Faculty Bibliography

A majority of the Justices today are self-described textualists. Yet even as these jurists insist that “the text of the law is the law,” they appeal to “substantive” canons of construction that stretch statutory text in the direction of favored values, from federalism to restraining the administrative state. The conflict between these commitments would seem obvious — and indeed, candid textualists have long acknowledged that there is a “tension” here. But textualist theorists have also advanced several arguments to assuage or finesse that tension, and the sheer availability of those arguments has given the textualist Justices’ resort to these devices a respectability that, we argue here, it does not deserve.With the Justices now openly debating the compatibility of textualism and substantive canons, this Article surveys and critically assesses the assorted efforts to square this particular circle. Those strategies include (1) recharacterizing substantive canons as elements of the “background” against which Congress legislates, (2) linking them to “constitutional values,” and (3) restricting their use to resolving “ambiguities.” Each of those defenses, we argue, either commits textualists to jurisprudential positions they ordinarily denounce or, at best, implies such a narrow scope for substantive canons that nothing resembling their current use would survive. The Article thus concludes that textualists should either abandon their reliance on substantive canons or else concede that their textualism is not what they have often made it out to be.

A workaround is a maneuver that seems, on its face, consistent with the formal rules, but that employs those rules in an unanticipated way to circumvent a legal obstacle. Though some workarounds are tolerated or even celebrated, workarounds (and proposed workarounds) often provoke instinctive skepticism or hostility. When, if ever, is such skepticism justified? Do workarounds raise distinctive legal or public policy concerns? This Article seeks to provide a systematic normative assessment of workarounds in American public law. We argue, first, that from a general public interest perspective, the desirability of a workaround depends primarily on the desirability of the rule that is being worked around. Put simply, workarounds will typically advance the public interest when the legal obstacle being worked around does more harm than good, while workarounds will set back the public interest when the obstacle being worked around serves an important public purpose. Other objections to workarounds—for example, that they will erode government legitimacy, weaken norms of self-restraint, undermine the credibility of government commitments, or sap energy for more substantial reforms—are either empirically implausible or relatively insignificant when compared to the first-order question of whether the obstacle being circumvented is itself in the public interest. Questions concerning the legality of workarounds raise different issues. While adjudicators who emphasize the primacy of legal text should have no intrinsic objections to workarounds as such, adjudicators who place significant weight on fidelity to the purposes or functions of legal rules (or rule systems) should embrace an anti-workaround presumption. But this presumption can and should be overcome in certain cases. Most significantly - and perhaps most controversially—we argue that the anti-workaround presumption should give way when the obstacle that the challenged workaround would sidestep is itself inconsistent with the larger purposes of the rule system. The question should not be whether the alleged workaround, viewed in isolation, is inconsistent with the purposes of the relevant rules, but whether the combination of obstacle and workaround, considered together, is more inconsistent with the purposes of those rules than the obstacle standing alone. Therefore, even strong purposivists might embrace certain workarounds—including workarounds to the Senate filibuster, the statutory debt ceiling, and the Electoral College.

Every year for the last umpteen years (I’ve lost count), shortly before or shortly after Transparency International releases its annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and associated repor…

West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency1 is the Supreme Court’s most important administrative law decision in decades. The opinion’s significance is due principally to the Court’s embrace of an aggressive version of the so-called “major questions doctrine” (MQD), which appears to require unusually explicit statutory authorization before agencies may undertake “major” regulatory actions. The West Virginia Court claims that this strong MQD is based on longstanding precedent, and that its use has salutary effects on the policymaking process. Neither claim is accurate. In Part I of this Article, we show that the strong version of the MQD embraced by the West Virginia Court is in fact relatively new; the extent of the doctrinal innovation is obscured by the fact that the MQD label has been unhelpfully attached to several related but distinct interpretive techniques, which we disentangle. In Part II, we turn to the impact of this new MQD on the policymaking process, focusing in particular on democratic accountability. While the MQD’s proponents claim that this doctrine protects separation-of-powers principles and the prerogatives of Congress, in fact the new MQD is more likely to weaken democratic accountability by shifting power from the elected branches to the courts, undermining transparency, and exacerbating the already excessive tendency toward minoritarian obstruction in Congress. The West Virginia Court’s aggressive MQD would likely have other effects; perhaps most importantly, this version of the MQD makes it much more difficult for the federal government to address new problems under broadly worded statutes. Both the MQD’s supporters and its detractors anticipate that the doctrine will result in less, and less aggressive, federal regulation. For purposes of this Article, though, our critique of the MQD focuses less on its impact on policy outcomes (though we think this is very important), and more on the impact of the MQD on the policymaking process, especially the extent to which the MQD makes that process less democratic.

