Michael Klarman

Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law

Areeda 332

Assistant: Melinda Eakin / 617-496-2050

Biography

Professor Michael J. Klarman is the Kirkland & Ellis Professor at Harvard Law School, where he joined the faculty in 2008.  He received his B.A. and M.A. (political theory) from the University of Pennsylvania in 1980, his J.D. from Stanford Law School in 1983, and his D. Phil. in legal history from the University of Oxford (1988), where he was a Marshall Scholar.  After law school, Professor Klarman clerked for the Honorable Ruth Bader Ginsburg on the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (1983-84).  He joined the faculty at the University of Virginia School of Law in 1987 and served there until 2008 as the James Monroe Distinguished Professor of Law and Professor of History. 

Klarman has also served as the Ralph S. Tyler, Jr., Visiting Professor at Harvard Law School, Distinguished Visiting Lee Professor of Law at the Marshall Wythe School of Law at the College of William & Mary, Visiting Professor at Stanford Law School, and Visiting Professor at Yale Law School. 

Klarman has won numerous awards for his teaching and scholarship, which are primarily in the areas of Constitutional Law and Constitutional History.  In 2009 he was inducted into the American Academy of Arts & Sciences.

Klarman’s first book, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality, was published by Oxford University Press in 2004 and received the 2005 Bancroft Prize in History.  He published two books in the summer of 2007, also with Oxford University Press: Brown v. Board of Education and the Civil Rights Movement and Unfinished Business: Racial Equality in American History, which is part of Oxford’s Inalienable Rights series.  In 2012, he published From the Closet to the Altar: Courts, Backlash, and the Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage. He is currently working on a revisionist history of the Founding.

