Mergers & Acquisitions

William T. Allen, Reinier Kraakman & Guhan Subramanian, Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization (Aspen 2nd ed. 2007).

William T. Allen, Reinier Kraakman & Guhan Subramanian, Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization (Aspen 3rd ed. 2009).

John C. Coates, IV & Reinier Kraakman, The Link Between the Acquisitions Market and the Market for CEOs (Jan. 12, 2011).

Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates & Guhan Subramanian, The Trouble with Staggered Boards: A Reply to Georgeson’s John Wilcox, 11 Corp. Governance Advisor 17…

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, Staggered Boards and the Wealth of Shareholders: Evidence from Two Natural Experiments (NBER Working Paper No.

Lucian A. Bebcuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Takeover Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, in Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration 68 (D.

Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 887…

Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants, 55…

Lucian A. Bebchuk, & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Takeover Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1168 (1999).

Lucian A. Bebchuk, & Allen Ferrell, On Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, 57 Bus. Law. 1047 (2002).

Lucian A. Bebchuk, & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, 87 Va. L. Rev. 111 (2001).

John C. Coates & Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side Model of M&A Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 307 (2000).

Holger Spamann & Guhan Subramanian, Corporations (CreateSpace Indep. Publ’g Platform 2017).

Holger Spamann & Hao Guo, The SPAC Trap: How SPACs Disable Indirect Investor Protection, Yale J. on Regul. (forthcoming 2022).

Guhan Subramanian & Caley Petrucci, Deals in the Time of Pandemic, 121 Colum. L. Rev 1405 (2021).

Guhan Subramanian, Deal Process Design in Management Buyouts, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 590 (2016).

Guhan Subramanian & Annie Zhao, Go-Shops Revisited, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 1216 (2020).

William J. Carney, Jack B. Jacobs, Richard Painter, Robert Pritzker & Robert H. Sitkoff, Roundtable Discussion: Corporate Governance, 77 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 235 (2001)(Symposium: Theory…

Robert H. Mnookin & Robert B. Wilson, Rational Bargaining and Market Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 Va. L. Rev. 295 (1989).

William T. Allen, Reinier Kraakman & Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization (Wolters Kluwer 6th ed. 2021).

Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Takeovers in the Boardroom: Burke Versus Schumpeter, 60 Bus. Law. 1419 (2005).

Reinier H. Kraakman & Henry Hansmann, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 Yale L.J. 387 (2000).

Reinier Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd ed. Mar. 2017).

Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549 (1984).

Robert C. Clark, Tender Offers and Corporate Governance, in American Society: Public and Private Responsibilities 251 (Winthrop Knowlton & Richard Zeckhauser eds., 1986).

Robert C. Clark, Major Changes Lead Us Back to Basics (A Response to the Symposium on My Treatise), 31 J. Corp. L. 591 (2006).

Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law (A. A. Balkema, 2nd ed. 1986).

Mark J. Roe, Mergers, Acquisitions and Tort: A Comment on the Problem of Successor Corporation Liability, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1559 (1984).

Mark J. Roe, Takeover Politics, in The Deal Decade: What Takeovers and Leveraged Buyouts Mean for Corporate Governance 321 (Margaret M. Blair ed., Brookings Inst.

Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Last (?) Reply, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 253 (1986).

Lucian A. Bebchuk & Yuval Procaccia, Corporate Acquisitions, 13 U. Tel-Aviv U. L. Rev. 71 (1988).

Lucian A Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Thomas Keusch, Dancing with Activists (NBER Working Paper w26171, Aug. 15, 2019).

Lucian A. Bebchuk (with Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Thomas Keusch), Dancing with Activists, 137 J. Fin. Econ. 1 (2020).

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jay W. Eisenhofer, Stuart M. Grant, Michael J. Barry & P. Bradford DeLeeuw, On the Validity of Poison Pill By-Laws (June 2006).

Lucian Bebchuk, A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control (NBER, Working Paper No. 7302, July 1999).

Lucian Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, The ‘Lemons Effect’ in Corporate Freeze-Outs (Harv. L. Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. Discussion Paper No. 248, Feb. 1999).

Lucian Bebchuk & Oliver Hart, Takeover Bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control (Harv. L. Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. Discussion Paper No.

Lucian Bebchuk, Asymmetric Information and the Choice of Corporate Governance Arrangements (Harv. L. Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. Discussion Paper No. 398, Nov. 4, 2002).

Lucain Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy, 12 Del. J. Corp. L, 911 (1987).

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 713 (2003).

Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Sole Owner Standard For Takeover Policy, 17 J. Legal Stud. 197 (1988).

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Takeover Bids Below the Expected Value of Minority Shares, 24 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 171 (1989).

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1695 (1985).

Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Longterm Value, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1637 (2013).

Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case For Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1028 (1982).

Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Toward Proxy Contests, 78 Calif. L. Rev. 1071 (1990).

Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 973 (2002).