Faculty Bibliography

Against the background of the legal reform contemplated in Israel, the Israeli Supreme Court would have to reach a decision on an array of petitions that focus on seemingly two separate subjects: (1) the implications of allegations that Prime Minster Netanyahu has breached his conflicts-of-interest arrangement in advancing the legal reform, and (2) the validity of actions adopted, both legislative and administrative, as part of the legal reform. We argue that these two subjects are interconnected, and that the decision in each of them should take the second into account. The 2020 Supreme Court decision, which enabled Netanyahu to serve as Prime Minister despite his criminal indictment, sought to advance two fundamental values: respecting the choice of the parliamentary majority regarding the choice of PM, and protecting the rule of law by requiring Netanyahu to comply with the constraints of a conflict-of-interest arrangement. The governing conflict-of-interest arrangement expressly prohibits any involvement by Netanyahu in initiatives to make changes in the legal system. This paper seeks to identify the way in which the Supreme Court should continue to protect these two values if the Court determines that Netanyahu played a substantial role in advancing the legal reform, and thereby failed to comply with his conflict-of-interest arrangement, and thereby with the obligations imposed on him by the 2020 Supreme Court decision. Such a violation of the conflicts-of-interest arrangement would confront the Supreme Court with the question of how to prevent circumvention of its 2020 decision. We examine this question. We first show that an imposition of sanctions on Netanyahu, including even removal from office, would not be an appropriate remedy to his violating the conflicts-of-interest arrangement. Our thesis is that the best judicial reaction would be to give substantial weight to this violation when considering the validity of any actions taken as part of the legal reform, whether administrative or legislative, that (i) are actions in whose adoption the conflict-of-interest arrangement prohibited any involvement by Netanyahu, and (ii) are actions to whose adoption Netanyahu contributed substantially either directly or indirectly through his support for the legal reform as a whole. In the examination of any action satisfying these criteria, the Court should invalidate the action or at least delay the point in time in which the action becomes effective until after the expiration of the conflicts-of-interest arrangement. The remedy we put forward offers an intermediate approach that would well serve the two values that the 2020 Supreme Court decision sought to protect. The proposed remedy would effectively protect the legal system, while respecting the choice of the parliamentary majority to have Netanyahu serve as PM despite his criminal trial. Because the proposed remedy would protect important interests of the different parts of the Israeli public, it also would serve the goals of strengthening the public legitimacy of, and the public trust in, the courts and the government. Finally, we show that using the proposed remedy would be consistent with existing legal doctrine and case law. Among other things, granting the proposed remedy would be consistent with the authority of courts to enforce prior judicial decisions and prevent circumventions of them, and with the prohibition on the abuse of official power. Furthermore, due to the unique circumstances on which the use of this remedy would be based, using it would not create a precedent for any significant widening of the judicial review of administration and legislative decisions.

This study focusses on the acquisition of Twitter by Elon Musk. Our analysis indicates that when negotiating the sale of their company to Musk, Twitter’s leaders chose to disregard the interests of the company’s stakeholders and to focus exclusively on the interests of shareholders and the corporate leaders themselves. In particular, Twitter’s corporate leaders elected to push under the bus the interests of company employees, as well as the mission statements and core values to which Twitter had pledged allegiance for years. Our analysis can inform the heated debates on corporate stakeholders and their treatment by corporate leaders. Our findings indicate that, contrary to the predictions of the implicit promises and team production theories of Coffee (1986), Shleifer-Summers (1988) and Blair-Stout (1999), corporate leaders selling their company should not be expected to look after the interests of stakeholders. In addition, rather than supporting the stakeholder governance, our findings also support the agency critique of stakeholder governance (Bebchuk and Tallarita (2020)), which stresses that corporate leaders have incentives not to serve stakeholders beyond what would serve shareholder value. Finally, our findings are consistent with the view that corporate mission and purpose statements are mostly for show.

Lucian Bebchuk and Oliver Hart explain why Israel’s proposed legal transformation would undermine not only its democracy but also its economy.

This Article tests the claims of supporters of stakeholder capitalism (“stakeholderism”) in the context of the COVID pandemic. Supporters of stakeholderism advocate encouraging and relying on corporate leaders to use their discretion to serve stakeholders such as employees, customers, suppliers, local communities, and the environment. The pandemic followed and was accompanied by peak support for, and broad expressions of commitment to, stakeholderism from corporate leaders. Nonetheless, and even though the pandemic heightened risks to stakeholders, we document that corporate leaders negotiating deal terms failed to look after stakeholder interests. We conduct a detailed examination of all the $1B+ acquisitions of public companies that were announced from April 2020 to March 2022, totaling 122 acquisitions with an aggregate consideration exceeding $800 billion. We find that deal terms provided large gains for the shareholders of target companies, as well as substantial private benefits for corporate leaders. However, although many transactions were viewed at the time of the deal as posing significant post-deal risks for employees, corporate leaders largely did not obtain any employee protections, including payments to employees who would be laid off post-deal. Similarly, we find that corporate leaders failed to negotiate for protections for customers, suppliers, communities, the environment, and other stakeholders. After conducting various tests to examine whether this pattern could have been driven by other factors, we conclude that it is likely to have been driven by corporate leaders’ incentives not to benefit stakeholders beyond what would serve shareholder interests. While we focus on decisions in the acquisition context, we explain why our findings also have implications for ongoing-concern decisions, and we discuss and respond to potential objections to our conclusions. Overall, our findings have significant implications for long-standing debates on the corporate treatment of stakeholders. In particular, our findings are inconsistent with the implicit-promises/team-production view that corporate leaders of an acquired company should and do look after stakeholder interests; on this view, fulfilling implicit promises to protect stakeholder interests serves shareholders’ ex-ante interest in inducing the stakeholder cooperation and investment that are essential to corporate success. Our work also supports the agency critique of stakeholder capitalism which suggests that, due to their incentives, corporate leaders cannot be relied upon to look after stakeholder interests and to live up to pro-stakeholder rhetoric.

