Law & Economics

Kathryn E. Spier & David E. Weinstein, Retaliatory Mechanisms for Eliminating Trade Barriers: Aggressive Unilateralism vs. GATT Cooperation, in Imperfect Competition in International Trade 231…

Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards, in 2 The Economics of Evidence, Procedure, and Litigation (Chris W. Sanchirico ed., 2007).

Kathryn E. Spier, Economics of Litigation, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).

Kathryn Spier, Litigation, in The Handbook of Law and Economics 249 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven M. Shavell eds., 2007).

James D. Dana & Kathryn E. Spier, Bundling and Quality Assurance (Northeastern Univ. D’Amore-McKim Sch. of Bus. Research Paper, Aug. 27, 2015).

Kathryn E. Spier & James D. Dana, Bundling and Firm Reputation (Harv. L. Sch. L. & Econ. Discussion Paper No. 649, Sept. 14, 2009).

Enrico Perotti & Kathryn E. Spier, Capital Structure as a Bargaining Tool: The Role of Leverage in Contract Renegotiation, 83 Law & Econ. Rev. 1131…

Kathryn E. Spier, A Note on Joint and Several Liability: Insolvency, Settlement, and Incentives, 23 J. Legal Stud. 559 (1994).

Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement with Multiple Plaintiffs: The Role of Insolvency, 18 J.L. Econ. & Org. 293 (2002).

Kathryn E. Spier, ‘Tied to the Mast’: Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Contracts, 32 J. Legal Stud. 91 (2003).

Kathryn E. Spier, The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation, 59 Rev. Econ. Stud. 93 (1992).

James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn E. Spier, Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation, 9 J.L. Econ. & Org.

Kathryn E. Spier & Michael D. Whinston, On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, and Renegotiation, 26 RAND…

Kathryn E. Spier & Alan O. Sykes, Capital Structure, Priority Rules, and the Settlement of Civil Claims, 18 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 187 (1998).

Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier, Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer, 164 J. Inst. & Theoretical Econ. 4 (2008).

Kathryn E. Spier, The Use of ‘Most-Favored-Nation’ Clauses in Settlement of Litigation, 34 RAND J. Econ. 78 (2003).

Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signaling, 23 RAND J. Econ. 432 (1992).

Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards, 10 J.L. Econ. & Org. 84 (1994).

James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn Spier, Revenue Sharing and Vertical Control in the Video Rental Industry, 49 J. Indus. Econ. 223 (2001).

Kathryn E. Spier, Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules, 25 RAND J. Econ. 197 (1994).

James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn E. Spier, Designing a Private Industry: Government Auctions with Endogenous Market Structure, 53 J. Pub. Econ. 127 (1994).