Faculty Bibliography

In new research, Alma Cohen finds that the political affiliations of Circuit Court judges influence decisions in a much wider variety of cases than previously thought.

It has been suggested that the use of gendered language reinforces gendered stereotypes and influences behaviour. This column investigates whether the performance of women was affected when more gender-neutral language was introduced to Israeli standardised college entrance exams. The use of more gender-neutral language is associated with a significant improvement in performance on quantitative questions, where women are stereotypically perceived as underperforming, without negative effects on the performance of men.

This paper seeks to contribute to the long-standing debate on the extent to which the ideology of federal circuit court judges, as proxied by the party of the president nominating them, can help to predict case outcomes. To this end, I combine and analyze a novel dataset containing about 670,000 circuit court cases from 1985 to 2020. I show that the political affiliation of judges is associated with outcomes, and thus can help to predict them, throughout the vast universe of circuit court cases – and not only in the ideologically contested cases on which prior empirical research has focused. In particular, I find an association between political affiliation and outcomes in each of six categories of cases in which the two litigating parties could be perceived by judges to have unequal power. In each of these six case categories, which together add up to more than 550,000 cases, the more Democratic judges a panel has, the higher the odds of the panel siding with the seemingly weaker party. Furthermore, I identify evidence of polarization over time in circuit court decisions. Consistent with such growing polarization, in the important subset of published cases, the identified patterns are more pronounced in the last two decades of the examined period than earlier. Going beyond the very large sample of cases with parties of seemingly of unequal power, I identify how political affiliation can help to predict outcomes in most of the cases outside this sample. In particular, I show that panels with more Democratic judges are less likely than panels with less Democratic judges to defer to the lower-court decision in civil cases between private parties that seem to be of equal power. Altogether, my analysis shows that political affiliation can help to predict outcomes in over 90% of circuit court cases. Overall, my results highlight the pervasiveness with which – and the array of ways through which – the political affiliation of judges can help to predict the outcome of circuit court cases.

Disclosure-based nudges are increasingly utilized by governments around the world to achieve policy goals related to health, safety, employment, environmental protection, retirement savings, credit, debt, and more. Yet, a critical aspect of these nudge-type policy interventions—the mode of communication—remains unexplored. We study the effects of the communication medium on debt collection procedures, using a policy experiment conducted in cooperation with the Israeli Ministry of Justice. Debtors often lack adequate information about the debt, the judgment, and the enforcement and collection procedures. As a result, the process of debt collection is often harmful to the debtor and ineffective in securing repayment. We manipulate the choice of medium--telephone, regular mail, text message, and video message--holding fixed the content of the communication. We find that digital communication strategies, in particular, communicating via text message, were the most cost-effective, significantly improving the outcomes for both debtors and creditors.

To compare post-operative vocal outcomes of a voice rest regimen versus no voice restrictions following micro-laryngeal surgery for benign glottic lesions.

The gender gap in corporate America is increasingly well documented, but the literature has not yet examined how a CEO’s political preferences might be associated with gender equality in the executive suite. Focusing on the US, this column compares the fraction of a CEO’s political contributions that went to Republican, rather than Democratic, candidates and the gender balance among top executives (excluding the CEO). Companies run by a CEO who only donates to Democrats employ a 15–25% higher fraction of women in the executive suite than those run by CEOs who only donate to Republicans.