This document is an appendix to our article, Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID, 40 YALE J. REG. (forthcoming, 2022). Although the article reports our overall findings with respect to the full sample of 112 acquisitions, the article provides full details of our analysis of particular cases only with respect to the 24 acquisitions above $10 billion in our sample. This Appendix supplements this reporting by providing full details of our analysis with respect to each of the particular cases of the 98 acquisitions in our sample with a consideration between $1 billion and $10 billion. The Article tests the claims of supporters of stakeholder capitalism (“stakeholderism”) in the context of the COVID pandemic. Supporters of stakeholderism advocate encouraging and relying on corporate leaders to use their discretion to serve stakeholders such as employees, customers, suppliers, local communities, and the environment. The pandemic followed and was accompanied by peak support for, and broad expressions of commitment to, stakeholderism from corporate leaders. Nonetheless, and even though the pandemic heightened risks to stakeholders, we document that corporate leaders negotiating deal terms failed to look after stakeholder interests. We conduct a detailed examination of all the $1B+ acquisitions of public companies that were announced from April 2020 to March 2022, totaling 122 acquisitions with an aggregate consideration exceeding $800 billion. We find that deal terms provided large gains for the shareholders of target companies, as well as substantial private benefits for corporate leaders. However, although many transactions were viewed at the time of the deal as posing significant post-deal risks for employees, corporate leaders largely did not obtain any employee protections, including payments to employees who would be laid off post-deal. Similarly, we find that corporate leaders failed to negotiate for protections for customers, suppliers, communities, the environment, and other stakeholders. After conducting various tests to examine whether this pattern could have been driven by other factors, we conclude that it is likely to have been driven by corporate leaders’ incentives not to benefit stakeholders beyond what would serve shareholder interests. While we focus on decisions in the acquisition context, we explain why our findings also have implications for ongoing-concern decisions, and we discuss and respond to potential objections to our conclusions. Overall, our findings have significant implications for long-standing debates on the corporate treatment of stakeholders. In particular, our findings are inconsistent with the implicit-promises/team-production view that corporate leaders of an acquired company should and do look after stakeholder interests; on this view, fulfilling implicit promises to protect stakeholder interests serves shareholders’ ex-ante interest in inducing the stakeholder cooperation and investment that are essential to corporate success. Our work also supports the agency critique of stakeholder capitalism which suggests that, due to their incentives, corporate leaders cannot be relied upon to look after stakeholder interests and to live up to pro-stakeholder rhetoric.

Written for a symposium issue celebrating the thirty-year anniversary of the publication of The Economic Structure of Corporate Law by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel (“E&F”), this Essay discusses the interaction of my research over the years with their writings. During the period in which the book and articles were written, and in the many years since then, I have paid close attention to E&F’s writings in my research in the economics of corporate governance. Indeed, a significant part of my research in this field engaged closely with E&F’s writing and reached conclusions that substantially differed from theirs. Below I discuss this engagement of my work with E&F’s writings, and our respective approaches, in five corporate research areas: (i) takeover policy and rules; (ii) contractual freedom in corporate law; (iii) state competition in the provision of corporate law rules; (iv) efficiency and distribution in corporate law; and (v) corporate purpose.

This Article focuses on the power and corporate governance significance of the three largest index fund managers commonly referred to collectively as the "Big Three." We present current evidence on the substantial voting power of the Big Three and explain why it is likely to persist and, indeed, further grow. We show that, due to their voting power, the Big Three have considerable influence on corporate outcomes through both what they do and what they fail to do. We also discuss the Big Three's undesirable incentives both to underinvest in stewardship and to be excessively deferential to corporate managers. In the course of our analysis, we reply to responses and challenges to our earlier work on these issues that have been put forward by high-level officers of the Big Three and by a significant number of prominent academics. We show that these attempts to downplay Big Three power or the problems with their incentives do not hold up to scrutiny. We conclude by discussing the substantial stakes in this debate--the critical importance of recognizing the power of the Big Three, and why it matters.

In 2019, more than 100 CEOs of US public companies signed a Business Roundtable statement in which they pledged to deliver value to all stakeholders, not just shareholders. Have their companies lived up to this commitment? A forthcoming study based on a wide array of hand-collected corporate documents shows that, two years later, Business Roundtable companies generally have retained corporate governance principles and practices that reflect traditional shareholder primacy.

