Faculty Bibliography

Anticorruption agencies (ACAs), and other bodies entrusted with investigating or prosecuting high-level government corruption, face a daunting task: They must faithfully discharge their anticorruption functions in the near term, but at the same time they must protect, entrench, and strengthen their institutions so that they can carry out these anticorruption functions effectively over the longer term. These objectives are sometimes complementary, but there can often be significant tensions between them. This essay considers some of the strategic challenges that ACA leaders must confront, taking the institutional rules and the agency’s structure, resources, and capacity as exogenous constraints. While such leaders face many strategic challenges, we focus on two. The first concerns case selection strategy. How do (or should) ACAs decide which cases to pursue or prioritize? The second issue concerns communications strategy. How do (or should) ACAs engage with various constituencies—such as politicians, media organizations, activists, international bodies, and the general public—about the ACA’s work? This essay explores these questions, drawing on both existing scholarship and on several in-depth interviews with current and former senior officials from ACAs or comparable bodies.

In Loper Bright v. Raimondo, the Supreme Court overruled Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council and repudiated Chevron’s the across-the-board presumption that statutory ambiguities should be treated as implied delegations of discretion to agencies. But Loper Bright did not repudiate the possibility that a court might properly find implied delegation in some cases. How should a court identify such cases? Loper Bright did not offer much guidance, and in the coming years, a central project of administrative law will be articulating, elaborating, and refining the doctrine that is to govern this inquiry. This Article argues that the canonical pre-Chevron cases Gray v. Powell and NLRB v. Hearst Publications, together with their antecedents and progeny, provide a useful framework for distinguishing those interpretive questions on which courts ought to find implicit delegations to agencies from those issues that are for the courts to decide without deference. The Gray doctrine establishes a presumption that, when a statute empowers an agency to take some authoritative action which necessarily involves the application of an imprecise statutory term to particular situations, the statute should be read as implicitly delegating to the agency the authority to make the necessary line-drawing decisions. At the same time, the Gray doctrine does not call for judicial deference to an agency’s views on the resolution of interpretive questions that can be answered through abstract textual or structural analysis. Courts can and should incorporate the Gray doctrine into the implicit delegation prong of the Loper Bright framework. Doing so would be both legal—consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as interpreted by Loper Bright—and desirable. The Gray doctrine provides a structured, workable method—one well-grounded in decades of pre-Chevron case law—for deciding when a finding of implicit delegation is appropriate. Integrating Gray into Loper Bright would achieve a more appropriate allocation of authority between the judicial and executive branches than would alternative and more restrictive approaches to Loper Bright’s implicit delegation prong.

A majority of the Justices today are self-described textualists. Yet even as these jurists insist that “the text of the law is the law,” they appeal to “substantive” canons of construction that stretch statutory text in the direction of favored values, from federalism to restraining the administrative state. The conflict between these commitments would seem obvious — and indeed, candid textualists have long acknowledged that there is a “tension” here. But textualist theorists have also advanced several arguments to assuage or finesse that tension, and the sheer availability of those arguments has given the textualist Justices’ resort to these devices a respectability that, we argue here, it does not deserve.With the Justices now openly debating the compatibility of textualism and substantive canons, this Article surveys and critically assesses the assorted efforts to square this particular circle. Those strategies include (1) recharacterizing substantive canons as elements of the “background” against which Congress legislates, (2) linking them to “constitutional values,” and (3) restricting their use to resolving “ambiguities.” Each of those defenses, we argue, either commits textualists to jurisprudential positions they ordinarily denounce or, at best, implies such a narrow scope for substantive canons that nothing resembling their current use would survive. The Article thus concludes that textualists should either abandon their reliance on substantive canons or else concede that their textualism is not what they have often made it out to be.