Individuals who engage in “judging” – that is, render a determination in a dispute or contest between two parties – might be influenced by public pressure to favor one of the parties. Many rules and arrangements seek to insulate such individuals from public pressure or to address the effects of such pressure. We study this subject empirically, investigating the circumstances in which public pressure is more and less likely to affect judging. Using detailed data from the Bundesliga, Germany’s top soccer league, our analysis of how crowd pressure affects the decisions of referees yields two key insights. First, we show that crowd pressure biases referee’s decisions in favor of the home team for those decisions that cannot be unambiguously identified as erroneous but not for those decisions that can. In particular, referees exhibit a bias in favor of the home team with respect to more subjective decisions such as the showing of yellow cards (cautions), which is based on the referee’s judgment call, but not with respect to more objective decisions such as validating goals and awarding penalty kicks, where live TV coverage often allows for objective identification of errors. Second, we show that the effect of crowd pressure on referee decisions depends on the extent to which such pressure is viewed by the referee as understandable or reasonable (or even justified).Specifically, a referee’s bias in favor of the home team in yellow card issuance is strengthened after the referee makes an objectively identifiable error against the home team and thus might view crowd heckling as understandable. This effect is stronger when the referee’s error is costlier to the home team because the game is more important or the error is more consequential due to the closeness of the game at the time of the error. The introduction of VAR (Video Assisted Referee) technology in 2017 and Covid-19, which caused games to be played without crowds for the second part of the 2019-20 season allows us to test our results under three different regimes (pre-VAR, post-VAR, and post-VAR but without any crowd).Inspection of the results under these three different regimes serves to reinforce them. As expected, VAR reduces the number of referee errors, but the pattern of no bias with respect to errors is preserved. VAR has no effect on the number of yellow cards. Once the crowd disappears, so does the home advantage in field goals. Referee errors are unaffected, but the home bias with respect to yellow cards disappears as well. This confirms the effect that the crowd has on referee’s more subjective decisions.

We investigate whether CEOs' political preferences are associated with the prevalence and compensation of women among non-CEO top executives at U.S. public companies. We find that "Democratic" CEOs are associated with more women in the executive suite. To explore causality, we use an event study approach to show that replacing a Republican with a Democratic CEO increases female representation. Additionally, we discuss how the lack of an association between CEO political preferences and gender diversity in the boardroom influences our interpretation of these results. Finally, gender gaps in the level and performance-sensitivity of compensation diminish, or disappear, under Democratic CEOs.

This article studies the political preferences of chief executive officers (CEOs) of public companies. We use Federal Election Commission records to compile a comprehensive database of the political contributions made by more than 3800 individuals who served as CEOs of Standard & Poor’s 1500 companies between 2000 and 2017. We find a substantial preference for Republican candidates. We identify how this pattern is related to the company’s industry, region, and CEO gender. In addition, we show that companies led by Republican CEOs tend to be less transparent to investors with respect to their political spending. Finally, we discuss the policy implications of our analysis.

Racial and gender disparities are prevalent in the criminal justice system, but the sources of these disparities remain largely unknown. This paper investigates whether judge political affiliation contributes to these disparities using data on over 500,000 federal defendants linked to sentencing judge. Exploiting random case assignment, we find that Republican appointed judges sentence black defendants to 3.0 more months than similar non-blacks and female defendants to 2.1 fewer months than similar males, compared to Democratic appointed judges. Disparities by judge political affiliation cannot be explained by other judge characteristics and grow substantially larger when judges are granted more discretion.

This paper experimentally investigates the effect of gender-based affirmative action (AA) on performance in the lab, focusing on a tournament environment. The tournament is based on GRE math questions commonly used in graduate school admission, and at which women are known to perform worse on average than men. We find heterogeneous effect of AA on female participants: AA lowers the performance of high-ability women and increases the performance of low-ability women. Our results are consistent with two possible mechanisms—one is that AA changes incentives differentially for low- and high-ability women, and the second is that AA triggers stereotype threat.Bracha

Insurance companies use credit score to predict auto insurance risk. The theory being that people who are irresponsible in handling their finance, might also be irresponsible drivers. As a result, in states which ban discrimination based on credit score one would expect to see more fatal car accidents. In this study we seek to estimate the effect of introducing laws that prohibit credit score discrimination on the number of traffic fatalities, taking a standard differences-in-differences approach and using data on traffic fatalities from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS). We find that prohibiting credit score discrimination is likely to not have an impact on insureds’ primary behavior. Specifically, we find that in the first few years after the introduction of a law prohibiting credit score discrimination, there is a statistically insignificant increase in the number of traffic fatalities. Because the increase is not statistically significant we interpret the results as suggestive only.

