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    The 2020 Holding Foreign Companies Accountable (HFCA) Act will force China-based firms to delist from U.S. exchanges if China fails to permit audit inspections during a two-year period. The Act also requires such firms, as soon as China blocks such inspections, to disclose ties to the Chinese party-state. We first explain why the delisting provisions, while well-intentioned, may well harm U.S. investors. We then turn to the disclosure provisions, explaining that they appear to be motivated by a desire to name-shame Chinese firms rather than to protect investors. While China-based firms do pose unique risks to U.S. investors, the Act fails to mitigate--and may well exacerbate--these risks.

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    Alibaba, the e-commerce giant that completed a record-setting IPO in the United States in 2014 and was valued at over $700 billion in early 2021, is one of hundreds of China-based firms listed in the United States whose controlling insiders are largely law-proof: the corporate and securities laws governing these firms are unenforceable because the firms’ insiders, records, and assets are in China. This casts doubt on the claim that foreign firms list in the United States to bond insiders to tough securities law. In fact, for China-based firms, listing in the United States but not in China effectively insulates insiders from any securities law. Yet U.S. securities law not only allows these firms to list, but also requires them to dis-close less than domestic firms. U.S. securities law thus favors foreign entrepreneurs and likely harms U.S. investors. We suggest ways to reduce this bias and better protect U.S. investors. More generally, we argue that enforceability is key to corporate governance.

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    The following article adapts and consolidates two comment letters submitted last spring by a group of twenty-two professors of finance and law on the SEC's proposed climate change disclosure rules. The professors reiterate their recommendation that the SEC withdraw its proposal as legally misguided, while outlining some of the issues that the proposal will face when challenged in court.

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    They’re good for just about everyone, including employees and shareholders as well as overpaid CEOs.

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    For the sake of the company's stakeholders and investors, let's hope it reverses course on Ben & Jerry’s Israel boycott.

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    The stock market generates less wealth than it appears. We show that total shareholder return (TSR), the standard measure of stock investor performance, substantially exaggerates returns earned by these investors in aggregate, and thus by most investors. The main reason: from investors’ collective perspective, dividends cannot be reinvested in public equity, as TSR assumes, but only in other lower-yielding assets. In addition, TSR is inflated by well-timed repurchases and equity issuances that merely transfer value among investors. We put forward another measure–"all-shareholder return" (ASR)–which better captures the wealth generated by the stock market for investors. We estimate that the ASR equity premium is 17 to 73% lower than the TSR-implied equity premium, depending on the investment alternative. We also estimate that the wedge between ASR and TSR is primarily driven by the reinvestment effect. However, over time, the reinvestment effect declines while the timing effect of cash flows increases, consistent with rising stock issuances and buybacks.

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    Under Delaware law, a securities issuance in which all existing investors may participate pro rata (a “rights offer”) is often seen as treating insiders and outsiders equally, making it difficult for nonparticipating outsiders to prevail on a claim that insiders sold themselves cheap securities. I show that insiders can use rights offers to sell themselves cheap securities, even if outsiders are sophisticated and well-capitalized. My analysis suggests courts applying Delaware law should more aggressively probe rights offers for substantive fairness. I conclude by describing red flags indicating a heightened risk of expropriation.

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    Investor‐driven ’short‐termism’ is said to harm EU public firms’ ability to invest for the long term, prompting calls for the EU to better insulate managers from shareholder pressure. But the evidence offered—rising levels of repurchases and dividends—is incomplete and misleading: it ignores large offsetting equity issuances that move capital from investors to EU firms. We show that, over the last 30 years and the last decade, net shareholder payouts have been moderate and investment and cash balances have increased. In sum, the data provide little basis for the view that short‐termism in the EU warrants corporate governance reforms.

