unintentionally impedes such action has been recognized by an increasingly wide array of States and entities, including the United Nations Security Council and the U.N. Secretary-General. At least two aspects of the contemporary international discourse on intersections between principled humanitarian action and counterterrorism measures warrant more sustained attention. The first concerns who is, and who ought to be, in a position to authentically and authoritatively interpret and apply IHL in this area. The second concerns the relationships between IHL and other possibly relevant regulatory frameworks, including counterterrorism mandates flowing from decisions of the U.N. Security Council. Partly in relation to those two axes of the broader international discourse, a debate has emerged regarding whether the U.N. Security Council may authorize one particular counterterrorism entity — namely, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) — to interpret and assess compliance with IHL pertaining to humanitarian action in relation to certain counterterrorism contexts. In a new legal briefing for the Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict (HLS PILAC), Dustin A. Lewis, Naz K. Modirzadeh, and Jessica S. Burniske seek to help inform that debate by raising some preliminary considerations regarding that possibility. The authors focus on the possible implications of States and other relevant actors pursuing various responses or not responding to this debate. One of the authors’ goals is to help raise awareness of this area with a focus on perspectives drawn from international law. Another is to invite a broader engagement with the question of the preservation of the humanitarian commitments laid down in IHL in a period marked by a growing number — and a deepening — of the intersections between situations of armed conflict and measures to suppress terrorism.

In this paper, I explore how international legal scholarship about war, written at a time of war, ought to read. Can — and should — we demand doctrinal rigor and analytical clarity, while also expecting that scholarship makes us feel something, that it connects us to the author, that it captures the intimacy and emotion that human beings experience in relation to war? I use two eras of international legal scholarship on war — namely, the Vietnam era and the War on Terror — to illustrate key moments in the field that were typified by very different kinds of writing and the corresponding differences in thinking and feeling. I argue, in part, that — in contradistinction to passion-filled Vietnam-era scholarship — a particularly influential strand of contemporary scholarship on the United States’ War on Terror adopts a view that is aridly technical, acontextual, and ahistorical. In short, it lacks passion. (I use “passion” as a composite term in an attempt to capture diverse facets of a problem that I am attempting to diagnose.) The Introduction situates this project within broader writing on law and emotions. Part I provides a list of characteristics of what I consider passionate scholarship, using the Vietnam era as an example of that approach. Part II provides a mirrored list of the characteristics of abstract and bloodless scholarship, using the latter part of the War on Terror (2009 onward). The observations compare how scholars of each period contend with the sense of crisis and urgency of their time, the understanding that they (we) were living — and writing — through moments that would be seen as history-changing and law-shifting in the future. Part III examines possible explanations for differences where we ought to see similarities, for absences of scholarly connection where they should be plentiful, and for a seismic shift in the general tone and mood of international legal scholarship on war in less than two generations. Part IV concludes by discussing why we — international lawyers, scholars who feel strongly about war and peace — ought to care about and seek to reverse this shift.

In this paper, we examine the actual and potential roles of silence as an element of jus ad bellum treaty law and customary international law. By silence, we mean a lack of a publicly discernible response either to conduct reflective of a legal position or to the explicit communication of a legal position. We focus here on the silence of States and the United Nations Security Council as the primary actors who are positioned to shape, interpret, and apply jus ad bellum. We evaluate how silence has been employed by various scholars in making legal arguments in this field, and how silence may have the potential to affect the formation, identification, modification, and termination of various doctrines. We submit that there is no quantum of silence that has clear doctrinal force. We argue that, at least in relation to jus ad bellum, only certain forms of qualified silence — whether of States or of the Security Council — may be capable of contributing to legal effects. We further contend that, due in part to the nature and status of the norms underlying this field, those forms of qualified silence ought not to be lightly presumed. Arguably, there is a strong, if rebuttable, presumption that silence alone does not constitute acceptance of a jus ad bellum claim. Still, States and other international actors should be aware of the possible role that their silence could play in the identification and development of this field. We complement our analysis with an Annex that offers the most comprehensive catalogue to date of communications made by U.N. Member States to the Security Council of measures taken in purported exercise of the right of self-defense. The catalogue records over 400 communications made since the founding of the United Nations in late October 1945 through 2018. These communications reflect the views of the submitting State(s) on the scope of the right to employ force on the purported basis of self-defense.