There has been growing support for replacing the traditional corporate purpose with so-called “enlightened shareholder value,” which would guide firms to consider stakeholder interests when pursuing long-term shareholder value maximization. But such a move would not benefit stakeholders and might in fact be counterproductive.

Amid growing concerns for the effects that corporations have on stakeholders, supporters of stakeholder governance advocate relying on corporate leaders to use their discretion to protect stakeholders, and they seem to take corporate pledges to do so at face value. By contrast, critics question whether corporate leaders have incentives to protect stakeholders and to follow though pledges to do so. We provide empirical evidence that can contribute to resolving the debate between these rival views. The most celebrated pledge by corporate leaders to protect stakeholders was the Business Roundtable’s 2019 Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation (the “BRT Statement”). The BRT Statement expressed a commitment to deliver value to all stakeholders, not just shareholders, and was widely viewed as a major milestone that would usher in “stakeholder capitalism” and significantly improve the treatment of stakeholders. If any companies could be expected to follow through on stakeholder rhetoric, those whose CEOs signed the highly visible BRT Statement would be natural candidates to do so. We review a wide array of hand-collected corporate documents of the 128 U.S. public companies that joined the BRT Statement (the “BRT Companies”). Examining the two-year period following the issuance of the BRT Statement, we obtain the following six findings: First, the numerous BRT Companies that updated their corporate governance guidelines during the two-tear period generally did not add any language that improves the status of stakeholders and, indeed, most of them chose to retain a commitment to shareholder primacy in their guidelines. Second, as of the end of the two-year period, most of the BRT Companies had governance guidelines that reflected a shareholder primacy approach. Third, in SEC submissions or securities filings responding to the over forty shareholder proposals that were submitted to BRT Companies regarding their implementation of the BRT Statement, most of the BRT Companies explicitly stated that their joining the BRT Statement did not require any such changes, and none of them accepted that the Statement required any changes. Fourth, all of the BRT Companies had and retained corporate bylaws that reflect a shareholder-centered view. Fifth, in their proxy statement following the BRT Statement, the great majority of the BRT did not even mention their joining the BRT Statement, and, among the minority of companies that did mention it, none indicated that their endorsement required or was expected to result in any changes in stakeholder treatment. Sixth, the BRT Companies all continued to pay directors compensation that strongly aligns their interests with shareholder value and avoided any use or support of stakeholder-oriented metrics. Overall, our findings support the view that the BRT Statement was mostly for show and that BRT Companies joining it did not intend or expect it to bring about any material changes in how they treat stakeholders.

Unlike shareholder value maximization (SV), which merely calls on corporate leaders to maximize shareholder value, enlightened shareholder value (ESV) combines this prescription with guidance to consider stakeholder interests in the pursuit of long-term shareholder value maximization. ESV is being increasingly embraced by many actors: it was adopted by the U.K. Companies Act, is being considered for inclusion in the Restatement of Corporate Governance Law, and is broadly supported by both corporate leaders and institutional investors. This article examines whether replacing SV with ESV can be expected to benefit stakeholders or society. We begin by arguing that the appeal of ESV and the enthusiasm for it among supporters is grounded in a misperception about how frequent "win-win situations" are. In reality, corporate leaders often face significant trade-offs between shareholder and stakeholder interests, and such situations are exactly those for which the specification of corporate purpose is important. Furthermore, we explain that, under certain standard assumptions, SV and ESV are always operationally equivalent and prescribe exactly the same corporate choices. We then relax these assumptions and consider arguments that using ESV is beneficial in order to (i) counter the tendency of corporate leaders to be excessively focused on short-term effects, (ii) educate corporate leaders to give appropriate weight to stakeholder effects, (iii) provide cover to corporate leaders who wish to serve stakeholders, and/or (iv) protect capitalism from a backlash and deflect pressures to adopt stakeholder-protecting regulation. We show that each of these arguments is flawed. We conclude that, at best, replacing SV with ESV would create neither value nor harm. However, to the extent that ESV would give the false impression that corporate leaders can be relied on to protect stakeholders, the switch from SV to ESV would be detrimental for stakeholders and could impede or delay reforms that could truly protect them. This paper is part of a larger research project of the Harvard Law School Corporate Governance on stakeholder capitalism and stakeholderism. Other parts of this research project include The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita, Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders? by by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita, Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita, and The Perils and Questionable Promise of ESG-Based Compensation by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita.

The Securities and Exchange Commission has put forward for public comment that would mandate immediate disclosure of the acquisition of any equity swap position with a dollar value exceeding $300 million. This paper examines the proposal. I first show that the proposed rule would impose a serious cost – its detrimental effect on hedge fund activism – that the Commission seems to have overlooked. I then discuss the problematic disparity between the treatment of equity swaps and equity securities that the proposed rule would introduce, and I explain that the rationales put forward by the Commission for the proposed rule cannot justify introducing such a disparity. Finally, I identify a number of issues that the Commission should analyze before putting forward for public comment any proposed rule governing disclosure of equity swaps. Without analyzing these issues, I conclude, the Commission would not have an adequately informed basis for adopting the proposed rule.