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    In July 2020, the European Commission published the “Study on directors’ duties and sustainable corporate governance” by Ernst & Young (EY). The Report purports to find evidence of debilitating short-termism in EU corporate governance and recommends many changes to support sustainable corporate governance. In this paper, we point out deep flaws in the Report’s evidence and analysis. We recently submitted the content of this paper in response to the European Commission’s call for feedback. Parallel issues have arisen in American discourse, although none has reached the incipient lawmaking level that it has in Europe. First, the Report defines the corporate governance problem as one of pernicious short-termism that damages the environment, the climate, and stakeholders. But the Report mistakenly conflates time-horizon problems with externalities and distributional concerns. Cures for one are not cures for the others and a cure for one may well exacerbate the others. Second, the Report’s main evidence for an increase in corporate short-termism is rising gross payouts to shareholders (dividends and stock repurchases). However, the more relevant payout measure to assess corporations’ ability to fund long-term investment is net payouts (gross payouts minus equity issuances), which is much lower and has left plenty of funds available for long-term and short-term investment. Third, when the Report turns to other evidence for short-termism, it selectively picks academic studies that support its views on short-termism, while failing to engage substantial contrary literature. Significant studies fail to detect short-termism and some substantial studies show excessive long-termism. Conceptually, some short-termism is an unfortunate but an inevitable side effect of effective corporate governance and may not be a first-order problem warranting wholesale reform. Finally, the Report touts cures whose effectiveness has little evidentiary support and, for some, there is real evidence that the cures could be counterproductive and costly.

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    Alibaba, the NYSE-traded Chinese ecommerce giant, is currently valued at over $500 billion. But Alibaba’s governance is opaque, obscuring who controls the firm. We show that Jack Ma, who now owns only about 5%, can effectively control Alibaba by controlling an entirely different firm: Ant Group. We demonstrate how control of Ant Group enables Ma to dominate Alibaba’s board. We also explain how this control gives Ma the indirect ability to disable (and perhaps seize) VIE-held licenses critical to Alibaba, providing him with substantial additional leverage. Alibaba is a case study of how corporate control can be created synthetically with little or no equity ownership via a web of employment and contractual arrangements.

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    In August 2021, the Securities and Exchange Commission approved Nasdaq's proposed rules related to diversity. The rules' aim is for most Nasdaq-listed firms to have at least one director self-identifying as female and another self-identifying as an underrepresented minority or LGBTQ+. While Nasdaq claims these rules will benefit investors, the empirical evidence provides little support for the claim that gender or ethnic diversity in the boardroom increases shareholder value. In fact, rigorous scholarship--much of it by leading female economists--suggests that increasing board diversity can actually lead to lower share prices. The implementation of Nasdaq's proposed rules thus may well generate risks for investors.

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    In July 2020, the European Commission published the “Study on directors’ duties and sustainable corporate governance” by EY. The Report purports to find evidence of debilitating short-termism in EU corporate governance and recommends many changes to support sustainable corporate governance. In this paper, we point out deep flaws in the Report’s evidence and analysis. We recently submitted the content of this paper in response to the European Commission’s call for feedback. First, the Report defines the corporate governance problem as one of pernicious short-termism that damages the environment, the climate, and stakeholders. But the Report mistakenly conflates time-horizon problems with externalities and distributional concerns. Cures for one are not cures for the others and a cure for one may well exacerbate the others. Second, the Report’s main ostensible evidence for an increase in corporate short-termism is rising gross payouts to shareholders (dividends and stock repurchases). However, the more relevant payout measure to assess corporations’ ability to fund long-term investment is net payouts (gross payouts minus equity issuances), which is much lower and has left plenty of funds available for long-term and short-term investment. Third, when the Report turns to other evidence for short-termism, it selectively picks academic studies that support its views on short-termism, while failing to engage substantial contrary literature. Significant studies fail to detect short-termism and some substantial studies show excessive long-termism. Conceptually, some short-termism is an unfortunate but an inevitable side effect of effective corporate governance and may not be a first-order problem warranting wholesale reform. Finally, the Report touts cures whose effectiveness has little evidentiary support and, for some, there is real evidence that the cures could be counterproductive and costly.

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    Investor-driven "short-termism'" is said to harm EU public firms' ability to invest for the long term, prompting calls for the EU to better insulate managers from shareholder pressure. But the evidence offered---in the form of rising levels of repurchases and dividends---is incomplete and misleading, as it ignores large offsetting equity issuances that move capital from investors to EU firms. We show that net shareholder payouts have been moderate, that both investment levels and investment intensity have been rising, and that cash balances have increased. In sum, the data provide little basis for the view that short-termism in the EU warrants corporate governance reforms.

