Faculty Bibliography

An important component of corporate governance is the regulation of significant transactions – mergers, acquisitions, and restructuring. This paper (a chapter in Oxford Handbook on Corporate Law and Governance, forthcoming) reviews how M&A and restructuring are regulated by corporate and securities law, listing standards, antitrust and foreign investment law, and industry-specific regulation. Drawing on real-world examples from the world’s two largest M&A markets (the US and the UK) and a representative developing nation (India), major types of M&A transactions are reviewed, and six goals of M&A regulation are summarized – to (1) clarify authority, (2) reduce costs, (3) constrain conflicts of interest, (4) protect dispersed owners, (5) deter looting, asset-stripping and excessive leverage, and (6) cope with side effects. Modes of regulation either (a) facilitate M&A – collective action and call-right statutes – or (b) constrain M&A – disclosure laws, approval requirements, augmented duties, fairness requirements, regulation of terms, process and deal-related debt, and bans or structural limits. The paper synthesizes empirical research on types of transactions chosen, effects of law on M&A, and effects of M&A. Throughout, similarities and differences across transaction types and countries are noted. The paper concludes with observations about what these variations imply and how law affects economic activity.

Some members of Congress, the D.C. Circuit, and the legal academy are promoting a particular, abstract form of cost-benefit analysis for financial regulation: judicially enforced quantification. How would CBA work in practice, if applied to specific, important, representative rules, and what is the alternative? Detailed case studies of six rules—(1) disclosure rules under Sarbanes-Oxley section 404; (2) the SEC’s mutual fund governance reforms; (3) Basel III’s heightened capital requirements for banks; (4) the Volcker Rule; (5) the SEC’s cross-border swap proposals; and (6) the FSA’s mortgage reforms—show that precise, reliable, quantified CBA remains unfeasible. Quantified CBA of such rules can be no more than “guesstimated,” as it entails (a) causal inferences that are unreliable under standard regulatory conditions; (b) the use of problematic data; and/or (c) the same contestable, assumption-sensitive macroeconomic and/or political modeling used to make monetary policy, which even CBA advocates would exempt from CBA laws. Expert judgment remains an inevitable part of what advocates label “gold-standard” quantified CBA, because finance is central to the economy, is social and political, and is non-stationary. Judicial review of quantified CBA can be expected to do more to camouflage discretionary choices than to discipline agencies or promote democracy.