Faculty Bibliography

In the domain of national security, many people favor some kind of Precautionary Principle, insisting that it is far better to be safe than sorry, and hence that a range of important safeguards, including widespread surveillance, are amply justified to prevent loss of life. Those who object to the resulting initiatives, and in particular to widespread surveillance, respond with a Precautionary Principle of their own, seeking safeguards against what they see as unacceptable risks to privacy and liberty. The problem is that as in the environmental context, a Precautionary Principle threatens to create an unduly narrow view screen, focusing people on a mere subset of the risks at stake. What is needed is a principle of risk management, typically based on some form of cost-benefit balancing. For many problems in the area of national security, however, it is difficult to specify either costs or benefits, creating a severe epistemic difficulty. Considerable progress can nonetheless be made with the assistance of four ideas, calling for (1) breakeven analysis; (2) the avoidance of gratuitous costs (economic or otherwise); (3) a prohibition on the invocation or use of illicit grounds (such as punishment of free speech or prying into people’s private lives); and (4) maximin, which counsels in favor of eliminating, or reducing the risk of, the very worst of the worst-case scenarios. In the face of incommensurable goods, however, the idea of maximin faces particular challenges.

Management buyouts (MBOs) are an economically and legally significant class of transaction: not only do they account for more than $10 billion in deal volume per year, on average, but they also play an important role in defining the relationship between inside and outside shareholders in every public company. Delaware courts and lawyers in transactional practice rely heavily on “market-check” processes to ensure that exiting shareholders receive fair value in MBOs. This Article identifies four factors that create an unlevel playing field in that market check: information asymmetries, valuable management, management financial incentives to discourage overbids, and the “ticking-clock” problem. This taxonomy of four factors allows special committees and their advisors to assess the degree to which the playing field is level in an MBO, and (by extension) the extent to which a market canvass can provide a meaningful check on the buyout price. This Article then identifies more potent deal process tools that special committees can use to level the playing field: for example, contractual commitments from management that allow the board to run the process; pre-signing rather than post-signing market checks; information rights rather than match rights; ex ante inducement fees; and approval from a majority of the disinterested shares. This Article also identifies ways that the Delaware courts can encourage the use of these more potent devices when appropriate: through the threat of entire fairness review, the application of Revlon duties, and the weight given to the deal price in appraisal proceedings. The result would be improved deal process design in MBOs and improved capital formation in the economy overall.

This article examines the hedge fund investment strategy of buying junior claims of Chapter 11 debtors and playing an activist role in the bankruptcy process. These hedge funds are often accused of rent-seeking by managers. I use a new methodology to conduct the first empirical study of this investment strategy. I find little evidence that junior activists abuse the bankruptcy process to extract hold-up value. Instead, the results suggest that they constrain managerial self-dealing and promote the bankruptcy policy goals of maximizing creditor recoveries and distributing the firm’s value in accordance with the absolute priority rule.

This online publication includes two documents published in a Hastings Center Special Report – NFL Player Health: The Role of Club Doctors. The Special Report was published as part of the Football Players Health Study at Harvard University. The first document is the main article for the Special Report, entitled A Proposal to Address NFL Club Doctors’ Conflicts of Interest and to Promote Player Trust. This article focuses on the principal recommendation of our report, “Protecting and Promoting the Health of NFL Players: Legal and Ethical Analysis and Recommendations,” for addressing the conflicts of interest inherent in the current structure of NFL player healthcare, in which club medical staff provide services to both the club and players. The article proposes to “resolve the problem of dual loyalty by largely severing the club doctor’s ties with the club and refashioning that role into one of singular loyalty to the player-patient.” Specifically, club physicians would be replaced by two sets of medical professionals: the players’ medical staff, with exclusive loyalty to the player, and the club evaluation doctor, with exclusive loyalty to the club. Existing ethical codes and legal requirements are not adequate to ensure that players receive health care that is trustworthy and as free of conflicts of interest as is realistically possible, the article says, making structural change necessary. “This structure – which is flawed even in the absence of ethical lapses by any individual club doctor – may substantially contribute to player health concerns,” it concludes. The Special Report also included commentaries from a diverse and highly-qualified group of experts, including: · Arthur L. Caplan, Lee H. Igel, and Brendan Parent, New York University, · Richard Diana, former NFL player and current sports medicine specialist, · Laurent Duvernay-Tardif, current NFL player and offseason medical student, · Ross McKinney, Association of American Medical Colleges and NFLPA consultant, · National Football League Physicians Society, · Mark A. Rothstein, University of Louisville, · Marvin Washington, former NFL player. The commentaries can be found on the Wiley Online Library. This online publication includes our response to the commentaries.