Today, most warfare is conducted with and through partners. As of March 2017, for example, the U.S. State Department identified 68 States and international institutions that formed the coalition against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In every partnership, each member brings its own legal interpretations, policy priorities, and military capabilities. Reconciling these disparate elements often poses significant difficulties, not least for legal advisors. While partnered warfare is by no means a recent invention, it is nonetheless vital that, in order to protect civilians, those who may be involved in or otherwise affected by such operations understand relevant risks and challenges. This one-session case study zooms in on one of the pivotal decision points in contemporary partnered conflicts: whether or not to share intelligence with a partner. With a focus on managing legal responsibility and protecting civilians, participants are primed to quickly weigh countervailing considerations, navigate interoperability challenges, and make strategic decisions in high-pressure, time-sensitive, complex operations involving several States and non-state armed groups. While fictionalized, the simulation exercise — which involves a growing threat from a designated terrorist group to a civilian population and several States — draws from experiences of recent diverse coalition operations. This case study’s general background document acquaints participants with foundations of the law and highlights ways to manage risk. The other case materials provide information about the simulation exercise’s setting as well as instructions for each of the simulation exercise’s six partners.

Driven by a deplorable trend of unlawful attacks on health-care facilities and workers in armed conflicts throughout the world, on May 3, 2016, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2286 calling for an end to such attacks. The Secretary-General followed with recommendations of concrete measures for implementation. However, unlawful attacks on health care have continued or intensified in many conflicts, notably in Syria. We, academic institutions, civil society, and co-sponsoring Member States, convened a side event during the 72nd UN General Assembly to focus global attention on this issue and the imperative that Resolution 2286 be implemented.

Several significant legal, policy, and practical concerns are at issue in whether armed non-state actors (ANSAs) will ultimately be recognized—by all relevant institutions and actors—as bearing human-rights obligations in general under international law in a manner previously reserved primarily for states. In considering this set of issues, it is important to clarify what obligations, if any, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council and the U.N. General Assembly recognize ANSAs as possessing under IHRL. This June 2017 Briefing Report with Annexes provides an overview of research conducted by HLS PILAC concerning modalities in which the U.N. Security Council and the U.N. General Assembly have addressed ANSAs with respect to human rights; ways in which these U.N. principal organs have distinguished between different types of ANSAs; and the consequences of these organs possibly establishing responsibility of ANSAs in relation to the protection and fulfillment—or, at least, the non-abuse—of human rights. While it is incontrovertible that the U.N. Security Council and the U.N. General Assembly have recognized, at a minimum, that the conduct of at least some ANSAs can amount to violations or abuses of human rights, it is not currently possible to state that either of these principal U.N. organs has taken sufficient steps to formally endow ANSAs with human-rights obligations in general under international law.

Can we say, definitively, when an armed conflict no longer exists under international law? The short, unsatisfying answer is sometimes: it is clear when some conflicts terminate as a matter of international law, but a decisive determination eludes many others. The lack of fully-settled guidance often matters significantly. That is because international law tolerates, for the most part, far less violent harm, devastation, and suppression in situations other than armed conflicts. Thus, certain measures governed by the laws and customs of war — including killing and capturing the enemy, destroying and seizing enemy property, and occupying foreign territory, all on a possibly large scale — would usually constitute grave violations of peacetime law. This Legal Briefing details the legal considerations and analyzes the implications of that lack of settled guidance. It delves into the myriad (and often-inconsistent) provisions in treaty law, customary law, and relevant jurisprudence that purport to govern the end of war. Alongside the doctrinal analysis, this Briefing considers the changing concept of war and of what constitutes its end; evaluates diverse interests at stake in the continuation or close of conflict; and contextualizes the essentially political work of those who design the law. In all, this Legal Briefing reveals that international law, as it now stands, provides insufficient guidance to precisely discern the end of many armed conflicts as a factual matter (when has the war ended?), as a normative matter (when should the war end?), and as a legal matter (when does the international-legal framework of armed conflict cease to apply in relation to the war?). The current plurality of legal concepts of armed conflict, the sparsity of IHL provisions that instruct the end of application, and the inconsistency among such provisions thwart uniform regulation and frustrate the formulation of a comprehensive notion of when wars can, should, and do end. Fleshing out the criteria for the end of war is a considerable challenge. Clearly, many of the problems identified in this Briefing are first and foremost strategic and political. Yet, as part of a broader effort to strengthen international law’s claim to guide behavior in relation to war and protect affected populations, international lawyers must address the current confusion and inconsistencies that so often surround the end of armed conflict.