Companies increasingly use ESG metrics in their compensation packages for CEOs. A new empirical study suggests that this practice has questionable promise and produces significant risks.

Prior to the outbreak of Covid-19, corporate leaders pledged to look after all stakeholders, not just deliver value to shareholders. Did they live up to these promises? A new empirical study examines more than 100 major public company acquisitions that were announced during the pandemic and shows that corporate leaders failed to look after stakeholder interests.

With the rising support for stakeholder capitalism and at the urging of its advocates, companies have been increasingly using environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance metrics for CEO compensation. This Article provides a conceptual and empirical analysis of this trend and exposes its fundamental flaws and limitations. It shows that the use of ESG-based compensation has, at best, a questionable promise and poses significant perils. We identify two structural problems with the use of ESG compensation metrics and provide empirical analysis highlighting their presence in current practices of S&P 100 companies. First, ESG metrics commonly attempt to tie CEO pay to limited dimensions of the welfare of a limited subset of stakeholders. Therefore, even if these pay arrangements were to provide a meaningful incentive to improve the given dimensions, the economics of multitasking indicates that the use of these metrics could well ultimately hurt, not serve, aggregate stakeholder welfare. Second, and most importantly, the push for ESG metrics overlooks and exacerbates the agency problem of executive pay. To ensure that they are designed to provide effective incentives rather than serve the interests of executives, pay arrangements need to be subject to effective scrutiny by outsider observers. However, our empirical analysis shows that in almost all cases in which S&P 100 companies use ESG metrics, it is difficult, if not impossible, for outside observers to assess whether these metrics provide valuable incentives or merely line CEO’s pockets with performance-insensitive pay. Current practices for using ESG metrics, we conclude, likely serve the interests of executives, not of stakeholders. Expansion of such use should not be supported even by those who care deeply about stakeholder welfare.

With the rising support for stakeholder capitalism and at the urging of its advocates, companies have been increasingly using environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance metrics for CEO compensation. This Article provides a conceptual and empirical analysis of this trend, and exposes its fundamental flaws and limitations. The use of ESG-based compensation, we show, has at best a questionable promise and poses significant perils. Based partly on an empirical analysis of the use of ESG compensation metrics in S&P 100 companies, we identify two structural problems. First, ESG metrics commonly attempt to tie CEO pay to limited dimensions of the welfare of a limited subset of stakeholders. Therefore, even if these pay arrangements were to provide a meaningful incentive to improve the given dimensions, the economics of multitasking indicates that the use of these metrics could well ultimately hurt, not serve, aggregate stakeholder welfare. Second, the push for ESG metrics overlooks and exacerbates the agency problem of executive pay, which both scholars and corporate governance rules have paid close attention. To ensure that they are designed to provide effective incentives rather than serve the interests of executives, pay arrangements need to be subject to effective scrutiny by outsiders. However, our empirical analysis shows that in almost all cases in which S&P 100 companies use ESG metrics, it is difficult if not impossible for outside observers to assess whether this use provides valuable incentives or rather merely lines CEO’s pockets with performance-insensitive pay. The current use of ESG metrics, we conclude, likely serves the interests of executives, not of stakeholders. Expansion of ESG metrics should not be supported even by those who care deeply about stakeholder welfare.

The author, a professor at Harvard Law School, argues that concerns about the perils of short-termism—and support for measures that would insulate corporate leaders from the outside pressures that allegedly make them myopic—are long on alarming rhetoric and short on empirical evidence or economic logic. Furthermore, he writes, the threat of hedge fund activism should be expected to discourage managerial slack and underperformance, thus playing an important disciplinary role and incentivizing leaders to enhance shareholder value.

At the center of a fundamental and heated debate about the purpose that corporations should serve, an increasingly influential “stakeholderism” view advocates giving corporate leaders the discretionary power to serve all stakeholders and not just shareholders. Supporters of stakeholderism argue that its application would address growing concerns about the impact of corporations on society and the environment. By contrast, critics of stakeholderism object that corporate leaders should not be expected to use expanded discretion to benefit stakeholders. This Article presents novel empirical evidence that can contribute to resolving this key debate. During the hostile takeover era of the 1980s, stakeholderist arguments contributed to the adoption of constituency statutes by more than thirty states. These statutes authorize corporate leaders to give weight to stakeholder interests when considering a sale of their company. We study how corporate leaders in fact used the power awarded to them by these statutes in the past two decades. In particular, using hand-collected data, we analyze in detail more than a hundred cases governed by constituency statutes in which corporate leaders negotiated a sale of their company to a private equity buyer. We find that corporate leaders have used their bargaining power to obtain gains for shareholders, executives, and directors. However, despite the risks that private equity acquisitions posed for stakeholders, corporate leaders made very little use of their power to negotiate for stakeholder protections. Furthermore, in cases in which some protections were included, they were practically inconsequential or cosmetic. We conclude that constituency statutes failed to deliver the benefits to stakeholders that they were supposed to produce. Beyond their implications for the long-standing debate on constituency statutes, our findings also provide important lessons for the ongoing debate on stakeholderism. At a minimum, stakeholderists should identify the causes for the failure of constituency statutes and examine whether the adoption of their proposals would not suffer a similar fate. After examining several possible explanations for the failure of constituency statutes, we conclude that the most plausible explanation is that corporate leaders have incentives not to protect stakeholders beyond what would serve shareholder value. The evidence we present indicates that stakeholderism should be expected to fail to deliver, as have constituency statutes. Stakeholderism therefore should not be supported, even by those who deeply care about stakeholders. This paper is part of a larger research project of the Harvard Law School Corporate Governance on stakeholder capitalism and stakeholderism. Another part of this research project is The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita.