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    A central challenge in the regulation of controlled firms is curbing rent extraction by controllers. As independent directors and fiduciary duties are often insufficient, some jurisdictions give minority shareholders veto rights over related-party transactions. To assess these rights’ effectiveness, we exploit a 2011 Israeli reform that gave minority shareholders veto rights over related-party transactions, including the pay of controllers and their relatives (“controller executives”). We find that the reform curbed controller-executive pay and led some controller executives to resign or go with little or no pay in circumstances suggesting their pay would be rejected. These findings suggest that minority veto rights can be an effective corporate governance tool.

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    Startup founders, who generally must cede control to obtain VC financing, are widely believed to regain control in the event of IPO, à la Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg. Indeed, the premise that founders expect to reacquire control if there is an IPO underlies the leading finance theory for why venture capital cannot thrive without a robust stock market: the existence of an IPO market enables VCs to give founders a “call option on control” exercisable if the firm is successful. But little is known about how frequently founders regain control via IPO. Using a sample of over 18,000 VC-backed firms that received their initial round of VC financing during 1990-2012, we show that founders generally do not reacquire control if there is an IPO. In almost 60% of firms that do go public, the founder is no longer CEO at IPO. In firms with a founder-CEO right after IPO, founders generally lack substantial voting power; 50% are no longer CEO of the firm within three years. Zuckerberg is not the norm. We also show that the ex ante likelihood of any given founder reacquiring control via IPO is extremely low, suggesting that the expected value of any call option on control is trivial. As of initial VC financing, the likelihood that a founder takes her firm public and retains the CEO position and voting control for three years is about 0.4%. Our results shed light on how control evolves in U.S. startups, and cast doubt on the plausibility of the “call option on control” theory linking stock and VC markets.

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    This statement presents my views on buybacks and my general reactions to provisions in four pieces of legislation relating to stock buybacks. Part I describes the role of stock buybacks in the economy and offers some “investor-benign” explanations for firms’ use of repurchases rather than dividends to distribute cash to investors. Part I then explains that the overall level of shareholder payouts (that is, the total amount of dividends and repurchases) does not appear to be too high; in fact, it may well be too low. Part II describes the current regulation of buybacks, which I believe is too lax and enables their abuse by corporate executives. In particular, I will explain how current regulation can enable executives to use buybacks to enrich themselves at the expense of public investors, through (1) indirect insider trading, (2) the manipulation of the stock price and EPS metrics in compensation arrangements, and (3) “false signaling:” announcing repurchases that executives do not intend to carry out, solely to boost the stock price before executives unload shares. Part III suggests a disclosure rule that would reduce executives’ ability to engage in the above-mentioned abuses, and therefore, better protect public investors: requiring public firms (like their insiders) to disclose trades in firm stock within two business days. I also describe additional measures that could be taken if this disclosure rule turns out be insufficient. Part IV offers initial reactions to key provisions in these four pieces of legislation.

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  • Jesse M. Fried, Powering Preemptive Rights with Presubscription Disclosure, in The Law and Finance of Related Party Transactions (Luca Enriques & Tobias H. Tröger eds., 2019).

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    Preemptive rights can prevent cheap-issuance tunneling by a controller when outside investors know that the offered securities are cheap. But when outsiders cannot tell whether the securities are cheap or overpriced, preemptive rights fail to prevent such tunneling. Afraid of purchasing overpriced securities, outsiders may rationally refrain from purchasing (even when the securities are in fact cheap), and then suffer cheap-issuance losses. I put forward a mechanism to make preemptive rights more effective: requiring disclosure of a controller’s subscription commitment, before outside investors must finalize their own, so that outsiders can choose to mimic it.