Areas of Interest

Michael J. Klarman, The Framers' Coup: The Making of the United States Constitution (Oxford Univ. Press 2016).
Categories:
Constitutional Law
,
Legal Profession
Sub-Categories:
Constitutional History
,
Legal History
Type: Book
Abstract
"Based on prodigious research and told largely through the voices of the participants, Michael Klarman's The Framers' Coup narrates how the Framers' clashing interests shaped the Constitution--and American history itself. … Not only does Klarman capture the knife's-edge atmosphere of the convention, he populates his narrative with riveting and colorful stories. … The Framers' Coup is more than a compendium of great stories, however, and the powerful arguments that feature throughout will reshape our understanding of the nation's founding. Simply put, the Constitutional Convention almost didn't happen, and once it happened, it almost failed. And, even after the convention succeeded, the Constitution it produced almost failed to be ratified. Just as importantly, the Constitution was hardly the product of philosophical reflections by brilliant, disinterested statesmen, but rather ordinary interest group politics. Multiple conflicting interests had a say, from creditors and debtors to city dwellers and backwoodsmen. The upper class overwhelmingly supported the Constitution; many working class colonists were more dubious. Slave states and nonslave states had different perspectives on how well the Constitution served their interests. Ultimately, both the Constitution's content and its ratification process raise troubling questions about democratic legitimacy. The Federalists were eager to avoid full-fledged democratic deliberation over the Constitution, and the document that was ratified was stacked in favor of their preferences. And in terms of substance, the Constitution was a significant departure from the more democratic state constitutions of the 1770s. Definitive and authoritative, The Framers' Coup explains why the Framers preferred such a constitution and how they managed to persuade the country to adopt it. We have lived with the consequences, both positive and negative, ever since"-- Publisher's website.
Michael J. Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar: Courts, Backlash, and the Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage (Oxford Univ. Press 2013).
Categories:
Family Law
,
Government & Politics
,
Discrimination & Civil Rights
Sub-Categories:
LGBTQ Rights Law
,
Gender & Sexuality
,
Domestic Relations
,
Congress & Legislation
Type: Book
Abstract
Klarman traces this same pattern--court victory followed by dramatic backlash--through cases in Vermont, California, and Iowa, taking the story right up to the present.
Michael J. Klarman, Brown v. Board of Education and the Civil Rights Movement (Oxford Univ. Press 2007).
Categories:
Government & Politics
,
Constitutional Law
,
Discrimination & Civil Rights
Sub-Categories:
Constitutional History
,
Race & Ethnicity
,
Civil Rights
,
Congress & Legislation
,
Supreme Court of the United States
Type: Book
Michael Klarman, The Constitution as a Coup Against the Public Opinion, 3 Revista de Estudos Institucionais 255 (2017).
Categories:
Constitutional Law
,
Government & Politics
Sub-Categories:
Constitutional History
,
Congress & Legislation
,
Federalism
Type: Article
Michael J. Klarman, Tribute, Judicial Statesmanship: Justice Breyer’s Concurring Opinion in Van Orden v. Perry, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 452 (2014).
Categories:
Government & Politics
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Constitutional Law
Sub-Categories:
Constitutional History
,
Religion
,
Religion & Law
,
Supreme Court of the United States
Type: Article
Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial Equality, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 127 (2013).
Categories:
Family Law
,
Government & Politics
,
Constitutional Law
,
Discrimination & Civil Rights
Sub-Categories:
Constitutional History
,
Fourteenth Amendment
,
Race & Ethnicity
,
LGBTQ Rights Law
,
Civil Rights
,
Domestic Relations
,
Supreme Court of the United States
Type: Article
The Political Heart of Criminal Procedure: Essays on Themes of William J. Stuntz (Michael J. Klarman, David Skeel & Carol Steiker eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2012).
Categories:
Criminal Law & Procedure
Sub-Categories:
Criminal Justice & Law Enforcement
Type: Book
Michael J. Klarman, The Foundng Revisited, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 544 (2011) (reviewing Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787-1788).
Categories:
Constitutional Law
Sub-Categories:
Constitutional History
Type: Article
Carol S. Steiker, Daniel C. Richman, David A. Skeel, Martha Minow, Michael J. Klarman, Pamela S. Karlan & Robert E. Scott, In Memoriam: William J. Stuntz, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1844 (2011).
Categories:
Legal Profession
Sub-Categories:
Biography & Tribute
Type: Article
Michael J. Klarman, Has the Supreme Court Been More a Friend or Foe to African Americans?, 140 Daedalus 101 (2011).
Categories:
Government & Politics
,
Constitutional Law
,
Discrimination & Civil Rights
Sub-Categories:
Constitutional History
,
Race & Ethnicity
,
Civil Rights
,