Corporate purpose is now the focus of a fundamental and heated debate, with rapidly growing support for the proposition that corporations should move from shareholder value maximization to “stakeholder governance” and “stakeholder capitalism.” This Article critically examines the increasingly influential “stakeholderism” view, according to which corporate leaders should give weight not only to the interests of shareholders but also to those of all other corporate constituencies (including employees, customers, suppliers, and the environment). We conduct a conceptual, economic, and empirical analysis of stakeholderism and its expected consequences. We conclude that this view should be rejected, including by those who care deeply about the welfare of stakeholders. Stakeholderism, we demonstrate, would not benefit stakeholders as its supporters claim. To examine the expected consequences of stakeholderism, we analyze the incentives of corporate leaders, empirically investigate whether they have in the past used their discretion to protect stakeholders, and examine whether recent commitments to adopt stakeholderism can be expected to bring about a meaningful change. Our analysis concludes that acceptance of stakeholderism should not be expected to make stakeholders better off. Furthermore, we show that embracing stakeholderism could well impose substantial costs on shareholders, stakeholders, and society at large. Stakeholderism would increase the insulation of corporate leaders from shareholders, reduce their accountability, and hurt economic performance. In addition, by raising illusory hopes that corporate leaders would on their own provide substantial protection to stakeholders, stakeholderism would impede or delay reforms that could bring meaningful protection to stakeholders. Stakeholderism would therefore be contrary to the interests of the stakeholders it purports to serve and should be opposed by those who take stakeholder interests seriously.

takeholderism—granting corporate leaders discretion to give weight to the interest of all stakeholders—should not be expected to deliver its purported benefits to stakeholders. Furthermore, it could well impose substantial costs on shareholders, stakeholders themselves, and society at large, and therefore should be rejected, even by those who are deeply concerned about stakeholders.

The debate about stakeholder capitalism should seek to learn from our experience with constituency statutes, which authorized corporate leaders to take into account stakeholder interests in considering a sale of the company. We document how, over the past two decades, these statutes utterly failed to produce the hoped-for stakeholder benefits: Corporate leaders used their bargaining power to secure benefits for shareholders, executives, and directors, but made little use of it to obtain protections for stakeholders.

An important milestone often reached in the life of an activist engagement is the entering into a “settlement” agreement between the activist and the target’s board. Using a comprehensive hand-collected data set, we provide the first systematic analysis of the drivers, nature, and consequences of such settlement agreements. We identify the determinants of settlements, showing that settlements are more likely when the activist has a credible threat to win board seats in a proxy fight. We argue that, due to incomplete contracting, settlements can be expected to contract not directly on the operational or leadership changes that activists seek but rather on board composition changes that can facilitate operational and leadership changes down the road. Consistent with the incomplete contracting hypothesis, we document that settlements focus on boardroom changes and that such changes are subsequently followed by increases in CEO turnover, increased payout to shareholders, and higher likelihood of a sale or a going-private transaction. We find no evidence to support concerns that settlements enable activists to extract significant rents at the expense of other investors by introducing directors not supported by other investors or by facilitating “greenmail.” Finally, we document that stock price reactions to settlement agreements are positive and that the positive reaction is higher for “high-impact” settlements. Our analysis provides a look into the “black box” of activist engagements and contributes to understanding how activism brings about changes in its targets.

This Article seeks to contribute to the heated debate on the disclosure of political spending by public companies. A rulemaking petition urging SEC rules requiring such disclosure has attracted over 1.2 million comments since its submission seven years ago, but the SEC has not yet made a decision on the petition. The petition has sparked a debate among academics, members of the investor and issuer communities, current and former SEC commissioners, and members of Congress. In the course of this debate, opponents of mandatory disclosure have put forward a wide range of objections to such SEC mandates. This Article provides a comprehensive and detailed analysis of these objections, and it shows that they fail to support an opposition to transparency in this area. Among other things, we examine claims that disclosure of political spending would be counterproductive or at least unnecessary; that any beneficial provision of information would best be provided through voluntary disclosures of companies; and that the adoption of a disclosure rule by the SEC would violate the First Amendment or at least be institutionally inappropriate. We demonstrate that all of these objections do not provide, either individually or collectively, a good basis for opposing a disclosure rule. The case for keeping political spending under the radar of investors, we conclude, is untenable.

