Child Categories
Legal Theory & Philosophy
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Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law
August 19, 2026
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law, 5 J.L. Econ. & Org. 99 (1989).
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A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines, 35 J.L. & Econ. 133 (1992).
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A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Liability Be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?, 10 J.L. Econ.
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A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies Among Individuals
August 19, 2026
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies Among Individuals, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 618 (1991).
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On Offense History and the Theory of Deterrence
August 19, 2026
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On Offense History and the Theory of Deterrence, 18 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 305 (1998).
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A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1999).
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A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 Am. Econ. Rev. 880 (1979).
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Sharing of Information Prior to Settlement or Litigation
August 19, 2026
Steven Shavell, Sharing of Information Prior to Settlement or Litigation, 20 RAND J. Econ. 183 (1989).
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A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Contribution and Claim Reduction Among Antitrust Defendants: An Economic Analysis, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 447 (1981).
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Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs
August 19, 2026
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs, 19 J. Pub. Econ. 385 (1982).
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The Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent
August 19, 2026
Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 77 Am. Econ. Rev. 584 (1987).
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On Liability and Insurance
August 19, 2026
Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 Bell J. Econ. 120 (1982).
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Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. Legal Stud. 333 (1982).
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The Optimal Level of Corporate Liability Given the Limited Ability of Corporations to Penalize Their Employees
August 19, 2026
Steven Shavell, The Optimal Level of Corporate Liability Given the Limited Ability of Corporations to Penalize Their Employees, 17 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 203…
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An Economic-Analysis of Threats and Their Illegality: Blackmail, Extortion, and Robbery
August 19, 2026
Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Threats and Their Illegality: Blackmail, Extortion, and Robbery, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1877 (1993).
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Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1232 (1985).
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The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System
August 19, 2026
Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. Legal Stud. 575 (1997).
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An Economic Analysis of Altruism and Deferred Gifts
August 19, 2026
Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Altruism and Deferred Gifts, 20 J. Legal Stud. 401 (1991).
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The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction
August 19, 2026
Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. Legal Stud. 379 (1995).
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A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?
August 19, 2026
Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers…
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Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale
August 19, 2026
Steven Shavell, Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale, 25 RAND J. Econ. 20 (1994).