Supreme Court of the United States
,
Congress & Legislation
Type: Article
Michael J. Klarman, Social Reform Litigation and Its Challenges: An Essay in Honor of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg , 32 Harv. J.L. & Gender 251 (2009).
Categories:
Legal Profession
,
Government & Politics
,
Discrimination & Civil Rights
Sub-Categories:
Law & Public Policy
,
Civil Rights
,
Gender & Sexuality
,
Supreme Court of the United States
,
Judges & Jurisprudence
,
Biography & Tribute
Type: Article
Michael J. Klarman, Race and Rights, in 3 The Cambridge History of Law in America 403 (Christopher Tomlins & Michael Grossberg eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2008).
Categories:
Constitutional Law
,
Discrimination & Civil Rights
Sub-Categories:
Constitutional History
,
Race & Ethnicity
,
Civil Rights
Type: Book
Abstract
Profound changes in American racial attitudes and practices occurred during the second half of the twentieth century. This chapter examines the social and political conditions that enabled the modern civil rights revolution and situates the Court's racial rulings in their historical context. Several decisions in the 1960s expanded the concept of state action, enabling the justices to strike at instances of race discrimination that previously were thought beyond the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court began to revolutionize First Amendment doctrine, criminal procedure, the law of federal courts, and habeas corpus rules, based largely on the justices' conviction that Southern states could not be trusted to deal fairly with matters involving race. Changing social and political circumstances halted civil rights progress just as the movement reached its zenith. As civil rights leaders shifted their focus to the North and broadened their objectives to include economic redistribution, many previously sympathetic whites became alienated from the movement.
Michael J. Klarman, Unfinished Business: Racial Equality in American History (Oxford Univ. Press 2007).
Categories:
Constitutional Law
,
Discrimination & Civil Rights
Sub-Categories:
Constitutional History
,
Race & Ethnicity
,
Civil Rights
Type: Book
Abstract
Unfinished Business offers an invaluable, succinct account of racial equality and civil rights throughout American history.
Michael J. Klarman, Why Massive Resistance, in Massive Resistance: Southern Opposition to the Second Reconstruction 21 (Clive Webb ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2005).
Categories:
Government & Politics
,
Discrimination & Civil Rights
Sub-Categories:
Race & Ethnicity
,
Civil Rights
,
State & Local Government
Type: Book
Abstract
This chapter assesses how the forces of massive resistance overwhelmed more liberal opinion on racial integration. It stresses that those white southerners who were opposed to the Brown decision were more politically committed than were those who accepted or supported it. It adds that die-hard segregationists used the apparatus of local and state government to destroy political dissent among the southern whites. It highlights the importance of legislative malapportionment, which provided disproportionate political power to rural districts where white racism was most virulent.
Michael Klarman, Brown v. Board of Education: Law or Politics?, in From the Grassroots to the Supreme Court: Brown v. Board of Education and American Democracy (Peter F. Lau ed., Duke Univ. Press 2004).
Categories:
Constitutional Law
,
Discrimination & Civil Rights
,
Government & Politics
,
Family Law
,
Legal Profession
Sub-Categories:
Discrimination
,
Civil Rights
,
Race & Ethnicity
,
Education Law
,
Politics & Political Theory
,
Supreme Court of the United States
,
Legal History
Type: Book
Michael J. Klarman, Brown at 50, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1613 (2004).
Categories:
Government & Politics
,
Constitutional Law
,
Discrimination & Civil Rights
Sub-Categories:
Constitutional History
,
Civil Rights
,
Supreme Court of the United States
Type: Article
Michael J. Klarman, It Could Have Gone the Other Way, 278 Nation 24 (2004).
Categories:
Government & Politics
,
Constitutional Law
,
Discrimination & Civil Rights
Sub-Categories:
Constitutional History
,
Race & Ethnicity
,
Civil Rights
,
Supreme Court of the United States
Type: Article
Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality (Oxford Univ. Press 2004).
Categories:
Government & Politics
,
Constitutional Law
,
Discrimination & Civil Rights
Sub-Categories:
Constitutional History
,
Race & Ethnicity
,
Civil Rights
,
Supreme Court of the United States
,
Congress & Legislation
Type: Book
Michael J. Klarman, Is the Supreme Court Sometimes Irrelevant? Race and the Southern Criminal Justice System in the 1940s, 89 J. Am. Hist. 119 (2002).
Categories:
Discrimination & Civil Rights
,
Criminal Law & Procedure
,
Government & Politics
,
Constitutional Law
Sub-Categories:
Fourteenth Amendment
,
Criminal Defense
,
Criminal Justice & Law Enforcement
,
Criminal Prosecution
,
Jury Trials
,
Sentencing & Punishment
,
Discrimination
,
Race & Ethnicity
,
Courts
,
Judges & Jurisprudence
,
Supreme Court of the United States
Type: Article
Abstract