Many people have insisted on an opposition between active choosing and paternalism, and in some cases, they are right to do so. But in many contexts, the opposition is illusory, because people do not want to choose actively. Nanny states forbid people from choosing, but they also forbid people from choosing not to choose. If and to the extent that health insurers, employers, hospitals and doctors forbid that choice, they are acting paternalistically, and that particular form of paternalism might be unjustified. It is true that active choosing has a central place in a free society, and it needs to play a large role in the health care system. But for those involved in that system, as for everyone else, the same concerns that motivate objections to paternalism in general can be applied to paternalistic interferences with people’s choice not to choose. These points have implications for health insurance, for food safety, for wellness programs, and for the idea of "patient autonomy."

This introductory chapter to the edited volume "Nudging Health: Health Law and Behavioral Economics" (I. Glenn Cohen, Holly Fernandez Lynch, Christopher T. Robertson, eds.) introduces the potential benefits, drawbacks, and possibilities for using the tools of behavioral economics - and particularly behavioral law and policy - to improve human health, exploring the policy alternatives to traditional "carrots and sticks" that may be utilized in the health sector. It also provides brief summaries of each chapter in the volume, along with a complete Table of Contents. From the book jacket: Behavioral nudges are everywhere: calorie counts on menus, automated text reminders to encourage medication adherence, a reminder bell when a driver’s seatbelt isn’t fastened. Designed to help people make better health choices, these reminders have become so commonplace that they often go unnoticed. In Nudging Health, forty-five experts in behavioral science and health policy from across academia, government, and private industry come together to explore whether and how these tools are effective in improving health outcomes. Behavioral science has swept the fields of economics and law through the study of nudges, cognitive biases, and decisional heuristics — but it has only recently begun to impact the conversation on health care. Nudging Health wrestles with some of the thorny philosophical issues, legal limits, and conceptual questions raised by behavioral science as applied to health law and policy. The volume frames the fundamental issues surrounding health nudges by addressing ethical questions. Does cost-sharing for health expenditures cause patients to make poor decisions? Is it right to make it difficult for people to opt out of having their organs harvested for donation when they die? Are behavioral nudges paternalistic? The contributors examine specific applications of behavioral science, including efforts to address health care costs, improve vaccination rates, and encourage better decision-making by physicians. They wrestle with questions regarding the doctor-patient relationship and defaults in healthcare while engaging with larger, timely questions of healthcare reform. Nudging Health is the first multi-voiced assessment of behavioral economics and health law to span such a wide array of issues — from the Affordable Care Act to prescription drugs.

Behavioral nudges are everywhere: calorie counts on menus, automated text reminders to encourage medication adherence, a reminder bell when a driver's seatbelt isn't fastened. Designed to help people make better health choices, these reminders have become so commonplace that they often go unnoticed. In Nudging Health, forty-five experts in behavioral science and health policy from across academia, government, and private industry come together to explore whether and how these tools are effective in improving health outcomes. Behavioral science has swept the fields of economics and law through the study of nudges, cognitive biases, and decisional heuristics-but it has only recently begun to impact the conversation on health care. Nudging Health wrestles with some of the thorny philosophical issues, legal limits, and conceptual questions raised by behavioral science as applied to health law and policy. The volume frames the fundamental issues surrounding health nudges by addressing ethical questions. Does cost-sharing for health expenditures cause patients to make poor decisions?Is it right to make it difficult for people to opt out of having their organs harvested for donation when they die? Are behavioral nudges paternalistic? The contributors examine specific applications of behavioral science, including efforts to address health care costs, improve vaccination rates, and encourage better decision-making by physicians.