In this briefing report, we introduce a new concept—war algorithms— that elevates algorithmically-derived “choices” and “decisions” to a, and perhaps the, central concern regarding technical autonomy in war. We thereby aim to shed light on and recast the discussion regarding “autonomous weapon systems.” In introducing this concept, our foundational technological concern is the capability of a constructed system, without further human intervention, to help make and effectuate a “decision” or “choice” of a war algorithm. Distilled, the two core ingredients are an algorithm expressed in computer code and a suitably capable constructed system. Through that lens, we link international law and related accountability architectures to relevant technologies. We sketch a three-part (non-exhaustive) approach that highlights traditional and unconventional accountability avenues. By not limiting our inquiry only to weapon systems, we take an expansive view, showing how the broad concept of war algorithms might be susceptible to regulation—and how those algorithms might already fit within the existing regulatory system established by international law.

This briefing report summarizes the legal status, content, and nature of relevant U.N. sanctions regimes; defines and analyzes the two general categories of “humanitarian exemptions” (those for designated individuals and for the humanitarian sector); highlights the stakes and interests in the debate on whether such exemptions may be desirable and feasible or may be inadvisable and impracticable; explains some of the few existing and limited exemptions at the international and domestic levels; and discusses the perceived benefits and costs of suggested “humanitarian exemptions.”

This report focuses on the concept of “foreign terrorist fighters” (FTFs) as it relates to U.N. Security Council practice and principled humanitarian action in situations of armed conflict involving terrorists. It has two goals. First, we aim to provide a primer on the most salient issues at the intersection of counterterrorism measures and humanitarian aid and assistance, with a focus on the ascendant FTF framing. Second, we seek to put forward, for critical feedback and assessment, a provisional methodology for evaluating the following question: is it feasible to subject two key contemporary wartime concerns—the fight against FTFs and supporting humanitarian aid and assistance for civilians in terrorist-controlled territories—to meaningful empirical analysis?

The surge in armed conflicts involving terrorism has brought to the fore the general question of medical care in armed conflict and the particular legal protections afforded to those providing such care to terrorists. Against this backdrop, we evaluate IHL protections for wartime medical assistance concerning terrorists. Through that lens, we expose gaps and weaknesses in IHL. We also examine tensions between IHL and state responses to terrorism more broadly.

“Is the world about to watch 750,000 Somalis starve to death?” asked the New York Times in 2011. The United Nations had declared a famine in Somalia, and hundreds of thousands of Somalis set out on foot across the desert in search of food, shelter, and safety. To make matters worse, al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda-linked terrorist group, restricted access to famine-affected areas and threatened the safety of humanitarian aid groups. Aid organizations, many funded by the U.S. government, faced an ethical conundrum: they could pay a “tax” to al-Shabaab to access restricted areas and provide life-saving relief to Somalis, but this interaction might contravene U.S. anti-terrorism law. This case study provides an opportunity for students to examine the potential impacts of U.S. material-support-to-terrorism laws in the context of humanitarian crises, through the lens of the 2011 Somalia famine. This background document (A) surveys the decades of political and humanitarian crises before 2011; the rise of al-Shabaab; the history of U.S. foreign assistance, international legal obligations, and material-support regulations; a complicating Supreme Court decision; and the role of Executive Orders and government enforcement agencies. Participants are primed to problem solve, navigate potentially competing domestic and international law and policy, and make ethical and legal decisions in a high-pressure, complex international crisis. This background document may be paired with one or both of the following participant exercises: The National Security Council Dilemma (Part B1, on the challenges in developing a consensus government response to a humanitarian crisis involving terrorists) The NGO General Counsel Dilemma (Part B2, on the legal and ethical issues faced by general counsel advising international humanitarian organizations)

This Opinion Note highlights the international humanitarian law (IHL) provisions mandating dissemination of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols to the civilian population. In referencing three dilemmas concerning contemporary challenges to international law in armed conflict and how each of those dilemmas may result in a “breaking point” or a “turning point”, the author argues that it is vitally important not only for armed forces but also for the general public to learn – and actively engage with – IHL both during war and in (relative) peacetime.

