Mergers & Acquisitions

Lucian A. Bebchuk (with Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Thomas Keusch), Dancing with Activists, 137 J. Fin. Econ. 1 (2020).

Holger Spamann & Hao Guo, The SPAC Trap: How SPACs Disable Indirect Investor Protection, Yale J. on Regul. Bull. (2022).

William J. Carney, Jack B. Jacobs, Richard Painter, Robert Pritzker & Robert H. Sitkoff, Roundtable Discussion: Corporate Governance, 77 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 235 (2001)(Symposium: Theory…

Robert H. Mnookin & Robert B. Wilson, Rational Bargaining and Market Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 Va. L. Rev. 295 (1989).

William T. Allen, Reinier Kraakman & Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization (Wolters Kluwer 6th ed. 2021).

Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Takeovers in the Boardroom: Burke Versus Schumpeter, 60 Bus. Law. 1419 (2005).

Reinier H. Kraakman & Henry Hansmann, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 Yale L.J. 387 (2000).

Reinier Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd ed. Mar. 2017).

Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549 (1984).

Robert C. Clark, Tender Offers and Corporate Governance, in American Society: Public and Private Responsibilities 251 (Winthrop Knowlton & Richard Zeckhauser eds., 1986).

Robert C. Clark, Major Changes Lead Us Back to Basics (A Response to the Symposium on My Treatise), 31 J. Corp. L. 591 (2006).

Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law (A. A. Balkema, 2nd ed. 1986).

Mark J. Roe, Mergers, Acquisitions and Tort: A Comment on the Problem of Successor Corporation Liability, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1559 (1984).

Mark J. Roe, Takeover Politics, in The Deal Decade: What Takeovers and Leveraged Buyouts Mean for Corporate Governance 321 (Margaret M. Blair ed., Brookings Inst.

Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Last (?) Reply, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 253 (1986).

Lucian A. Bebchuk & Yuval Procaccia, Corporate Acquisitions, 13 U. Tel-Aviv U. L. Rev. 71 (1988).

Lucian A Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Thomas Keusch, Dancing with Activists (NBER Working Paper w26171, Aug. 15, 2019).

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jay W. Eisenhofer, Stuart M. Grant, Michael J. Barry & P. Bradford DeLeeuw, On the Validity of Poison Pill By-Laws (June 2006).

Lucian Bebchuk, A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control (NBER, Working Paper No. 7302, July 1999).

Lucian Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, The ‘Lemons Effect’ in Corporate Freeze-Outs (Harv. L. Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. Discussion Paper No. 248, Feb. 1999).

Lucian Bebchuk & Oliver Hart, Takeover Bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control (Harv. L. Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. Discussion Paper No.

Lucian Bebchuk, Asymmetric Information and the Choice of Corporate Governance Arrangements (Harv. L. Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. Discussion Paper No. 398, Nov. 4, 2002).

Lucain Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy, 12 Del. J. Corp. L, 911 (1987).

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 713 (2003).

Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Sole Owner Standard For Takeover Policy, 17 J. Legal Stud. 197 (1988).

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Takeover Bids Below the Expected Value of Minority Shares, 24 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 171 (1989).

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1695 (1985).

Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Longterm Value, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1637 (2013).

Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case For Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1028 (1982).

Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Toward Proxy Contests, 78 Calif. L. Rev. 1071 (1990).

Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 973 (2002).

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control, 109 Q.J. Econ. 957 (1994).

Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case For Facilitating Competing Tender Offers — A Reply and Extension, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 23 (1982).

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Robert J. Jackson & Wei Jiang, Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy, 39 J. Corp. L. 1 (2013).

Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Toward a Constitutional Review of the Poison Pill, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1549 (2014).

Phillip Areeda & Louis Kaplow, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, and Cases (Little, Brown 4th ed., 1988).

Phillip Areeda & Louis Kaplow, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, and Cases (Aspen 5th ed., 1997).

Phillip Areeda, Louis Kaplow & Aaron Edlin, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, and Cases (Aspen 6th ed., 2004).

Phillip Areeda, Louis Kaplow & Aaron Edlin, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, and Cases (Wolters Kluwer 7th ed., 2013).

Louis Kaplow, On the Choice of Welfare Standards in Competition Law, in Goals of Competition Law 3 (Daniel Zimmer ed., 2012).

Louis Kaplow, Balancing Versus Structured Decision Procedures: Antitrust, Title VII Disparate Impact, and Constitutional Law Strict Scrutiny, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1375 (2019).

Louis Kaplow, Market Definition, in 1 The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics 345 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2014).

Louis Kaplow, The Accuracy of Traditional Market Power Analysis and a Direct Adjustment Alternative, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1817 (1982).

Louis Kaplow, Market Definition: Impossible and Counterproductive, 79 Antitrust L.J. 361 (2013).

Louis Kaplow, Market Definition, Market Power, 43 Int’l J. Indus. Org. 148 (2015).

Louis Kaplow, Market Definition and the Merger Guidelines, 39 Rev. Indus. Org. 107 (2011).

Audra Boone, Brian Broughman, Albert Choi, Jesse Fried, Mira Ganor, Antonio Macias & Noah Stoffman, Brief of Amici Curiae Professors in Support of Appellant and…