Faculty Bibliography

Large, multilateral, international negotiations have become a mainstay of modern diplomacy. Given the complexity of these negotiations, it is common that they be facilitated by a Secretariat. Typically, the Secretariat is composed of professional staff that is primarily responsible for administering negotiations and, in certain cases, providing support to monitory treaty implementation. Nonwithstanding this central role in many of the most consequential international negotiations, however, relatively little research has been conducted regarding their optimal structure so as to maximize the chance for success in these negotiations. This Article explores the role of Secretariats by applying general principles drawn from the study of complex adaptive systems. This interdisciplinary perspective suggests a structure that departs from existing debates in the negotiation theory literature regarding the proper role of Secretariats. The lessons from this interdisciplinary perspective are substantiated by an analysis of the negotiations leading up to and during the 21st Conference of the Parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which culminated in the Paris Climate Accord. As shared resource issues proliferate in international politics, coordinated action at a global scale will only become more important. It is essential, therefore, that scholars and practitioners alike devote more energy to understanding these often-neglected focal points of the international treaty system.

International law has always been contested. In recent years, however, competition between States to influence the trajectory of international law has intensified. Unfortunately, most international lawyers and policy makers still employ an impoverished understanding of the way in which international law is created (i.e., through formal international negotiations or as developed through custom). In this article, I argue that this formalist perspective neglects the foundational role of domestic lawmaking and regulation in the development of international law. Indeed, this paper shows that domestic action has historically been a direct causal antecedent to international legal regimes, and concludes that States must fundamentally reconsider the underpinnings of international law if they hope to effectively advance their national interests in international politics. These findings are born out through four case studies, which analyze the development of international legal regimes for the continental shelf, bribery of foreign officials, data privacy, and artificial intelligence. In each case study, I apply an analytic model rooted in Aristotelian understandings of causation, and expanded upon through the constructivist legal literature. Throughout, the paper provides concrete suggestions as to how States can re-imagine their approach towards international law to better advance their interests in the increasingly fragmented, yet still highly interconnected, world of international politics.

This article critically examines two doctrines that States have used to declare exceptional maritime sovereignty: Historic Waters and Ancient Title. Despite their long pedigree in customary international law, I argue that both doctrines are largely irrelevant in the modern regime of maritime delimitation established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Analysis of the negotiating record shows that UNCLOS was negotiated as a package deal, creating a novel and holistic regime for maritime delimitation that was responsive to the international community's pressing concern with overfishing, pollution, freedom of navigation, and greater equality of economic rights. Both historic waters and ancient title would derogate from this negotiated regime as they are incompatible with the objective criteria UNCLOS uses to demarcate maritime sovereignty and jurisdiction. Furthermore, I argue that historic water and ancient title can only be applied in the context of historic bays as this is explicitly allowed in UNCLOS article 10. Additionally, provisions in which UNCLOS allows consideration of 'historic title' should not be understood to incorporate the doctrines of historic waters and ancient title into modern maritime delimitation. Instead, they should be interpreted as allowing States and tribunals room for limited equitable consideration of historic practice when contemplating minor adjustments to maritime boundaries established by UNCLOS' objective principles. These conclusions are far from a theoretical curiosity. For example, the limited degree to which international law countenances exceptional maritime claims based on historic waters and ancient title will have profound implications for States claiming broad historic entitlement in the South China Sea.