When agents with a significant risk of termination in the short term have discretion over project selection, they may have incentives to underinvest in projects whose results would be realized only in the long term, and owners may take this agency problem into account when deciding whether to grant those agents discretion in decision-making. Because NBA rookies who participate in games gain NBA experience that likely improves their long-term performance, decisions of NBA teams about whether to let rookies play provide a useful context for investigating this potential agency problem. We develop a model that identifies when owners will choose to leave coaches with discretion over rookie participation decisions and shows that, in the presence of such discretion, coaches facing a higher termination risk can be expected to use rookies less often. Testing our model using NBA data, we find evidence that is consistent with the predictions of our model (JEL D20, J44, K00, L83).

Cohen and Wang (2013) (CW2013) provide evidence consistent with market participants perceiving staggered boards to be value reducing. Amihud and Stoyanov (2016) (AS2016) contests these findings, reporting some specifications under which the results are not statistically significant. We show that the results retain their significance under a wide array of robustness tests that address the concerns expressed by AS2016. Our empirical findings reinforce the conclusions of CW2013.

We analyze how the rise of institutional investors has transformed the governance landscape. While corporate ownership is now concentrated in the hands of institutional investors that can exercise stewardship of those corporations that would be impossible for dispersed shareholders, the investment managers of these institutional investors have agency problems vis-à-vis their own investors. We develop an analytical framework for examining these agency problems and apply it to study several key types of investment managers. We analyze how the investment managers of mutual funds - both index funds and actively managed funds - have incentives to under-spend on stewardship and to side excessively with managers of corporations. We show that these incentives are especially acute for managers of index funds, and that the rise of such funds has system-wide adverse consequences for corporate governance. Activist hedge funds have substantially better incentives than managers of index funds or active mutual funds, but their activities do not provide a complete solution for the agency problems of institutional investors. Our analysis provides a framework for future work on institutional investors and their agency problems, and generates insights on a wide range of policy questions. We discuss implications for disclosure by institutional investors; regulation of their fees; stewardship codes; the rise of index investing; proxy advisors; hedge funds; wolf pack activism; and the allocation of power between corporate managers and shareholders.

This note offers an initial response to a study released earlier this month by Martijn Cremers and Simone Sepe, “Board Declassification Activism: The Financial Value of the Shareholder Rights Project.” Putting aside methodological questions about their analysis and accepting their results “as is,” we show that the results of this study do not provide a basis for opposing board declassifications. Appropriately interpreted, the results provide some significant evidence that declassifications are beneficial and no evidence that they are value-reducing. The results obtained for preceding years in prior published work by the authors either do not hold or are substantially reversed in the period examined by the current study. Overall, the results of the current study contradict and undermine the conclusions in the authors’ earlier published work in support of staggered boards.

In a paper published in the JFE in 2013, we provided evidence that market participants perceive staggered boards to be on average value-reducing. In a recent response paper, Amihud and Stoyanov (2015) “contest” our results. They advocate using alternative methods for estimating risk-adjusted returns and excluding some observations from our sample. Amihud and Stoyanov claim that making such changes renders our results not significant (though retaining their direction) and conclude that staggered boards have no significant effect on firm value. This paper examines and replies to the Amihud-Stoyanov challenge. We question their methodological claims, study the consequences of following their suggestions, and conduct additional robustness tests. Our analysis shows that the evidence is overall consistent with the results and conclusions of our JFE paper.