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    During the period 2005-2014, S&P 500 firms distributed to shareholders more than $3.95 trillion via stock buybacks and $2.45 trillion via dividends — $6.4 trillion in total. These shareholder payouts amounted to over 93% of the firms' net income. Academics, corporate lawyers, asset managers, and politicians point to such shareholder-payout figures as compelling evidence that “short-termism" and “quarterly capitalism" are impairing firms' ability to invest, innovate, and provide good wages. We explain why S&P 500 shareholder-payout figures provide a misleadingly incomplete picture of corporate capital flows and the financial capacity of U.S. public firms. Most importantly, they fail to account for offsetting equity issuances by firms. We show that, taking into account issuances, net shareholder payouts by all U.S. public firms during the period 2005-2014 were in fact only about $2.50 trillion, or 33% of their net income. Moreover, much of these net shareholder payouts were offset by net debt issuances, and thus effectively recapitalizations rather than firm-shrinking distributions. After excluding marginal debt capital inflows, net shareholder payouts by public firms during the period 2005-2014 were only about 22% of their net income. In short, S&P 500 shareholder-payout figures are not indicative of actual capital flows in public firms, and thus cannot provide much basis for the claim that short-termism is starving public firms of needed capital. We also offer three other reasons why corporate capital flows are unlikely to pose a problem for the economy. A prior version of this paper was circulated under the title “Short-Termism and Shareholder Payouts: Getting Corporate Capital Flows Right."

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    This amicus brief, filed with the Delaware Supreme Court in Verition Partners v. Aruba Networks, addresses two topics: (i) application of the efficient market hypothesis in appraisal litigation and (ii) empirical scholarship regarding the effect of Delaware appraisal decisions and amendments to 8 Del. C. § 262 on premia in public M&A transactions.

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    Some experts argue that corporate leaders are starving their firms of investment capital by making excessive payouts to shareholders, thereby undermining innovation, employment opportunity, and economic growth. As evidence, they point to S&P 500 firms’ using 96% of their net income for repurchases and dividends. A closer look at the data shows that the amounts going to shareholders at the expense of internal investment are less than claimed. The problem lies in the ratio used—shareholder payouts as a percentage of net income—which fails to take into account offsetting equity issuances as well as actual R&D expenditures. The percentage of income potentially available for investment that goes to shareholders is not 96% but a much more modest 41%. After paying shareholders, S&P 500 firms are at near-peak levels of investment and have huge stockpiles of cash for exploiting future opportunities. There may well be severe corporate governance problems in the S&P 500, but the data suggests that excessive shareholder payouts is not one of them.

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    Executive pay continues to attract much attention from investors, financial economists, regulators, the media, and the public at large. The dominant paradigm for economists' study of executive compensation has long been that pay arrangements are the product of arm's-length bargaining—bargaining between executives attempting to get the best possible deal for themselves and boards seeking only to serve shareholder interests. But the actual pay-setting process has deviated far from this arm's-length model. Managerial power and influence have played a key role in shaping the amount and structure of executive compensation. Directors have had various economic incentives to support, or at least go along with, arrangements favorable to the company's top executives. The inability or unwillingness of directors to bargain at arm's length has enabled executives to obtain pay that is higher and more decoupled from performance than would be expected under arm's-length bargaining.

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    On July 1, 2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed an excess-pay clawback rule to implement the provisions of Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act. I explain why the SEC’s proposed Dodd-Frank clawback, while reducing executives’ incentives to misreport, is overbroad. The economy and investors would be better served by a more narrowly targeted “smart” excess-pay clawback that focuses on fewer issuers, executives, and compensation arrangements.

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    We report the results of an online survey, conducted on behalf of Harvard Law School, of 124 practicing attorneys at major law firms. The survey had two main objectives: (1) to assist students in selecting courses by providing them with data about the relative importance of courses; and (2) to provide faculty with information about how to improve the curriculum and best advise students. The most salient result is that students were strongly advised to study accounting and financial statement analysis, as well as corporate finance. These subject areas were viewed as particularly valuable, not only for corporate/transactional lawyers, but also for litigators. Intriguingly, non-traditional courses and skills, such as business strategy and teamwork, are seen as more important than many traditional courses and skills.

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    This Article challenges a persistent and pervasive view in corporate law and corporate governance: that a firm’s managers should favor long-term shareholders over short-term shareholders, and maximize long-term shareholders’ returns rather than the short-term stock price. Underlying this view is a strongly held intuition that taking steps to increase long-term shareholder returns will generate a larger economic pie over time. I show, however, that this intuition is flawed. Long-term shareholders, like short-term shareholders, can benefit from managers’ destroying value—even when the firm’s only residual claimants are its shareholders. Indeed, managers serving long-term shareholders may well destroy more value than managers serving short-term shareholders. Favoring the interests of long-term shareholders could thus reduce, rather than increase, the value generated by a firm over time.