The Federal Circuit’s ruling that the § 2(a) disparagement provision is unconstitutional, if upheld, could allow for numerous provisions of the Trademark Act to be overturned, dismantling the modern trademark system. The trademark system is premised on evaluating speech and making content-based determinations. Granting a trademark registration requires content-based determinations, though not viewpoint-based, as words are evaluated independent of applicants’ individual viewpoints. In no way does the refusal to register a trademark prevent its use or diminish public debate. Rather than facilitating public debate, a trademark registration is a government-issued document that makes it easier for its owner to suppress the speech of others. A trademark registration is not an entry pass to the forum; it is a right to exclude. Thus in trademark law whether the government refuses registration to a mark owner or it arms that owner with a registration to enforce against other speakers, the government inevitably interferes in someone’s speech. The Federal Circuit’s mistake was to treat a regulatory, benefit-granting program as if it were a ban on speech. Although prohibiting the use of disparaging marks would suppress speech, the government does not suppress speech by refusing to include these marks on the federal register. If a firm wants to use the N-word as its mark, it is free to do so under trademark law. Instead of doctrines focused on banned speech, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is a more appropriate test for the trademark registration system, and because registration does not attempt to affect a registrant’s speech outside the four corners of the registration it poses no First Amendment problem. The different justifications, functioning, and risks of registration compared to laws punishing speech make application of doctrines about banning speech to the Lanham Act both incoherent and unwise. To rule otherwise would jeopardize much of the structure of trademark law.

Ronald Dworkin once imagined law as an empire and judges as its princes. But over time, the arc of law has bent steadily toward deference to the administrative state. Adrian Vermeule argues that law has freely abandoned its imperial pretensions, and has done so for internal legal reasons. In area after area, judges and lawyers, working out the logical implications of legal principles, have come to believe that administrators should be granted broad leeway to set policy, determine facts, interpret ambiguous statutes, and even define the boundaries of their own jurisdiction. Agencies have greater democratic legitimacy and technical competence to confront many issues than lawyers and judges do. And as the questions confronting the state involving climate change, terrorism, and biotechnology (to name a few) have become ever more complex, legal logic increasingly indicates that abnegation is the wisest course of action. As Law’s Abnegation makes clear, the state did not shove law out of the way. The judiciary voluntarily relegated itself to the margins of power. The last and greatest triumph of legalism was to depose itself.

Under American regulatory law, the dominant contemporary test involves cost-benefit analysis. The benefits of regulation must justify the costs; if they do, regulation is permissible and even mandatory. Under American free speech law, in sharp contrast, the dominant contemporary test involves clear and present danger. Regulators cannot act on the ground that the benefits justify the costs. They may proceed only if the speech is likely to produce imminent lawless action. In principle, it is not simple to explain why the free speech test does not involve cost-benefit analysis, as indeed both Judge Learned Hand and the Supreme Court insisted that it should in the early 1950s. An initial explanation points to the difficulty of quantifying both costs and benefits in the context of speech. That is indeed a serious challenge, but it does not justify the clear and present danger test, because some form of cost-benefit balancing is possible on a more informal, intuitive basis. A second and more plausible explanation points to the serious risk of institutional bias in any assessment of both costs and benefits of speech. This explanation has considerable force, but it depends on questionable assumptions, because institutional safeguards could be introduced to increase accuracy and to reduce any such bias. The third and best justification of the clear and present danger test is that in practice, it does not impose high costs, because the speech that ends up being immunized from regulation has not, in practice, turned out to be harmful. On this view, the benefits of the clear and present danger test turn out to justify its costs. From 1960 or until 2001, this assessment was probably correct for the United States, and it may continue to be correct; but the problem of terrorism, and of recruitment to commit terrorist acts, raises legitimate questions about whether the assumptions on which it rests are correct today.

