Parent Categories
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
-
Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement with Multiple Plaintiffs: The Role of Insolvency, 18 J.L. Econ. & Org. 293 (2002).
-
Kathryn E. Spier, ‘Tied to the Mast’: Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Contracts, 32 J. Legal Stud. 91 (2003).
-
The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation
July 14, 2026
Kathryn E. Spier, The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation, 59 Rev. Econ. Stud. 93 (1992).
-
Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation
July 14, 2026
James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn E. Spier, Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation, 9 J.L. Econ. & Org.
-
On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, and Renegotiation
July 14, 2026
Kathryn E. Spier & Michael D. Whinston, On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, and Renegotiation, 26 RAND…
-
Kathryn E. Spier & Alan O. Sykes, Capital Structure, Priority Rules, and the Settlement of Civil Claims, 18 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 187 (1998).
-
‘Competition’ Among Employers Offering Health Insurance
July 14, 2026
David Dranove, Kathryn E. Spier & Laurence Baker, ‘Competition’ Among Employers Offering Health Insurance, 19 J. Health Econ. 121 (2000).
-
Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier, Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer, 164 J. Inst. & Theoretical Econ. 4 (2008).
-
Kathryn E. Spier, The Use of ‘Most-Favored-Nation’ Clauses in Settlement of Litigation, 34 RAND J. Econ. 78 (2003).
-
Incomplete Contracts and Signaling
July 14, 2026
Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signaling, 23 RAND J. Econ. 432 (1992).
-
Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards
July 14, 2026
Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards, 10 J.L. Econ. & Org. 84 (1994).
-
James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn Spier, Revenue Sharing and Vertical Control in the Video Rental Industry, 49 J. Indus. Econ. 223 (2001).
-
Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities, 99 Am. Econ. Rev. 1850 (2009).
-
James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn E. Spier, Designing a Private Industry: Government Auctions with Endogenous Market Structure, 53 J. Pub. Econ. 127 (1994).
-
Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules
July 14, 2026
Kathryn E. Spier, Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules, 25 RAND J. Econ. 197 (1994).
-
Incentives and Contract Frames
July 14, 2026
Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, Incentives and Contract Frames, 168 J. Inst. & Theoretical Econ. 83 (2012).
-
A Theory of Utilization Review
July 14, 2026
David Dranove & Kathryn E. Spier, A Theory of Utilization Review, 2 Contributions to Econ. Analysis & Pol’y (2003).
-
Threats Without Binding Commitment
July 14, 2026
Steven Shavell & Kathryn E. Spier, Threats Without Binding Commitment, 2 Topics in Econ. Analysis & Pol’y (2002).
-
Incentive Contracts for Teams: Experimental evidence
July 14, 2026
Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, Incentive Contracts For Teams: Experimental Evidence, 119 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 496 (2015).
-
Information and externalities in sequential litigation
July 14, 2026
Xinyu Hua & Kathryn E. Spier, Information and Externalities in Sequential Litigation, 161 J. Inst. & Theoretical Econ. 215 (2005).
-
The Influence of the Iranian Model in Egypt
July 14, 2026
Kristen Stilt, Harry R. Horrow Professor in Int’l L. at Nw. L. Sch., The Influence of the Iranian Model in Egypt, Paper Presentation at the…