Os economistas fizeram grandes progressos na compreensão dos incentivos e do comportamento dos agentes que operam fora dos mercados econômicos tradicionais, incluindo eleitores, legisladores e burocratas. Os incentivos e o comportamento dos juízes, no entanto, permanecem em grande parte incertos. Os juízes atuam como executores neutros de decisões substantivas tomadas por terceiros? Os juízes são legisladores “comuns”, que dão sequência a quaisquer resultados favoráveis, sem qualquer consideração especial pela lei como tal? Estudos recentes começaram a explorar concepções com mais nuances de como o direito, as evidências e as preferências judiciais podem interagir para influenciar as decisões judiciais. Este trabalho desenvolve uma perspectiva de julgamento que pode ser entendida como a manifestação moderna do Realismo Jurídico Americano, um movimento jurisprudencial de advogados, juízes e professores de direito que floresceu no início do século XX. O objetivo deste ensaio é introduzir, de forma simplificada, o relato realista de decisões judiciais; contrastar esta visão com teorias alternativas sobre direito e julgamento; e esboçar como uma integração mais explícita dos insights conceituais dos Realistas sobre direito e comportamento judicial poderia enriquecer o trabalho econômico em rápida expansão neste campo.

Systemic corruption in developing countries often seems intractable. Yet most countries that currently have relatively high public integrity were, at an earlier point in their history, afflicted with pervasive corruption. Studying the history of these countries may therefore make a valuable contribution to modern debates about anticorruption reform. This paper considers the experience of the United States, focusing principally on the period between 1865 and 1941. We find that the U.S. experience calls into question a number of commonly-held views about the struggle against corruption in modern developing countries. First, although some argue that entrenched cultures of corruption are virtually impossible to dislodge, the U.S. experience demonstrates that it is possible to make a transition from a systemically corrupt political system to a system in which public corruption is aberrational. Second, although some have argued that tackling systemic corruption requires a “big bang” approach, the U.S. transition away from systemic corruption would be better characterized as incremental, uneven, and slow. Third, although some have argued that fighting corruption requires shrinking the state, in the U.S. reductions in systemic corruption coincided with a substantial expansion of government size and power. Fourth, some commentators have argued that “direct” anticorruption measures that emphasize monitoring and punishment do not do much good in societies where corruption is pervasive. On this point, the lessons from U.S. history are more nuanced. Institutional reforms played a key role in the U.S. fight against corruption, but investigations and prosecutions of corrupt actors were also crucial, not only because of deterrence effects, but because these enforcement efforts signaled a broader shift in political norms. Progress against corruption in the United States involved a combination of “direct strategies,” such as aggressive law enforcement, and “indirect strategies,” such as civil service reform and other institutional changes.

The Congressional Review Act (CRA) authorizes fast-track procedures for resolutions disapproving agency rules. The near-universal assumption is that the CRA is relevant only when a new President seeks, with the support of Congress, to cancel regulations promulgated during the previous administration. Yet the CRA has substantially greater unrealized potential. When the agency, the President, and congressional majorities agree on their preferred interpretation of a statute, they can secure formal legislative endorsement of this interpretation through the following two-step maneuver: first, the agency promulgates an interpretive rule that construes the statute to have the opposite of the meaning the agency actually wants--for example, by interpreting a statute to prohibit a regulation that the agency would like to adopt. Next, Congress and the President use the CRA to disapprove that interpretive rule--thus establishing, via a formal exercise of legislative power, that the statute has the meaning the agency rule rejected. This double-negative maneuver would be a lawful way for the Executive and Legislative Branches to clarify, or even to change, statutory law in a manner that bypasses the filibuster and other legislative roadblocks. This Article develops this legal argument and also discusses the practical, political, and normative implications of this novel use of the CRA.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows are at a low point as a result of not only the COVID-19 pandemic but also restrictive FDI policies adopted in recent years. Investment facilitation has gained in importance as a set of practical measures to increase the transparency and predictability of investment frameworks and promote cooperation to advance development. Investment facilitation can help to reduce the transactional and administrative costs faced by foreign investors and contribute to a resilient and sustainable economic recovery. Discussions on a distinct set of investment facilitation policies and measures have gained momentum in recent years. Negotiations are undertaken at the bilateral and regional levels, for example, in the context of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) or the Sustainable Investment Protocol of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). Another important initiative is underway among members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) which are negotiating an Investment Facilitation Framework for Development. This article develops a set of key recommendations for policy-makers on how investment facilitation frameworks can be designed to help attract sustainable FDI for sustainable development and recovery in general. These recommendations can be summarized in three guiding principles: contribute directly to sustainable development, focus on conflict prevention and management, and learn from experiences from other processes such as trade facilitation.