We explore a model of litigation where the plaintiff can acquire a financial position in the defendant firm. The plaintiff gains a strategic advantage by taking a short financial position in the defendant’s stock. First, the plaintiff can turn what would otherwise be a negative expected value claim (even a frivolous one) into a positive expected value claim. Second, the short financial position raises the minimum amount the plaintiff is willing to accept in settlement, thereby increasing the settlement amount. Conversely, taking a long position in the defendant’s stock puts the plaintiff at a strategic disadvantage. When the capital market is initially unaware of the lawsuit, the plaintiff can profit both directly and indirectly from its financial position. When the defendant is privately informed of the merit of the case, the plaintiff balances the strategic benefits of short position against the costs of bargaining failure and trial. When credibility is an issue, short selling by the plaintiff can actually benefit both the plaintiff and the defendant by lowering the settlement amount and also reducing the probability of proceeding to costly trial.

Moderator, Dispute Systems Design: Expanding Horizons, Harvard Negotiation and Mediation Clinical Program 10th Anniversary Gala Symposium,

Most sperm donation that occurs in the USA proceeds through anonymous donation. While some clinics make the identity of the sperm donor available to a donor-conceived child at age 18 as part of ‘open identification’ or ‘identity release programs,’ no US law requires clinics to do so, and the majority of individuals do not use these programs. By contrast, in many parts of the world, there have been significant legislative initiatives requiring that sperm donor identities be made available to children after a certain age (typically when the child turns 18). One major concern with prohibiting anonymous sperm donation has been that the number of willing sperm donors will decrease leading to shortages, as have been experienced in some of the countries that have prohibited sperm donor anonymity. One possible solution, suggested by prior work, would be to pay current anonymous sperm donors more per donation to continue to donate when their anonymity is removed. Using a unique sample of current anonymous and open identity sperm donors from a large sperm bank in the USA, we test that approach. As far as we know, this is the first attempt to examine what would happen if the USA adopted a prohibition on anonymous sperm donation that used the most ecologically valid population, current sperm donors. We find that 29% of current anonymous sperm donors in the sample would refuse to donate if the law changed such that they were required to put their names in a registry available to donor-conceived children at age 18. When we look at the remaining sperm donors who would be willing to participate, we find that they would demand an additional $60 per donation (using our preferred specification). We also discuss the ramifications for the industry.

How can we ensure that players in the National Football League receive excellent health care they can trust from providers who are as free from conflicts of interest as realistically possible? NFL players typically receive care from the club's own medical staff. Club doctors are clearly important stakeholders in player health. They diagnose and treat players for a variety of ailments, physical and mental, while making recommendations to the player concerning those ailments. At the same time, club doctors have obligations to the club, namely to inform and advise clubs about the health status of players. While players and clubs share an interest in player health—both of them want players to be healthy so they can play at peak performance—there are several areas where their interests can diverge, and the divergence presents legal and ethical challenges. The current structure forces club doctors to have obligations to two parties—the club and the player—and to make difficult judgments about when one party's interests must yield to another's. None of the three parties involved should prefer this conflicted approach. We propose to resolve the problem of dual loyalty by largely severing the club doctor's ties with the club and refashioning that role into one of singular loyalty to the player-patient. The main idea is to separate the roles of serving the player and serving the club and replace them with two distinct sets of medical professionals: the Players' Medical Staff (with exclusive loyalty to the player) and the Club Evaluation Doctor (with exclusive loyalty to the club). We begin by explaining the broad ethical principles that guide us and that help shape our recommendation. We then provide a description of the role of the club doctor in the current system. After explaining the concern about the current NFL player health care structure, we provide a recommendation for improving this structure. We then discuss how the club medical staff fits into the broader microenvironment affecting player health.