This Article seeks to contribute to the heated debate on the disclosure of political spending by public companies. A rulemaking petition urging SEC rules requiring such disclosure has attracted over 1.2 million comments since its submission seven years ago, but the SEC has not yet made a decision on the petition. The petition has sparked a debate among academics, members of the investor and issuer communities, current and former SEC commissioners, and members of Congress. In the course of this debate, opponents of mandatory disclosure have put forward a wide range of objections to such SEC mandates. This Article provides a comprehensive and detailed analysis of these objections, and it shows that they fail to support an opposition to transparency in this area. Among other things, we examine claims that disclosure of political spending would be counterproductive or at least unnecessary; that any beneficial provision of information would best be provided through voluntary disclosures of companies; and that the adoption of a disclosure rule by the SEC would violate the First Amendment or at least be institutionally inappropriate. We demonstrate that all of these objections do not provide, either individually or collectively, a good basis for opposing a disclosure rule. The case for keeping political spending under the radar of investors, we conclude, is untenable.

An important milestone often reached in the life of an activist engagement is entering into a “settlement” agreement between the activist and the target’s board. Using a comprehensive hand-collected dataset, we analyze the drivers, nature, and consequences of such settlement agreements. Settlements are more likely when the activist has a credible threat to win board seats in a proxy fight and when incumbents’ reputation concerns are stronger. Consistent with incomplete contracting, face-saving benefits and private information considerations, settlements commonly do not contract directly on operational or leadership changes sought by the activist but rather on board composition changes. Settlements are accompanied by positive stock price reactions, and they are subsequently followed by changes of the type sought by activists, including CEO turnover, higher shareholder payouts, and improved operating performance. We find no evidence to support concerns that settlements enable activists to extract rents at the expense of other investors. Our analysis provides a look into the “black box” of activist engagements and contributes to understanding how activism brings about changes in target companies.

This Article contributes to the long-standing and heated debate over dual-class companies by placing a spotlight on a significant set of dual-class companies whose structures raise especially severe governance concerns: those with controllers holding a small minority of the company’s equity capital. Such small-minority controllers dominate some of the country’s largest companies, and we show that their numbers can be expected to grow. We begin by analyzing the perils of small-minority controllers, explaining how they generate considerable governance costs and risks and showing how these costs can be expected to escalate as the controller’s stake decreases. We then identify the mechanisms that enable such controllers to retain their power despite holding a small or even a tiny minority of the company’s equity capital. Based on a hand-collected analysis of governance documents of these companies, we present novel empirical evidence on the current incidence and potential growth of small-minority and tiny-minority controllers. Among other things, we show that governance arrangements at a substantial majority of dual-class companies enable the controller to reduce his equity stake to below 10% and still retain a lock on control, and a sizable fraction of such companies enable retaining control with less than a 5% stake. Finally, we examine the considerable policy implications that arise from recognizing the perils of small-minority controllers. We first discuss disclosures necessary to make transparent to investors the extent to which arrangements enable controllers to reduce their stake without forgoing control. We then identify and examine measures that public officials or institutional investors could take to ensure that controllers maintain a minimum fraction of equity capital; to provide public investors with extra protections in the presence of small-minority controllers; or to screen midstream changes that can introduce or increase the costs of small-minority controllers.

This Article examines the large, steady, and continuing growth of the Big Three index fund managers--BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Global Advisors. We show that there is a real prospect that index funds will continue to grow, and that voting in most significant public companies will come to be dominated by the future “Giant Three.” We begin by analyzing the drivers of the rise of the Big Three, including the structural factors that are leading to the heavy concentration of the index funds sector. We then provide empirical evidence about the past growth and current status of the Big Three, and their likely growth into the Giant Three. Among other things, we document that the Big Three have almost quadrupled their collective ownership stake in S&P 500 companies over the past two decades; that they have captured the overwhelming majority of the inflows into the asset management industry over the past decade, that each of them now manages 5% or more of the shares in a vast number of public companies; and that they collectively cast an average of about 25% of the votes at S&P 500 companies. We then extrapolate from past trends to estimate the future growth of the Big Three. We estimate that the Big Three could well cast as much as 40% of the votes in S&P 500 companies within two decades. Policymakers and others must recognize--and must take seriously--the prospect of a Giant Three scenario. The plausibility of this scenario exacerbates concerns about the problems with index fund incentives that we identify and document in other work.

This academic presentation is based on the slides we prepared for delivery by one of us at the Federal Trade Commission hearing on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century on December 6, 2018, which focused on common ownership. The slides discuss the implications of our research work for the common ownership debate. The research work whose implications we consider includes Bebchuk, Cohen, and Hirst, The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors (2017) (https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2982617) and Bebchuk and Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy (2018) (https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3282794). We argue that the attack on common ownership is misguided.The claims of common ownership critics, we argue, fail to take into account how the agency problems of investment fund managers provide them with incentives to under-invest in stewardship and to be deferential toward the corporate managers of portfolio companies. Given these problems, policymakers should be primarily concerned that investment fund managers engage too little and not that they engage too much. The measures advocated by common ownership critics are not merely unnecessary but would be counterproductive; they could well discourage investment fund managers from stewardship activities that should be encouraged.