This article considers the impact of Supreme Court criminal procedure decisions on the treatment of blacks by the southern criminal justice system. It considers decisions in the areas of coerced confessions, race discrimination in jury selection, the right to counsel, and the right against mob-dominated trials. The article finds that these Supreme Court rulings had almost no impact. Blacks continued to be almost entirely excluded from juries in criminal cases; law enforcement officers continued to beat black defendants into confessing; and court-appointed white lawyers turned in sham performances. The article also considers the indirect effects of these decisions and the litigation that produced them. Here, the rulings may have been more consequential, in terms of educating blacks about their rights, mobilizing social protest, facilitating NAACP branch-building and fund-raising, and instructing oblivious whites about the egregiousness of Jim Crow conditions. Finally, the article considers why Supreme Court criminal procedure rulings were so much less efficacious (for southern blacks) than contemporaneous Court decisions invalidating the white primary and mandating the admission of blacks to southern public universities.
Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 Calif. L. Rev. 1721 (2001).
Categories:
Constitutional Law
,
Government & Politics
Sub-Categories:
Constitutional History
,
Supreme Court of the United States
,
Politics & Political Theory
,
Judges & Jurisprudence
,
Elections & Voting
,
Executive Office
Type: Article
Abstract
This Article considers the long-term implications of Bush v. Gore for the Court's institutional standing and legitimacy. First, the Article considers the possibility that the Court's legitimacy turns on the legal soundness of the reasoning of its opinions. If this is the case, I argue, the Court is in a lot of trouble, since few reputable lawyers will be convinced that the result was a product of anything but the conservative Justices' partisan preference for George W. Bush in the 2000 presidential election. Second, the Article considers the alternative (in my mind, more plausible) premise that history's verdict on a Supreme Court ruling depends more on whether public opinion ultimately supports the outcome than on the quality of the legal reasoning or the craftsmanship of the Court's opinion. The Article's strategy is to canvas some of the landmark decisions in American constitutional history ? Dred Scott v. Sandford, Brown v. Board of Education, Furman v. Georgia, Roe v. Wade, and others ? with the aim of deriving a list of factors that predict how particular rulings will affect the Court's reputation: the amount of opposition a decision generates, the intensity of opposition, perceptions of how efficacious a ruling is likely to be, the relative clout of constituencies supporting and opposing the decision, the continuing saliency of the issue adjudicated by the Court, shifts in public opinion regarding the issue resolved by the Court, the ability of the Justices to take advantage of subsequent opportunities to modulate their decision in light of hostile public opinion, and whether a particular decision is an isolated ruling or part of a "package" of controversial decisions. Finally, the Article considers how those variables apply to Bush v. Gore and predicts that the decision's long-term consequences for the Court's reputation are likely to be relatively insignificant, mainly because the underlying issue will rapidly become obsolete (unlike, say, the abortion or school prayer issues, which have remained controversial for over a quarter of a century).
Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the "Great" Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1111 (2001).
Categories:
Government & Politics
Sub-Categories:
Supreme Court of the United States
,
Judges & Jurisprudence
,
Federalism
,
Congress & Legislation
Type: Article
Abstract
On this two hundredth anniversary of the ascension of John Marshall to the Chief Justiceship of the United States Supreme Court, it is appropriate that we take a revisionist look at some of the landmark decisions of the Court that he presided over for thirty-four years. Political scientists and legal scholars have written a great deal in recent years questioning conventional as-sumptions about the importance of Supreme Court decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education, Roe v. Wade, and Engel v. Vitale. Yet almost nothing has been written about the conse-quences of the "great" Marshall Court decisions. Scholars continue, almost universally, to assume that the old Marshall Court chestnuts---decisions such as Marbury v. Madison, McCulloch v. Maryland, and Dartmouth College v. Woodward---were of enormous significance to the history of the early republic. A closer look at these rulings in their historical context, however, suggests that such assumptions are in need of serious revision. While I do not mean to suggest that these famous Marshall Court decisions were completely inconsequential, the prevalent assumption that they fundamentally shaped the course of American national development is almost certainly wrong. This Article will reconsider the consequences of three categories of Marshall Court decisions. Part I will examine the most famous Marshall opinion of all, Marbury v. Madison, and will question the