Our article “NFL Player Health Care: Addressing Club Doctors’ Conflicts of Interests and Promoting Player Trust” focused on an inherent structural conflict that faces club doctors in the National Football League. The conflict stems from club doctors’ dual role of providing medical care to players and providing strategic advice to clubs. We recommended assigning these roles to different individuals, with the medical staff members who are responsible for providing player care being chosen and subject to review and termination by a committee of medical experts selected equally by the NFL and the NFL Players Association. Recognizing that the problem of structural conflict of interest is deeply entrenched and that our recommendation is a significant departure from the status quo, we invited comment from a diverse and highly qualified group of experts. There is considerable common ground among the commentators. All but one agreed with us that, despite the best intentions of upstanding professionals, there is a structural conflict of interest in the club doctors’ relationship with players, and the commentaries were generally supportive of our recommendation for change. There are also meaningful disagreements, however. Some commentators think that the proposal is on the right track but does not go far enough to reduce the structural conflict of interest, and one commentary wholly disagrees with our analysis and recommendations.

Globalization is rapidly changing the landscape of law practice in China, especially its corporate legal sector. This article reports on the preliminary findings of the China research of the Globalization, Lawyers, and Emerging Economies (GLEE) Project—a comparative study that examines how globalization is reshaping the market for legal services in important emerging economies and how these developments are contributing to the transformation of the political economy in these countries and beyond. Adopting an ecological approach, which examines how different segments of the legal system interact with one another in complex ways, this article maps the corporate core, international linkages, and domestic contexts of China’s globalizing corporate legal sector and discusses its impact on lawyers and society.

The book offers clear explanations of property law through textual treatment, with numerous examples, analytical discussion of key cases, and issues followed by hypotheticals.

This Essay analyzes the First Amendment arguments against §2(a)’s disparagement bar with reference to the consequences of any invalidation on the rest of the trademark statute. Ultimately, given the differences — or lack thereof — between disparagement and other bars in the statute, I conclude that §2(a) is generally constitutional as a government determination about what speech it is willing to approve, if not endorse. If the Supreme Court disagrees, it will face a difficult job distinguishing other aspects of trademark law. And these difficulties signal a greater problem: the Court has lost touch with the reasons that some content-based distinctions might deserve special scrutiny. Often, perfectly sensible and by no means censorious regulations that depend on identifying the semantic content of speech would fall afoul of a real application of heightened scrutiny, to no good end.

Tort scholars have long been obsessed with the dichotomy between strict liability and liability based on fault or wrongdoing. We argue that this is a false dichotomy. Torts such as battery, libel, negligence, and nuisance are wrongs, yet all are “strictly” defined in the sense of setting objective and thus quite demanding standards of conduct. We explain this basic insight under the heading of “the strict liability in fault.” We then turn to the special case of liability for abnormally dangerous activities, which at times really does involve liability without wrongdoing. Through an examination of this odd corner of tort law, we isolate “the fault in strict liability” — that is, the fault line between the wrongs-based form of strict liability that is frequently an aspect of tort liability and the wrongs-free form of strict liability that is found only within the very narrow domain of liability for abnormally dangerous activities. We conclude by defending these two features of the common law of tort: the strictness of the terms on which it defines wrongdoing and its begrudging willingness to recognize, in one special kind of case, liability without wrongdoing.

Judges on a multimember court might vote in two different ways. In the first, judges behave solipsistically, imagining themselves to be the sole judge on the court, in the style of Ronald Dworkin’s mythical Judge Hercules. On this model, judges base their votes solely on the information contained in the legal sources before them – statutes, regulations, precedents and the like – and the arguments of advocates. In the second model, judges vote interdependently; they take into account not only the legal sources and arguments, but also the information contained in the votes of other judges, based on the same sources and arguments. What does the law say about these two models? May judges take into account the votes of colleagues when deciding how to vote themselves? Should they do so? Are there even conditions under which judges must do so? To date, the law has no general theory about how to approach interdependent voting. Each setting is taken on its own terms, and judges muddle through. The problem is that some judges muddle in one direction, some in another, without any consistent approach, either across judges, or across settings. We argue for a presumption that judges not only may but should consider the votes of other judges as relevant evidence or information, unless special circumstances obtain that make the systemic costs of doing so clearly greater than the benefits. Our view is not absolutist; we do not say that judges should always and everywhere consider the votes of other judges. Under certain conditions, it may be better for decisionmakers not to attempt to consider all available information, and we will attempt to indicate what those conditions might be, in this domain. But we will argue that such conditions should not casually be assumed to exist. Interdependence should be the norm, and solipsism the exception, so that unless judges have good reason to do otherwise they should take into account the information contained in other judges’ votes. Our central case is an extended fugue on Chevron-related examples and variants, but we also consider qualified immunity, new rules in habeas corpus, mandamus, and the rule of lenity.

