Law & Economics

Louis Kaplow, Concavity of Utility, Concavity of Welfare, and Redistribution of Income, 17 Int’l Tax & Pub. Fin. 25 (2010).

Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Notions of Fairness versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 110 Yale L.J. 237 (2000).

Louis Kaplow, On the Undesirability of Commodity Taxation Even When Income Taxation is Not Optimal, 90 J. Pub. Econ. 1235 (2006).

Louis Kaplow, Optimal Policy with Heterogeneous Preferences, 8 B.E. J. Econ. Analysis & Pol’y art. 40 (2008).

Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. Legal Stud. 661 (1998).

Xinyu Hua & Kathryn E. Spier, Settling Lawsuits with Pirates (Aug. 6, 2020).

Albert H. Choi & Kathryn E. Spier, Taking a Financial Position in Your Opponent in Litigation, 108 Am. Econ. Rev. 3626 (2018).

Albert H. Choi & Kathryn E. Spier, Class Actions and Private Antitrust Litigation, 14 Am. Econ. J.: Microeconomics 131 (2022).

Kathryn E. Spier, Economics of Litigation, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).

James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn E. Spier, Bundling and Quality Assurance, 49 Rand J. Econ. 128 (2018).

James D. Dana & Kathryn E. Spier, Bundling and Quality Assurance (Northeastern Univ. D’Amore-McKim Sch. of Bus. Research Paper, Aug. 27, 2015).

Kathryn E. Spier, A Note on Joint and Several Liability: Insolvency, Settlement, and Incentives, 23 J. Legal Stud. 559 (1994).

Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement with Multiple Plaintiffs: The Role of Insolvency, 18 J.L. Econ. & Org. 293 (2002).

Kathryn E. Spier, ‘Tied to the Mast’: Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Contracts, 32 J. Legal Stud. 91 (2003).

Kathryn E. Spier, The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation, 59 Rev. Econ. Stud. 93 (1992).

Kathryn E. Spier & Michael D. Whinston, On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, and Renegotiation, 26 RAND…

Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier, Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer, 164 J. Inst. & Theoretical Econ. 4 (2008).

Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signaling, 23 RAND J. Econ. 432 (1992).

Kathryn E. Spier, The Use of ‘Most-Favored-Nation’ Clauses in Settlement of Litigation, 34 RAND J. Econ. 78 (2003).

James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn Spier, Revenue Sharing and Vertical Control in the Video Rental Industry, 49 J. Indus. Econ. 223 (2001).

Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards, 10 J.L. Econ. & Org. 84 (1994).