This academic presentation, based on our joint work on dual-class structures, was delivered by Lucian Bebchuk as his keynote address to the December 2018 ECGI-BIU conference on differential voting structures. The presentation focuses on the lifecycle theory of dual-class structure introduced in Bebchuk and Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, 2017 (https://ssrn.com/abstract=2954630). The presentation begins with discussion of precursor works to, and the motivation for developing, the lifecycle theory. The presentation then proceeds to describing the elements of the theory. In particular, it explains the reasons for expecting the efficiency benefits of dual-class structures to decline over time; for the efficiency costs to increase over time; and for controllers to choose to retain a dual-class structure even when it ceases to be efficient. The presentation also discusses a number of cases that vividly illustrate arguments advanced by the lifecycle theory. Among cases discussed are dual-class companies Viacom, CBS, and Facebook, as well as single-class companies Amazon, Microsoft and Yahoo!. We also explain that time-based sunsets can address the identified problems, and we discuss the design of, and objections to, such sunsets. Finally, we discuss the influence that our lifecycle theory has had on subsequent policy discourse and on empirical work testing the theory’s predictions. The presentation concludes that the lifecycle theory has solid theoretical foundations and is confirmed by recent empirical testing. We hope that the lifecycle theory that we introduced will continue to prove useful for researchers and policymakers and to contribute to the adoption of dual-class sunsets.

Dell Technologies Inc. (“Dell”) is planning a “backdoor-IPO” transaction that would bring it back to the public market with a multiclass structure. Dell’s return to the public market is expected to make it one of the ten largest multiclass companies with an aggregate capitalization substantially exceeding $50 billion. Building on our earlier work on multiclass structures, this Article identifies and analyzes three governance risks and costs that Dell’s IPO structure would create for public investors holding Dell’s low-voting stock: • Lifetime entrenchment of Michael Dell (“MD”): He would be able to retain control indefinitely even after he ceases to be a fitting leader and even if he becomes disabled or incompetent. • Small-minority controller: Although MD would initially hold a majority of the equity capital, Dell’s structure would enable him to unload most of his shares and still retain control even with a small equity stake, and his status as small-minority controller would be expected to produce substantial governance risks and costs. • Midstream changes: Dell’s governance structure would enable MD to adopt subsequent changes in governance arrangements, without any support from public investors, which would increase Dell's governance risks beyond the risks associated with a small-minority controller. Each of these governance risks can be expected to both (i) decrease the expected future value of Dell by increasing agency costs and distortions, and (ii) increase the discount to a per-share value of Dell at which low-voting shares of Dell can be expected to trade. Both types of effects would operate to reduce the value at which the low-voting shares of public investors would trade and therefore should be taken into account in assessing the risks to such investors posed by Dell’s planned structure.

The Supreme Court has looked to the rights of corporate shareholders in determining the rights of union members and non-members to control political spending, and vice versa. The Court sometimes assumes that if shareholders disapprove of corporate political expression, they can easily sell their shares or exercise control over corporate spending. This assumption is mistaken. Because of how capital is saved and invested, most individual shareholders cannot obtain full information about corporate political activities, even after the fact, nor can they prevent their savings from being used to speak in ways with which they disagree. Individual shareholders have no “opt out” rights or practical ability to avoid subsidizing corporate political expression with which they disagree. Nor do individuals have the practical option to refrain from putting their savings into equity investments, as doing so would impose damaging economic penalties and ignore conventional financial guidance for individual investors.Most individual shareholders cannot obtain full information about a corporation’s speech or political activities, even after the fact, nor can most shareholders prevent their savings from being used for political activity with which they disagree. More generally, the Court's focus on whether union non-members are effectively forced to fund political speech or activity with which they disagree should reflect the fact that most Americans must routinely fund speech with which they disagree. While some of this compulsion is from practical reality rather than law there are numerous examples outside the union context of laws that require individuals to fund expressive activities. There is, simply put, very little way for most individuals in modern America to avoid subsidizing speech with which they disagree.

Executive pay continues to attract much attention from investors, financial economists, regulators, the media, and the public at large. The dominant paradigm for economists' study of executive compensation has long been that pay arrangements are the product of arm's-length bargaining—bargaining between executives attempting to get the best possible deal for themselves and boards seeking only to serve shareholder interests. But the actual pay-setting process has deviated far from this arm's-length model. Managerial power and influence have played a key role in shaping the amount and structure of executive compensation. Directors have had various economic incentives to support, or at least go along with, arrangements favorable to the company's top executives. The inability or unwillingness of directors to bargain at arm's length has enabled executives to obtain pay that is higher and more decoupled from performance than would be expected under arm's-length bargaining.

The desirability of a dual-class structure, which enables founders of public companies to retain a lock on control while holding a minority of the company's equity capital, has long been the subject of a heated debate. This debate has focused on whether dual-class stock is an efficient capital structure that should be permitted at the time of initial public offering ("IPO"). By contrast, we focus on how the passage of time since the IPO can be expected to affect the efficiency of such a structure. Our analysis demonstrates that the potential advantages of dual-class structures (such as those resulting from founders' superior leadership skills) tend to recede, and the potential costs tend to rise, as time passes from the IPO. Furthermore, we show that controllers have perverse incentives to retain dual-class structures even when those structures become inefficient over time. Accordingly, even those who believe that dual-class structures are in many cases efficient at the time of the IPO should recognize the substantial risk that their efficiency may decline and disappear over time. Going forward, the debate should focus on the permissibility of finite-term dual-class structures -- that is, structures that sunset after a fixed period of time (such as ten or fifteen years) unless their extension is approved by shareholders unaffiliated with the controller. We provide a framework for designing dual-class sunsets and address potential objections to their use. We also discuss the significant implications of our analysis for public officials, institutional investors, and researchers.