Over 20 years, M&A contracts have more than doubled in size – from 35 to 88 single-spaced pages in this paper’s font. They have also grown significantly in linguistic complexity – from post-graduate “grade 20” to post-doctoral “grade 30”. A substantial portion (lower bound ~20%) of the growth consists not of mere verbiage but of substantive new terms. These include rational reactions to new legal risks (e.g., SOX, FCPA enforcement, shareholder litigation) as well as to changes in deal and financing markets (e.g., financing conditions, financing covenants, and cooperation covenants; and reverse termination fees). New contract language also includes dispute resolution provisions (e.g., jury waivers, forum selection clauses) that are puzzling not for appearing new but in why they were ever absent. A final, notable set of changes reflect innovative deal terms, such as top-up options, which are associated with a 18-day (~30%) fall in time-to-completion and a 6% improvement in completion rates. Exploratory in nature, this paper frames a variety of questions about how an important class of highly negotiated contracts evolves over time.

This chapter proposes that proportionality as a mode of legal reasoning is implicated in no fewer than three phases of the decision of ‘hard cases’ of judicial review of statutes. First, at the level of legal ‘substance,’ the jurist faces the situation of contemporary legal thought characterized by the rise of proportionality, institutional competence arguments, and the ‘hermeneutic of suspicion’ that ideology corrupts legal judgment. Second, it is arguably appropriate for the judge to decide whether or not to uphold a statute, in spite of his good faith opinion against it, on the basis of a proportional weighing of the counter-majoritarian difficulty against the bad consequences of deference. Third, the judge may have to decide proportionally whether to present his reasons for striking a statute in their true proportional form or rather to violate his duty of candor by presenting himself as a legal formalist. The judge, inescapably a political actor, is subject to the decisionist ethical calculus of Max Weber’s Politics as a Vocation.

Despite a declining prison population, the US still sends more people to jail per capita than any other country. But does this predilection towards incarceration lead to lower crime rates? By relating crime and incarceration data to country-specific data on measures such as development and social policy Holger Spamann finds that the US’ incarceration rate is a distinct outlier given the amount of crime it experiences. He writes that the incarceration gap may be down to factors such as poor race relations, but that it is more likely that the US’ policy of mass incarceration simply doesn’t do enough to deter or prevent crime.

The world of 2016 is one where leaking a lot is much easier than leaking a little. And the indiscriminate compromise of people’s selfies, ephemeral data, and personal correspondence — what we used to rightly think of as a simple and brutal invasion of privacy — has become the unremarkable chaff surrounding a few worthy instances of potentially genuine whistleblowing. These now-routine Exxon Valdez spill-sized leaks, for which anyone can be a target, threaten us as individuals and as a citizenry. They’re not at all like the Pentagon Papers or the revelations of Watergate, and they wrongly benefit from the general feeling that such leaks are a way to bring powerful parties to account.