This article proposes that the U.S. Senate adopt a “popular-majoritarian cloture rule,” under which a motion to close debate and proceed to a final vote would carry if but only if supported by a majority of Senators who collectively represent a larger share of the population than those Senators in opposition. This rule, which would be a constitutional exercise of the Senate’s power to set the rules of its proceedings, would make the body more democratic and more functional, and would be preferable both to the current filibuster rule and to simple majority rule.

The Congressional Review Act gives Congress the power to disapprove of agency rules by simple majority vote. It could provide a way around the filibuster to keep the existing program for dreamers in place

‪C Wathne, MC Stephenson, 2021‬ - ‪Cited by 1‬

‪MC Stephenson‬, ‪Yale J. on Reg., 2021‬

Corruption is widely believed to be a self-reinforcing phenomenon, in the sense that the incentive to engage in corrupt acts increases as corruption becomes more widespread. Some argue that corruption's self-reinforcing property necessarily implies that incremental anticorruption reforms cannot be effective, and that the only way to escape a high-corruption equilibrium “trap” is through a so-called “big bang” or “big push.” However, corruption's self-reinforcing property does not logically entail the necessity of a big bang approach to reform. Indeed, corruption's self-reinforcing property may strengthen the case for pursuing sustained, cumulative incremental reforms. While there may be other reasons to prefer a big bang approach to an incremental approach, this conclusion cannot be grounded solely or primarily on corruption's self-reinforcing character.

As part of the global effort to combat public corruption, anti-money laundering laws require financial institutions and other entities to conduct enhanced scrutiny on so-called “politically exposed persons” (PEPs)–mainly senior government officials, along with their family members and close associates. Unfortunately, the current system for identifying PEPs–which depends entirely on a combination of self-identification, in-house checks, and external private vendors that rely on searches of publicly available source material–is both inefficient and in some cases inaccurate. We therefore propose the creation of a global PEP database, organized and overseen by an inter-governmental body. This database would be populated with data compiled by national governments, drawing primarily on the data those governments already collect pursuant to existing financial declaration systems for public officials. A global PEP database along the lines we propose has the potential to make PEP identification more accurate and more efficient, reducing overall compliance costs and allowing compliance resources to be used more productively.

In 2018, Ukraine established a High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC). Ukrainian civil society groups, with the crucial support of the international community, pushed for this specialised court as a way to address the ineffectiveness of Ukraine’s regular courts in addressing high-level corruption. The HACC’s most distinctive institutional feature is the role of international experts in the judicial selection process, intended to safeguard against the capture of the HACC by corrupt elites.

Given the well-documented risks associated with anonymous companies, there’s no longer any serious question that governments should collect accurate information on companies’ “ultimate beneficial owners” (UBOs), and should make this information available to law enforcement and entities conducting due diligence.

The Philippines’ Sandiganbayan is the oldest specialised anti-corruption court in the world. Though established mainly to resolve corruption cases more expeditiously, the Sandiganbayan is plagued by delays and inefficiency. This concern prompted recent legislative reforms and has led to calls for other changes as well, including procedural reforms such as further narrowing its jurisdiction, limiting postponements, improving case management, and introducing “continuous trials” rather than scheduling a series of piecemeal hearings stretched out over a long period of time. This brief is part of a series of case studies on special anti-corruption courts. The case studies discuss the courts’ design and whether they have lived up to the expectations that led to their establishment. We draw lessons for their particular country context, but also specialisation of courts more generally. These case studies will be complemented by a forthcoming issue paper discussing and comparing specialised anti-corruption courts around the world.