importance of its proclamation of the judicial review power. Part II will reevaluate the importance of McCulloch v. Maryland and Gibbons v. Ogden--decisions that approved extremely broad conceptions of national legislative power. Part III will turn to some of the famous Contract Clause decisions of the Marshall Court---specifically, Dartmouth College v. Woodward, Sturges v. Crowninshield, and Green v. Biddle---and will challenge the widespread assumption that they were instrumental to American economic development during the first half of the nineteenth century. Finally, Part IV will consider one way in which the Marshall Court did make a vital contribution to American history: It helped establish the Supreme Court as a significant, if not quite coequal, branch of the national government. This final Part will assess the extent to which Marshall and his colleagues were responsible for the Court's growing institutional stature and the extent to which this development was fortuitous. While I doubt this Article will conclusively resolve any of these issues, my goal is to prompt other scholars to reconsider prevalent assumptions about the importance of canonical Supreme Court rulings generally and the "great" Marshall Court decisions specifically.
Michael J. Klarman, The White Primary Rulings: A Case Study in the Consequences of Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 29 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 55 (2001).
Categories:
Discrimination & Civil Rights
,
Government & Politics
Sub-Categories:
Civil Rights
,
Race & Ethnicity
,
Discrimination
,
Supreme Court of the United States
,
Judges & Jurisprudence
Type: Article
Abstract
Political scientists and legal scholars have written a good deal in recent years on the consequences of Supreme Court decisions. Much of this scholarship has been skeptical of the capacity of courts to produce significant social change. Most notably, Professor Gerald Rosenberg has declared the notion that courts can reform society a "hollow hope." While much of my own scholarship has reached conclusions broadly similar to those of Professor Rosenberg, it is a mistake to conclude that Supreme Court decisions in the civil rights context never made much difference. The Court's most important white primary decision, Smith v. Allwright, inaugurated a political revolution in the urban South. This Article considers both the circumstances that enabled Smith to accomplish what it did and the limitations of that accomplishment. My goal is to shed light on the conditions that enable and disable Supreme Court decisions from effectuating significant social change. Part I summarizes the Supreme Court's three pre-Smith white primary decisions. Part II provides legal and political background to Smith v. Allwright and also describes the post-Smith history of the white primary. Part III, the core of the Article, describes the impact of Smith on southern black voter registration. Relying principally on archival material mined from the NAACP Papers, I describe how southern blacks and whites responded to Smith and identify the political and social conditions that enabled Smith to launch a revolution in black political participation in the urban South. This Part also examines the factors that largely nullified the impact of Smith in the rural South. The Conclusion addresses the question of why the Supreme Court's intervention in the white primary context was so much more immediately efficacious than were either its contemporaneous decisions involving criminal procedure issues affecting southern blacks or its slightly later ruling in Brown v. Board of Education.
Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 48 (2000).
Categories:
Constitutional Law
,
Discrimination & Civil Rights
,
Government & Politics
,
Criminal Law & Procedure
Sub-Categories:
Fourteenth Amendment
,
Criminal Prosecution
,
Jury Trials
,
Sentencing & Punishment
,
Discrimination
,
Race & Ethnicity
,
Civil Rights
,
Supreme Court of the United States
,
Judges & Jurisprudence
,
Courts
Type: Article
Abstract
This article takes a close look at four of the landmark criminal procedure cases of the 1920s and 1930s--Moore v. Dempsey, Powell v. Alabama, Norris v. Alabama, and Brown v. Mississippi. The article claims that it was no fortuity that modern criminal procedure originated in cases involving southern black defendants. For the Supreme Court to assume the function of superintending the state criminal process required a departure from a century and a half of tradition and legal precedent, both grounded in federalism concerns. The Justices were willing to take that leap only in cases of flagrant injustice--cases that by the 1920s and 1930s arose mainly in the South and involved black defendants charged with serious interracial crimes, usually rape or murder. Part I makes three related points about these egregious exemplars of Jim Crow justice, which provided the occasion for the birth of modern criminal procedure. First, the southern state appellate courts and the United States Supreme Court were operating on the basis of different paradigms when they evaluated the fairness of these criminal trials. For the southern courts, the simple fact that these defendants enjoyed the formalities of a criminal trial, rather