Child Categories
Law & Economics
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Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law
December 4, 2024
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law, 5 J.L. Econ. & Org. 99 (1989).
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On Offense History and the Theory of Deterrence
December 4, 2024
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On Offense History and the Theory of Deterrence, 18 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 305 (1998).
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A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1999).
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The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell & Laurence Weiss, The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time, 87 J. Pol. Econ. 1347 (1979).
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Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks
December 4, 2024
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks, 28 J.L. Econ. & Org. 360 (2012).
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The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
December 4, 2024
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. Econ. Lit. 45 (2000).
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Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement
December 4, 2024
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement, 81 J. Pub. Econ. 1 (2001).
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Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights
December 4, 2024
Steven M. Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & Econ. 525 (2001).
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Sharing of Information Prior to Settlement or Litigation
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, Sharing of Information Prior to Settlement or Litigation, 20 RAND J. Econ. 183 (1989).
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The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment
December 4, 2024
A.Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, 24 J. Pub. Econ. 89 (1984).
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Risk Aversion and the Desirability of Attenuated Legal Change
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, Risk Aversion and the Desirability of Attenuated Legal Change, 16 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 366 (2014).
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Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs
December 4, 2024
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs, 19 J. Pub. Econ. 385 (1982).
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On Liability and Insurance
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 Bell J. Econ. 120 (1982).
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A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Contribution and Claim Reduction Among Antitrust Defendants: An Economic Analysis, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 447 (1981).
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The Optimal Level of Corporate Liability Given the Limited Ability of Corporations to Penalize Their Employees
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, The Optimal Level of Corporate Liability Given the Limited Ability of Corporations to Penalize Their Employees, 17 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 203…
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Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. Legal Stud. 333 (1982).
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When Is Compliance with the Law Socially Desirable?
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, When Is Compliance with the Law Socially Desirable?, 41 J. Legal Stud. 1 (2012).
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An Economic-Analysis of Threats and Their Illegality: Blackmail, Extortion, and Robbery
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Threats and Their Illegality: Blackmail, Extortion, and Robbery, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1877 (1993).
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Uncertainty Over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability
December 4, 2024
Stevem Shavell, Uncertainty Over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability, 28 J.L. & Econ. 587 (1985).
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The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System
December 4, 2024
Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. Legal Stud. 575 (1997).
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Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1232 (1985).