When a significant event occurs at a publicly traded company, federal law requires the firm to disclose this information to investors in a securities filing known as a Form 8-K. But the firm need not disclose immediately; instead, SEC rules give companies four business days after the event occurs within which to file an 8-K. These rules thus create a period during which market-moving information is known by those inside the firm but not most public-company investors — a period we call the “8-K trading gap.” In this Article, we study how corporate insiders trade their company’s stock during the 8-K trading gap. We develop a unique dataset of 15,419 Form 8-Ks with trades by insiders during this gap. We identify systematic abnormal returns of 42 basis points on average, per trade, from trades by insiders during the 8-K gap. When insiders engage in an unusual transaction during the gap — open-market purchases of their own company’s stock — they earn even larger abnormal returns of 163 basis points. We also show that, when they engage in such purchases, insiders are correct about the directional impact of the 8-K filing more often than not — and that the probability that this finding is the product of random chance is virtually zero. To examine whether it is the expertise of the insiders, or the value associated with the information, that drives insider returns, we then focus on a type of 8-K that reveals positive information: those that announce new agreements with the company’s business partners. We show, without reference to any specific insider transaction, that a trading strategy of buying on the date such an agreement is struck and selling immediately before the agreement is disclosed yields, on average, abnormal returns of 35.4 basis points. We also demonstrate that insiders are more likely to engage in open market purchases of their own company’s stock when the firm is about to reveal new agreements with customers and suppliers. In light of the potential concerns raised by these findings, lawmakers should reconsider the effects of information-forcing rules such as those governing Form 8-K on the incidence and profitability of trading by insiders.

This paper provides experimental evidence on the effect of affirmative action (AA). In particular, we investigate whether affirmative action has a ”stereotype threat effect” – that is, whether AA cues a negative stereotype that leads individuals to conform to the stereotype and adversely affects their performance. Stereotype threat has been shown in the literature to be potentially significant for individuals who identify strongly with the domain of the stereotype and who engage in complex stereotype-relevant tasks. We therefore explore this question in the context of gender-based AA for a complex math task. In this context, the stereotype is most relevant for women with high math ability, and the stereotype threat effects can be expected to work in the opposite direction to AA’s competition effect that encourages women to compete. We find that, consistent with the presence of a stereotype threat, AA has an overall negative effect on the performance of high-ability women performing complex math tasks.

We seek to contribute to an understanding of how judicial elections affect the incentives and decisions of judges. We develop a theoretical model suggesting that judges who are concerned about their reputation will tend to decide against their prior decisions as they approach elections. That is, judges who imposed a large number of severe sentences in the past and are thus perceived to be strict will tend to impose less severe sentences prior to elections. Conversely, judges who imposed a large number of light sentences in the past and are thus perceived to be lenient will tend to impose more severe sentences prior to elections. Using data from the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, we test, and find evidence consistent with, the predictions of our model.

Golden parachutes (GPs) have attracted substantial attention from investors and public officials for more than two decades. We find that GPs are associated with higher expected acquisition premiums and that this association is at least partly due to the effect of GPs on executive incentives. However, we also find that firms that adopt GPs experience negative abnormal stock returns both during and subsequent to the period surrounding their adoption. This finding raises the possibility that even though GPs facilitate some value-increasing acquisitions, they do have, on average, an overall negative effect on shareholder wealth; this effect could be due to GPs weakening the force of the market for control and thereby increasing managerial slack, and/or to GPs making it attractive for executives to go along with some value-decreasing acquisitions that do not serve shareholders' long-term interests. Our findings have significant implications for ongoing debates on GPs and suggest the need for additional work identifying the types of GPs that drive the identified correlation between GPs and reduced shareholder value.

The correlation between governance indices and abnormal returns documented for 1990-1999 subsequently disappeared. The correlation and its disappearance are both due to market participants' gradually learning to appreciate the difference between good-governance and poor-governance firms. Consistent with learning, the correlation's disappearance was associated with increases in market participants' attention to governance; market participants and security analysts were, until the beginning of the 2000s but not subsequently, more positively surprised by the earning announcements of good-governance firms; and, although governance indices no longer generated abnormal returns during the 2000s, their negative association with firm value and operating performance persisted.

Using panel data on over 300,000 Israeli women from 1999 to 2005, we exploit variation in Israel's child subsidy to identify the impact of changes in the price of a marginal child on fertility. We find a positive, statistically significant, and economically meaningful price effect on overall fertility and, consistent with Becker (1960) and Becker and Tomes (1976), a small effect of income on fertility, which is negative at low and positive at high income levels. We also find a price effect on fertility among older women, suggesting that part of the overall effect is due to a reduction in total fertility.