than being lynched, represented a significant advance over what likely would have transpired in the pre-World War I era. For the United States Supreme Court, on the other hand, criminal trials were supposed to be about adjudicating guilt or innocence, not simply avoiding a lynching. Second, because these southern criminal trials were so egregiously unfair, public opinion in the nation generally supported the Supreme Court's interventions. Thus, these early criminal procedure cases hardly represent the sort of countermajoritarian judicial decisionmaking one often associates with landmark criminal procedure decisions, such as Mapp or Miranda. Third and finally, it seems quite likely that the southern state courts themselves would have intervened to rectify the obvious injustices involved in these cases had the circumstances been slightly different. Southern courts in the post-World War I period were becoming more committed to norms of procedural fairness, even in cases involving black defendants charged with serious interracial crimes. Yet in cases that aroused outside criticism of the South or that posed broader challenges to the system of white supremacy, the southern state courts regressed. Part II evaluates the impact of these Supreme Court decisions, in terms of both the precise issues involved (e.g., black service on juries) and the general treatment of blacks in the southern criminal justice system. It turns out that none of these rulings had a very significant direct impact on Jim Crow justice. This Part will explore some of the factors that explain the general failure of these Supreme Court decisions to affect the actual treatment of black criminal defendants in the South. Yet this Part also suggests that these criminal procedure rulings may have indirectly contributed to the modern civil rights movement by educating blacks about their rights, mobilizing protest in the black community, and rallying support among sympathetic whites who were horrified by revelations of Jim Crow practices at their worst. Part III connects these criminal procedure decisions to broader themes in constitutional and civil rights history, identifying some tentative lessons regarding the nature and consequences of Supreme Court constitutional decisionmaking and the dynamics through which American race relations have changed over time.
Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the History of American Freedom, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 265 (2000)(reviewing Eric Foner, The Story of American Freedom (1998)).
Categories:
Legal Profession
,
Constitutional Law
,
Discrimination & Civil Rights
,
Government & Politics
Sub-Categories:
Constitutional History
,
Civil Rights
,
LGBTQ Rights Law
,
Gender & Sexuality
,
Discrimination
,
Race & Ethnicity
,
Supreme Court of the United States
,
Legal History
Type: Article
Abstract
This essay looks at three issues concerning freedom in American history. First, it examines competing conceptions of freedom--positive/negative and individual/political-and considers whether the equal validity of these competing conceptions makes freedom such a malleable concept that it is vacuous. In other words, freedom apparently can be invoked with equal plausibility on either side of any significant political dispute. Second, the essay seeks to identify the circumstances or conditions under which particular freedoms prosper and expand. Third and finally, it considers the complex and sometimes paradoxical role that courts have played in the history of American freedom.
Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fetishism and the Clinton Impeachment Debate, 85 Va. L. Rev. 631 (1999).
Categories:
Constitutional Law
,
Government & Politics
Sub-Categories:
Constitutional History
,
Congress & Legislation
,
Executive Office
,
Politics & Political Theory
,
Supreme Court of the United States
Type: Article
Abstract
This essay examines what the Clinton impeachment debate reveals about the nature of constitutional interpretation and the function of constitutional rhetoric in political debate. One striking feature of the impeachment debate was the certitude with which politicians and pundits espoused a variety of constitutional interpretations, notwithstanding the thinness of the constitutional law governing impeachment. After showing that the Constitution does not resolve most of the disputed issues raised during the Clinton impeachment, the essay considers the consequences of conducting a transparently political debate in constitutional terms. I argue, first, that debating impeachment questions in constitutional terms enabled politicians to evade responsibility for their actions. Second, by invoking constitutional rhetoric, Republicans implicitly tapped into the anti-majoritarian strand of constitutional law, without ever offering a justification for treating impeachment as an issue upon which minorities warrant protection from majoritarian decisionmaking. Finally, the essay briefly considers what the impeachment debate teaches us about constitutional interpretation.
Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 303.
Categories:
Constitutional Law
,
Discrimination & Civil Rights
,
Government & Politics
,
Legal Profession
Sub-Categories:
Fourteenth Amendment
,
Civil Rights
