Faculty Bibliography

The past three decades have seen American capitalism quietly transformed by a single, powerful idea—that financial markets are a suitable tool for measuring performance and structuring compensation. Stock instruments for managers, high-powered incentive contracts for investors, and the rise of alternative assets have dramatically altered the nature and level of incentives and rewards in our society, on both sides of the capital market. These changes have contributed significantly to the twin crises of modern American capitalism: repeated governance failures, which lead many to question the stewardship abilities of American managers and investors, and rising income inequality. When risk is repeatedly mispriced because investors enjoy skewed incentive schemes, financial capital is being misallocated. When managers undertake unwise investments or mergers in order to meet expectations that will trigger large compensation packages, real capital is being misallocated. And when relative compensation is as distorted as it has been by the financial-incentive bubble over the past several decades, one can only assume that human capital is being misallocated, to a disturbing degree. Awakening our monitors to their responsibilities and to the flaws of market-based compensation provides the best hope for correcting these imbalances and strengthening the U.S. economy for the challenges of this century.

This paper examines how costly financial contracting and weak investor protection influence the cross-border operational, financing, and investment decisions of firms. We develop a model in which product developers can play a useful role in monitoring the deployment of their technology abroad. The analysis demonstrates that when firms want to exploit technologies abroad, multinational firm (MNC) activity and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows arise endogenously when monitoring is nonverifiable and financial frictions exist. The mechanism generating MNC activity is not the risk of technological expropriation by local partners but the demands of external funders who require MNC participation to ensure value maximization by local entrepreneurs. The model demonstrates that weak investor protections limit the scale of MNC activity, increase the reliance on FDI flows, and alter the decision to deploy technology through FDI as opposed to arm's length technology transfers. Several distinctive predictions for the impact of weak investor protection on MNC activity and FDI flows are tested and confirmed using firm-level data.