This paper studies a unique panel dataset of transactions with repeat customers of an insurer that operates in a market in which insurers are not required by law or contract to share information about their customers’ records. This dataset is used to test the asymmetric learning hypothesis under which sellers obtain private information about repeat customers and this learning allows them to make higher profits from transactions with repeat customers. Consistent with this learning hypothesis, I find that the insurer in my dataset makes higher profits in transactions with repeat customers who have a good claims history with the insurer – customers about whom the insurer has positive private information not shared by other insurers; that the insurer provides these repeat customers with a reduction in premiums that is lower than the reduction in expected costs associated with such customers; and that policyholders who have bad claim histories with the insurer are more likely to flee their record by switching to other insurers.

While staggered boards have been documented to be negatively correlated with firm valuation, such association might be due to staggered boards either bringing about lower firm value or merely reflecting the tendency of low-value firms to have staggered boards. In this paper, we use two natural experiments to shed light on the causality question. In particular, we focus on two recent court rulings, separated by several weeks, that affected in opposite directions the antitakeover force of staggered boards: (i) a ruling by the Delaware Chancery Court approving the legality of shareholder-adopted bylaws that weaken the antitakeover force of a staggered board by moving the company's annual meeting up from later parts of the calendar year to January, and (ii) the subsequent decision by the Delaware Supreme Court to overturn the Chancery Court ruling and invalidate such bylaws. We find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the Chancery Court ruling increased the value of affected companies - namely, companies with a staggered board and an annual meeting in later parts of the calendar year - and that the Supreme Court ruling produced a reduction in the affected companies' value. The identified effects were most pronounced for firms for which control contests are especially relevant due to relative underperformance, small firm size, high asset pledgibility, or high takeover intensity in their industry. Our findings have implications for the long-standing debate on staggered boards. The findings are consistent with the market's viewing staggered boards as bringing about a reduction in firm value. Our findings are thus consistent with leading institutional investors' policies in favor of board de-staggering, and with the view that the ongoing process of board de-staggering in public firms can be expected to enhance shareholder value.

This article reviews and evaluates the empirical literature on adverse selection in insurance markets. We focus on empirical work that seeks to test the basic coverage-risk prediction of adverse selection theory - that is, that policyholders who purchase more insurance coverage tend to be riskier. The analysis of this body of work, we argue, indicates that whether such a correlation exists varies across insurance markets and pools of insurance policies. We discuss various reasons why a coverage-risk correlation may not be found in some pools of insurance policies. The presence of a coverage-risk correlation can be explained either by moral hazard or adverse selection, and we discuss methods for distinguishing between them. Finally, we review the evidence on learning by policyholders and insurers.

The standard narrative of the meltdown of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers assumes that the wealth of the top executives at these firms was largely wiped out along with their firms. In the ongoing debate about regulatory responses to the financial crisis, commentators have used this assumed fact as a basis for dismissing both the role of compensation structures in inducing risk-taking and the potential value of reforming such structures. This Article provides a case study of compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers during 2000-2008 and concludes that this assumed fact is incorrect. We find that the top-five-executive teams at these firms cashed out large amounts of performance-based compensation during this period. From 2000-2008, they were able to cash out large amounts of bonus compensation that were not clawed back when the firms collapsed, and to pocket large amounts from selling shares. Overall, we estimate that the top executive teams of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers derived cash flows of about $1.4 billion and $1 billion, respectively, from cash bonuses and equity sales during 2000-2008. These cash flows substantially exceeded the value of the executives' initial holdings at the beginning of the period, and the executives' net payoffs for the period were thus decidedly positive. The divergence between how the top executives and their shareholders fared implies that it is not possible to rule out, as standard narratives suggest, that the executives' pay arrangements provided them with excessive risk-taking incentives. We discuss the implications of our analysis for understanding the possible role that pay arrangements have played in the run-up to the financial crisis and how they should be reformed going forward.