The report is aimed at a generalist humanitarian audience; it does not explore legal concepts in great depth or detail, but rather provides readers with a survey of some of the pressing challenges facing humanitarian actors as they navigate counter-terrorism laws and policies in their work in conflicts where listed non-state armed groups control territory or access to civilians. The paper begins by outlining the legal bases for both counterterrorism law and humanitarian action, and then discusses the challenges and possible consequences of legislation for humanitarian actors. Chapter 3 outlines some of the key challenges anti-terrorism laws and regulations pose to humanitarian action, and Chapter 4 provides some questions and approaches humanitarian actors may wish to consider when facing these challenges.

This Article argues that the positions many U.S.-based lawyers in the disciplines of international humanitarian law and human rights law took in 2013 on issues of lethal force and framing of armed conflict vis-à-vis the Obama Administration would have been surprising and disappointing to those same professionals back in 2002 when they began their battle against the Bush Administration’s formulations of the “Global War on Terror.” In doing so, the Article demonstrates how, by 2013, many U.S.-based humanitarian and human rights lawyers—in the face of a perceived existential threat to their relevance from the Bush Administration’s general rejection of international law as a binding constraint in the “Global War on Terror”—had traded in strict fealty to international law for potential influence on executive decision-making. These lawyers and advocates would help to shape the Obama Administration’s articulation of its legal basis for the use of force against al Qaeda and others by making use of “folk international law,” a law-like discourse that relies on a confusing and soft admixture of IHL, jus ad bellum, and IHRL to frame operations that do not, ultimately, seem bound by international law—at least not by any conception of international law recognizable to international lawyers, especially those outside of the U.S. In chronicling the collapse of multiple legal disciplines and fields of application into the “Law of 9/11,” the Article illustrates how that result came about not simply through manipulation by a government seeking to protect national security or justify its actions but also through a particular approach to legal argumentation as mapped through various tactical moves during the course of the legal battle over the war on terror.

In this paper, we discuss the trajectory of modern Islamic legal discourse on jus ad bellum questions, challenging the ideas that the choice is between either a defensive or an aggressive jihad doctrine, and that declaring and waging war is regarded in Islamic law as properly a matter to be monopolized by legitimate state authorities. The dominant modern doctrine of just war in Islamic legal thought is not quite as simple as a bare doctrine of mutual non-aggression. While it is understandable that many Muslims have been eager to conclude that the proper understanding of jihad in Islam is that it authorizes only defensive or humanitarian war, virtually indistinguishable from modern international norms, the reality of modern Islamic just war thinking is somewhat more interesting than this. In this paper, we introduce a third modern Islamic concept of just war that would permit war against a country that does not allow for peaceful proselytization of Islam within its borders, and discuss some of the ambiguities of this doctrine.

This paper argues that the formalist machinations currently employed to argue that violations of IHL should come within the jurisdictional ambit of human rights instruments and courts may be harmful to the very aims liberal international lawyers seek to achieve. My argument is that parallel application is equally as bad for the Iraqi civilian as it is for the American soldier. As we pull back the layers of legalistic argumentation, the real role of rights discourse and the real function of human rights law on the battlefield seem much less thought-out than leading scholars suggest, and the implications for this new approach to international law seem much more problematic than the current debate on the issue presents.

This article focuses on the work of two international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, and their impact on the effectiveness of the human rights movement. It presents at typology of methods currently used by INGOs when they encounter Shari'a law, demonstrating through an analysis of their work in this area that they fail to engage with Islamic Law and, instead, offer a first-line of defense to charges of anti-Muslim bias, neo-imperialism, and insensitivity toward Muslim culture. The author calls on INGOs to acknowledge the uncomfortable realities of their current position and consider new ways of engaging with Islamic Law.