Prerequisite: None

Exam Type: No Exam

I have written on several occasions that the single most important political idea of the past 450 years (certainly since Thomas Hobbes and Leviathan (1651) is that of “popular sovereignty.”  Among other things, it replaces the notion of “Divine sovereignty”—i.e., truly being “under God,” either directly or, more likely, indirectly, through the rule of “magistrates” and other rulers who are the agents of God—with that of rule by “we the people.”  That notion in itself raises deep problems.  The most obvious is simply  who counts as part of “the people” who are entitled to rule.  This question becomes especially important with the concomitant rise over the past several centuries of the idea of “nationalism.”  There were certainly “nations” in ancient time, but the idea of a given nation that was entitled to “self-determination” is distinctly more modern.  Indeed, the idea is closely linked with Woodrow Wllson, who promoted the idea of “national self-determination” as an ideal underlying World War I, the war that was supposed to make the world “safe for democracy.”  How one defines “democracy” is obviously itself a loaded question, but Wilson, and others, linked it strongly to “self-rule” by a defined national “people” who were differentiated from other “peoples,” who, indeed, might become defined as “Others” in a quite baleful sense.  So much of our twelve hours together will be spent exploring some aspects of this problem. 

Although it is a general problem of world politics, particularly in the modern era, much of the inquiry will be focused on the United States. Ask yourself only if the United States is a “nation-state” as against, say, a state composed of millions of individuals who share a very large territory but who are not truly part of a single nation.  “Who is an American” has been a question addressed by a variety of writers since at least the 18th century and we certainly haven’t all agreed on an answer even today.  Is “Americanness” constituted by attachment to certain abstract ideals (including the Constitution) or by an ostensibly shared history quite literally rooted in blood and soil (as, for example, has recently been suggested by Vice President Vance?)

The United States presents a second problem, especially if one inflects “States” rather than “United”:  I.e., how does “popular sovereignty” work in a federal system that, by definition, consists of a number of distinct sub-national political entities characterized by their sense of difference, along various dimensions, from one another?  Were we in 1787—or even today—a singular “American people” or a collection of multiple “peoples” who have come together for limited purposes in a complex “federation” (as distinguished from a “unitary government”)?

Even if we can agree on who actually comprises the set of “we the people” (and, therefore, who is outside of the set, see. e.g., Dred ScotI), who actually gets to exercise the “sovereignty” that is purportedly assigned to “the people.”  And, as “sovereigns,” how, if at all, are they limited in their powers? This generates the problem of “constituent power,” which is differentiated from the “constituted powers” established by the true sovereigns.  I.e, American politics, and its presumptively limited nature, takes place within a political system consciously designed by the so-called “Framers” in Philadelphia and ratified by those chosen in elections as “ratifiers.”  But what if “we the people” become dissatisfied with the decisions made long ago (and, in some cases, far away)? Are “we” entitled to re-engage as “sovereigns” and redesign the system, whether through outright revolution (see, e.g., the Declaration of Independence that we’re ostensibly celebrating this semiquincentennial year) or even through a new “convention” as, perhaps, suggested by Article V itself of the current U.S. Constitution. 

So how, if at all, do we define the “constituent power” in the 21st century, whether in the United States or elsewhere?  As you will see (should you take the course), there is significant disagreement, and some theorists make plausible argument that the notion is incoherent and/or dangerous, best forgotten.  Others disagree.  But even if we can identify the subset of “the people” who are entitled to take on the awesome powers of a “constituent assembly” or “convention,” are their powers truly unlimited, as suggested by the idea of “sovereignty,” or are they limited?  Hobbes solved this problem by suggesting that the sovereign people, after authorizing a framework of government, which could certainly include a monarch, would simply fall asleep, never to awaken.  But what if a “sleeping sovereign” in fact does wake up and wish to reassert its ostensible power?

Once again, federalism presents special problems.  One of the readings, for example, be a chapter from a book by Stephen Tierney, a Scottish academic, on the possibility that all federal systems are characterized by multiple constituent powers rather than a singular one that might be present in a true “nation-state.” 

 There is, of course, no possibility at all that we will pay truly adequate attention to all of the issues raised by these topics.  My hope is that it will serve as an introduction and that it will provoke interesting discussions among those taking the course.  To this end, I shall ask/require each registrant to write one “response paper” during the semester.  It should be roughly 600-750 words, and the aim should be to set out one or two questions suggested by one of the readings for that particular week that pique your interest and that you would like to hear discussed by everyone.  My hope is that these papers will limit my own propensity to speak too often and for too long!

Note: This reading group will meet on the following dates: TBD.