We investigate the relative importance of the twenty-four provisions followed by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) and included in the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick governance index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003). We put forward an entrenchment index based on six provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments. We find that increases in the index level are monotonically associated with economically significant reductions in firm valuation as well as large negative abnormal returns during the 1990-2003 period. The other eighteen IRRC provisions not in our entrenchment index were uncorrelated with either reduced firm valuation or negative abnormal returns.

This paper analyzes the choice of deductible in insurance contracts that insure against a risk that, as is common, might materialize more than once during the life of the policy. As was established by Arrow (1963), from the perspective of risk-bearing costs, the optimal contract is one that uses an aggregate deductible that applies to the aggregate losses incurred over the life of the policy. Aggregate deductibles, however, are uncommon in practice. This paper identifies two disadvantages that aggregate deductibles have. Aggregate deductibles are shown to produce higher expected verification costs and moral hazard costs than contracts that apply a per-loss deductible to each loss that occurs. I further show that each of these disadvantages can make an aggregate deductible contact inferior to a contract with per loss deductibles. The results of the analysis can help explain the rare use of aggregate deductibles and, in addition, might explain why umbrella policies that cover all types of losses are rarely used.

This paper investigates empirically how the value of publicly traded firms is affected by arrangements that protect management from removal. Staggered boards, which a majority of U.S. public companies have, substantially insulate boards from removal in either a hostile takeover or a proxy contest. We find that staggered boards are associated with an economically meaningful reduction in firm value (as measured by Tobin's Q). We also provide suggestive evidence that staggered boards bring about, and not merely reflect, an economically significant reduction in firm value. Finally, the correlation with reduced firm value is stronger for staggered boards that are established in the corporate charter (which shareholders cannot amend) than for staggered boards established in the company's bylaws (which shareholders can amend).

This paper tests the predictions of adverse-selection models using data from the automobile insurance market. I find that, in contrast to what recent research suggests, the evidence is consistent with the presence of informational asymmetries in this market: new customers choosing higher insurance coverage are associated with more accidents. Consistent with the possibility of policyholders' learning about their risk type, such a coverage-accidents correlation exists only for policyholders with enough years of driving experience. The informational advantage that new customers with driving experience have over the insurer appears to arise in part from customers' underreporting their past claim history: policyholders switching to new insurers are disproportionately ones with a poor claims history, and new customers tend to underreport their past claims history when joining a new insurer.

This paper investigates the effects of mandatory seat belt laws on driver behavior and traffic fatalities. Using a unique panel data set on seat belt usage in all U.S. jurisdictions, we analyze how such laws, by influencing seat belt use, affect the incidence of traffic fatalities. Allowing for the endogeneity of seat belt usage, we find that such usage decreases overall traffic fatalities. The magnitude of this effect, however, is significantly smaller than the estimate used by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. In addition, we do not find significant support for the compensating-behavior theory, which suggests that seat belt use also has an indirect adverse effect on fatalities by encouraging careless driving. Finally, we identify factors, especially the type of enforcement used, that make seat belt laws more effective in increasing seat belt usage.

This paper empirically investigates the decisions of publicly traded firms where to incorporate. We study the features of states that make them attractive to incorporating firms and the characteristics of firms that determine whether they incorporate in or out of their state of location. We find that states that offer stronger antitakeover protections are substantially more successful both in retaining in-state firms and in attracting out-of-state incorporations. We estimate that, compared with adopting no antitakeover statutes, adopting all standard antitakeover statutes enabled the states that adopted them to more than double the percentage of local firms that incorporated in-state (from 23% to 49%). Indeed, we find no evidence that the incorporation market has even penalized the three states that passed antitakeover statutes widely viewed as detrimental to shareholders. We also find that there is commonly a big difference between a state's ability to attract incorporations from firms located in and out of the state, and we investigate several possible explanations for this home-state advantage. Our findings have significant implications for corporate governance, regulatory competition, and takeover law.