In 2003 Slovakia established a Special Court, subsequently renamed the Special Criminal Court (SCC), principally for corruption and organised crime cases. The SCC was a response to the domination of the ordinary lower courts by criminal networks and local elites. The SCC attracted considerable criticism from the judicial establishment, due mainly to the higher compensation for SCC judges, but it survived both political and constitutional challenges, albeit in a slightly modified form. Although the SCC has been effective in addressing organised crime and local-level corruption cases, it has issued very few convictions for high-level corruption involving the national elite. Many lay the blame for this situation on the prosecutors rather than on the SCC itself. This brief is part of a series of case studies on special anti-corruption courts. The case studies discuss the court’s design and whether they have lived up to the expectations that led to their establishment. We draw lessons for their particular country context, but also specialisation of courts more generally. These case studies will be complemented by a forthcoming issue paper discussing and comparing specialised anti-corruption courts around the world.

Constitutional theorists usually assume that minority-protective judicial review leads to outcomes more favorable to the protected minority and less favorable to the majority. Our analysis highlights an indirect effect of judicial review that complicates this conventional wisdom. Without judicial review, pro-majority and pro-minority leaders adopt different policies. Because judicial review limits the degree to which pro-majority leaders can adopt anti-minority policies, it becomes easier for pro-minority leaders to ‘mimic’ pro-majority leaders by adopting the most anti-minority policy that the judiciary would uphold. Furthermore, if judicial invalidation of anti-minority policies is probabilistic rather than certain, pro-majority leaders may propose even more extreme anti-minority policies in order to deter pro-minority leaders from mimicking. These effects can sometimes nullify, or even reverse, the assumed relationship between minority-protective judicial review and pro-minority outcomes. When such reversal occurs, majoritarian democrats should favor minority-protective judicial review, while those concerned with protecting unpopular minorities should oppose it.

What makes the control of corruption so difficult and contested? Drawing on the insights of political science, economics and law, the expert contributors to this book offer diverse perspectives.

This essay discusses the development of a Legislation and Regulation course (or Leg-Reg) as part of a 1L curriculum reform that the Harvard Law School faculty unanimously adopted in 2006. The reform was adopted following three years of work by a Committee on Educational Innovations appointed by then-Dean Elena Kagan and chaired by future Dean Martha Minow. The Leg-Reg piece of the new curriculum aims to broaden the 1L program's perspective from the essential, but by today's standards incomplete, focus on private law topics and common law reasoning that had dominated the 1L curriculum since 1873. Leg-Reg instead focuses on statutes and the regulations that implement them. The course emphasizes not only the interpretation of those materials, but also the lawmaking process, institutional context, and political dynamics that shape the production and interpretation of statutes and regulations. This essay discusses several aspects of the Harvard experience with Legislation and Regulation. First, because reforming the 1L curriculum is such a daunting process, the paper provides a brief account of the extensive curricular reform process that successfully produced this and two other new 1L courses. Second, the essay discusses the course's strategy for fitting novel and somewhat different techniques, materials, and concepts into a 1L course. In particular, it will discuss the fact that, while the Leg-Reg incorporates many topics and methods that are touched on only tangentially, if at all, in other 1L courses (such as textual exegesis, legislative procedure, and public choice theory), it does so primarily by asking students (a) to learn and assess concrete, real-world legal decisions and then (b) to build out, through note material, to the broader concepts implicated by the cases. In addition, the version of the Leg-Reg course developed at Harvard is consciously transsubstantive, rather than focused on a particular policy area. Third, this essay elaborates on this pedagogical approach by giving some detail about the way Leg-Reg presents certain key cases on statutory interpretation. Fourth, the essay examines the administrative law (“Reg”) component of the course. In particular, the essay explains how starting with statutory interpretation addresses the often-voiced concern that administrative law is simply too complicated for 1Ls. This part of the essay also discusses the impact of 1L Leg-Reg course on enrollments in Administrative Law and related public law offerings.

