Litigation & Settlement

Albert H. Choi & Kathryn E. Spier, Class Actions and Private Antitrust Litigation, 14 Am. Econ. J.: Microeconomics 131 (2022).

Kathryn E. Spier, Economics of Litigation, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).

Albert H. Choi & Kathryn E. Spier, Taking a Financial Position in Your Opponent in Litigation (Va. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 3, Nov.

Kathryn E. Spier & J.J. Prescott, Contracting on Litigation (Univ. Mich. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 16-009, Apr. 8, 2016).

Kathryn E. Spier, A Note on Joint and Several Liability: Insolvency, Settlement, and Incentives, 23 J. Legal Stud. 559 (1994).

Kathryn E. Spier, ‘Tied to the Mast’: Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Contracts, 32 J. Legal Stud. 91 (2003).

Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement with Multiple Plaintiffs: The Role of Insolvency, 18 J.L. Econ. & Org. 293 (2002).

Kathryn E. Spier, The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation, 59 Rev. Econ. Stud. 93 (1992).

Kathryn E. Spier & Michael D. Whinston, On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, and Renegotiation, 26 RAND…

Kathryn E. Spier, A Note on the Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Settle Under a Negligence Rule, 26 J. Legal Stud.

J.J. Prescott, Kathryn E. Spier & Albert Yoon, Trial and Settlement: A Study of High-Low Agreements, 57 J. L. & Econ. 699 (2014).

Kathryn E. Spier, The Use of ‘Most-Favored-Nation’ Clauses in Settlement of Litigation, 34 RAND J. Econ. 78 (2003).

Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards, 10 J.L. Econ. & Org. 84 (1994).

Kathryn E. Spier, Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules, 25 RAND J. Econ. 197 (1994).

Keith Fogg, Access to Judicial Review in Non-Deficiency Tax Cases, 73 Tax Law. 435 (2020).

Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1785 (1995).

Jacob Gersen, Markets and Corporate Conflict: A substitution-cost approach to business litigation, 24 Law & Soc. Inquiry 589 (1999).

Ross E. Cheit & Jacob Gersen, When Businesses Sue Each Other: An empirical study of state court litigation, 25 Law & Soc. Inquiry 789 (2000).

J. Mark Ramseyer, The Costs of the Consensual Myth: Antitrust Enforcement and Institutional Barriers to Litigation in Japan, 94 Yale L.J. 604 (1985).

J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. Legal Stud. 263 (1989).

J. Mark Ramseyer, Social Capital and the Formal Legal System: Evidence from Prefecture-Level Data in Japan, 7 J. Legal Analysis 421 (2015).