We analyze how the rise of institutional investors has transformed the governance landscape. While corporate ownership is now concentrated in the hands of institutional investors that can exercise stewardship of those corporations that would be impossible for dispersed shareholders, the investment managers of these institutional investors have agency problems vis-à-vis their own investors. We develop an analytical framework for examining these agency problems and apply it to study several key types of investment managers. We analyze how the investment managers of mutual funds - both index funds and actively managed funds - have incentives to under-spend on stewardship and to side excessively with managers of corporations. We show that these incentives are especially acute for managers of index funds, and that the rise of such funds has system-wide adverse consequences for corporate governance. Activist hedge funds have substantially better incentives than managers of index funds or active mutual funds, but their activities do not provide a complete solution for the agency problems of institutional investors. Our analysis provides a framework for future work on institutional investors and their agency problems, and generates insights on a wide range of policy questions. We discuss implications for disclosure by institutional investors; regulation of their fees; stewardship codes; the rise of index investing; proxy advisors; hedge funds; wolf pack activism; and the allocation of power between corporate managers and shareholders.

The desirability of a dual-class structure, which enables founders of public companies to retain a lock on control while holding a minority of the company’s equity capital, has long been the subject of a heated debate. This debate has focused on whether dual-class stock is an efficient capital structure that should be permitted at the time of initial public offering (“IPO”). By contrast, we focus on how the passage of time since the IPO can be expected to affect the efficiency of such a structure. Our analysis demonstrates that the potential advantages of dual-class structures (such as those resulting from founders’ superior leadership skills) tend to recede, and the potential costs tend to rise, as time passes from the IPO. Furthermore, we show that controllers have perverse incentives to retain dual-class structures even when those structures become inefficient over time. Accordingly, even those who believe that dual-class structures are in many cases efficient at the time of the IPO should recognize the substantial risk that their efficiency may decline and disappear over time. Going forward, the debate should focus on the permissibility of finite-term dual-class structures — that is, structures that sunset after a fixed period of time (such as ten or fifteen years) unless their extension is approved by shareholders unaffiliated with the controller. We provide a framework for designing dual-class sunsets and address potential objections to their use. We also discuss the significant implications of our analysis for public officials, institutional investors, and researchers.

This note offers an initial response to a study released earlier this month by Martijn Cremers and Simone Sepe, “Board Declassification Activism: The Financial Value of the Shareholder Rights Project.” Putting aside methodological questions about their analysis and accepting their results “as is,” we show that the results of this study do not provide a basis for opposing board declassifications. Appropriately interpreted, the results provide some significant evidence that declassifications are beneficial and no evidence that they are value-reducing. The results obtained for preceding years in prior published work by the authors either do not hold or are substantially reversed in the period examined by the current study. Overall, the results of the current study contradict and undermine the conclusions in the authors’ earlier published work in support of staggered boards.

Independent directors are an important feature of modern corporate law. Courts and lawmakers around the world increasingly rely on these directors to protect investors from controlling shareholder opportunism. In this Article, we argue that the existing director-election regime significantly undermines the ability of independent directors to effectively perform their oversight role. Both the election and retention of independent directors normally depend on the controlling shareholders. As a result, these directors have incentives to go along with controllers’ wishes, or, at least, inadequate incentives to protect public investors. To induce independent directors to perform their oversight role, we argue, some independent directors should be accountable to public investors. This can be achieved by empowering investors to determine or at least substantially influence the election or retention of these directors. These “enhanced-independence” directors should play a key role in vetting “conflicted decisions,” where the interests of the controller and public investors substantially diverge, but not have a special role with respect to other corporate issues. Enhancing the independence of some directors would substantially improve the protection of public investors without undermining the ability of the controller to set the firm’s strategy. We explain how the Delaware courts, as well as other lawmakers in the United States and around the world, can introduce or encourage enhanced-independence arrangements. Our analysis offers a framework of director election rules that allows policymakers to produce the precise balance of power between controlling shareholders and public investors that they find appropriate. We also analyze the proper role of enhanced-independence directors as well as respond to objections to their use. Overall, we show that relying on enhanced-independence directors, rather than independent directors whose election fully depend on the controller, can provide a better foundation for investor protection in controlled companies.

The Supreme Court has looked to the rights of corporate shareholders in determining the rights of union members and non-members to control political spending, and vice versa. The Court sometimes assumes that if shareholders disapprove of corporate political expression, they can easily sell their shares or exercise control over corporate spending. This assumption is mistaken. Because of how capital is saved and invested, most individual shareholders cannot obtain full information about corporate political activities, even after the fact, nor can they prevent their savings from being used to speak in ways with which they disagree. Individual shareholders have no “opt out” rights or practical ability to avoid subsidizing corporate political expression with which they disagree. Nor do individuals have the practical option to refrain from putting their savings into equity investments, as doing so would impose damaging economic penalties and ignore conventional financial guidance for individual investors.