,
Discrimination
,
Race & Ethnicity
,
Supreme Court of the United States
,
Legal History
Type: Article
Michael J. Klarman, Fidelity, Indeterminacy, and the Problem of Constitutional Evil, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1739 (1997).
Categories:
Constitutional Law
,
Government & Politics
Sub-Categories:
Fourteenth Amendment
,
Constitutional History
,
Supreme Court of the United States
,
Judges & Jurisprudence
,
Federalism
,
Politics & Political Theory
Type: Article
Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 Geo. L.J. 491 (1997).
Categories:
Constitutional Law
,
Government & Politics
,
Discrimination & Civil Rights
Sub-Categories:
Constitutional History
,
Race & Ethnicity
,
Courts
,
Judges & Jurisprudence
,
Supreme Court of the United States
,
Politics & Political Theory
,
Elections & Voting
Type: Article
Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 381 (1997).
Categories:
Government & Politics
,
Constitutional Law
Sub-Categories:
Constitutional History
,
Federalism
,
Supreme Court of the United States
,
Congress & Legislation
,
Judges & Jurisprudence
,
Politics & Political Theory
Type: Article
Michael J. Klarman, Book Review, 101 Am. Hist. Rev. 1644 (1996)(reviewing Stephen C. Halpern, On the Limits of the Law: The Ironic Legacy of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (1995)).
Categories:
Discrimination & Civil Rights
Sub-Categories:
Civil Rights
,
Race & Ethnicity
Type: Article
Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1996).
Categories:
Constitutional Law
,
Government & Politics
,
Discrimination & Civil Rights
,
Criminal Law & Procedure
Sub-Categories:
Constitutional History
,
First Amendment
,
Religion
,
Civil Rights
,
Race & Ethnicity
,
Religious Rights
,
Supreme Court of the United States
,
Judges & Jurisprudence
,
Courts
,
Politics & Political Theory
Type: Article
Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1881 (1995).
Categories:
Discrimination & Civil Rights
,
Constitutional Law
,
Government & Politics
Sub-Categories:
Fourteenth Amendment
,
Constitutional History
,
Civil Rights
,
Discrimination
,
Race & Ethnicity
,
Congress & Legislation
,
Supreme Court of the United States
,
Politics & Political Theory
Type: Article
Michael J. Klarman, Book Review, 82 J. Am. Hist. 849 (1995)(reviewing Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1963-1990, Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994).
Categories:
Discrimination & Civil Rights
,
Government & Politics
Sub-Categories:
Civil Rights
,
Race & Ethnicity
,
Elections & Voting
,
Politics & Political Theory
,
Supreme Court of the United States
Type: Article
Michael J. Klarman, Civil Rights Law: Who Made It and How Much Did It Matter, 83 Geo. L.J. 433 (1994)(reviewing Mark V. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court, 1936-1961 (1994)).
Categories:
Constitutional Law
,
Discrimination & Civil Rights
,
Government & Politics
Sub-Categories:
Fourteenth Amendment
,
Civil Rights
,
Judges & Jurisprudence
,
Supreme Court of the United States
Type: Article
Michael J. Klarman, Letter to the Editor, 81 J. Am. Hist. 1429 (1994).
Categories:
Discrimination & Civil Rights
,
Government & Politics
Sub-Categories:
Civil Rights
,
Race & Ethnicity
,
Politics & Political Theory
,
Elections & Voting
Type: Article
Michael J. Klarman, Brown v. Board of Education: Facts and Political Correctness, 80 Va. L. Rev. 185 (1994).
Categories:
Discrimination & Civil Rights
,
Constitutional Law
Sub-Categories:
Fourteenth Amendment
,
Discrimination
,
Race & Ethnicity
,
Civil Rights
Type: Article
Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 Va. L. Rev. 7 (1994).
Categories:
Discrimination & Civil Rights
,
Government & Politics
Sub-Categories:
Civil Rights
,
Discrimination
,
Race & Ethnicity
,
Politics & Political Theory
,
Elections & Voting
Type: Article
Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 759 (1992)(reviewing Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (1991)).
Categories:
Constitutional Law
,
Government & Politics
Sub-Categories:
Constitutional History
,
Judges & Jurisprudence
,
Supreme Court of the United States
,
Politics & Political Theory
Type: Article
Michael J. Klarman, Parliamentary Reversal of the Osborne Judgment, 32 Hist. J. 893 (1989).
Categories:
Government & Politics
,
Labor & Employment
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Elections & Voting
,
Politics & Political Theory
,
Foreign Law
,
Labor Law
Type: Article
Michael J. Klarman, The Judges versus the Unions: The Development of British Labor Law, 1867-1913, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1487 (1989).
Categories:
Labor & Employment
,
Government & Politics
,
Civil Practice & Procedure
,
Legal Profession
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International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Torts
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Judges & Jurisprudence
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Foreign Law
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Labor Law
,
Employment Practice
,
Legal History
Type: Article

Academic Appointment and Employment History

Education History

Honors and Awards

Current Courses

Course Catalog View

Areeda 332

Assistant: Melinda Eakin / 617-496-2050