Anu Bradford

Henry L. Shattuck Visiting Professor of Law

Spring 2022

Areeda 131

617-998-0227

Assistant: Caroline Reger / (617) 384-0291

Biography

Anu Bradford is Henry L. Moses Professor of Law and International Organizations at Columbia Law School. She is also a director for Columbia’s European Legal Studies Center and a Senior Scholar at Jerome A. Chazen Institute for Global Business at Columbia Business School.

Bradford’s research focuses on international trade law, European Union law, comparative and international antitrust law, and regulation of the digital economy. Her work has been published in leading peer-reviewed journals, including the Journal of Empirical legal Studies, Journal of Law & Economics, American Law and Economics Review and International Review of Law and Economics, and in law reviews, including The University of Chicago Law Review, Northwestern Law Review and Harvard International Law Journal. Most recently, she is the author of “The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World” (OUP 2020), which was named one of the Best Books of 2020 by Foreign Affairs.

Bradford earned her S.J.D. (2007) and LL.M. (2002) degrees from Harvard Law School and also holds a law degree from the University of Helsinki. After completing her LL.M. studies as a Fulbright Scholar at Harvard Law School, Bradford practiced antitrust law and European Union law at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton in Brussels before returning to Harvard for her doctoral studies. She has also served as an adviser on economic policy in the Parliament of Finland and as an expert assistant to a member of the European Parliament.

Areas of Interest

Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World (2020)
Categories:
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Financial Markets & Institutions
Type: Book
Abstract
The Brussels Effect challenges the prevalent view that the European Union (EU) is a declining world power. It argues that notwithstanding its many obvious challenges, the EU remains an influential superpower that shapes the world in its image through a phenomenon called the “Brussels Effect.” The Brussels Effect refers to the EU’s unilateral power to regulate global markets. Without the need to resort to international institutions or seek other nations’ cooperation, the EU has the unique ability among nations today to promulgate regulations that shape the global business environment, elevating standards worldwide and leading to a notable Europeanization of many important aspects of global commerce. Different from many other forms of global influence, the Brussels Effect entails that the EU does not need to impose its standards coercively on anyone—market forces alone are often sufficient to convert the EU standard into the global standard as multinational companies voluntarily extend the EU rule to govern their global operations. In this way, the EU wields significant, unique, and highly penetrating power to unilaterally transform global markets, including through its ability to set the standards in diverse areas such as competition regulation, data protection, online hate speech, consumer health and safety, or environmental protection.
Anu Bradford, Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Jonathan Zytnick, Is E.U. Merger Control Used for Protectionism? An Empirical Analysis, 15 J. Empirical L. Stud. 165 (2018)
Categories:
Corporate Law & Securities
Sub-Categories:
Antitrust & Competition Law
Type: Article
Abstract
The European Commission has often used its merger-review power to challenge high-profile acquisitions involving non-E.U. companies, giving rise to concerns that its competition authority has evolved into a powerful tool for industrial policy. The Commission has been accused of deliberately targeting foreign—especially U.S.—acquirers, while facilitating the creation of European national champions. These concerns, however, rest on a few famous anecdotes. In this article, we introduce a unique dataset that allows us to provide the first rigorous examination of these claims. Our analysis of the over 5,000 mergers reported to the Commission between 1990 and 2014 reveals no evidence that the Commission has systematically used its authority to protectionist ends. If anything, our results suggest that the Commission is less likely to challenge transactions involving non-E.U. acquirers. Our analysis therefore challenges the common notion of European antitrust protectionism and shifts the burden of proof to those advancing this view.
Anu Bradford & Adam S. Chilton, Trade Openness and Antitrust Law, 62 J. L. Econ. 29 (2019)
Categories:
Corporate Law & Securities
Sub-Categories:
Antitrust & Competition Law
Type: Article
Abstract
Openness to international trade and adoption of antitrust laws can both curb anticompetitive behavior. But scholars have long debated the relationship between the two. Some argue that greater openness to trade makes antitrust laws unnecessary, while others contend that antitrust laws are still needed to realize the benefits of trade liberalization. Limitations of data have made this debate largely theoretical to date. We study the relationship between trade and antitrust regimes empirically using new data on antitrust laws and enforcement activities. We find that openness to trade and stringency of antitrust laws are positively correlated from 1950 to 2010 overall, but the positive correlation disappears in the early 1990s as a large number of countries adopt antitrust laws. However, we find a positive correlation between openness to trade and resources and activities for antitrust enforcement for both early and late adopters of antitrust regimes during this period.

Current Courses

Course Catalog View

Areeda 131

617-998-0227

Assistant: Caroline Reger / (617) 384-0291