We show that nonbinding law can have a constraining effect on political leaders, because legal compliance is a costly signal to imperfectly informed voters that the leader is unbiased. Moreover, nonbinding law can also have a liberating effect, enabling some leaders to take action when they otherwise would have done nothing. In addition, we illustrate how voters may face a trade-off between the legal standard that induces optimal behavior of the current leader (i.e., that most effectively addresses the moral hazard problem) and the legal standard that optimizes selection of future leaders (i.e., that most effectively addresses the adverse selection problem). We discuss a range of positive and normative implications that follow from our analysis.

Keynote Address, International Bar Association Conference on "The Fight Against Corruption in Latin America".

Although ensuring the “accountability” of agents to their principals is widely considered a core objective of institutional design, recent work in political economy has identified and elucidated an important class of situations in which effective accountability mechanisms can decrease, rather than increase, an agent’s likelihood of acting in her principal’s interests. The problem, which we call “over-accountability,” is essentially an information problem: sometimes even a fully rational but imperfectly informed principal (e.g., the citizens) will reward “bad” actions rather than “good” actions by an agent (e.g. the President). In these cases, not only do accountability mechanisms fail to remedy the agency problem inherent in representative government, they actually make the problem worse. This Article offers a conceptual and empirical overview of over-accountability problems, and also considers a range of potential solutions. By surveying both the distortions themselves and a range of possible responses, this article aspires to assist both public law scholars and institutional reformers in producing more effective solutions.

It is often asserted that separation of legislative powers tends to make legislation both more moderate (because concessions to all veto players are needed to secure enactment) and less frequent (because sufficient concessions are sometimes infeasible). The formal analysis in this article shows this claim to be incomplete and sometimes incorrect. Although greater separation of powers makes legislation more difficult to enact, it also makes legislation, once enacted, more difficult to repeal. Attenuating the threat of repeal means that when one faction has sufficient power to push through extreme policies, it is more likely to do so than would be the case if legislative power were more concentrated. These two effects cut in opposite directions, and it is difficult to say, as a general matter, which will predominate. Indeed, increasing the fragmentation of legislative power may sometimes increase both the expected frequency and the expected extremism of legislative enactments.

Keynote Address, Conference on "A New Era for Public Sector Reform in the ASEAN Community

It is generally assumed that the Constitution requires the Senate to vote to confirm the President’s nominees to principal federal offices. This Essay argues, to the contrary, that when the President nominates an individual to a principal executive branch position, the Senate’s failure to act on the nomination within a reasonable period of time can and should be construed as providing the Senate’s tacit or implied advice and consent to the appointment. On this understanding, although the Senate can always withhold its constitutionally required consent by voting against a nominee, the Senate cannot withhold its consent indefinitely through the expedient of failing to vote on the nominee one way or the other. Although this proposal seems radical, and certainly would upset longstanding assumptions, the Essay argues that this reading of the Appointments Clause would not contravene the constitutional text, structure, or history. The Essay further argues that, at least under some circumstances, reading the Constitution to construe Senate inaction as implied consent to an appointment would have desirable consequences in light of deteriorating norms of Senate collegiality and of prompt action on presidential nominations.

Keynote Address, Conference on "Evidence-Based Anti-Corruption Policies"

Constitutional theorists usually assume that minority-protective judicial review leads to outcomes more favorable to the protected minority and less favorable to the majority. Our analysis highlights three effects of judicial review that complicate, and sometimes undermine, this conventional wisdom. First, judicial review can induce a shift from a separating equilibrium—in which pro-majority leaders and pro-minority leaders pursue different policies—to a semiseparating or pooling equilibrium in which pro-minority leaders sometimes mimic pro-majority leaders by adopting the most anti-minority policy that the judiciary would uphold. Second, if judicial invalidation of anti-minority policies is probabilistic rather than certain, pro-majority leaders may propose even more extreme anti-minority policies in order to deter pro-minority leaders from mimicking. Third, if voters cannot directly observe policy outcomes, the nminority-protective judicial review may create incentives for a leader to signal (or con-ceal) her type by provoking judicial reversal. These effects can sometimes nullify, oreven reverse, the assumed relationship between minority-protective judicial review and pro-minority outcomes. When such reversal occurs, majoritarian democrats should favor minority-protective judicial review, while those concerned with protecting un-popular minorities should oppose it.

Formal Rulemaking and Judicial Review: Protecting Jobs and the Economy with Greater Regulatory Transparency and Accountability: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial & Admin. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 112-49 (2011)(statement of Matthew C. Stephenson).