Law & Economics

A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines, 35 J.L. & Econ. 133 (1992).

A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Liability Be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?, 10 J.L. Econ.

A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies Among Individuals, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 618 (1991).

A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On Offense History and the Theory of Deterrence, 18 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 305 (1998).

Steven Shavell & Laurence Weiss, The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time, 87 J. Pol. Econ. 1347 (1979).

A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1999).

A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks, 28 J.L. Econ. & Org. 360 (2012).

Steven M. Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & Econ. 525 (2001).

A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement, 81 J. Pub. Econ. 1 (2001).

Steven Shavell, Risk Aversion and the Desirability of Attenuated Legal Change, 16 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 366 (2014).

A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 Am. Econ. Rev. 880 (1979).

A.Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, 24 J. Pub. Econ. 89 (1984).

Steven Shavell, Sharing of Information Prior to Settlement or Litigation, 20 RAND J. Econ. 183 (1989).

A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Contribution and Claim Reduction Among Antitrust Defendants: An Economic Analysis, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 447 (1981).

A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs, 19 J. Pub. Econ. 385 (1982).

Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 77 Am. Econ. Rev. 584 (1987).

Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 Bell J. Econ. 120 (1982).

Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. Legal Stud. 333 (1982).

Steven Shavell, The Optimal Level of Corporate Liability Given the Limited Ability of Corporations to Penalize Their Employees, 17 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 203…

Steven Shavell, When Is Compliance with the Law Socially Desirable?, 41 J. Legal Stud. 1 (2012).

Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Threats and Their Illegality: Blackmail, Extortion, and Robbery, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1877 (1993).