Shareholders

Robert C. Clark, Harmony or Dissonance? The Good Governance Ideas of Academics and Worldly Players, 70 Bus. Law. 321 (2015).

Robert C. Clark, The Regulation of Financial Holding Companies, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 789 (1979).

Mark J. Roe, Why Shareholder-Driven Corporate Social Responsibility Failed, SSRN (Mar. 3, 2026).

Mark J. Roe, What Is Stock Market Short-Termism?, 77 Bus. Law. 1039 (2022).

Mark J. Roe, Dodge v. Ford: What Happened and Why?, 74 Vand. L. Rev. 1755 (2021).

Mark J. Roe, Corporate Purpose and Corporate Competition, 99 Wash. U. L. Rev. 223 (2021).

Mark J. Roe & Roy Shapira, The Power of the Narrative in Corporate Lawmaking, 11 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 233 (2021)…

Mark J. Roe & Massimiliano Vatiero, Corporate Governance and Its Political Economy, in The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance 56 (Jeffrey N. Gordon…

Mark J. Roe, Stock Market Short-Termism’s Impact, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 71 (2018).

Mark J. Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1986).

Mark J. Roe, Mergers, Acquisitions and Tort: A Comment on the Problem of Successor Corporation Liability, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1559 (1984).

Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 Yale L.J. 1927 (1993).

Mark J. Roe, Labor Policy and Shareholder Primacy, in アメリカ型経済社会の二面性: 市場論理と社会的枠組/Amerika-gata keizai shakai no nimensei: shijo ronri to shakaiteki wakugumi (Hiroshi Shibuya, Shinʼya Imura, Masaharu…

Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (Princeton Univ. Press, 1994).

Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, in Corporate Governance: Law, Theory and Policy 290 (Thomas W. Joo ed., 2d ed. 2010).

Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 Yale L.J. 871 (1993).

Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 527 (1983).

Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 Colum L. Rev. 846 (1984).

Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 10 (1991).

Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions To Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1463 (2000).

Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organizations, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2063 (2001).