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    Why would a firm incorporate in Delaware rather than in its home state? Prior explanations have focused on the inherent features of Delaware corporate law, as well as the positive network externalities created by so many other firms domiciling in Delaware. We offer an additional explanation: a firm may choose Delaware simply because its law is nationally known and thus can serve as a “lingua franca” for in-state and out-of-state investors. Analyzing the incorporation decisions of 1,850 VC-backed startups, we find evidence consistent with this lingua-franca explanation. Indeed, the lingua-franca effect appears to be more important than other factors that have been shown to influence corporate domicile, such as corporate-law flexibility and the quality of a state’s judiciary. Our study contributes to the literature on the market for corporate charters by providing evidence that Delaware’s continued dominance is in part due to investors’ familiarity with its corporate law.

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    A U.S. firm buying and selling its own shares in the open market can trade on inside information more easily than its own insiders because it is subject to less stringent trade disclosure rules. Not surprisingly, insiders exploit these relatively lax rules to engage in indirect insider trading: they have the firm buy and sell shares at favorable prices to boost the value of their own equity. Such indirect insider trading imposes substantial costs on public investors in two ways: by systematically diverting value to insiders and by inducing insiders to take steps that destroy economic value. To reduce these costs, I put forward a simple proposal: subject firms to the same trade-disclosure rules that are imposed on their insiders.

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    We report the results of an online survey, conducted on behalf of Harvard Law School, of 124 practicing attorneys at major law firms. The survey had two main objectives: (1) to assist students in selecting courses by providing them with data about the relative importance of courses; and (2) to provide faculty with information about how to improve the curriculum and best advise students. The most salient result is that students were strongly advised to study accounting and financial statement analysis, as well as corporate finance. These subject areas were viewed as particularly valuable, not only for corporate/transactional lawyers, but also for litigators. Intriguingly, non-traditional courses and skills, such as business strategy and teamwork, are seen as more important than many traditional courses and skills.

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    Venture capitalists (VCs) usually exit from their investments in a startup via a trade sale. But the startup's entrepreneurial team-the startup's founder, other executives, and common shareholders-may resist a trade sale. Such resistance is likely to be particularly intense when the sale price is low relative to the VCs' liquidation preferences. Using a hand-collected dataset of Silicon Valley firms, we investigate how VCs overcome such resistance. We find, in our sample, that VCs give bribes (carrots) to the entrepreneurial team in 45 % of trade sales; in these sales, carrots total an average of 9% of deal value. The overt use of coercive tools (sticks) occurs, but only rarely. Our study sheds light on important but underexplored aspects of corporate governance in VC-backed startups and the venture capital ecosystem.

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    In the bank-borrower setting, a firm’s existing lender may exploit its positional advantage to extract rents from the firm in subsequent financings. Analogously, a startup’s existing venture capital investors (VCs) may dilute the founder through a follow-on financing from these same VCs (an “inside” round) at an artificially low valuation. Using a hand-collected dataset of Silicon Valley startup firms, we find little evidence that VCs use inside rounds to dilute founders. Instead, our findings suggest that inside rounds are generally used as “backstop financing” for startups that cannot attract new money, and these rounds are conducted at relatively high valuations (perhaps to reduce litigation risk).

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    The Dodd-Frank Act requires firms to adopt clawback policies for recovering certain types of excess pay-overpayments resulting from errors in performance measures (such as reported earnings). The authors discuss the costs of excess pay to investors and explain why most firms' existing arrangements fall far short of what the Dodd-Frank Act is likely to require. The authors also offer guidance to boards seeking to eliminate the types of excess pay not reached by Dodd-Frank.

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    The Dodd-Frank Act requires firms to adopt clawback policies for recovering certain types of excess pay — overpayments resulting from errors in performance measures (such as reported earnings). We discuss the costs of excess pay to investors, explain why most firms’ existing arrangements fall far short of what the Dodd-Frank Act is likely to require, and offer guidance to boards seeking to eliminate the types of excess pay not reached by Dodd-Frank.