Constitutional theorists usually assume that minority-protective judicial review leads to outcomes more favorable to the protected minority and less favorable to the majority. Our analysis highlights an indirect effect of judicial review that complicates this conventional wisdom. Without judicial review, pro-majority and pro-minority leaders adopt different policies. Because judicial review limits the degree to which pro-majority leaders can adopt anti-minority policies, it becomes easier for pro-minority leaders to ‘mimic’ pro-majority leaders by adopting the most anti-minority policy that the judiciary would uphold. Furthermore, if judicial invalidation of anti-minority policies is probabilistic rather than certain, pro-majority leaders may propose even more extreme anti-minority policies in order to deter pro-minority leaders from mimicking. These effects can sometimes nullify, or even reverse, the assumed relationship between minority-protective judicial review and pro-minority outcomes. When such reversal occurs, majoritarian democrats should favor minority-protective judicial review, while those concerned with protecting unpopular minorities should oppose it.

This essay discusses the development of a Legislation and Regulation course (or Leg-Reg) as part of a 1L curriculum reform that the Harvard Law School faculty unanimously adopted in 2006. The reform was adopted following three years of work by a Committee on Educational Innovations appointed by then-Dean Elena Kagan and chaired by future Dean Martha Minow. The Leg-Reg piece of the new curriculum aims to broaden the 1L program's perspective from the essential, but by today's standards incomplete, focus on private law topics and common law reasoning that had dominated the 1L curriculum since 1873. Leg-Reg instead focuses on statutes and the regulations that implement them. The course emphasizes not only the interpretation of those materials, but also the lawmaking process, institutional context, and political dynamics that shape the production and interpretation of statutes and regulations. This essay discusses several aspects of the Harvard experience with Legislation and Regulation. First, because reforming the 1L curriculum is such a daunting process, the paper provides a brief account of the extensive curricular reform process that successfully produced this and two other new 1L courses. Second, the essay discusses the course's strategy for fitting novel and somewhat different techniques, materials, and concepts into a 1L course. In particular, it will discuss the fact that, while the Leg-Reg incorporates many topics and methods that are touched on only tangentially, if at all, in other 1L courses (such as textual exegesis, legislative procedure, and public choice theory), it does so primarily by asking students (a) to learn and assess concrete, real-world legal decisions and then (b) to build out, through note material, to the broader concepts implicated by the cases. In addition, the version of the Leg-Reg course developed at Harvard is consciously transsubstantive, rather than focused on a particular policy area. Third, this essay elaborates on this pedagogical approach by giving some detail about the way Leg-Reg presents certain key cases on statutory interpretation. Fourth, the essay examines the administrative law (“Reg”) component of the course. In particular, the essay explains how starting with statutory interpretation addresses the often-voiced concern that administrative law is simply too complicated for 1Ls. This part of the essay also discusses the impact of 1L Leg-Reg course on enrollments in Administrative Law and related public law offerings.

We analyze the interaction between electoral accountability and separation-of-powers by comparing three regimes: ‘Unilateral Authority’ (the President has exclusive decision-making power); ‘Mandatory Checks’ (the President cannot change policy without congressional assent); and ‘Opt-in Checks’ (the President may seek congressional authorization or act unilaterally). We find: (1) voters use asymmetric electoral rewards and punishments to offset the risk of politician bias, but voters rely less on this blunt instrument if there are internal checks; (2) adding a veto player need not alter the ex ante likelihood of policy change; and (3) voter welfare is highest under Opt-In Checks and lowest under Unilateral Authority.

Public choice theory sheds light on many aspects of legislation, regulation, and constitutional law and is critical to a sophisticated understanding of public policy. The editors of this landmark addition to the law and economics literature have organized the Handbook into four main areas of inquiry: foundations, constitutional law and democracy, administrative design and action, and specific statutory schemes. The original contributions, authored by top scholars in the field, provide helpful introductions to important topics in public choice and public law while also exploring the institutional complexity of American democracy.

The relationship between third-party contract enforcement and informal networks raises important sociological, political, and economic questions. When economic activity is embedded in social structures, what are the implications of third-party contract enforcement for the scope and nature of economic relations? What determines whether individuals rely on formal legal institutions or informal networks to sustain trade relationships? Do legal institutions erode informal networks? We develop a model in which a trade-off exists between size and sustainability of networks. By adding the possibility of fee-based, enforceable contracts, we provide a theoretical explanation for the coexistence of legal contract enforcement and an informal economy. We find that legal enforcement has little effect on networks until law becomes sufficiently inexpensive, at which point small decreases in the cost of law have dramatic effects on network size and the frequency of use of the legal system.