"Proponents of ‘nudge theory’ argue that, because of our human susceptibility to an array of biases, we often make subprime choices and decisions that make us poorer, less healthy, and more miserable than we might otherwise be. However, using behavioural economics—and insights from other disciplines—they suggest that apparently small and subtle solutions (or ‘nudges’) can lead to disproportionately beneficial outcomes without unduly restricting our freedom of choice. Indeed, the apparently virtuous—and cost-effective—possibilities of nudge theory has led to its enthusiastic adoption by adherents in the highest echelons of government and business, and ‘nudge units’ (such as the Behavioural Insights Team in the British Cabinet Office) have been established in the UK, the United States, and Australia. While far from uncontroversial (some critics have questioned its ethical implications and dismissed many of its practical applications as short-term, politically motivated initiatives based on flimsy evidence), in recent years there has been an astonishing growth in scholarly output about and around the economics of nudge. And now, while the hybrid field continues to flourish, Routledge announces a new four-volume collection to provide users with a much-needed compendium of foundational and the very best cutting-edge scholarship. The collection is co-edited by Cass R. Sunstein (Robert Walmsley University Professor at Harvard), the co-author (with Richard Thaler) of the pioneering Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008), and Lucia Reisch of the Copenhagen Business School. The Economics of Nudge is fully indexed and has a comprehensive introduction, newly written by the editors, which places the collected material in its historical and intellectual context. It is an essential work of reference and is destined to be valued by scholars, students, and policymakers as a vital resource." --Publisher

Wholesale prices for electricity vary significantly due to high fluctuations and low elasticity in short-run demand. End-use customers have typically paid flat retail rates for their electricity consumption, and time-varying prices have been proposed to help reduce peak consumption and lower the overall cost of servicing demand. Unfortunately, the general practice is an opt-in system: a default rule in favor of time-varying prices would be far better. A behaviorally informed analysis also shows that when transaction costs and decision biases are taken into account, the most cost-reflective policies are not necessarily the most efficient. On reasonable assumptions, real-time prices can result in less peak conservation of manually controlled devices than time-of-use or critical-peak prices. For that reason, the trade-offs between engaging automated and manually controlled loads must be carefully considered in time-varying rate design. The rate type and accompanying program details should be designed with the behavioral biases of consumers in mind, while minimizing price distortions for automated devices.

Doctors and lawyers are prohibited from using clients’ information for their own interests, so why aren’t Google and Facebook?

In the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and many other nations, those involved in law and policy have been exploring choice-preserving approaches, or “nudges,” informed by behavioral science and with the purpose of promoting important public policy goals, such as improved health and safety. But there is a large and insufficiently explored difference between System 1 nudges, which target or benefit from automatic processing, and System 2 nudges, which target or benefit from deliberative processing. Graphic warnings and default rules are System 1 nudges; statistical information and factual disclosures are System 2 nudges. On philosophical grounds, it might seem tempting to prefer System 2 nudges, on the assumption that they show greater respect for individual dignity and promote individual agency. A nationally representative survey in the United States finds evidence that in important contexts, majorities do indeed prefer System 2 nudges. At the same time, that preference is not fixed and firm. If people are asked to assume that the System 1 nudge is significantly more effective, then large numbers of them will move in its direction. In a range of contexts, Republicans, Democrats, and independents show surprisingly similar responses. The survey findings, and an accompanying normative analysis, offer lessons for those involved in law and policy who are choosing between System 1 nudges and System 2 nudges.

This short technical report provides an empirical analysis of the level of institutional block ownership overall, and of foreign block ownership, at a broad set of publicly traded corporations. Disclosed institutional blockholders of every company in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index are analyzed, and the distribution of blockholders is presented. Blockholders are identified as domestic or foreign entities, and whether they were majority owned or controlled by foreign entities. Roughly one in three companies in the S&P 500 has one or more block holders with 20 % ownership, and one in eleven (9%) has one or more foreign institutions each owning five percent or more blocks of stock. The descriptive data reported here may assist lawmakers, analysts, and investors in assessing the effects of globalization of capital markets and the interaction of country and governance risk, and in developing policies. Among other things, these data may inform debates on the degree to which domestic political spending by U.S. corporations conveys any potential for foreign influence through governance, and the likely costs and benefits of disclosure laws regarding such influence.

On July 1, 2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed an excess-pay clawback rule to implement the provisions of Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act. I explain why the SEC’s proposed Dodd-Frank clawback, while reducing executives’ incentives to misreport, is overbroad. The economy and investors would be better served by a more narrowly targeted “smart” excess-pay clawback that focuses on fewer issuers, executives, and compensation arrangements.

What is the appropriate test to determine when a feature of a useful article is protectable under § 101 of the Copyright Act?