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    This Article identifies a cost to public investors of tying executive pay to the future value of a firm’s stock - even its long-term value. In particular, such an arrangement can incentivize executives to engage in share repurchases (when the current stock price is low) and equity issuances (when the current stock price is high) that reduce “aggregate shareholder value,” the amount of value flowing to all the firm’s shareholders over time. The Article also puts forward a mechanism that ties executive pay to aggregate shareholder value and thereby eliminates the identified distortions.

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    We explain why firms should have a policy requiring directors to recover “excess pay” – payouts to executives resulting from an error in compensation metrics (such as inflated earnings). We then analyze the clawback policies voluntarily adopted by S&P 500 firms as of 2010 and find that only a small fraction had such a policy. Our findings suggest that the Dodd-Frank Act, which requires firms to adopt a clawback policy for certain types of excess pay, will improve compensation arrangements at most firms. We also suggest how the types of excess pay not reached by Dodd-Frank should be addressed.

  • Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, in The History of Modern U.S. Corporate Governance (Brian Cheffins ed., 2011).

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    Firms, investors, and regulators around the world are now seeking to ensure that the compensation of public company executives is tied to long-term results, in part to avoid incentives for excessive risk taking. This Article examines how best to achieve this objective. Focusing on equity-based compensation, the primary component of executive pay, we identify how such compensation should best be structured to tie pay to long-term performance. We consider the optimal design of limitations on the unwinding of equity incentives, putting forward a proposal that firms adopt both grant-based and aggregate limitations on unwinding. We also analyze how equity compensation should be designed to prevent the gaming of equity grants at the front end and the gaming of equity dispositions at the back end. Finally, we emphasize the need for widespread adoption of limitations on executives’ use of hedging and derivative transactions that weaken the tie between executive payoffs and the long-term stock price that well-designed equity compensation is intended to produce.

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    Incomplete contracting theory suggests that venture capitalist (VC) cash flow rights, including liquidation preferences, could be subject to renegotiation. Using a hand-collected data set of sales of Silicon Valley firms, we find common shareholders do sometimes receive payment before VCs’ liquidation preferences are satisfied. However, such deviations from VCs’ cash flow rights tend to be small. We also find that renegotiation is more likely when governance arrangements, including the firm’s choice of corporate law, give common shareholders more power to impede the sale. Our study provides support for incomplete contracting theory, improves understanding of VC exits, and suggests that choice of corporate law matters in private firms.

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    Companies, investors, and regulators around the world are now seeking to tie executives’ payoffs to long-term results and avoid rewarding executives for short-term gains. Focusing on equity-based compensation, the primary component of top executives’ pay, the authors analyze how such compensation should best be structured to provide executives with incentives to focus on long-term value creation. To improve the link between equity compensation and long-term results, the authors recommend that executives be prevented from unwinding their equity incentives for a significant time period after vesting. At the same time, however, the authors suggest that it would be counterproductive to require that executives hold their equity incentives until retirement, as some have proposed. Instead, the authors recommend that companies adopt a combination of “grant-based” and “aggregate” limitations on the unwinding of equity incentives. Grant-based limitations would allow executives to unwind the equity incentives associated with a particular grant only gradually after vesting, according to a fixed, pre-specified schedule put in place at the time of the grant. Aggregate limitations on unwinding would prevent an executive from unloading more than a specified fraction of the executive’s freely disposable equity incentives in any given year. Finally, the authors emphasize the need for effective limitations on executives’ use of hedging and derivative transactions that would weaken the connection between executive payoffs and long-term stock values that a well-designed equity arrangement should produce.

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    The securities laws currently permit certain firms to exit the mandatory disclosure system even though their shares are held by hundreds (or even thousands) of investors and continue to be publicly traded. Such exiting firms are said to "go dark" because they subsequently provide little information to public investors. This paper addresses the going-dark phenomenon and its implications for the debate over mandatory disclosure. Mandatory disclosure's critics contend that insiders of publicly traded firms will always voluntarily provide adequate information to investors. The disclosure choices of gone-dark firms raise doubts about this claim. The paper also puts forward a new approach to regulating going-dark firms: giving public shareholders a veto right over exits from mandatory disclosure. Such an approach, it shows, will prevent undesirable exits from mandatory disclosure while preserving firms' ability to engage in value-increasing exits.